UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


Mrs.  SARAH  P.  WALSWORTH. 

Received  October,  1894. 
Accessions  No.\T*fJ&0.-      Class  No. 


RECONCILIATION 


OF 


SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION, 


BY  ALEXANDER  WINCHELL,  LL.D., 

AUTHOR  OF   "  SKETCHES   OF   CREATION,"    "  THE    DOCTRINE    OF  EVOLUTION,"  ETC. 


NEW    YORK: 
HARPER   &   BROTHERS,    PUBLISHERS, 

FRANKLIN     SQUARE. 

1877. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  18T7,  by 

HARPER    &   BROTHERS, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


KITIRSITTI 

i  /*. 


PREFACE. 


WHAT  are  the  natural  relations  between  science  and  religion  ? 
This  is  a  question  in  which  the  public  has  recently  manifested 
a  profound  interest.  On  this  question  a  layman  and  scientific 
teacher  here  ventures  to  offer  some  thoughts.  The  discussions 
in  which  they  are  embodied  aim  to  reach  some  of  the  ground- 
principles  on  which  the  propositions  of  science  and  religion 
alike  rest.  They  enunciate  a  substantial  basis  of  harmony  and 
mutual  helpfulness,  and  disclose  a  promised  synthesis  of  deep- 
est scientific  conviction  and  simplest  religious  faith. 

The  author  has  written  as  he  felt  profoundly  moved  to  write. 
He  has  made  a  record  of  honest  and  earnest  convictions ;  and 
he  flatters  himself  that  his  record  nowhere  betrays  the  spirit 
of  a  partisan. 

The  thoughts  here  presented,  though  lying  generally  beyond 
the  peculiar  domain  of  natural  science,  have  mingled  them- 
selves, by  a  spontaneous  interplay  of  the  psychic  powers,  with 
the  dry  details  and  lofty  generalizations  of  strict  science.  They 
have  been  to  the  author  a  source  of  enjoyment,  consolation, 
and  assurance;  and  he  hopes  they  may  serve  to  ballast  the 
faith  of  others  who  have  less  opportunity  for  reflection,  but 
who  must,  nevertheless,  if  they  think  at  all,  grapple  with  the 
inevitable  and  irrepressible  questions  which  arise  concerning 
the  validity  of  their  religious  beliefs. 

The  author  has  always  entertained  an  unshaken  conviction 
of  the  unity  of  all  truth ;  and  the  right  of  all  our  faculties  to 
activity  within  limits  prescribed  or  sanctioned  by  reason.  He 


iv  PREFACE. 

holds  that  reason  is  the  only  criterion  of  truth,  and  must  even 
arbitrate  the  claims  of  an  assumed  divine  revelation.  He  holds 
that  the  religious  faculties  are  not  cognitive,  but  must  be  served 
by  the  cognitive  faculties ;  and  that,  while  religion  is  spontane- 
ous, its  grounds  may  be  subjected  to  a  rational  authentication. 
He  holds  that  though  history  has  shown  that  ecclesiastical  sys- 
tems unavoidably  incorporate  more  or  less  of  secular  beliefs, 
such  beliefs  are  not  thereby  rendered  sacred  or  essentially  re- 
ligious, and  ought  to  be  modified  or  rejected  according  to  im- 
proved knowledge.  He  holds  that  the  religious  sentiments 
are  co-ordinate  with  the  knowing  faculties,  and  demand  from 
intellect  the  concession  of  a  free  field  for  exercise ;  and  that 
the  phenomena  of  their  activity,  in  the  history  of  our  race, 
afford  the  data  for  an  inductive  philosophy  of  religion.  He 
holds  that  systems  of  science  and  religion  approved  alike  by 
rational  tests  must  be  found  in  complete  harmony ;  and  that 
the  so-called  conflict  between  science  and  religion  is  partly  fic- 
titious, and  partly  a  conflict  between  science  and  religious  or 
ecclesiastical  systems;  while  the  conflict  with  these  systems 
reduces  itself  to  a  collision  between  the  effete  science  which 
they  embody  and  the  results  of  more  advanced  science. 

The  author  likewise  maintains  that  natural  science,  while  af- 
fording the  data  from  which  philosophy  may  reason  to  Deity, 
does  not,  in  its  proper  character,  reach  a  theistic  issue ;  and 
that,  as  a  corollary,  exclusive  physicists  and  biologists  incur 
the  danger  of  overlooking  the  importance  of  supramaterial  and 
transcendental  verities.  He  composes  himself,  nevertheless,  in 
the  conviction  that  no  scientist,  however  exclusive,  can  possi- 
bly reach  a  firm  datum  which  is  not  on  one  of  the  many  lines 
of  ratiocinative  thought  converging  toward  Deity  and  supra- 
material  realities.  He  holds  that  this  position  is  confirmed  by 
the  bearing  of  the  profoundest  results  of  recent  science  and 
the  declarations  of  its  votaries. 

In  these  and  other  dominant  ideas  pervading  the  various 


PREFACE.  V 

papers  assembled  in  this  volume  is  the  disclosure  of  their  es- 
sential unity  and  continuity.  In  reference  to  the  much  mooted 
scientific  question  of  the  derivative  origin  of  species,  the  reader 
will  detect  indications  of  a  growing  faith.  A  certain  class  of 
proofs  has  been  accumulating  at  a  rapid  rate ;  and  the  author's 
present  conviction  is  that  the  doctrine  of  the  derivation  of 
species  should  be  accepted;  and  that  the  most  tenable  theory 
of  the  causes,  instrumentalities,  and  conditions  of  this  deri- 
vation is  that  propounded,  in  1868,  by  Professor  Edward  D. 
Cope. 

These  papers  do  not  represent  the  author's  conception  of  a 
complete  and  systematic  discussion  of  the  relations  of  science 
and  religion.  They  are  rather  separate  outcroppings  of  the  re- 
sults of  much  study  and  reflection,  which  have  correlated  and 
consolidated  themselves  in  the  author's  mind  in  a  broad  under- 
lying system  of  which  no  opportunity  has  presented  itself,  as 
yet,  for  a  fuller  exposition. 

In  the  hope  that  the  reasonings  here  presented  may  prove 
helpful  to  young  persons  engaged  in  the  serious  work  of  fash- 
ioning a  system  of  belief ;  corrective  or  strengthening  to  those 
whose  beliefs  are  matured;  and  admonitory  to  such  as  have 
left  their  beliefs  to  the  control  of  circumstance — to  student, 
theologian,  and  scientist — to  all  thoughtful  persons,  this  essay 
toward  a  good  understanding  between  religion  and  science  is 
cordially  and  respectfully  submitted. 

THE  AUTHOR. 

ANN  ARBOR,  MICHIGAN,  March,  1877. 


CONTENTS. 


THE  INTERACTION  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE  IN- 
TELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 

PAGE 

I.  NECESSARY  RELATIONS  OP  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE  INTELLECTUAL 

FACULTIES 17 

The  Religious  Nature  of  Man 19 

Rise  and  Progress  of  Scientific  Thought 26 

Results  of  the  Interaction  of  these  Forces 36- 

II.  INTERACTION  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE  INTELLECTUAL  FACULTIES 

IN  ORIENTAL  AND  GRECIAN  PSYCHIC  HISTORY 41 

Laws  of  the  Interaction  of  Faith  and  Intellect 42 

Egyptian  Psychic  History 46 

Chinese  Psychic  History 48 

Indian  Psychic  History 51 

Grecian  Psychic  History 55 

III.  INTERACTION  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE  INTELLECTUAL  FACULTIES 

IN  CHRISTIAN  PSYCHIC  HISTORY 66 

First  Psychic  Cycle 66 

Second  Psychic  Cycle 72 

Third  Psychic  Cycle ...  74 

Fourth  Psychic  Cycle 82 


SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  IN  RELIGION. 

IV.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSALITY 87 

1.  Original  Causation 87 

The  Notion  of  Causality 93 

Implications  of  the  Notion  of  Causality 101 

V.  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSALITY — Continued. 120 

2.  Causal  Intermediation 120 

Relation  of  Matter  and  Force 120 

Philosophy  of  Cause  applied  to  Science 134 


viii  CONTENTS. 

PAGH 

VI.  THE  DOCTRINE  OP  INTENTIONALITY 150 

Correlation  in  general 151 

Homology 156 

Fundamental  Types  of  Animals 159 

The  Vertebrate  Type 161 

Membral  Homologies  of  Vertebrates 166 

Cosmical  Homologies 174 

VII.  REASON  FOR  THE  FAITH 178 

Causes  of  Skepticism 179 

I.  The  Necessity  of  some  Religion  is  upon  us 184 

II.  Constructive  or  Deductive  Theistic  Belief 191 

III.  Deductions  from  the  Theistic  Proposition 199 

IV.  The  Christian  Scriptures  answer  to  these  Deductions 203 

V.  Our  Reasonable  Duty 205 

VIII.  THE  CONFLICTS  OF  FAITH 207 

The  Human  Powers  engaged 208 

The  Reconciliation 222 

IX.  THOUGHTS  ON  CAUSALITY,  WITH  REFERENCES  TO  PHASES  OF  RE- 
CENT SCIENCE 231 

X.  Is  GOD  COGNIZABLE  BY  REASON  ? 266 

The  Achievements  of  Greek  Philosophy 271 

Forms  of  Theistic  Proof 292 

XL  GOD  IN  THE  WORLD.  .,  .  304 


GLIMPSES  OF  THE  EVIDENCE,  A  POSTERIORI. 

XII.  GOD  AND  RELIGION  IN  NATURE. — ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  INTENTION- 
ALITY AND  OF  OTHER  BlBLICAL   TEACHING 333 

I.  Manifestations  of  Power  in  Creation 333 

II.  Manifestations  of  -  Intelligence  in  Creation 337 

III.  Manifestations  of  Beneficence  in  Creation 342 

IV.  The  Unity  of  Creation 347 

V.  The  Religious  Nature  of  Man 351 

VI.  Genesis  and  Geology 356 

VII.  The  Mosaic  Deluge 363 

VIII.  Man  in  the  Light  of  Geology 368 

IX.  The  Finiteness  of  the  Existing  Order  of  Things 373 

X.  The  Bible  in  the  Light  of  Nature 379 

INDEX..  .  385 


ANALYSES. 


NECESSARY  RELATIONS  OF  INTELLECT   AND  FAITH. 

Rights  on  both  sides  of  the  existing  conflict,  18. — The  controversy  one 
of  long  duration,  18. — Two  imperishable  forces  antagonizing  each  other, 
19. — Religious  characteristics  innate  in  man.  Proofs,  19-20. — The  signifi- 
cance of  a  power  native  to  humanity,  20-21. — Generalizations  from  relig- 
ious phenomena,  21-22. — What  is  the  religious  nature  ?  Answer,  22. — 
Contrasted  with  the  cognitive  powers,  22-23. — What  is  conscience  ?  An- 
swer, 24. — It  is  not  a  knowing  faculty,  24. — Sway  of  the  religious  feelings 
in  the  life  of  man,  26. — Incipient  antagonism  of  the  knowing  faculties,  26. 
— Continued  aggressions  of  the  knowing  faculties,  27. — Fidelity  of  religious 
faith  to  its  objects,  27. — Science  seeks  only  truth — true  divinity,  28. — Faith 
accepts  what  science  offers  as  true,  and  hallows  it,  28. — Faith  tends  to 
conservatism  ;  science  to  progress ;  hence  strife,  29. — Distinction  betweeen 
pure  religious  faith  and  its  accessories,  29. — The  progress  of  science  re- 
forms the  accessories,  30. — Alternating  ascendency  of  faith  and  intellect, 
32. — Explanation  of  the  chronic  conflict,  32. — Religion  necessary  to  the 
welfare  of  science,  33. — Antagonism  a  universal  law  in  nature,  34. — Faith 
finds  an  avowed  enemy  in  the  depraved  heart  of  man,  35. — The  antago- 
nism of  faith  and  intellect  beneficent,  36. — It  has  purified  the  religious  sys- 
tem, 36. — The  constant  and  the  variable  factor  in  religion,  37. — Historical 
development  of  the  religious  system,  37-39. — Imperishability  of  religion, 
39. 

II. 

OKIENTAL  AND   GRECIAN  PSYCHIC  HISTORY. 

Periodicity  in  the  dominance  of  faith  and  intellect,  41. — Laws  of  the 
interaction  of  faith  and  intellect,  42-43. — Psychic  cycles-,  44. — Orbits  of 
faith  and  intellect,  44. — Psychic  epicycles,  45. — Overlapping  of  phases,  46. 
— Bifurcation  in  cyclic  movements,  46. — EGYPTIAN  PSYCHIC  HISTORY  :  First 
Psychic  Cycle,  embracing  the  era  of  Memphis,  46 ;  Second  Psychic  Cycle, 
embracing  the  period  of  the  later  monuments,  47 ;  Third  Psychic  Cycle 
dates  from  Alexander's  conquest,  48  ;  Fourth  Psychic  Cycle,  from  the  con- 
quest by  the  Arabians,  48: — CHINESE  PSYCHIC  HISTORY  :  first  Psychic  Cy- 
cle precedes  Confucius,  48 ;  Second  Psychic  Cycle,  from  Confucius  to  the 

1* 


x  ANALYSES. 

overthrow  of  Taoism,  49 ;  Third  Psychic  Cycle,  from  Wen-ti  to  the  introduc- 
tion of  Buddhism,  49 ;  Fourth  Psychic  Cycle,  extending  to  the  present,  50. 
— INDIAN  PSYCHIC  HISTORY  :  First  Psychic  Cycle,  Brahmanism,  51 ;  Second 
Psychic  Cycle,  the  Zoroastrian  revolt,  52 ;  Return  to  early  simplicity  and 
purity,  52 ;  Third  Psychic  Cycle,  the  Buddhistic  schism,  53 ;  Advancing 
ceremonialism,  54 ;  Psychic  movements  among  the  Hebrews,  55. — GRECIAN 
PSYCHIC  HISTORY  :  First  Psychic  Cycle,  Homeric,  55.  Second  Psychic  Cycle, 
Religious  Phase,  the  Ionics  and  Pythagoreans,  56 ;  Intellectual  Phase,  em- 
bracing the  Eleatics,  Atomists,  and  Sophists,  57-60.  Third  Psychic  Cycle, 
Religious  Phase,  Socratic,  61 ;  the  Eleatics,  Hedonists,  and  Platonists,  61- 
62 ;  Intellectual  Phase,  Aristotelians,  63 ;  Stoics,  64 ;  Epicureans,  64-65 ; 
Skeptics,  65. 

III. 

CHRISTIAN   PSYCHIC   HISTORY. 

First  Psychic  Cycle:  Religious  Phase,  Eclecticism,  66 ;  the  New  Academy, 
66-67 ;  Alexandrian-Jewish  learning,  67 ;  Neo-Pythagoreanism,  68 ;  Pythag- 
orizing  and  Eclectic  Platonists,  68 ;  the  advent  of  Christ,  69.  Intellectual 
Phase,  the  Latin  Skeptics,  69 ;  Neo-Platonism,  Alexandrian-Roman  School, 
69-70;  Syrian  School,  70 ;  Athenian  School,  70 ;  Patristicism,  71 ;  Gnosti- 
cism, 71. — Second  Psychic  Cycle:  Religious  Phase,  Irenseus,  and  Tertullian, 
72 ;  First  Council  of  Nice,  72.  Intellectual  reaction  in  Augustine,  73. — 
Third  Psychic  Cycle:  Scholasticism,  74.  Religious  Phase,  a  divorce  of 
philosophy  and  faith,  74 ;  Erigena,  75 ;  Berengarius,  75 ;  Roscellinus,  75 ; 
Abelard,  75 ;  supremacy  of  ecclesiasticism,  76  ;  influence  of  Aristotle,  76 ; 
Alexander  of  Hales,  Albertus  Magnus,  Thomas  Aquinas,  Occam,  Pompona- 
tius,  76 ;  Luther  and  the  Reformation,  76-77.  Intellectual  Phase,  Roger 
Bacon,  78 ;  Eckart,  78 ;  "  revival  of  letters,"  78  ;  Saracenic  influence,  78 ; 
poetry,  79 ;  discovery,  79 ;  science  in  Italy,  79-80 ;  intellect  begins  to  en- 
croach, 80  ;  Macchiavelli,  Montaigne,  Hobbes,  Descartes,  80 ;  Bayle,  Locke, 
Berkeley,  Hartley,  and  Priestley,  80-81 ;  French  philosophy,  81 ;  growing 
arrogance  of  intellect,  81-82 ;  culmination  in  the  French  Revolution,  82. — 
Fourth  Psychic  Cycle :  Religious  Phase,  82 ;  Intellectual  Phase  dawns  with 
the  "Vestiges  of  Creation,"  83 ;  Omens  of  the  future,  83-84 ;  a  Synthesis  of 
Thought  and  Faith,  84. 

IV. 

ORIGINAL   CAUSALITY. 

» 

Retrospect,  87-89. — False  theories  of  the  origin  of  religious  feeling, 
89-90. — Intuition  as  one  origin  of  the  theistic  concept,  90. — Extravagances 
of  the  "  Mystics,"  91. — Our  notion  of  cause,  93. — Denial  of  causation,  93. 
— Theories  of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  causality,  93-94. — Its  origin  not 
empirical,  94.  —  Only  one  species  of  cause,  96.  —  The  use  of  the  term 
"  cause  "  in  science,  96. — Aristotelian  and  Scholastic  "  causes,"  96. — "  Sec- 
ondary "  causation,  98. — Implies  a  first  cause,  98. — Notion  of  primordial 


ANALYSES.  xi 

causality,  99 ;  Causation  implies  the  existence  of  real  cause,  101. — Chance, 
101. — Doctrine  of  the  atomists  not  wholly  atheistic,  102. — Causative  real- 
ity antecedent  to  all  its  effects,  103-104. — Causality  implies  correlative  subject- 
ivity and  objectivity,  104. — In  creative  causality  the  objectivity  is  potential, 
104. — The  causal  efficiency  must  possess  consciousness,  105. —  There  must  be  a 
conception  of  a  non-existent  effect,  106. — Limitations  of  foreknowledge,  106. 
— The  consciousness  of  the  principle  of  causality  must  arise,  107. — Necessity 
of  motive,  107-108. — Final  cause  in  the  history  of  speculation,  108-109. 
— Modern  opinion  becoming  unanimous  in  its  defense,  110. — Its  recogni- 
tion a  necessity  of  thought,  110. — Limitations  of  our  knowledge  of  final 
causes,  112-113. — Inconsequential  assertions  against  final  causes:  Haeck- 
el,  113-114. — The  question  of  final  causes  one  of  "common  sense,"  not  of 
science,  115. — A.  contingency  or  condition  may  be  discerned,  115. — The  influ- 
ence of  the  contingency  must  be  cognized,  116. — Desire  necessary  to  exertion  of 
efficiency,  116. — Causality  implies  intention,  116. — Causality  implies  volition, 
117. — Evolution  of  the  concept  of  personality,  119. 

V. 

CAUSAL  INTERMEDIATION. 

Use  of  the  term  "cause,"  120. — No  causality  in  matter,  120. — Does 
force  inhere  in  matter?  120. — The  theory  implies  that  all  motion  is  a 
search  for  equilibrium,  123. — It  implies  a  running-down  of  the  material 
system,  123. — The  inherent  efficiency  of  matter  unthinkable,  124. — Cause 
must  be  present  in  time  and  space,  125. — Delegated  force,  125. — Matter 
viewed  as  adynamic,  126. — Matter  viewed  as  the  vehicle  of  primordial 
force,  126. — The  theory  implies  the  subsidence  of  molecular  activities, 
126. — Matter  viewed  as  the  seat  of  a  force  momentarily  renewed,  126. — 
Force  viewed  as  the  direct  effort  of  Supreme  Will,  127. — Objections  to 
doctrine  of  divine  immanence  considered,  128. — Matter  regarded  merely 
as  a  manifestation  of  force,  128.  —  The  attributes  of  matter  inhere  in 
some  substance,  128. — Relation  of  the  dynami6  theory  to  pantheism,  130. 
— Theism  not  an  outcome  of  science,  131. — Divine  immanence  compatible 
with  law  and  order,  132. — Intelligence  the  best  explanation  of  order,  133. 
— Relations  of  science  and  philosophy,  134. — No  induction  possible  with- 
out deduction,  135. — What  is  implied  in  mediate  causation,  137.  —  The 
principle  of  congruity,  138. — The  principles  of  efficiency  and  conditionally, 
139. — ERRORS  IN  SCIENTIFIC  REASONING  :  1.  Subjective  mistaken  for  objective 
condition,  and  then  mistaken  for  efficiency,  140 ;  influence  of  the  "  environ- 
ment," 141. — 2.  Subjective  condition  mistaken  for  efficiency,  142;  evolution 
a  subjective  condition,  143. — 3.  Objective  condition  mistaken  for  efficiency, 
145  ;  connection  of  mind  and  matter,  145 ;  "  unconscious  cerebration," 
145. — 4.  Instrumental  relation  mistaken  for  cause,  146 ;  heredity  an  instru- 
ment, not  a  cause,  147. — 5.  Cause  arbitrarily  assumed,  148. — "Organized 
experiences,"  148.— Origin  of  life,  149. 


xii  ANALYSES. 

VI. 
THE  DOCTRINE  OP   INTENTIONALITY. 

Intentionality  implied  in  causality,  150. — And  in  correlations  of  plan, 
161. — Influence  upon  the  mind  of  facts  of  intentionality,  151. — Mechanic- 
al correlations,  153. — Modal  correlations,  153-154. — Evolution  the  method 
of  methods,  154. — Homology,  156. — Psychic  teleology,  156. — Heredity  an 
instrument  of  homology,  157. — Fundamental  types  in  the  animal  kingdom, 
159. — Persistent  in  all  situations,  159. — In  all  ages  of  the  world,  161. — 
The  Vertebrate  type  considered  more  particularly,  161-163. — Modifications 
of  the  archetype,  163-164. — Its  unfolding  in  geological  time,  164. — Inter- 
pretation of  the  facts,  165. — Centripetal  and  centrifugal  forces  in  organ- 
ization, 165.  —  Theism  of  the  hypothesis  of  derivation  of  species,  166. — 
Homologies  of  appendages  of  vertebrates,  166-168.  —  Intelligence  the  only 
explanation  of  correlations  between  environment  and  organs,  168. — Ho- 
mologies in  the  limbs  of  extinct  American  Iwrses,  168-169. — Two  possible 
explanations,  170. — Defects  in  the  evidence  for  derivation,  172-173. — 
Homology  in  the  field  of  cosmical  existence,  174-176. — Continuity  of  cos- 
mical  phenomena,  176. 

VII. 

REASON  FOR   THE   FAITH. 

Reason  must  be  satisfied  in  accepting  revelation,  179. —  Causes  of  skepti- 
cism: 1.  The  evil  heart,  179  ;  2.  The  progress  of  knowledge,  179 ;  3.  Rash 
generalizations  in  the  interest  of  unbelief,  181  ;  4.  Cowardice  of  believers, 
182;  5.  Mistaking  non-essentials  for  fundamentals  in  theology,  183. — 
The  reasons  can  not  be  defended,  183. — I.  The  necessity  of  some  Religion 
is  upon  us,  184. — The  great  religions  of  the  world,  185-187. — Inductive 
generalizations  from  them,  187. — Religious  nature  of  savages,  188-189. — 
And  of  prehistoric  peoples,  190. — Religion  a  universal  phenomenon  of 
humanity,  190.  —  II.  Constructive  or  Deductive  Theistic  JBelief,  191.  —  Pri- 
mary Beliefs,  191. — They  are  spontaneous  and  native,  193. — They  are  au- 
thoritative, 193. — Proofs,  in  brief,  193-195. — Testimony  of  Fichte,  195- 
196. — Resume  of  the  argument,  196. — Fundamental  intuitions  of  deduct- 
ive theism:  Real  Being,  196.— Causality,  197.— Intelligence,  197-198.— • 
Ethicality,  198. — Goodness,  198-199. — Integration  of  the  intuitions,  199. 
— III.  Deductions  from  tlie  Theistic  Proposition:  Peace  and  rejoicing,  199- 
200. — The  "unthinkable"  and  unsearchable  known,  200. — Grounds  to 
expect  a  verbal  revelation,  201-203. — Its  relations  to  humanity,  203. — 
IV.  TJie  Christian  Scriptures  answer  to  our  Deductions,  203. — Tinctured 
to  some  extent  by  the  imperfections  of  the  human  medium,  203. — But 
still  in  consonance  with  the  universal  system  of  truth,  204. — V.  Our  rea- 
sonable Duty,  205-206. 


ANALYSES.  xiii 

VIII. 

THE   CONFLICTS   OP   FAITH. 

The  historical  controversy,  207-208. — The  human  powers  in  action,  208. 
— The  religious  sentiment,  208. — Authority  of  both  classes  of  intuitions, 
209. — Their  different  spheres,  210. — Intellect  progressive,  religion  con- 
servative, 212. — Faith  clings  fondly  to  its  objects,  212. — Intellect  pro- 
nounces some  of  them  unreal,  212. — Action  and  reaction  of  these  forces, 
212. — Exemplifications  strew  the  pathway  of  history,  213. — Protagoras, 
Aristarchus,  Socrates,  Christ,  213-214.  —  The  conflict  in  reality  between 
old  science  and  new,  215. — Periodicity  in  the  interactions,  215. — The  con- 
flict in  the  scholastic  ages,  216. — Slavery  of  intellect,  216. — Two  orders  of 
truth  supposed,  217. — Rebellion  of  Luther,  217. — The  emergence  of  intel- 
lectual freedom  gradual,  218. — Champions  of  free  thought,  218. — The 
other  swing  of  the  pendulum,  218. — Champions  of  doubt,  218. — Readjust- 
ment after  the  French  Revolution,  218-219.  —  Later  strides  of  intellect, 
219. — Doting  faith  still  inclines  to  hug  her  idols,  220. — And  science  is 
again  shaming  her  for  it,  220. — Resume,  221. — Another  renaissance  of 
faith,  221.— The  prospect  of  reconciliation,  221-222.— The  Biblical  record 
of  creation,  222.— The  antiquity  of  the  human  race,  223.— Its  unity,  223- 
224.— The  origin  of  species,  224.— The  origin  of  life,  224-225.— Mental 
physiology,  225-226. — Rights  of  the  religious  nature,  227. — Religion  not 
a  human  enactment,  227. — Religion  in  schools,  227-228. — The  reconcilia- 
tion to  be  sought,  229..— An  incident  from  Casalis,  229-230. 

IX. 

THOUGHTS   ON   CAUSALITY. 

Utterances  of  Tyndall,  Huxley,  and  Haeckel,  231. — Synopsis  of  Profess- 
or Tyndall's  Belfast  address,  232. — His  "materialism"  not  atheistic,  nor 
pantheistic,  nor  antispiritualistic,  237. — He  recognizes  the  rights  of  the 
religious  nature,  237. — Phenomena  and  realities,  240.— Science  and  phi- 
losophy  defined,  240. — Chance  considered  as  the  explanation  of  an  event, 
242. — The  Lucretian  atomic  hypothesis,  243. — Increased  knowledge  dis- 
closes mere  effect  in  supposed  cause,  243. — Recession  of  real  cause,  244. 
— Convergence  of  lines  of  causation,  245. — Ineradicable  belief  in  primary 
causation,  245. — Influence  of  monotheism,  246. — Science  does  not  attain 
to  real  causes,  246-247. — Antecedent  not  necessarily  cause,  247. — Induct- 
ive and  deductive  procedures,  248. — Law  not  efficient,  249. — The  law  of 
the  "survival  of  the  fittest,"  249. — Conditions  are  not  causes,  250-251. — 
The  "environment"  only  a  condition,  251-252. — Consecutiveness  not  a 
causal  relation,  252. — Principle  applied  to  the  hypothesis  of  derivation  of 
species,  252-254. — "Organically  remembered"  experiences,  254. — Con- 
comitancy  not  a  causal  relation,  255. — "Unconscious  cerebration,"  255. — 


xiv  ANALYSES. 

Where  is  the  essential  ground  of  force?  256. — Not  in  dead  matter,  257. — 
Nor  in  living  matter,  257.  —  Is  force  external  to  matter?  257.  —  Its  seat 
in  supreme  intelligent  will,  258. — Significance  of  the  position,  258. — Or- 
der explained  by  intelligence,  not  by  its  denial,  259.  —  Force  viewed  as 
a  "mode  of  motion,"  259-260. — From  human  will  to  the  all  -  causative 
Will,  260. — Different  species  of  force,  261-262. — Analysis  of  our  concept 
of  primary  causality,  263-264. 

X. 

IS   GOD   COGNIZABLE   BY  REASON? 

Questionings  of  the  age,  267. — All  truth  belongs  to  Christianity,  267-268. 
— Influence  of  physical  surroundings  upon  human  character,  269. — Criti- 
cism of  various  philosophies  of  religious  phenomena,  269-271. — Religion 
of  the  ancient  Athenians,  271. — I.  The  idea  of  God  universal,  274. — II. 
Not  an  intuition  independent  of  experience,  274. — III.  The  universe  de- 
mands a  God,  275. — IV.  Ideas  of  the  Absolute  and  Infinite,  276. — Criti- 
cism of  theories  denying  the  cognoscibility  of  God  by  reason,  276. — The 
Pre-Socratic  schools  of  philosophy,  278. — The  Socratic  school,  279. — Re- 
sults of  Greek  philosophizing,  280. — These  appropriated  by  Christianity, 
280. — The  preparatory  office  of  Greek  philosophy  seen:  I.  In  the  field  of 
tlwstic  conceptions,  282. — 1.  In  weakening  the  power  of  polytheism,  282. — 
2.  In  formulating  the  theistic  argument,  284. — Forms  of  the  argument, 
284.— II.  In  the  department  of  ethical  ideas,  286.— III.  In  the  field  of  relig- 
ious sentiment,  287-289.— Characteristics  of  Dr.  Cocker's  work,  290-291.— 
Modes  of  theistic  proof,  292.  —  I.  The  argument  from  common  consent, 
292. — II.  The  argument  from  direct  revelation,  294. — III.  The  argument 
from  immediate  intuition,  294.  —  IV.  The  ^Etiological  argument,  295. — 
V.  The  Teleological  argument,  296. — VI.  The  Homological  argument,  296. 
— VII.  The  Ontological  argument,  297. — Ontological  concepts,  297-299. — 
All  arguments  rest  back  on  the  Ontological,  299.— Kant's  critique  of  the 
theistic  proofs,  269. — Possible  predicates  of  the  Unknowable,  300. — Are 
truths  necessary  to  reason,  absolute?  300-301. — The  direct  way  of  Leib- 
nitz, 302. — The  last  datum  of  reason,  simple  belief,  302-303. — Sacred  sanc- 
tion of  the  primary  beliefs,  303. 

XI. 

GOD   IN  THE   WORD. 

Mistaken  method  of  propagating  religious  truth,  304-305.  —  Various 
grounds  of  belief,  306. — Beliefs  possess  various  degrees  of  validity,  307. — 
— Influence  of  religious  feelings  on  belief,  308. — Men  differ  in  warmth  of 
religious  feeling,  308. — Religious  belief  as  begotten  by  authority,  309. — 
Different  teaching  required  where  the  religious  predisposition  is  wanting, 
310. — Influence  of  allegations  of  conflict  between  religion  and  science,  310. 


ANALYSES.  xv 

— A  painful  dilemma,  312. — Character  of  Dr.  Cocker's  work,  312-314. — 
What  is  the  First  Principle  of  all  things?  314.— Cocker's  views  of  time 
and  space,  315.  —  A  criticism,  316.  —  Author's  view  of  time  and  space, 
317-318. — Beginning  and  end  of  the  cosmical  order,  319. — The  highest 
law  of  the  universe  a  teleological  idea,  320. — Parallelism  of  Genesis  and 
geology,  320-322. — A  criticism,  320-322. — Author's  opinion  on  Gen.  i.,  2, 
321-322. — Theories  of  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world,  322. — The  world 
not  self-sustaining,  323. — Immanent  relation  of  God  to  the  world,  324. — 
God's  method  with  mankind,  325. — Prayer  considered  from  the  stand-point 
of  science,  325-326.  — The  moral  government  of  the  world,  326-328.— 
Cocker's  view  of  conscience,  326. — The  author's  view  of  conscience,  327. — 
General  definition  of  religion,  328. — Freedom  of  the  will,  328. — A  speci- 
men of  successful  authorship,  328-329. 

XII. 

GOD  AND  RELIGION  IN  NATURE. 

I.  MANIFESTATIONS  OF  POWER  IN  CREATION,  333. — Power  in  the  uplifting 
of  mountains,  333. — The  strain  of  the  rocks  revealed  in  the  quarry,  324. — 
The  power  which  molds  and  moves  a  planet,  334. — This  power  the  attri- 
bute of  some  being,  335. — Vastness  of  the  sun's  distance,  336. — Cosmical 
power  exerted  through  measureless  space,  336. — II.  MANIFESTATIONS  OF  IN- 
TELLIGENCE IN  CREATION,  337. — Accidental  and  purposive  arrangements  con- 
trasted, 337-338. — The  hand  a  purposive  arrangement,  338. — Its  internal 
mechanism  consummate,  339. — The  plan  of  anterior  appendages,  340-341. 
— The  reflection  of  intelligence  which  is  infinite,  342. — III.  MANIFESTA- 
TIONS OF  BENEFICENCE  IN  CREATION,  342. — The  vast  and  varied  utilities  of 
coal,  342. — All  pre-arranged  for  man  while  yet  in  futurity,  343. — Vastness 
of  the  preparations,  344. — The  intelligibility  of  nature  a  beneficent  provis- 
ion, 345. — Having  relations  only  to  man,  346. — Man  in  his  constitution  pro- 
vided with  happiness,  346. — IV.  THE  UNITY  OF  CREATION,  347. — Vastness 
of  the  empire  of  gravitation,  348. — Gravitation  is  will  acting  according  to 
method,  348.  —  Uniformities  of  the  solar  system,  348.  —  Gravity  active 
among  the  fixed  stars,  349. — Light  communicates  between  them  and  us, 
349. — One  substance  in  earth,  and  sun,  and  star,  350. — One  common  his- 
tory, 350. — One  method,  one  empire  in  infinite  time  as  in  infinite  space, 
351. — V.  THE  RELIGIOUS  NATURE  OF  MAN,  351. — All  people  devout  before 
the  spectacle  of  the  heavens,  351. — The  universal  feeling  of  the  divine, 
352. — Religious  condition  of  lowest  savages,  353. — Religious  manifesta- 
tions of  all  cultured  peoples,  353-354. — The  knowledge  of  God  can  not 
be  evaded,  354. — Reason  also  leads  from  Nature  to  God,  354-355. — VI. 
"GENESIS"  AND  GEOLOGY,  356.  —  Intellectual  progress  since  the  date  of 
King  James's  translation,  357. — The  Biblical  account  of  creation  poetical 
but  truthful,  358. — Some  things  premised,  358.— Seven  successive  periods 
of  geological  history,  359-361. — Seven  corresponding  periods  in  the  sacred 


xvi  ANALYSES. 

account,  361. — Supplementary  note  on  the  particle  eth,  362.— Note  on  the 
interpretation  of  yom,  363. — VII.  THE  MOSAIC  DELUGE,  363. — No  geologic- 
al record  of  a  universal  deluge,  363-364. — Extensive  emergences  of  lands 
in  human  times,  364. — Geological  and  traditional  evidences  of  great  local 
deluges,  365. — Chaldean,  Chinese,  Persian,  and  Greek  traditions,  365-366. — 
Fijian,  American,  and  Mexican  traditions,  366. — Six  points  of  agreement, 
367. — The  deluge  was  not  universal,  367. — VIII.  MAN  IN  THE  LIGHT  OP 
GEOLOGY,  368. — 1.  He  belongs  to  the  last  fauna,  367. — 2.  Man's  advent 
comparatively  recent,  369. — Great  events  within  the  human  period,  369- 
370. — 3.  Man's  birthplace  in  the  Orient,  370. — Evidence  from  continental 
faunas,  371. — Evidence  from  history  and  tradition,- 371. — 4.  Man's  advent 
the  prophecy  of  the  ages,  372. — 5.  Man  the  last  term  of  the  organic  se- 
ries, 372-373. — IX.  FINITENESS  OP  THE  EXISTING  ORDER  OF  THINGS,  373. — 
Changes  in  progress  imply  a  beginning,  374. — And  an  end,  374. — 1.  The 
land  wearing  out,  374-375. — 2.  Terrestrial  refrigeration  impending,  375. — 
3.  Solar  refrigeration,  376. — 4.  Effect  of  the  resisting  medium,  377. — The 
fiery  consummation  predicted  by  St.  Peter,  378. — X.  THE  BIBLE  IN  THE 
LIGHT  OF  NATURE,  379. — Resume,  379-380. — Biblical  statements  verified 
by  science,  381-382. — The  Bible  proved  truthful  must  be  accepted  as  a 
whole,  382. — Antecedent  probability  of  supernatural  revelation,  383. — Rev- 
elation the  recognized  response  to  the  want,  383-384. 


THE  INTERACTION  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE 
INTELLECTUAL  FACULTIES. 


'OP  THB 

UHX7B.ESXTY 


EECONCILIATION 

OP 

SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION 


i. 

NECESSARY  RELATIONS  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE  IN- 
TELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 

THE  din  of  a  great  controversy  sounds  in  our  ears.  Men 
of  thought  have  been  summoned  to  choose  their  banner,  and 
range  themselves  upon  one  side  or  the  other  of  the  line  of  bat- 
tle. It  is  the  "conflict"  between  Religion  and  Science  which 
has  thrown  the  world  into  commotion. 

It  might  be  expected  that  I  should  appear  before  you  in  a 
militant  character.  I  do  not.  I  shall  assume  the  office  of  a 
mediator.  It  may  mark  a  stronger  character  to  love  war ;  but 
when  I  see  "  a  house  divided  against  itself,"  I  love  peace.  I 
shall  be  reproached  for  weakness.  We  shall  hear  of  somebody 
"  on  the  fence."  Extremists  will  say  I  have  no  opinion,  and 
court  the  favor  of  both  the  combatants.  I  shall,  nevertheless, 
be  brave  enough  to  face  such  dangers ;  and  I  shall  deliberately 
incur  the  risk  of  losing  the  favor  of  both  combatants  by  re- 
fusing to  take  sides  with  either.  To  be  positive  is  not  to  be 
strong ;  to  be  dogmatic  is  not  to  be  brave.  To  be  right  is  to 
be  both  strong  and  brave.  I  have  a  fancy  there  is  some  merit 
in  keeping  cool  while  others  are  excited.  It  is  easier  to  go 
with  the  crowd  than  to  resist  it.  It  pampers  our  indolence  to 


18  LAW  OF  CONFLICT. 

adopt  opinions;  but  to  form  opinions  is  better.  Wherever 
conflict  is  possible,  neither  side  has  all  the  right,  nor  all  the 
virtue,  nor  all  the  truth.  Perpetuated  conflict  implies  imper- 
ishable life  and  vigor  on  both  sides  of  the  line  of  battle. 
Conflict  imbittered,  uncompromising  and  cruel,  implies  ex- 
cited passions  and  judicial  blindness.  Conflict  arises  through 
a  law  of  existence  as  broad  as  society — as  broad  as  nature. 
Progress  is  the  issue  of  conflict,  in  every  realm  of  being. 
Truth  is  a  structure  reared  only  on  the  battle-field  of  contend- 
ing forces.  Conflict  is  universal.  Conflict  is  beneficent.  But 
progress  does  not  arise  out  of  the  extermination  of  one  of  the 
conflicting  elements,  but  out  of  an  arbitration  which  negatives 
extravagant  claims,  brings  to  light  forgotten  truths,  and  settles 
the  contending  elements  in  a  temporary  equilibrium.  The 
"  golden  mean "  is  formed  of  the  genuine  metal.  .  The  judicial 
attitude  is  not  the  neutral  or  apathetic  one.  I  fancy  it  is  regal 
— honorable  to  the  loftiest  intellect — congenial  to  the  purest 
conscience. 

The  great  "  conflict "  of  our  day  is  between  the  claims  of 
the  religious  nature  and  those  of  the  intellect.  On  one  side  is 
consternation  over  the  supposed  encroachments  of  a  hostile  sci- 
ence ;  on  the  other,  exultation  over  a  deliverance  from  fancied 
bondage  to  religious  credulity.  I  shall  attempt  to  show  that 
this  consternation  is  unreasoning  and  groundless,  and  this  ex- 
ultation short-sighted  and  delirious. 

Every  student  of  the  history  of  mental  activity  must  have 
observed  that  a  similar  .strife  has  been  in  existence  ever  since 
the  dawn  of  reflective  thought.  Could  we  penetrate  the  pre- 
historic periods,  I  am  confident  it  might  be  traced  back  to  the 
very  cradle  of  humanity.  The  religious  instincts  and  the  know- 
ing faculties  have  always  regarded  each  other  with  jealous  eyes. 
I  can  not  believe  that  this  enduring  conflict  has  no  appointed 
place  in  the  beneficent  economy  of  a  superintending  Intelli- 
gence. I  am  persuaded  it  has  a  profound  significance;  and 


RELIGIOUS  NATURE  INNATE.  19 

it  must  be  that  a  discovery  of  it  will  promote  the  interests  of 
peace,  comity,  and  truth. 

A  careful  scrutiny  of  the  real  forces  concerned  in  this  secular 
controversy  shows  them  to  be  the  religious  instincts  and  percep- 
tions, on  the  one  hand,  and  the  cognitive  powers  on  the  other. 
Each  has  been  resisting  the  supposed  encroachments  of  the  oth- 
er ;  and,  in  resisting,  has  carried  its  pretensions  beyond  its  own 
legitimate  territory.  I  have  said  that  conflict  implies  a  living 
principle  arrayed  on  each  side  of  the  line  of  battle.  I  repeat 
that  here  are  two  living  forces,  which  must  strive  in  vain  to  ex- 
terminate each  other,  or  even  to  deprive  each  other  permanently 
of  any  of  their  natural  rights.  Why,  then,  are  they  always  at 
war? 

From  time  immemorial  we  have  heard  denials  of  the  relig- 
ious nature  of  man.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  imagined 
that  the  importance  of  Christianity  would  be  aggrandized  if  it 
should  appear  that  for  all  religious  knowledge  the  world  is  in- 
debted to  Jewish  and  Christian  inspiration.  It  was  not  per- 
ceived that  the  denial  of  man's  religious  intuitions  is  the  ex- 
tinction of  all  power  of  apprehending  any  divine  revelation,  or 
becoming  the  recipient  of  religious  instruction.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  thought  that  the  importance  of  Christianity 
would  be  diminished  if  it  should  appear  that  no  preparation 
for  religious  teaching  had  been  made  in  the  plan  of  human 
nature.  The  belief  has  always  been  in  existence,  however,  that 
some  form  of  religious  endowment  is  the  characteristic  of  hu- 
manity, in  all  the  conditions  of  its  existence.  This  belief  will 
be  found  supported  by  a  great  amount  and  variety  of  evidence. 

1.  The  universality  of  religious  belief  and  practice  among 
all  the  peoples  of  the  earth  is  a  fact  of  the  utmost  significance. 
Its  importance  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  it  has  been  com- 
bated by  the  most  powerful  intellects,  and  the  strength  of  that 
array  of  debasing  passions  whose  interests  are  alien  to  all  the 
teachings  of  religion. 


20  SOURCES  OF  EVIDENCE. 

2.  The  religious  nature  of  man  is  demonstrated  by  the  prev- 
alence of  vast  religious  systems,  which  have  embraced  among 
their  adherents  four -fifths  of  all  the  populations  which  have 
ever  lived. 

3.  Man's  religious  nature  is  evinced  by  the  fact  that  nearly 
all  the  poetry  of  the  world  is  a  clear  reflection  of  it ;  while  all 
the  philosophy r,  either  of  ancient  or  modern  times,  has  had  for 
its  object  to  find  out  the  nature  of  the  First  Cause,  recognized 
as  the  centre  of  all  ethical  aspirations  and  the  ground  of  all  eth- 
ical obligations,  or  else  to  unfold  the  law  and  order  existing  in 
the  world  as  the  ordination  of  the  Supreme  Will.    The  collisions 
between  philosophy  and  religion,  either  in  ancient  or  modern 
times,  have  not  involved  denials  of  divine  existence  and  moral 
relations,  but  only  of  a  particular  mode  of  relations  between 
God  and  the  world,  and  between  God  and  man. 

4.  Man's  religious  nature  is  demonstrated  by  the  essentially 
religious  character  of  certain  observances  among  all  the  savage 
tribes  of  the  world.      It  is  here  that  misapprehensions  have 
arisen ;  but  I  am  prepared  to  assert,  after  due  examination,  that 
there  are  not  a  dozen  tribes  in  existence  among  whom  may  not 
be  detected  some  belief  or  sentiment  of  an  essentially  religious 
character.     It  may  be  very  unchristian  in  its  mode  of  manifes- 
tation, but  it  will  be  found  based  on  a  recognition,  more  or  less 
clear,  of  superior  creative,  controlling  existence,  to  which  man 
owes  some  sort  of  allegiance. 

5.  The  existence  of  a  religious  nature  is  indicated  by  certain 
relics  of  prehistoric  times,  which,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  admit 
of  no  other  than  a  religious  interpretation.     Such  relics  reach 
back  to  the  remotest  epoch  of  the  Stone  Age. 

I  must  content  myself  with  indicating  these  sources  of  evi- 
dence respecting  the  innate  character  of  our  universal  religious 
sentiments.  I  desire  next  to  remind  you  of  the  significance 
of  any  faculty,  sentiment,  or  susceptibility  found  to  be  implant- 
ed in  the  very  ground  of  our  being.  In  the  first  place,  it  must 


AUTHORITY  OF  INTUITIONS.  21 

be  good.  The  whole  tenor  and  purport  of  Nature's  plans 
teaches  that  the  parts  are  adjusted  for  the  mutual  benefit  of 
each  other.  In  the  next  place,  it  can  not  be  illusory.  There 
is  not  an  instance  in  nature  of  the  existence  of  one  correlate 
and  the  non-existence  of  its  fellow.  The  echo  implies  the  real 
voice.  Religious  longings  imply  the  reality  of  their  object,  as 
the  power  of  vision  implies  things  visible.  Not  even  are  the 
brutal  instincts  deceptive.  Gratification  answers  to  desire.  The 
insect  care  which  arranges  food  for  offspring  still  in  the  egg, 
and  only  to  be  developed  months  after  the  death  of  the  moth- 
er which  arranges  it,  is  no  more  exempt  from  deception  than 
humanity's  longing  for  its  God,  or  the  individual's  cry  for  di- 
vine help.  Once  establish  the  innate  character  of  a  sentiment, 
a  belief,  or  intuition,  and  we  trace  in  it  a  divine  purpose,  a  di- 
vine utterance. 

But  I  dismiss  also  the  discussion  of  this  theme.  I  have 
reached  convictions,  after  much  study ;  and  my  immovable  be- 
lief has  been  a  source  of  consolation  and  calm.  I  would  ear- 
nestly commend  to  every  thinker  the  study  of  the  evidence  in 
support  of  the  existence  and  authority  of  innate  sentiments,  be- 
liefs, and  intuitions. 

I  must  pass  over,  similarly,  all  discussion  of  the  generaliza- 
tions induced  from  the  religious  phenomena  of  our  race.  The 
following  are  the  grand  facts  common  to  the  religious  faiths  of 
the  world : 

1.  A  Supreme  "R^'nor,  t.Tn*  Author  of  all  things  in  existence. 

2.  AJReyelation  of  the  Supreme  Being,  either  in  sensible 
things  or  in  the  intelligence  of  inspired  men. 

3.  A  System  of  Worship — which  is  either  instinctive  and 
aimless,  or  intended  to  propitiate  the  Deity,  and  win  happiness 
for  the  worshiper.     This  worship  consists  in  the  uplifting  of 
devout  thoughts,  sacrifices,  feasts,  fasts,  prostrations,  genuflec- ' 
tions,  singing,  dancing,  crossing,  and  a  great  number  of  other 
practices  suited  to  the  intellectual  condition  of  the  worshiper. 


22  UNIVERSAL  EELIGIOUS  CONSTANTS. 

4.  Prayer — the  universal  cry  of  humanity  in  distress. 

5.  Future  existence. 

6.  Moral  responsibility. 

7.  A  system  of  Future  Kewards  and  Punishments. 

8.  A  Priesthood,  charged  with  the  direction  of  religious  cere- 
monies, and  clothed  with  a  special  investiture  of  divine  author- 
ity and  power. 

These  facts  I  find  to  be  the  constants  in  the  varying  faiths 
of  mankind.  I  will  add  that  two  other  facts  reveal  themselves 
in  most  of  the  religious  systems  of  the  world — both  the  great- 
er and  the  less.  These  are,  1st.  A  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  vi- 
carious expiation ;  2d.  An  expectation  of  a  Kedeemer.  This  is 
hinted  in  the  philosophical  writings  of  Plato  and  the  later  Pla- 
tonists ;  and  was  a  belief  cherished  by  the  Aztecs,  as  it  is  by 
the  Pueblos,  Mojaves,  and  various  other  savage  tribes.  Faith 
in  a  system  of  divine  incarnations,  also,  is  found  disseminated 
through  the  religions  of  India,  China,  Persia,  Egypt,  and  an- 
cient Greece  and  Rome. 

I  maintain,  from  such  evidence  as  I  have  referred  to,  that 
man  is  endowed  with  an  innate  religious  nature,  which  express- 
es itself  universally  in  a  system  of  outward  manifestations. 
The  discussion  which  I  have  in  view  requires  that  I  should 
point  out  precisely  as  possible  what  this  religious  nature  is.  I 
shall  aim  to  set  it  in  antithesis  with  the  cognitive  powers. 
That  their  true  relations  are  antithetical  is  proved  by  the  chron- 
ic antagonism  which  they  display. 

Should  we  assert  that  the  religious  faculty  of  man  is  that 
which  recognizes  divine  existence,  and  recognizes  religious  and 
moral  obligations  growing  out  of  human  relations  to  divine  ex- 
istence, we  should  furnish  a  current  definition,  but  I  think  we 
should  fail  to  discriminate  between  that  which  is  simply  and 
exclusively  ethical  and  that  which  falls  within  the  province  of 
the  knowing  faculties.  Recognition  implies  cognition  and  re- 
flection. These  belong  to  the  other  term  of  the  antithesis. 


RELIGIOUS  FACULTY  DEFINED.  23  . 

Should  we  assert  that  the  religious  faculty  is  that  which  feels 
the  reality  of  the  divine — the  reality  of  a  standard  of  right,  and 
the  duty  to  conform  to  it,  it  might  be  objected  that  we  rele- 
gate religion  wholly  to  the  realm  of  feeling,  and  thus  throw  re- 
proach upon  its  character.  Still,  I  might  remind  you  that  a 
percipient  element  exists  in  all  feeling,  as  well  as  a  sensational 
^element  in  all  cognition.  When  the  lowest  savage  feels  a  mere 
sentiment  of  the  supernatural,  he  has,  in  truth,  a  species  of  cog- 
nition of  Deity ;  and  when  he  feels  an  impulse  to  refrain  from 
the  commission  of  an  atrocious  deed,  he  must  possess  a  percep- 
tion of  the  principle  of  right  and  the  law  of  duty.  Thus,  when 
I  speak  of  the  feeling  of  the  reality  of  divine  existence,  I  in- 
close in  the  expression  that  kind  and  degree  of  apperception 
which  are  implied  in  all  feeling. 

This,  however,  it  must  be  admitted,  is  not  that  clear  cogni- 
tion which  belongs  to  the  domain  of  the  intellect,  which  appro- 
priates the  facts  of  the  external  world,  and  the  inner  realm  of 
consciousness ;  which  seizes  and  interprets  the  intelligible  man- 
ifestations of  Deity,  discusses  the  ground  of  moral  obligation, 
and  weighs  the  circumstances  which  enter  into  the  solution  of 
a  moral  problem.  And  yet,  so  far  as  I  can  discern,  the  essen- 
tial nature  of  man's  religious  endowment  must  be  differentiated 
from  this  higher  cognition.  This  determination,  I  think  it  will 
appear,  exalts  the  character  of  religion,  exonerates  it  from  a 
multitude  of  reproaches,  and  places  it  in  the  position  of  a  con- 
trolling or  motive  power  in-  relation  to  the  intellect.  The  cog- 
nitive faculties  bring  us  into  intelligent  relations  to  the  cosmos 
and  all  knowable  existence ;  the  religious  faculties  prompt  to 
the  search  after  the  Author  of  the  cosmos,  and  the  discovery 
of  the  relations  of  visible  to  invisible  existence ;  they  thus 
reach  out  beyond  the  sensible  and  the  fleeting,  and  through 
their  instrument,  intellect,  take  hold  on  absolute  reality,  endur- 
ing relations,  and  future  life. 

Conscience,  which. belongs  to  the  group  of  ethical  feelings,  is 

2 


24  CONSCIENCE  DEFINED. 

frequently  treated  as  the  faculty  of -moral  cognition.  Greatly 
as  it  would  please  me  to  fall  in  with  this  idea,  I  feel  compelled 
to  deny  to  conscience  proper  the  power  of  discrimination.  Dis- 
crimination is  the  judgment  that  two  things  cognized  are  dif- 
ferent or  incompatible.  Now,  if  cognition  and  judgment  be- 
long to  conscience,  we  must  cease  throwing  the  intellectual  and 
the  moral  powers  into  different  categories.  We  must  admit 
that  power  of  conscience  is  measured  by  strength  of  intellect. 
Conscience,  I  must  maintain,  is  a  feeling  of  the  existence  of  a 
standard  of  right,  and  an  accompanying  impulse  to  bring  the 
actions  into  conformity  to  the  standard.  But  conscience  does 
not  discern  that  standard.  Discernment  is  an  attribute  of  in- 
tellect. Intellect  is  fallible.  Accordingly,  the  practical  stand- 
ard of  one  man  or  one  tribe  may  not  be  the  practical  standard 
of  another.  But  conscience  is  true  to  its  rule.  Whatever  is 
set  up  as  the  standard  of  right,  conscience  whips  its  possessor 
into  submission. 

We  may  confuse  the  subject  by  speaking  of  "  moral  judg- 
ments." This  expression,  however,  can  only  mean  a  judgment 
upon  a  question  of  right  and  wrong.  If  we  think  conscience 
pronounces  this  judgment,  we  deceive  ourselves.  The  moral 
criterion  is  not  discovered  by  conscience,  nor  cognized  by  con- 
science. It  is  discovered  by  the  reason  of  humanity,  and  cog- 
nized by  the  intellect  of  the  individual.  We  are  not  to  sup- 
pose that  this  deprives  us  of  fixed  standards  of  morality.  The 
voice  of  humanity  gives  a  consistent  utterance.  On  the  funda- 
mental moral  and  religious  questions  it  never  contradicts  itself. 
It  is  true,  that  among  some  of  the  most  degraded  tribes,  eth- 
ical standards  are  but  dimly  discerned.  Even  religious  percep- 
tions may  be  clearer.  The  conscientious  impulse,  also,  is  cor- 
respondingly feeble.  But  Livingstone  tells  us  that  among  the 
Hottentots,  whose  moral  perceptions — that  is,  whose  percep- 
tions of  the  data  of  moral  determinations — were  exceedingly 
perverted,  there  was  still  a  confession  that  they  really  under- 


CONSCIENCE  DISCRIMINATED.  25 

• 

stood  the  right  as  white  men  understood  it,  and  had  never  en- 
tertained different  views  on  those  subjects. 

It  is  obvious  that  conscience,  in  the  restricted  sense,  acts 
only  in  correlation  with  other  powers  of  the  soul.  The  reason 
of  humanity  recognizes  certain  necessary  and  infallible  stand- 
ards of  right  and  wrong.  The  understanding  apprehends  rela- 
tions subsisting  between  certain  acts  and  these  standards,  and 
the  judgment  affirms  a  compatibility  or  incompatibility.  Now, 
the  conscience,  in  its  essential  character,  becomes  a  wakened 
sensibility,  inflicting  pain  in  case  of  an  incompatibility,  and 
awaking  pleasure  if  the  contemplated  act  conform  to  the  stand- 
ard of  right  recognized  in  the  reason.  Now,  we  may  style  the 
whole  of  this  complex  operation  an  act  of  the  conscience ;  but 
if  so,  conscience  means,  not  only  a  moral  sensibility,  but  also 
the  set  of  mental  activities  concerned  in  the  excitement  of  that 
sensibility ;  and  then,  for  the  moral  sensibility — the  only  thing 
which  is  sui  generis  in  the  whole  series  of  acts — we  have  no 
name  whatever.  I  prefer  to  restrict  the  term  conscience  to  the 
moral  element  of  a  moral  judgment. 

Conscience  is  a  constituent  of  the  religious  nature  of  man. 
There  can  be  no  religious  nature  without  a  conscience;  but 
conscience  in  itself  does  not  rise  to  God.  There  is  a  theistic 
intuition  dwelling  in  the  soul,  and  there  are  theistic  judgments 
deduced  from  the  myriad  phenomena  which  surround  us  in  nat- 
ure, and  arise  within  the  field  of  the  moral  consciousness.  It 
is  thus  that  the  being  of  God  stands  revealed  to  us.  All  men 
acknowledge  it ;  all  men  instinctively  feel  that  they  stand  in 
relations  of  dependence  and  obligation  toward  that  being. 
This  intuition  or  feeling  of  God,  and  this  sense  of  certain  re- 
lations toward  him — this  is  the  essence  of  the  universal  relig- 
ion. Conscience,  the  companion  feeling,  prompts  to  a  dis- 
charge of  duty  toward  God,  as  well  as  toward  man.  This  body 
of  feelings  makes  up  all  that  is  peculiar  in  the  religious  nature 
of  man.  How  infinitely  less  than  a  conflict  between  science 


26  RELIGION  PRECEDES  SCIENCE. 

and  this  religion  are  the  narrow  contests  that  have  been  waged 
over  such  dogmas  as  consubstantiation,  the  geocentric  theory 
in  astronomy,  the  non-existence  of  other  habitable  worlds,  the 
immaculate  character  of  the- sun's  face,  or  the  scholastic  sub- 
tleties of  homoousianism,  homoiousianism,  and  heterousianism ! 

The  religious  feelings  sway  the  life  of  man  with  transcend- 
ent potency.  Until  the  reflective  intellect  has  been  brought 
into  active  and  continued  exercise,  they  dominate  all  his  judg- 
ments and  all  his  acts.  The  earliest  and  strongest  beliefs  of  the 
race  are  religious  ones.  The  agency  of  the  Unseen  Power  is 
recognized  in  every  striking  or  inexplicable  phenomenon ;  and 
it  is  the  nature  of  the  religious  sentiments  to  find  gratification 
in  every  recognition  of  the  presence  of  their  object.  An  invis- 
ible spirit  broods  in  the  midnight  sky,  smiles  in  the  life-inspir- 
ing sun,  frowns  in  the  dark  mountain  cliff,  or  rages  in  the  tem- 
pest of  lightning  and  wind. 

The  development  of  habits  of  closer  observation  and  reflec- 
tion is  accompanied  by  the  discovery  of  certain  invariable  se- 
quences in  the  order  of  physical  phenomena.  The  necessary 
idea  of  cause,  dwelling  in  the  mind,  suggests  the  existence  of  a 
causal  relation  subsisting  between  the  terms  of  an  invariable  se- 
quence. Certain  events  which,  under  the  influence  of  the  same 
idea,  had  been  attributed  to  the  direct  causation  of  the  Unseen 
Power,  also  revealed  in  the  intuitive  consciousness,  are  now  ac- 
cepted as  the  result  of  physical  causes.  This  is  the  first  step 
in  the  road  to  science.  The  very  first  effort  at  reasoning  upon 
scientific  data,  therefore,  deprives  the  religious  nature  of  one  of 
its  occasions  to  recognize  the  presence  of  its  God.  The  relig- 
ious sensibility  surrenders  this  gratification  reluctantly  and  com- 
plainingly.  It  is  easy  to  understand  that  those  individuals  in 
whom  intellect  is  most  active,  and  those  in  whom  the  religious 
sensibility  is  least  susceptible,  would  be  the  first  to  take  these 
infantile  steps  in  science.  It  is  easy  to  understand  that  those 
with  intellects  less  exercised,  or  religious  natures  more  quick- 


HOW  CONFLICT  AXISES.  27 

ened,  would  look  with  a  feeling  of  displeasure,  or  even  of  sharp 
dissent,  upon  the  opinions  and  consequent  practices  of  their 
neighbors.  The  murmur  of  heresy  must  have  arisen  while  yet 
our  race  was  in  its  Oriental  cradle. 

But  divine  causation,  thus  far,  would  be  removed  but  one 
step  from  visible  phenomenon.  The  soul  of  man  would  still 
recognize  divinity  in  the  physical  cause  occupying  the  place  of 
invariable  antecedent.  With  the  progress  of  intellect,  however, 
this  would  be  revealed  as  the  invariable  sequent  of  some  other 
physical  antecedent;  and  some  of  the  extraordinary  and  more 
striking  of  nature's  phenomena  would  also  be  traced  to  their 
true  physical  causes.  Religious  faith,  in  the  mean  time,  would 
cling  to  its  cherished  objects ;  and  the  strife  with  progressive 
and  iconoclastic  intellect  would  be  perpetuated. 

Thus,  step  by  step,  religious  faith,  which  casts  its  hallowing 
mantle  over  everv  object  upon  which  it  fixes,  finds  itself  com- 
pelled to  recede  farther  and  farther  into  the  realm  of  things 
and  agencies  unseen  and  mysterious ;  privileged  to  hug  and  to 
venerate  only  that  which  abides  in  the  obscu^t^  far  tVm  tim^ 
being  unpierced  by  the  rays  of  science.  Its  sacred  things  are 
torn  from  it,  vulgarized  and  bandied  about  from  crucible  to  rc- 
tort,  till  the  divinity  which  was  in  them  escapes  in  p^as,  or  steam  r 
or  electricity.  It  is  intelligible  that  religious  faith,  which  seeks 
only  real  divinity,  should  become  jealous  of  science,,  which  cares 
only  for  the  reality  of  divinity.  Faith  is  a  blind  love,  and  asks 
no  questions  about  fV  worth  of  its  object.  Intellect,  ™  -q11  PYPT 
and  has  no  heart  to  be  touched  bv  the  sorrows  of  a  l^jphtf^  nf- 
fection.  So  Faith  recedes?  pierced  with  regrets,  suffused  with 
tears?  sometimes  with  stubborn  resistance,  sometimes  after  a  bit- 
ter and  prolonged  conflicjb. 

But  Faith  stands  true  to  her  God.  She  never,  for  a  moment, 
doubts  that  divinity  abides  immediately  behind  the  veil.  She 
never  falters  in  her  veneration  for  the  things  still  left  to  her 
as  revelations  of  the  divine.  Disappointed  again  and  again  by 


28  THE  CENTRAL  FAITH  SECURE. 

the  substitution  of  physical  causation  for  her  supposed  divinity, 
she  feels  that  divinity  certainly  exists,  and  that  divinity  must  be 
revealed  in  the  world.  Nor  does  science  seek  to  strike  a  blow 
at  this  central  assurance.  Keen  as  its  vision  may  be,  uncom- 
promising as  its  methods  are,  its  aim  is  truth ;  and  as  no  proof 
has  been  found  of  the  unreality  of  the  divine,  whose  image  is 
mirrored  in  the  universal  consciousness,  the  voice  of  science  has 
never  been  heard  disputing  its  dominion  in  the  world.  On  the 
contrary,  philosophy,  which  builds  upon  the  data  disclosed  by 
science,  has  always  started  out  with  the  divine  existence  as  its 
postulate,  and  has  expended  its  loftiest  efforts  in  seeking  for 
the  mode  of  that  existence,  and  the  nature  of  its  relations  to 
man  and  the  world. 

In  saying  this,  I  hold  science  and  philosophy  irresponsible 
for  the  indiscretions  of  some  of  their  devotees.  The  great  ca- 
lamities of  the  world  have  proceeded  from  the  passion  or  mis- 
judgment  of  individuals.  It  must  be  admitted  that  individuals 
from  the  ranks  of  science  and  philosophy,  with  the  perversity 
and  blindness  of  madmen,  have,  at  intervals,  dared  to  ignore 
the  divinity  whose  voice,  even  in  their  own  hearts,  they  could 
not  silence,  and  have  attempted  to  rob  religious  faith  complete- 
ly of  its  object.  Exasperated  by  the  faithful  lash  of  conscience, 
the  wicked  heart  has  sometimes  driven  the  intellect  to  make 
the  rash  and  fatal  declaration  that  there  is  no  .God,  no  future, 
no  moral  tribunal ;  but  the  offended  and  indignant  conscience 
of  the  nations  has  rung  out  its  withering  reprobation  of  the 
blasphemy,  and  the  balance  of  rights  has  been  momentarily 
restored. 

Religious  faith,  I  have  said,  hallows  and  sanctifies  all  that  it 
can  appropriate.  This  is  its  nature ;  this  is  its  excellence.  Its 
essential  attitude  is  to  assume  the  sacredness  of  divinity  cloth- 
ing every  object,  every  event,  every  established  belief.  So  far 
as  concerns  religious  faith  in  its  pure  simplicity,  every  thing 
exists  in  direct  relation  to  God.  There  is  no  system  but  relig- 


THE  CREED  REFORMED.  29 

ion.  There  is  no  knowledge  which  is  not  a  part  of  its  theolo- 
gy. There  is  no  accepted  belief  which  is  not  incorporated  into 
its  confession.  There  is  nothing  secular.  Accordingly,  when 
intellect,  in  the  course  of  time,  has  attained  to  certain  explana- 
tions of  physical  phenomena,  albeit  under  the  perpetual  protest 
of  the  religious  feelings,  these  feelings,  submitting  at  length, 
immediately  incorporate  the  new  beliefs  in  the  religious  creed, 
and  sprinkle  the  incongruous  mass  with  holy  water.  Eeligious 
faith  now  discovers,  or  thinks  it  discovers,  new  demonstrations 
of  divine  agency  in  the  natural  world,  and  new  corroborations 
of  the  various  articles  of  its  creed. 

Meantime  science  marches  onward.  (*)  It  is  the  law  of  intel- 
lect to  accumulate  daily  something  new,  and  to  rise  daily  to  a 
higher  plane  of  observation.  This  is  the  excellence  of  intellect. 
Intellect  pioneers ;  intellect  piles  up  her  accumulations.  Faith 
conserves  and  sanctifies  what  intellect  gives  her.  It  is  not  her 
office  to  scrutinize,  and  assort  the  true  and  the  false.  The  dis- 
appointment and  grief  of  Faith  arise  from  the  unreality  and 
worthlessness  of  much  which  she  receives  from  the  hands  of 
science.  Science  is  an  indefatigable  reaper;  but  how  many 
tares  do  we  find  bound  up  with  the  wheat !  How  many  ex- 
ploded theories  have  left  their  wrecks  along  the  highway  of 

(J)  "Faith  is  in  its  nature  unchangeable,  stationary.  Science  is  in  its 
nature  progressive ;  and  eventually  a  divergence  between  them,  impossi- 
ble to  conceal,  must  take  place.  It  then  becomes  the  duty  of  those  whose 
lives  have  made  them  familiar  with  both  modes  of  thought  to  present 
modestly,  but  firmly,  their  views ;  to  compare  the  antagonistic  pretensions 
calmly,  impartially,  philosophically  "  (Draper,  "  Conflict  of  Science  and  Re- 
ligion," Preface,  p.  vii.).  But,  earlier  than  Draper,  the  same  ideas  were  set 
forth  by  an  English  writer  of  great  learning  and  ability.  "Christianity," 
he  says,  "  being  stationary  and  authoritative,  thought  progressive  and  in- 
dependent, the  causes  which  stimulate  the  restlessness  of  the  latter  inter- 
rupt the  harmony  which  ordinarily  exists  between  belief  and  knowledge, 
and  produce  crises,  during  which  religion  is  re-examined  "  (Farrar,  "A  Crit- 
ical History  of  Free  Thought,"  p.  12). 


30  RUBBISH  IN  CREEDS. 

time !  How  many  abandoned  explanations  and  beliefs  lie  scat- 
tered by  the  way-side  !  These  all  have  been  the  sacred  vessels 
of  religious  faith.  Every  fragment  of  these  exploded  systems 
exhales  the  perfume  of  sanctifying  incense.  Nay,  every  wreath 
of  incense  which  has  ascended  from  them — -hollow  and  false 
as  these  systems  were — has  testified  to  Heaven  the  fidelity  of 
faith,  and  proclaimed  to  man  the  reality  of  its  object. 

Faith  has  been  doomed  a  hundred  times  to  pluck  out  the  ef- 
fete constituents  of  her  creed.  This  is  no  more  true  in  Chris- 
tian countries  than  in  those  swayed  by  Pthah,  Brahma,  Bud- 
dha, or  Zoroaster,  Jove  or  Mohammed.  Faith  has  never  yet 
been  able  to  refrain  from  incorporating  in  her  creed  current 
beliefs  of  an  extraneous  and  necessarily  evanescent  character. 
These  have  embraced  contemporary  opinions  on  the  institutions 
of  society,  on  the  origin  and  rights  of  government,  on  the  fig- 
ure and  age  of  the  earth,  on  its  relation  to  the  heavenly  bodies, 
on  the  number  of  planets,  and  a  hundred  other  subjects  which 
it  is  the  rightful  province  .of  science  to  investigate  and  deter- 
mine, but  about  which  faith  is  wisely  created  absolutely  blind. 
How  often  has  faith,  rasher  than  the  atheism  of  science,  staked 
the  credibility  of  her  entire  system  upon  the  truth  of  an  opin- 
ion liable  to  be  falsified  by  the  discovery  of  a  fossil  bone,  or  by 
the  color  of  the  solution  in  a  test-tube  !(*) 

The  gravest  consequences  to  the  interests  of  religious  faith 
have  arisen  from  her  devotion  to  effete  dogmas  of  science  long 

(')  "All  religious  theories,  schemes,  and  systems," says  Tyndall,  with  a 
truthfulness  which  can  not  be  gainsaid,  "  which  embrace  notions  of  cos- 
mogony, or  which  otherwise  reach  into  the  domain  of  science,  must,  in 
so  far  as  they  do  this,  submit  to  the  control  of  science,  and  relinquish  all 
thought  of  controlling  it "  ("  Belfast  Address,"  Appletons'  ed.,  p.  94).  And, 
again,  "  The  facts  of  religious  feeling  are  as  certain  to  me  as  the  facts  of 
physics.  But  the  world,  I  hold,  will  have  to  distinguish  between  the  feel- 
ing and  its  forms,  and  to  vary  the  latter  in  accordance  with  the  intellect- 
ual condition  of  the  age  "  (Ibid.,  Preface,  p.  xxxiv.). 


CRUDITIES  PURGED   OUT.  31 

supposed  to  be  inculcated  by  texts  of  revelation.  Here  the  au- 
thority of  Scripture  was  added  to  the  sanction  of  faith's  accept- 
ance and  adoption ;  and  the  struggle  to  supersede  the  error  was 
correspondingly  stubborn  and  acrimonious.  Interpretations  of 
Scripture  long  suited  to  current  apprehensions  of  natural  phe- 
nomcna  have  been  unwisely  insisted  upon,  long  after  science 
had  rendered  her  final  verdict.  The  inexpediency  of  hazarding 
the  credibility  of  a  pretended  revelation  on  the  truth  of  an  opin- 
ion not  demonstrated  true,  is  something  which  seems  to  me 
self-evident;  but  the  Church  has  had  the  infatuation  to  run 
that  hazard  in  a  score  of  cases  where  the  opinion  was  not  even 
presumptively  true — nay,  where  it  had  been  already  demonstra- 
ted untrue — as  if  she  had  madly  resolved  to  commit  the  crime 
of  felo-de-se.  But  yet  revelation  stands;  and  religious  faith  re- 
mains as  deeply  rooted  as  ever.  Could  there  be  a  stronger 
proof  of  the  indestructibility  of  both  ?  The  religious  system, 
invincible  to  the  assaults  of  its  enemies,  has  withstood  equally 
the  suicidal  daggers  of  its  friends. 

But  religious  faith,  sooner  or  later,  has  receded  from  most  of 
its  preposterous  claims.  Loaded  and  encumbered  as  it  has 
been  by  the  debris  of  exploded  science  or  effete  philosophy,  or 
stale  ecclesiasticism,  or  conventional  dogmas,  or  absurd  ceremo- 
nials, or  preposterous  assumptions,  or  heathenish  superstitions, 
it  has  had  to  undergo  many  mortifications,  many  ablutions,  many 
rehabilitations ;  and  it  comes  now  out  of  the  conflicts  of  the 
ages  unchanged  in  its  fidelity  to  God  and  duty,  possessed  of  all 
the  fervor  of  its  youth  animating  the  sturdy  strength  of  its 
maturity,  and  clothed  in  cleaner  and  purer  accessories  of  invest- 
iture than  it  has  ever  possessed  in  all  the  history  of  our  race. 

It  appears  from  a  cursory  acquaintance  with  the  facts,  that 
faith  and  science  have  lived  in  perpetual  strife.  Faith  has  been 
wont  to  appropriate  whatever  has  fallen  within  her  reach,  and 
science  has  declared,  from  time  to  time,  that  certain  of  her 
claims  were  indefensible;  and  she  has  been  compelled  to  re- 

2* 


32  ACTION  AND  REACTION. 

cede.  Now,  intellect,  in  the  flush  of  victory,  has  pushed  its  an- 
tagonist to  the  verge  of  tyranny,  and  the  religious  instincts 
have  revolted  and  regained  their  rights.  Now,  in  turn,  relig- 
ious faith  has  maintained  an  ascendency  over  human  opinion, 
and  has  even  given  laws  to  science  and  philosophy.  Such  an 
invasion  of  its  dominion  the  intellect  could  not  long  endure. 
Arising  in  the  majesty  of  truth  and  justice,  it  has  asserted  its 
freedom,  broken  its  fetters,  and,  in  turn,  made  reprisals  upon 
the  religious  system.  The  fortunes  of  the  day  have  oscillated 
like  the  swing  of  a  pendulum,  or  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide. 
Sometimes  the  religious  system  has  yielded  to  slow  and  steady 
encroachments,  until  intellect  assumed  the  airs  of  arrogance, 
and  loud  assertions  were  sent  forth  that  religion  was  a  supersti- 
tion, and  faith  was  fed  only  by  fables.  Then,  from  SUCQ  an  ex- 
treme of  irreligion,  the  popular  mind  would  swing  back  with  a 
revulsion,  as  it  had,  at  other  times,  from  the  opposite  extreme. 
All  this  will  be  illustrated  by  a  review  of  the  facts  of  history, 
which  I  hope  to  present  in  a  subsequent  lecture. 
^.^^  From  our  stand-point,  it  seems  to  me  that  these  phenomena 
are  explicable  without  disparagement  to  the  character  either  of 
intellect  or  faith.  The  conflict  exists  between  the  conservatism 
of  faith  and  the  progressiveness  of  intellect.  It  is  the  nature 
of  religion  to  be  invariable,  and  this  central  character  is  trans- 
ferred  to  all  the  accessories  of  the  religious  system.  Religion 
is  based  on  the  being  and  attributes  of  an  unchanging  Deity, 
and  the  dominion  ofunchanging  principles.  It  implies  that  its 
world  of  surroundings  is  unchanging,  eternal,  and  divine.  It  is 
no  reproach  to  the  religious  sentiment  that  it  can  not  discrimi- 
nate between  that  which  is  fixed  and  true,  and  that  which  is 
fleeting  and  false.  If  it  had  the  power  to  make  these  discern- 
ments, it  would  be  intellect,  and  not  religious  sentiment.  Intel- 
lect is  its  eye — it  needs  no  other.  If  intellect  proves  an  unre- 
liable witness  to  the  truth,  faith  shows  its  fidelity  to  its  mission 
by  embracing  the  true  and  the  false  with  impartial  tenderness. 


AGGRESSIVE  FAITH  CONDITIONS  PROGRESS.  33 

It  is  the  office  of  intellect  to  discover  the  truth,  and  vouch  for 
it  to  the  other  departments  of  the  soul — the  religious,  the  aes- 
thetic, and  the  pathematic.  If  intellect  sometimes  errs  in  the 
interpretation  of  phenomena  and  the  induction  of  general  prin- 
ciples, this  is  no  reproach,  since  the  penetration  of  the  human 
intellect  is  finite,  and  its  utterances  must  be  fallible.  It  still  re- 
mains loyal  to  truth.  It  seeks,  also,  to  retrieve  its  errors,  and, 
though  consecrated  by  a  misled  devotion,  banish  them  from  ex- 
istence. The  conflict,  in  truth,  exists  between  new  science  and 
the  old  ;  and  the  only  concern  of  faith  in  the  controversy  is  to 
prompt  the  old  to  resistance. 

We  may  conceive  of  conditions  under  which  this  conflict 
would  never  arise.  Were  the  religious  nature  so  constituted  as 
to  content  itself  with  appropriating  only  the  central  truths  of 
the  religious  system,  science  and  philosophy,  which  recognize 
these,  would  never  attempt  to  drive  faith  from  its  positions. 
The  fact  is  otherwise,  and  this  reveals  the  cause  of  the  secu- 
lar conflict.  We  can  easily  understand  the  reason  why  the  fact 
is  as  it  is  —  at  least  one  of  the  reasons.  Were  the  religious 
nature  content  to  hold  fast  simply  the  essential  fact$  of  relig- 
ion,  the  proud  and  unmolested  intellect,  going  on  from  con- 
quest to  conquest,  would  assume  a  dominating  attitude.  The 
ethical  perceptions  and  sentiments,  though  gifted  with  an  un- 
dying vitality,  would  exert  but  little  influence  over  the  lives  of 
men.  This  subjugation  would  be  aided  by  the  alliance  of  the 
grosser  passions  of  mankind.  The  name  of  God  would  be  \ 
almost  forgotten,  and  his  commandments  be  quite  unheeded.  ' 
The  law  of  might  would  assert  supremacy  among  men ;  civil- 
ization would  be  strangled  in  its  cradle ;  the  means  and  instru- 
ments of  intellectual  culture  would  not  be  created,  and  the  ex- 
altation of  man — even  of  the  intellect  of  man — would  be  an 
impossibility.  As  we  understand  the  moral  government  under 
which  we  live,  it  contemplates  a  perpetuated  and  vivid  remem- 
brance of  God ;  a  perpetual  communion  with  the  spirit  of  God, 


34  PROGRESS  THROUGH  ANTAGONISM. 

and  a  sensitive  respect  for  the  law  of  God.  In  view  of  the  in- 
tellectual and  passional  constitution  of  man's  nature,  it  is  need- 
ful that  the  claims  of  God  be  frequently  and  vigorously  assert- 
ed to  accomplish  the  purpose  of  his  government  over  us.  It  is 
necessary  that  those  claims  be  made  obtrusive  and  encroaching. 
Thus  the  other  powers  are  aroused,  and  the  knowledge  of  God 
and  his  law  is  kept  alive  in  the  soul.  Thus,  a  living,  grasping, 
encroaching,  religious  consciousness  is  the  condition  of  intel- 
lectual and  social  advancement.^)  Thus,  even  religious  super- 
stition and  ecclesiastical  tyranny,  so  generally  deplored  as  the 
mediaeval  impediments  to  the  march  of  civilization,  may  be,  in 
reality,  the  providential  means  of  conserving  the  only  condi- 
tions which  render  human  progress  possible. 

In  the  light  of  these  considerations,  we  shall  not  contemplate 
this  conflict  as  a  war  of  extermination.  It  is  only  a  grand  ex- 
ample of  progress  through  antagonism.  It  is  subordinated  to 
the  universal  economy  of  God,  exemplified  in  nature,  in  mor- 
ds,  and  in  individual  experience.  There  is  no  excellence  which 
has  not  had  a  conflict,  no  virtue  without  temptation,  no  heav- 
enly joy  without  a  taste  of  earthly  sorrow.  In  nature,  the 
law  of  antagonism  rules  everywhere.  Attraction  contends  with 
repulsion ;  rarefaction,  with  condensation ;  evaporation,  with 
precipitation ;  centripetal  force,  with  centrifugal  force.  The 
whole  cosmos  is  merely  a  panorama  of  the  phenomena  of  a 
transitory  conflict  between  opposites  struggling  into  a  state  of 
ultimate  rest.  The  attacks  and  reprisals  of  the  religious  and 
intellectual  forces  are  but  a  particular  instance  of  the  general 
law.  I  prefer  to  regard  these  movements  simply  as  the  normal 
action  and  reaction  of  moral  forces,  rather  than  a  case  of  ab- 
normal warfare.  Instead  of  the  conflict  of  religion  and  science, 
I  should  prefer  to  speak  of  the  interaction  of  the  religious  and 

(!)  "  Nations  plunged  in  the  abyss  of  irreligion  must  necessarily  be  na- 
tions in  anarchy  "  (Draper,  "  Intellectual  Development  of  Europe,"  p.  103). 


ALLIANCE  OF  PASSIONS.  35 

intellectual  faculties.  I  deplore  the  view  that  this  is  a  war  in 
which  one  of  the  combatants  has  no  rights.  I  deplore  the 
spirit  which  seeks  to  put  faith  and  science  in  deadly  antago- 
nism. This  is  a  weakness  of  which  representatives  of  both  in- 
terests must  plead  guilty.  I  deplore  the  spirit  which  continu- 
ally represents  religion  as  a  superstition ;  providential  care  as 
the  reign  of  arbitrary  will,  caprice,  and  disorder;  law  as  ex- 
cluding providence ;  and  creation  as  the  "  carpenter  theory  "  of 
existence. 

Religion  has  always  been  compelled  to  wage  a  warfare  of 
quite  another  kind.  The  passions  of  men,  not  satisfied  with 
their  legitimate  gratification,  clamor  always  for  excessive  indul- 
gence. This  demand  is  in  sharp  collision  with  the  law' of  the 
religious  nature,  which,  accordingly,  offers  unceasing  resistance. 
Naturally  the  repulses  of  faith  at  the  hands  of  science  have 
brought  cheer  to  the  baser  nature  of  man ;  and  naturally,  too, 
the  baser  nature  has  sometimes  availed  itself  of  the  ascendency 
of  religious  faith  to  bribe  the  spiritual  power  to  serve  its  base 
purposes.  But  the  prostitution  of  faith  is  exceptional,  and  in- 
tellect has  never  had  fellowship  with  the  vice  which  exults  in 
its  victories.  The  final  cause  of  the  hostility  of  religion  to 
vice  is  easy  to  discover.  Vice  not  only  antagonizes  the  moral 
law  revealed  in  the  soul,  but  its  influence  upon  the  individual 
and  upon  society  is  fatal  to  all  those  ends  involved  in  social 
and  intellectual  elevation. 

The  conflict  of  religion  with  the  evil  passions  of  men  has 
engendered  a  special  scries  of  oscillations  in  the  fortunes  of  re- 
ligion. Relapses  from  a  condition  of  religious  activity  have 
resulted,  sometimes,  from  the  steady  seductive  influence  of  the 
baser  nature,  as  well  as  from  the  quickened  activity  of  intel- 
lect, or  its  actual  encroachments.  Then  the  voice  of  the  re- 
former would  be  raised  on  high,  and  the  universal  conscience 
would  cry  out  in  response.  These  have  been  occasions  for  the 
rapid  strengthening  of  the  religious  system — sometimes  for  the 


36  PASSIONS  DIRECTING  POWER. 

establishment  of  a  spiritual  tyranny,  which,  in  turn,  has  pro- 
voked intellect  to  manly  resistance.  The  part  which  has  been 
performed  by  each  of  these  antagonists  of  religious  faith  will 
appear  as  we  shall  glance  over  the  records  of  history. 

If  the  sharp  interaction  of  the  religious  and  the  intellectual 
forces  is  the  order  of  nature  and  of  Providence,  it  is  needful 
and  beneficent.  We  have  nothing  to  fear  from  it,  and  may 
calmly  and  confidently  contemplate  the  progress  of  events  and 
anticipate  the  issue.  There  is  no  need  of  fear  for  the  interests 
of  religion.  All  we  have  to  fear  is  the  evil  to  which  human 
passions  may  prompt.  Ambition,  and  love  of  power,  and  sen- 
suous gratifications,  more  than  zeal  for  the  faith,  may  nerve 
the  arm  which  rivets  the  fetters  of  an  ecclesiastical  despotism. 
Pride  of  intellect  or  a  vindictive  disposition  may  prompt  the 
representative  of  science  to  affect  an  unconcern  about  religious 
questions ;  to  feign  a  belief  that  Deity  and  his  purposes  must 
remain  unknowable,  or  even  to  oppress  with  ridicule  and  scorn 
the  character  which  remains  faithful  to  the  religious  prompt- 
ings of  human  nature.  Our  solicitude  may  be  usefully  turned 
to  the  arrest  of  such  encroachments  upon  the  mutual  liberties 
and  rights  of  the  parties  to  this  strife. 

The  results  of  the  interaction  of  these  forces  are  written  upon 
the  pages  of  the  religious  history  of  our  race.  Whatever  may 
be  the  beneficent  influences  of  the  vital  activities  of  the  relig- 
ious instincts  upon  the  fortunes  of  intellectual  progress,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  religious  system,  under  the  pruning  and  re- 
straints of  the  cognitive  faculty,  has  undergone  a  gradual  ad- 
vance.^) The  proposition  does  not  imply  a  progressive  im- 
provement or  perfection  of  the  religious  nature.  This  is  no 


(')  "Disorganization  is  the  temporary  result;  theological  advance  the 
subsequent.  Whatever  is  evil  is  eliminated  in  the  conflict ;  whatever  is 
good  is  retained.  Under  the  overruling  of  a  beneficent  Providence,  antag- 
onism is  made  the  law  of  human  progress  "  (Farrar,  "  A  Critical  History 
of  Free  Thought,"  p.  12). 


RELIGIOUS  CONSTANTS  AND  VARIABLES.  37 

truer  to  the  great  realities  which  it  represents  in  an  age  of  civ- 
ilization than  in  an  age  of  barbarism.  The  progress  consists  in 
a  gradual  excision  of  crudities,  excesses,  and  meaningless  ac- 
cessories. The  religious  nature  is  a  blind  instinct  feeling  for 
its  object.  It  is  an  infant  crying  in  the  night  for  its  food.  It 
accepts  whatever  the  intelligence  offers  as  real  and  true,  and 
consecrates  it  as  the  objective  revelation  of  real  divinity.  The 
body  of  accessory  beliefs  accepted  at  any  particular  period,  ac- 
creted around  the  central  facts  of  religion,  constitute,  for  the 
time,  the  religious  system.  With  the  enlargement  of  the  in- 
tellectual horizon,  the  cruder  accessories  become  eliminated. 
The  religious  system  always  consists,  therefore,  of  constants 
and  variables.  Progress  is  incident  only  to  the  variable  factor. 
This  is  the  human  and  finite  and  imperfect  element  of  religion. 
The  constant  factor  is  an  eternal  truth,  resting  on  the  Rock  of 
Ages.  This  is  the  infinite  and  perfect  and  unchanging  element 
in  religion.  The  variable  factor  represents  weak,  struggling, 
aspiring  humanity ;  the  constant  factor,  the  eternal  All  -  suffi- 
ciency. The  former  is  practical  or  actual  religion ;  the  latter 
is  the  absolute  or  ideal  religion.  The  former  is  the  nearest  ap- 
proach which  feeble  humanity  has  been  able  to  make  toward 
its  perfect  standard ;  the  latter  is  the  perfect  standard  to  which 
humanity  aspires. 

In  the  infancy  of  intellect,  the  religious  system  is  encumber- 
ed by  an  environment  of  grossest  crudities.  Every  motion  in 
nature  reveals  the  agency  of  the  supernatural.  Every  object  is 
the  shrine  of  divinity.  Benignant  spirits  award  success  in  hunt- 
ing or  in  war,  while  sickness  and  misfortune  are  the  visitations 
of  malignant  ones.  These  are  propitiated  and  appeased  by 
dances,  bowlings,  brutal  sacrifices,  and  sometimes  beastly  orgies. 
This  is  the  stage  of  Fetichism.  The  next  stage  in  advance  may 
be  styled  Totemism.  The  intellectual  mists  have  lifted  from 
the  ground,  and  common  things  are  discerned  in  their  natural 
relations.  But  supernaturalism  reigns  in  all  the  realm  above 


38  GROWTH  OF  RELIGIONS. 

commonplace.  The  cataract  thunders  the  power  and  majesty 
of  the  Invisible ;  the  tempest  is  a  paroxysm  of  divine  rage ;  the 
foliage  of  the  breezy  forest  hums  the  melodies  of  unseen  sprites ; 
and  the  rippling  stream,  as  it  floats  the  solemn  worshiper  in  his 
rude  canoe,  murmurs  a  spirit  lullaby.  With  the  further  advance 
of  knowledge,  divinity  seems  retired  into  the  grand  and  myste- 
rious abodes  of  nature.  The  mountains,  with  their  serene  and 
inaccessible  summits,  are  the  homes  of  divinity ;  or  the  sky 
spreads  a  brazen  floor  in  the  court  of  the  celestials,  and  the  stars 
beam  with  the  radiance  of  divine  intelligence.  This  may  be 
styled  the  stage  of  Shamanism.  The  system  known  as  Magi- 
anism  is  scarcely  more  advanced,  but  its  worship  recognizes  a 
more  limited  number  of  divine  abodes  or  manifestations.  The 
elements  permeate  and  constitute  and  dominate  nature,  and  are 
the  fittest  representatives  of  the  All-powerful  and  All-pervading. 
The  sun  is  justly  regarded  as  the  great  life-giving  and  control- 
ling agent  of  the  natural  world ;  and  fire,  its  essential  character- 
istic, becomes  the  representative  of  the  sun  and  the  emblem  of 
the  Supreme  Efficiency.  The  Anthropomorphic  stage  may  be 
the  next  in  advance.  The  intellect  has  discovered  that  thought 
and  purpose  are  not  the  attributes  of  inanimate  objects.  The 
Being  who  plans  and  executes  and  ordains  in  the  cosmic  realm 
must  possess  a  nature  akin  to  that  which  plans  and  wills  in  hu- 
man affairs.  The  Deity  must  be  an  intelligence.  Human  in 
his  spiritual  attributes,  the  groping  intellect  could  scarcely  es- 
cape the  assignment  of  human  shape  and  human  passions. 
Higher  attainments  of  reflective  thought,  however,  would  re- 
veal the  fact  that  bodily  form  is  the  accident  of  humanity ;  that 
it  implies  limitation  and  dependence.  The  Infinite  Reason  must 
be  incorporeal,  without  parts  and  without  locality.  This  is 
the  stage  of  pure  Spiritualism,  which  we  have  reached.  Its 
morning  rays  have  illuminated  the  loftiest  peaks  of  human  spec- 
ulation in  ages  surprisingly  remote,  and  in  nations  unexpected- 
ly separate.  Yet  the  difficulty  of  a  purely  spiritual  conception 


ANTHROPOMORPHISM  INEVITABLE.  39 

of  God  is  so  great  that  anthropomorphism  has  pervaded  most 
of  the  religious  systems  of  the  world,  and  even  taints  the  purest 
and  best  of  the  present  age.  We  are  not  casting  a  taunt  at  any 
system  of  religion  in  saying  that  it  is  adulterated  with  anthro- 
pomorphism. It  could  not  be  otherwise.  This  is  the  ordina- 
tion of  Heaven,  and  is  pleasing  to  Heaven ;  just  as  the  weak- 
ness and  shapelessness  of  the  embryo  are  involved  in  the  plan  of 
creation — the  very  index  and  condition  of  progress — the  clear 
promise  of  coming  perfection.  In  anthropomorphism  man  con- 
fers upon  his  God  the  highest  attributes  and  the  loftiest  char- 
acter of  which  he  has  any  conception  ;  and  if,  on  attaining  the 
stage  of  a  pure  spiritualism,  he  retains  anthropomorphic  and 
anthropopathic  images,  symbols,  and  forms  of  speech,  they  serve 
merely  as  a  scaffolding  over  which  his  feeble  thought  climbs  to 
the  lofty  and  dazzling  and  adorable  truth. 

Religious  systems  have  changed,  but  religion  remains  as 
changeless  as  the  being  of  God.  Religious  systems  have  be- 
come extinct ;  but,  like  the  integuments  of  the  chrysalis,  they 
have  infolded  a  living  germ,  the  law  of  whose  development 
implies  the  casting -off  of  its  effete  accessories.  The  human 
intellect  has  marched  onward,  unconsciously  and  unintentional- 
ly purifying  and  spiritualizing  the  religious  system ;  while  the 
religious  nature,  perfect  from  the  first,  has  yielded  timidly  and 
reluctantly  to  the  processes  which  have  promoted  the  unpre- 
meditated progress  of  the  religious  system.  A  progress  unpre- 
meditated by  both  of  the  agencies  which  have  contributed  to 
its  realization  must  be  providential.  In  asserting  that  intel- 
lect has  not  purposed  the  advancement  of  religion,  I  allude,  of 
course,  to  the  purely  secular  nature  of  the  search  for  truth 
which  is  the  office  of  intellect.  If  intellect  search  for  the  truth 
respecting  God,  or  duty,  or  future  life,  this  manifests  no  relig- 
ious character  in  intellect.  The  religious  nature  may  appropri- 
ate the  results  reached ;  it  may  even  prompt  intellect,  as  it  oft- 
en does,  to  engage  in  researches  which  will  yield  religious  fruit ; 


40  RELIGION  SERVED  BY  INTELLECT. 

nay,  more,  and  finally,  there  is  no  truth  attainable  by  intellect 
which  is  not  available  to  the  religious  nature ;  there  is  no  truth 
which  the  religious  nature  can  afford  to  despise ;  and  I  venture 
to  utter  a  proposition  which  brings  us  back  to  the  simple,  di- 
rect, and  primitive  faith  of  humanity :  there  is  no  truth  which 
is  not  an  immediate  reflection  and  revelation  of  God. 

The  service  which  intellect,  under  the  promptings  of  religious 
instinct,  can  render  to  the  religious  system  will  be  indicated 
in  later  lectures  of  this  course.  In  the  present  lecture  I  have 
enunciated  general  truths  relating  to  the  necessary  interaction 
of  the  religious  and  the  intellectual  faculties.  These  truths 
may  be  regarded  as  deduced  from  the  necessary  laws  of  the 
human  mind ;  but  they  must  be  amply  exemplified  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  world :  and  I  shall  devote  the  next  two  lectures  to 
a  rapid  historical  sketch  of  the  so-called  "  conflicts  "  of  religion 
and  science.  I  do  this  not  only  to  present  an  inductive  basis 
for  the  generalizations  already  brought  forward,  but  because 
these  conflicts  have  been  unjustly  made  a  ground  of  accusa- 
tion against  religion  as  the  foe  of  science  and  of  the  civiliza- 
tion which  runs  parallel  with  it. 


II. 

INTERACTION  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  THE  INTELLECTUAL 

FACULTIES  IN  ORIENTAL  AND  GRECIAN 

PSYCHIC  HISTORY. 

I  HAVE  attempted  to  show  that  the  essential  natures  of  the 
religious  and  the  intellectual  forces  in  man  foreordain  a  species 
of  antagonism ;  that  this  perpetual  antagonism  is  not,  neverthe- 
less, an  abnormal  condition,  but  a  grand  example  of  the  univers- 
al economy  of  God,  who  has  ordained  antagonism  as  the  con- 
dition of  progress  in  the  natural  and  the  moral  worlds.  I  have 
deduced  from  the  necessary  relation  of  the  ethical  and  cognitive 
powers  a  necessary  series  of  oscillations  in  the  relative  domi- 
nance of  religious  and  intellectual  influences  in  the  lives  of  men ; 
and  have  indicated  that  the  exponent  of  these  oscillations  has 
been,  as  it  must  be,  a  series  of  alternating  periods  of  religious 
and  of  intellectual  activity  and  progress.  Such  alternations, 
since  the  antagonizing  forces  belong  to  humanity  as  such,  must 
characterize  the  history  of  all  nations,  all  races,  and  all  times. 

The  present  lecture  will  aim  to  show  that  the  facts  of  the 
religious  and  intellectual  history  of  the  human  race  illustrate 
and  confirm  these  deductions,  and  become,  in  reality,  a  broad 
inductive  basis  on  which  these  propositions  may  be  rested  as 
valid  generalizations.  A  prolonged  and  attentive  study  of  the 
facts  which  make  up  the  religious  and  intellectual  history  of 
our  race  has  caused  my  attention  to  be  directed  to  the  follow- 
ing facts  subsidiary  to  the  general  inductions:  1.  Religious 
faith  recedes  from  its  normal  condition  to  one  of  abnormal  sub- 
ordination, or  advances  to  one  of  abnormal  supremacy.  2.  In- 
tellect, from  its  normal  condition,  either  advances  to  a  haughty 


42  LAWS  OF  INTERACTION. 

dictatorship,  or  falls  into  a  condition  of  servitude.  3.  These 
movements  of  faith  and  intellect  are  reciprocal  and  responsive. 
4.  The  direction  of  the  movement  is  determined  by  the  initia- 
tive :  if  faith  lead  in  activity,  a  religious  phase  succeeds ;  if  in- 
tellect take  precedence,  religious  pretensions  shrink,  and  an  in- 
tellectual phase  succeeds..  The  two  phases  complete  a  psychic 
cycle. 

I  proceed  now  to  enunciate  in  advance  the  general  principles 
induced  from  a  study  of  the  facts  of  human  history. 

LAWS  OF  THE  INTERACTION  OF  FAITH  AND  INTELLECT. 

I.  ABNORMAL  STATES  OF  FAITH. 

1.  The  abnormal  states  of  Faith  are  insensibility,  debility, 
and  overactivity. 

II.  THEIR  CAUSES. 

2.  Moral  insensibility  results  from  the  supremacy  of  evil 
passions.     This  condition  is  not  directly  concerned  in  the  in- 
teraction of  the  religious  and  intellectual  faculties. 

3.  The  state  of  debility  (disregarding  moral  causes)  results 
from  intellectual  encroachments. 

4.  The  state  of  overactivity  results  from  aggrandizements  se- 
cured through  political  power,  or  perhaps,  sometimes,  through 
intellectual  indolence. 

III.  RECIPROCAL  MOVEMENTS  OF  FAITH  AND  INTELLECT. 
(a)   Toward  the  Norm. 

5.  From  a  state  of  debility,  the  moral  norm  is  regained  by  a 
moral  reaction  or  revulsion  arising  in  the  religious  nature.    The 
process  is  a  moral  revival.     Concomitantly,  intellect  returns  to 
a  state  of  soberness  and  sanity.    The  basis  of  the  revival  is  laid 
in  a  previous  period  of  intellectual  ascendency ;  but  its  quick- 
ening force  is  the  religious  consciousness. 


LAWS  OF  INTERACTION.  43 

6.  From  a  state  of  overactivity,  the  moral  norm  is  reached 
by  a  rebellion  of  the  intellect.     The  result  lifts  intellect  again 
into  a  state  of  normal  authority.     The  process  is  a  reforma- 
tion in  the  political  and  the  religious  system,  or,  at  least,  in  the 
latter. 

7.  The  watch-word  of  a  revival  or  a  reformation  is  "primi- 
tive faith  ;"  and  to  the  strength  and  simplicity  of  the  primi- 
tive (normal)  faith  it  struggles  to  return. 

(b)  from,  the  Norm. 

.  8.  From  the  primitive  faith  follows  a  divergence.  Its  sim- 
plicity is  succeeded,  according  to  what  seems  a  psychical  law, 
by  a  tendency  to  complexity,  marked  by  a  growing  ritualism, 
sacerdotalism,  aggressiveness,  intolerance,  tyranny. 

9.  Against  these  excesses  the  intellect  begins  to  rebel,  and 
the  germs  of  a  new  reformation  are  planted.     Meantime,  intel- 
lect is  repressed,  and  ultimately  falls  into  a  state  of  complete 
bondage. 

10.  The  new  reformation  brings  back  faith  to  its  normal  sim- 
plicity, and  intellect  to  its  normal  action. 

IV.  RESUME. 

11.  Thus,  when  Faith  takes  the  initiative  in  action,  starting 
from  the  state  of  simple  (monotheistic)  faith,  we  witness  the 
following  series  of  results  : 

(  Faith  simple :  complex )  „ 

Faith  ascendant. .  \  _  [•  Revolution. 

( Intellect  normal ;  rebellious .  ) 

12.  Revolution  now  throws  the  initiative  upon  Intellect,  and, 
starting  from  the  coincident  norm  of  intellect  and  faith,  we 
witness  the  following  results : 

( Intellect  normal ;  dominant. . .  )  _ 

Intellect  ascendant.  .-<  .     ,,.,.,  [-Revival. 

( taith  normal;  debilitated. . . .  ) 

Both  movements  may  be  thrown  into  a  diagrammatic  form, 
and  more  clearly  illustrated  to  the  eye : 


44 


PSYCHIC  CYCLES. 


Duplex  Psychic  Cycle.                  Duplex  Hemicycle. 

FAITH. 

Religious  Phase.    £  Intellectual  Phase.        Religious  Phase.    ^ 

Normal. 

Complex.      "^    Normal. 

Debilitated.  **     Normal. 

Complex.     '•§ 

INTELLECT. 

Normal. 

Rebellious,     g    Normal. 

Dominant*     92     Normal. 
PH 

Rebellious,     g 
«w 

r%                                                                                                    r& 
FAITH  ASCENDANT.      P3    THOUGHT  ASCENDANT.             FAITH  ASCENDANT.       PH 

The  psychical  history  of  our  race  presents,  therefore,  a  suc- 
cession of  Religious  and  Intellectual  Phases  alternating  with 
each  other.  During  the  Religious  Phase,  Faith  takes  the  initi- 
ative in  action,  and  is  in  the  ascendant,  while  Intellect  is  in  the 
descendent.  During  the  Intellectual  Phase,  thought  takes  the 
initiative,  and  is  in  the  ascendant,  while  Faith  is  in  the  descend- 
ent. The  Religious  Phase  supervenes  on  a  Revival,  and  is  ter- 
minated by  a  Reformation ;  the  Intellectual  supervenes  on  a 
Reformation,  and  is  terminated  by  a  Revival.  On  the  comple- 
tion of  a  cycle,  consisting  of  the  two  phases,  Faith  and  Intel- 
lect stand  in  the  same  relative  positions  as  at  first. 

These  movements  may  be  otherwise  illustrated.  Faith  and 
Intellect  move  in  two  equal  intersecting  orbits,  having  a  com- 
mon centre.  The  norm  is  a  plane  bisecting  the  angle  formed 
by  the  planes  of  these  orbits.  The  orbit  of  Faith  is  alternately 
above  and  below  the  normal  plane ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
orbit  of  Intellect.  The  two  orbits  intersect  each  other  in  the 
plane  of  the  norm,  and  we  have  here  two  equipotencies.  That 
which  occurs  when  Faith  passes  its  ascending,  and  Intellect  its 
descending,  node  is  a  Revival  Equipotence ;  and  that  which 
occurs  when  Faith  passes  its  descending,  and  Intellect  its  as- 
cending, node  is  a  Reformative  Equipotence.  (See  next  page.) 

This  particular  example  of  a  deeply  rooted  tendency  to  pe- 
riodicity in  the  psychic  activities  of  mankind  confirms  the 


PSYCHIC  CYCLES  AND  EPICYCLES. 


45 


truth  of  an  adage  long  extant,  that  "History  repeats  itself." 
The  phenomenon  is  grounded  on  the  psychical  identity  of  the 
race,  and  the  uniformity  of  the  physical  laws  under  which  phe- 
nomena are  wrought  out,  which  become  conditions  of  psychic 
activity.  Each  individual's  developmental  experience  repeats 
the  history  of  every  other  individual.  Each  tribe  or  civic  com- 
munity, beginning  as  a  child,  proceeds,  with  greater  or  less  ra- 
pidity, through  a  series  of  educational  stages  determined  by  the 
psychic  forces  of  an  unchanging  human  nature,  played  upon 
by  the  stimuli  emanating  from  the  presence  and  contact  of  a 
material  environment  changeless  in  its  mode  of  action. 

It  would  not  express  the  whole  of  the  cyclic  system  to  rep- 
resent these  cycles  as  either  the  only  psychic  cycles  realized  in 
human  history,  or  as  movements  sharply  isolated  and  definable. 


Within  the  sweep  of  one  cycle  have  been  evolved  cycles  of  less 
magnitude  and  salience;  and  this  system  of  cycles  and  epicy- 
cles has  been  embraced  in  grander  cycles  which  represent 
psychic  movements  which  embrace  entire  races.  Thus  the 
Indo-European  race  sweeps  through  three  grand  psychic  cycles, 
the  first  ending  with  the  fall  of  the  Persian  Empire ;  the  sec- 
ond, with  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  of  the  East ;  and  the 
third,  extending  to  our  own  times. 


46  CYCLIC  IRREGULARITIES. 

Further,  it  must  be  clearly  stated  that  the  religious  and  intel- 
lectual phases  are  seldom  quite  consecutive.  The  latter  arises 
before  the  termination  of  the  Religious  Phase.  Sometimes  it 
runs  for  centuries  parallel  with  it,  and  sometimes  even  dies  out 
while  yet  the  Religious  Phase  persists.  The  partial  or  com- 
plete contemporaneity  of  the  two  phases  implies  a  division  of 
the  public  into  a  religious  section  and  an  intellectual  section. 

The  series  of  cyclic  movements  sometimes  bifurcates,  as  in 
the  divergence  of  the  Zoroastrian,  and  afterward  the  Buddhist, 
system,  from  the  Brahmanic.  The  Brahmanic  continues  its 
cyclic  development  by  itself,  while  the  two  others,  each  in  turn, 
begin  a  series  of  cyclic  evolutions  of  their  own ;  and  all  three 
reach  to  our  own  times.  A  similar  phenomenon  is  seen  in  the 
histories  of  Christianity  and  Islamism. 

These  grand  movements  in  the  field  of  psychical  history  are 
not  obscurely  seen  in  the  vicissitudes  of  the  nations  of  remotest 
antiquity. 

Egyptian  Psychic  History. 

Egyptian  history,  which,  according  to  respectable  authority, 
stretches  back  to  the  remotest  date  (5004  B.C.,  according  to 
Manetho ;  3623  B.C.,  according  to  Bunsen ;  2700  B.C.,  according 
to  Poole),  presents  a  series  of  vicissitudes  which  we  may  group 
into  four  Psychic  Cycles.  The  FIRST  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  embraces 
the  first  Ten  Dynasties.  As  with  the  mythic  periods  of  all 
nations,  the  earliest,  or  prereflective,  period  of  Egypt  seems  to 
have  been  characterized  by  a  dominance  of  the  religious  nature. 
This  is  the  first  Religious  Phase.  We  may  regard  it  as  preced- 
ing the  epoch  of  the  culminating  prosperity  of  Memphis.  The 
Intellectual  Phase  followed,  and  appears  to  be  well  marked; 
though  its  remains  have  but  recently  been  brought  to  the  no- 
tice of  the  world.  These  monuments,  exhumed  through  the 
industry  and  sagacity  of  M.  Mariette,  sustained  by  the  enlight- 
ened patronage  of  the  Khedive,  have  been  brought  together 
in  magnificent  collections  at  Boulak,  in  Upper  Egypt,  and  at 


SECOND  EGYPTIAN  CYCLE.  47 

Cairo.  They  are  described  as  evincing  a  degree  of  artistic  and 
intellectual  development  superior  even  to  that  which  is  repre- 
sented in  the  later  and  better-known  monuments  stored  in  the 
museums  of  Paris  and  Berlin^1) 

The  SECOND  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  embraces  the  period  of  these 
later  monuments.  The  Religious  Phase  covered  the  period  of 
the  formation  and  prevalence  of  the  ancient  religion  embodied 
in  the  First  Book  of  the  Sacred  Canon,  as  described  by  St. 
Clement.(2)  This,  like  the  most  ancient  book  of  the  Vedas, 
consisted  of  hymns  to  the  gods.  The  complete  Canon  contain- 
ed forty-two  books,  of  which  the  Second  treated  of  the  whole 
duty  of  a  king's  life.  The  celebrated  "  Book  of  the  Dead," 
belonging  to  the  Eleventh  Dynasty  (2500  B.C.),  is  supposed  to 
have  constituted  a  part  of  the  Canon.  This,  nevertheless,  must 
be  regarded  as  a  foreshadowing  of  the  next  phase,  since  "  it  is 
obviously  the  product  of  a  matured  sacerdotal  philosophy — 
the  Apocalypse  of  Egypt."(3)  The  "  Book  of  Transmigrations  " 
embodies  similar  doctrines,  and  probably  belongs  to  the  same 
stage  of  development.  The  Intellectual  Phase  of  this  Cycle 
is  marked  by  the  appearance  of  the  later  books  of  the  Sacred 
Canon.  These  seem  to  have  constituted  a  complete  encyclo- 
pedia, and  well  exemplify  the  universal  truth  that  all  learning 
among  primitive  peoples  is  turned  over  to  the  custody  of  re- 
ligion— priest  and  philosopher  being  one.  In  these  books  were 
treatises  on  astronomy,  hieroglyphics,  cosmography,  geography, 
topography  of  Egpyt,  and  a  particular  description  of  the  Nile. 
All  this  knowledge  was  represented  as  derived  from  Thoth,  the 
first  Hermes  Trismegistus,  by  order  of  the  Supreme  God.  The 
preparation  for  this  phase  began  560  B.C.,  when  Amosis  gave 
permission  to  Greeks  to  settle  in  Egypt.  Jews  had  already 


(J)  Taylor,  "  Egypt  and  Iceland,"  chaps,  ix.,  x. 

(2)  Clemens  Alexandrinus,  "  Stromata,"  book  vi.,  chap.  iv. 

(3)  Moffat,  "A  Comparative  History  of  Religions,"  p.  63. 

8 


48  LATER  EGYPTIAN  CYCLES. 

been  there  since  the  capture  of  Jerusalem  by  Nebuchadnezzar 
(588  B.C.). 

A  THIRD  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  of  Egyptian  history  dates  from  the 
conquest  of  Egypt  by  Alexander  (332  B.C.).  Though  Egypt 
has  never  since  had  an  independent  existence,  and  her  psychic 
development  may  be  regarded  rather  as  Greek,  Horn  an,  Sara- 
cenic, and  Turkish,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  we  still  discern 
the  cyclical  movement.  The  Religious  Phase  of  this  cycle  was 
clearly  exemplified  in  Alexandrian  Judaism  and  its  later  dis- 
placement by  Alexandrian  Christianity ;  while  an  Intellectual 
Phase  is  strongly  marked  by  the  planting  and  development  of 
science  and  theosophy  under  the  Ptolemies. 

A  FOURTH  PSYCHIC  CYCLE,  beginning  with  the  conquest  of 
Egypt  by  the  Arabians  (640  A.D.),  presents  a  Religious  Phase 
in  the  bloody  fanaticism  of  Mohammedanism,  bearing  down  all 
resistance;  and  an  Intellectual  Phase,  which  is  dawning  like 
another  "  Renaissance  "  under  the  auspices  of  the  present  Egyp- 
tian Viceroy — the  West  discharging  the  obligations  it  incurred 
to  the  East  in  the  European  Revival  of  Letters.^) 

Chinese  Psychic  History. 

We  turn,  next,  to  glance  at  the  psychic  history  of  the  Chi- 
nese. The  FIRST  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  may  be  taken  as  extending 
from  the  epoch  of  the  oldest  records  to  the  period  of  Confu- 
cius. The  Religious  Phase  begins  with  the  date  of  the  oldest 
of  the  Sacred  Writings,  said  to  have  been  written  by  Fu-hi, 
2800  B.C.  This  is  known  as  the  Yi-king,  meaning  "Transfor- 

(')  The  light  of  learning  has  been  reflected  reciprocally  between  the  East 
and  the  West  as  between  two  mirrors.  In  earliest  historic  times,  Egypt 
Assyria,  and  Persia  sent  the  light  of  learning  to  Greece.  Greece  reflected 
it  back  to  Egypt  and  Syria  as  a  sequence  of  the  Alexandrian  conquests ; 
Syria  and  Constantinople  sent  it  again  into  Greece,  Italy,  and  other  parts 
of  Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages :  and  now,  again,  the  learning  of  Europe  is 
seen  reflected  back  upon  Egypt,  Constantinople,  and  Syria. 


CONFUCIUS  AND  LAO-TSE.  49 

mations."  The  Second  Book,  or  She-king,  consists  of  chants  of 
a  sublime  and  devotional  character,  like  those  of  the  Rig- Veda. 
The  Intellectual  Phase  grew  up  with  the  development  of  reflec- 
tion, and  was  for  a  long  period  coincident  with  a  declension  of 
moral  and  religious  earnestness.  Literature  increased ;  but  the 
teaching  of  the  Sacred  Books  was  neglected. 

The  SECOND  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  was  introduced  by  Confucius, 
who,  like  other  reformers,  directed  attention  to  the  duties  in- 
culcated by  the  ancient  religion.  His  period  was  between  551 
and  479  B.C.  Though  Confucius  did  not  return  to  the  spiritu- 
alism of  the  primitive  faith,  he  revived  religious  interest,  and 
reinstated  a  respect  for  the  Sacred  Books  in  the  hearts  of  his 
countrymen.  He  collected  together  the  fragments  of  the  old 
canon,  and  compiled  and  composed  three  additional  books, 
which  constitute  a  portion  of  the  Sacred  Writings  of  the  Chi- 
nese. These  books  make  no  assumption  of  inspiration  nor 
support  by  miracles ;  but  their  authors  are  regarded  as  excel- 
ling in  wisdom  and  goodness  all  others  of  their  race.  The 
moral  and  religious  revival  introduced  by  Confucius  signalizes 
the  Religious  Phase  of  this  Cycle.  Almost  simultaneously 
arose  another  teacher,  Lao-Tse  (604  B.C.),  who  introduced  the 
religion  of  the  supreme  reason.  The  sum  of  his  recorded  in- 
structions is  embodied  in  the  Tau-teh-king,  the  classic  of  rea- 
son and  virtue.  Lao-Tse,  the  Schilling  of  China,  planted  the 
germs  of  a  transcendental  philosophy,  which,  with  the  abate- 
ment of  the  influence  exerted  by  Confucius,  gained  sufficient 
strength  and  acceptance  to  prompt  the  head  of  the  dynasty  of 
Ts'in  (220-200  B.C.)  to  doom  the  Sacred  Books  to  destruction. 
The  reign  of  Taoism  marks  the  Intellectual  Phase  of  the  Sec- 
ond Cycle. 

The  THIRD  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  was  ushered  in  by  the  termina- 
tion of  the  dynasty  of  Ts'in  and  the  reproduction  of  the  Sacred 
Books  under  Wen-ti  (135  B.C.).  A  new  religious  zeal  spread 
through  the  empire,  marking  a  Religious  Phase.  Of  its  de- 


50  CHINESE  BUDDHISM. 

cline,  and  the  invasion  of  the  Intellectual  Phase,  I  have  learn- 
ed nothing  very  specific.  We  know,  however,  that  in  the  year 
66  A.D.  Buddhism  made  its  advent  into  China,  and  awakened 
the  long-slumbering  religious  sentiments  to  the  demands  of  a 
system  more  spiritual,  and  more  consonant  with  the  simple  in- 
stincts of  the  soul,  than  the  degenerate  system  which  had  super- 
vened upon  the  revival  under  Wen-ti.  This  event,  then,  marks 
the  beginning  of  the  Religious  Phase  of  the  FOURTH  PSYCHIC 
CYCLE  in  China.  The  later  periods  of  Buddhist  history,  as 
is  well  known,  have  been  marked  by  a  growing  ceremonialism 
and  diminishing  spirituality.  China  has  shown  signs  of  an  in- 
tellectual awakening,  and  the  advent  of  an  Intellectual  Phase. 
While  the  Buddhism  of  China  has  reached  a  degeneracy  which 
forebodes  another  religious  revival,  the  intellectual  aristocracy 
of  the  empire,  however  small  their  minority  numerically,  are 
steadily  leading  its  institutions  into  the  light  and  learning  of 
advanced  civilization. 

I  have  dwelt  too  briefly  on  the  events  of  Chinese  history  to 
convey  a  vivid  impression  of  the  fluctuations  depicted  in  the 
spiritual  life  of  the  people ;  but  the  salient  facts  pointed  out 
teach  us  that  the  cyclic  movements  are  real.  The  fact  arrests 
the  attention  of  Moffat,  who  says:  "Among  the  sacred  books 
of  antiquity,  outside  of  the  Bible,  there  is  no  plainer  recogni- 
tion of  the  supreme  authority  of  one  personal  God  than  in  the 
utterances  of  some  of  the  Chinese  monarchs.  The  progress  of 
natural  religion,  in  China,  as  elsewhere,  has  been  that  of  degen- 
eracy, tending  to  a  multiplication  of  gods,  and  the  assumption 
of  objects  of  worship  from  various  sources ;  and  then,  the  sep- 
aration of  the  learned  from  the  unlearned  by  a  pantheistic  or 
otherwise  godless  philosophy." (J) 

(')  Hoffat,  "A  Comparative  History  of  Religions,"  p.  179. 


EARLY  BRAHMANISM.  51 

Indian  Psychic  History. 

We  turn  also,  briefly,  to  the  psychic  history  of  India.  The 
FIRST  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  is  Hindoo,  and  the  dominant  religion  is 
Brahmanism.  Its  Religious  Phase  is  stamped  by  primitive  Ve- 
daism,  or  the  religion  of  the  Rig- Veda  Sanhita,  whose  epoch  is 
thought  to  be  about  1400  B.C.  Max  Miiller  and  other  Orient- 
alists have  made  us  well  acquainted  with  the  pure  and  exalted 
devotion  which  characterizes  the  Mantras,  or  Hymns,  of  the  Rig- 
Veda  Sanhita.  Some  of  these  Hymns  are  almost  worthy  to  be 
placed  by  the  side  of  the  loftiest  Psalms  of  David.  They  illus- 
trate in  a  most  interesting  manner  the  eminently  religious  char- 
acteristics of  a  primitive  people,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  sim- 
plicity, beauty,  and  correctness  of  their  theology.  The  human 
mind  in  India,  however,  following  a  law  which  seems  necessary, 
began  to  gather  about  the  primitive  system  a  body  of  rites  and 
complications  of  a  merely  external  character.  However  the  in- 
telligence failed  to  discover  the  significance  and  propriety  of 
empty  forms,  the  religious  nature,  as  everywhere,  manifested  a 
proneness  to  ceremonials  and  unessentials.  A  burdensome  rit- 
ual grew  up,  embodied  in  the  books  known  as  the  Brahmanas, 
which  are  supposed  to  date  back,  approximately,  to  1000  B.C. 
In  the  lapse  of  time,  other  books,  embodying  other  or  more 
elaborate  directions  for  the  conduct  of  religion,  grew  into  exist- 
ence, under  the  designation  of  Sutras.  These  are  not  later  than 
600  B.C.  At  this  period,  the  Brahmanic  priests  had  come  into 
the  exercise  of  a  sacerdotal  despotism.  As  it  must  be,  under 
such  circumstances,  reflective  minds  had  long  felt  a  more  or 
less  outspoken  dissent.  Though  ritualistic  tyranny  was  only 
checked,  not  uprooted,  and  continued  yet,  through  many  cent- 
uries, an  Intellectual  Phase  was  setting  in.  Hindoo  speculation 
was  elaborating  systems  sometimes  fanciful,  sometimes  pro- 
found. To  this  period  belongs  the  monistic  theosophy  of  the 
Vedanta — the  theoretical  poetry  of  the  Mimansa.  Here,  also, 


52  RISE  OF  ZOROASTRIANISM. 

belongs  the  dualistic  philosophy  of  the  Sankya,  which  is  at- 
tributed to  Kapila ;  and  the  atomistic  philosophy  and  theistic 
school  of  Patangali.  These  systems  mark  clearly  the  phase  of 
thought  and  growing  dissent  which  always  succeeds  a  period  of 
religious  encroachment,  even  when  it  does  not  terminate  it  by 
a  revolution.  In  this  case,  Brahmanic  ritualism  outlived  skep- 
tical philosophy,  to  awaken  successive  protests  of  a  more  relig- 
ious kind,  to  undergo  itself  a  revival  incident  to  the  expulsion 
of  an  intrusive  system,  and  then  to  lapse  into  a  baser  ritualism 
than  before,  which  lingers  to  our  times,  overlapped  distinctly, 
however,  by  an  awakening  of  intellect  which  promises  for  Hin- 
doostan  an  era  of  correct  thinking  and  regenerated  religion. 

But,  in  the  mean  time,  superimposed  upon  the  tidal  move- 
ments of  Brahmanic  thought,  two  great  cycles  have  revolved, 
which  stand  forth  so  conspicuously  as  to  constitute  the  charac- 
teristic movements  of  Indian  psychic  history.  These  are,  re- 
spectively, Zoroastrian  and  Buddhistic.  The  first  we  may  re- 
gard as  marking  the  SECOND  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  in  India.  Its  re- 
ligion is  that  of  the  Avesta.  It  signalizes  a  sharp  dissent  from 
the  encroaching  demands  of  the  Brahmanic  system.  Though 
arising  long  before  Brahmanic  ritualism  had  attained  its  culmi- 
nation, and,  perhaps,  before  the  completion  of  the  Brahmanas, 
it  constitutes  a  logical  and  real  succession.  It  was,  in  its  Re- 
ligious Phase,  an  attempt  to  return  to  the  simplicity  of  the 
primitive  monotheistic  faith  and  worship.  Its  adherents,  orig- 
inally seceders  from  Brahmanism,  increased  most  rapidly  on 
the  north  of  the  Himalayas,  and  ultimately  made  Zoroastrian- 
ism  the  State  religion  of  Persia.  The  vicissitudes  of  this  relig- 
ion are  but  a  revolution  of  the  wheel  of  thought.  The  Gathas 
of  the  Yasna,  constituting  the  oldest  Book  of  the  Avesta,  give 
expression  to  the  simplest  and  purest  and  loftiest  devotion. 
The  Vispered,  the  Second  Book  of  the  Avesta,  discloses  the 
growth  of  a  liturgical  system.  The  next  step  shows  the  in- 
weaving of  the  threads  of  speculation.  The  Third  Book  of  the 


PIETY  OF  DARIUS.  53 

Avesta  is  the  Vendidad,  which  embraces  the  ethical  philosophy 
of  Zoroastrianism.  The  degeneracy  of  this  religion  has  never 
become  extreme.  Though  the  religion  of  the  State  under  such 
absolute  monarchs  as  Darius  (500  B.C.)  and  Cyrus,  it  continued 
to  be  characterized  by  a  monotheism  and  purity  which  still  ex- 
cite our  admiration.  It  was  Darius  Hystaspes  who  engraved 
the  famous  inscription  on  the  rocks  of  Behistun,  ascribing  his 
successes  as  a  ruler  and  general  to  the  assistance  of  the  Su- 
preme God — a  bold  and  devout  acknowledgment  imperishably 
sculptured  on  the  face  of  a  cliff,  high  -  lifted  before  the  gaze 
of  his  own  subjects  and  the  populations  which  should  succeed 
even  to  the  latest  time.  "A  great  God  is  Ahuramazda,  who 
made  the  earth,  who  made  the  heaven,  who  created  men,  and 
provided  blessedness  for  them,  who  made  Darius  king,  the  sole 
king  over  many.  *  *  *  Through  the  might  of  Ahuramazda  am 
I  king.  *  **  *  Through  the  grace  of  Ahuramazda  do  I  rule  this 
kingdom."  This  is  the  proclamation  of  a  monarch  mightier 
than  David.  Cyrus  acknowledged  the  same  God  ;(')  and  Cam- 
byses,  the  great  general,  ridiculed  the  gods  and  idols  of  the 
degenerate  Egyptians. 

This  Religious  Phase  was  followed  by  an  Intellectual  one, 
not  strongly  marked,  but  signalized  by  the  invasion  of  free 
thought  and  the  slow  corruption  of  the  ancient  religion.  This, 
again,  was  succeeded  by  the  development  of  Parseeism,  which 
persists  feebly  to  the  present  day. 

Meantime,  however,  the  THIRD  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  of  Indian 
history  had  begun.  Its  course  has  been  somewhat  parallel  and 
contemporaneous  with  the  later  history  of  Brahmanism  and  Zo- 
roastrianism. It  is  a  third  religious  system  of  Sanskrit-speak- 
ing peoples.  It  is  the  religion  of  the  Tripitaka.  Buddhism 
may  be  regarded  as  the  reduplication  of  the  Zoroastrian  rebell- 
ion against  the  excesses  of  Brahmanism.  That  was  a  diver- 

(')  Ezra  i.,  2. 


54  VICISSITUDES  OF  BUDDHISM. 

gence;  this  was  a  schism.  The  revolt  was  absolute.  It  re- 
jected the  doctrines,  the  sacerdotalism,  and  the  whole  pantheon 
of  the  Brahmanic  system,  and  returned  to  the  simple  practices 
of  virtue,  abstinence,  and  religious  contemplation.  The  Relig- 
ious Phase  begins  with  the  preaching  of  Buddha,  about  550 
B.C.  Note,  again,  the  circle  of  evolutions.  The  oldest  books 
of  the  Tripitaka  are  exclusively  religious  and  ethical.  The 
Vinaya-Pitaka  is  a  body  of  moral  precepts.  The  Sutra-Pi taka 
is  a  collection  of  the  sayings  of  Buddha.  Next,  however,  fol- 
lows the  Dharma-Pitaka,  in  which  we  recognize  a  growing  de- 
velopment of  speculative  thought.  This  book  consists  of  dog- 
matic philosophy,  cosmology,  and  other  secular  learning.  Next, 
we  see  Buddhism  (250  B.C.)  becoming  the  State  religion  of  In- 
dia under  Asoka.  It  degenerated,  by  degrees,  into  formalism, 
idolatry,  and  unreasoning  inanities.  Then  the  revolt  arose  to 
which  I  alluded  in  speaking  of  Brahmanism;  and  the  latter 
system,  in  a  regenerated  form,  replaced  Buddhism.  The  Bud- 
dhists were  expelled  250  A.D.,  and  spread  through  China,  Tarta- 
ry,  Corea,  Japan,  Burmah,  Siam,  and  other  regions,  preaching 
and  propagating  their  religion  with  a  missionary  spirit  quite 
comparable  with  that  which,  during  the  same  periods,  was 
spreading  Christianity  over  the  Western  world.  Buddhism  in 
the  East,  like  Christianity  in  the  West,  has  thus  maintained  a 
dominant  position  in  all  the  countries  to  which  it  spread,  down 
to  the  present  day.  This  dispersion  of  the  adherents  of  Bud- 
dhism through  so  many  countries  has  kept  the  system  in  the 
perpetuated  condition  of  a  rising  religion ;  and  it  has  been  vi- 
talized, through  so  many  centuries,  by  that  zeal  which  is  the 
condition  and  characteristic  of  the  youth  of  a  religious  system. 
Nevertheless,  Buddhism  has  undergone  its  destined  degenera- 
cy in  every  country  which  it  has  possessed.  It  has  become 
encumbered  with  accreted  forms  and  rites ;  and  heresies  have 
riven  the  body  ecclesiastic  to  its  centre.  Several  general  coun- 
cils have  been  held  for  the  compilation  of  sacred  books,  the 


HEBREW  CYCLES.  55 

suppression  of  heresies,  and  the  strengthening  of  the  system ; 
but  the  Intellectual  Phase  is  marching  on.  Its  rise  may  be 
regarded  as  signalized  by  the  appearance  of  the  Abidharma,  or 
body  of  metaphysics ;  and  its  march,  by  the  entrance  of  West- 
ern ideas  and  institutions  into  the  inert  mass  of  Chinese,  Jap- 
anese, and  other  Oriental  polities. 

I  shall  not  occupy  you  with  any  detail  of  the  psychic  move- 
ment among  the  Hebrews  and  Assyrians.  In  reference  to  the 
former,  it  suffices  to  remind  you  that  the  bounds  of  such  move- 
ments are  disclosed  in  Biblical  history.  The  Book  of  Genesis 
—  which  stands  before  us,  more  properly,  as  eleven  separate 
compositions — is  the  surviving  monument  of  the  earliest  Relig- 
ious Phase.  This  was  the  Bible  of  the  Patriarchs.  The  relig- 
ion was  patriarchal.  Intervening  between  the  compilation  of 
the  Book  of  Genesis  and  the  birth  of  Moses  was  a  decline  of 
faith,  and  an  infusion  of  the  literature  and  religion  of  the 
Egyptians.  A  Second  Religious  Phase  was  ushered  in  with 
the  giving  of  the  "Books  of  the  Law,"  and  endured  to  the 
end  of  prophecy,  when  another  decline  set  in  and  occupied  the 
interval  to  the  birth  of  Christ.  At  this  epoch  a  Third  Relig- 
ious Phase  dawned  upon  the  Hebrew  nation,  and  its  history 
began  to  be  merged  into  the  common  history  of  Europe. 

These  references  to  the  salient  epochs  of  Oriental  thought 
and  religious  emotion,  so  brief  as  almost  to  fall  within  the  do- 
main of  statistics,  demonstrate,  I  think,  that  the  mode  of  in- 
teraction of  the  religious  and  intellectual  faculties  is  a  reality, 
in  the  form  in  which  I  have  depicted  it.  But  more  interesting 
exemplifications  follow. 

Grecian  Psychic  History. 

Grecian  psychic  history  is  marked  by  a  more  luminous  line 
of  light  than  that  of  any  other  ancient  people.  The  FIRST 
PSYCHIC  CYCLE  is  Homeric.  The  priests  and  prophets  of  the 
Religious  Phase  were  such  semi-mythical  personages  as  Homer 


56  IONICS  AND  PYTHAGOREANS. 

and  Hesiod.  The. theology  and  cosmology  developed  in  their 
writings,  while  revealing,  like  all  primitive  faiths,  a  knowledge 
of  one  Supreme  Divinity,  disclose  a  bias  toward  polytheism 
and  gross  religious  perversions,  which  indicate  that  these  writ- 
ers lived  in  the  corrupted  decline  of  an  older  system,  of  which 
we  have  no  records,  unless  it  be  in  the  Orphic  Hymns.  These, 
however,  though  anciently  regarded  as  of  older  date,  embody 
speculations  which  mark  a  more  developed  stage  of  thought. 
I  prefer  to  consider  them,  with  Aristotle,  the  exponents  of  a  ris- 
ing spirit  of  philosophy,  which  Pherecydes  (548  B.C.)  brought 
to  a  fuller  development.  It  involves  speculations  of  a  mystical 
and  pantheistical  character,  and  gives  expression  to  the  Intel- 
lectual Phase  of  the  Homeric  Cycle. 

Overlapping  this  was  the  beginning  of  the  SECOND  PSYCHIC 
CYCLE,  whose  Religious  Phase  embraced  the  Ionic  and  Pytha- 
gorean Schools  of  Philosophy.  The  Ionic  Philosophy  was  Hy- 
lozoism,  based  on  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  animaliza- 
tion  of  forms  of  inorganic  matter — not  atheistic,  nor  even  ma- 
terialistic in  the  offensive  sense,  for  its  adherents  were  engaged 
in  the  earnest  pursuit  after  the  One  Principle,  which,  in  their 
consciousness,  was  the  revelation  of  God.  Thales  (640  B.C.) 
thought  the  first  principle  of  all  things  was  Water;  Anaximan- 
der  (611  B.C.)  thought  it  was  TO  aitEipov,  the  indefinite — per- 
haps the  equivalent  conception  of  Chaos,  or  the  condition  of 
absolute  homogeneity;  Anaximenes  (528-524  B.C.)  thought  he 
had  discovered  the  first  principle  in  Air;  while  Heraclitus  dis- 
covered it  in  Fire.  The  "  Fire  "  of  this  philosopher,  however, 
was  an  ethereal  element,  which  he  identifies  with  a  pervasive 
divine  spirit  or  reason,  which  he  conceived  as  eternal  and  im- 
manent in  the  world.  The  Pythagoreans  were  charmed  by  the 
harmony  which  they  recognized  in  Creation.  Numbers,  which 
exactly  express  the  harmony  and  rhythm  of  nature,  were  re- 
garded as  the  substance,  or,  at  least,  the  symbols,  of  that  har- 
mony. Pythagoras,  their  founder,  lived  582  B.C.  His  most 


EARLY  GREEK  ASPIRATIONS.  57 

conspicuous  disciples  lived  considerably  later,  and  after  the 
rise  of  other  schools  of  philosophy.  Philolaus  held  that  the 
"  world  is  eternal,  and  ruled  by  the  ONE  who  is  akin  to  it,  and 
has  supreme  might  and  excellence.  The  director  and  ruler  of 
all  things  is  God.  He  is  one  and  eternal,  enduring  and  un- 
movable,  ever  like  himself,  and  different  from  all  things  beside 
him.  He  encompasses  and  guards  the  universe.'^1) 

Hicetas,  who  taught  the  axial  revolution  of  the  earth,  and 
Ecphantus,  who  taught  the  same,  were  still  later  Pythagoreans ; 
and  there  was  a  revival  of  Pythagoreanism  in  the  century  be- 
fore Christ.  It  is  not  needful,  however,  to  reproduce  details. 
I  desire  only  to  fix  upon  the  rise  of  Ionic  and  Pythagorean 
philosophy  as  a  real  revival  of  correct  religious  thought  and 
feeling.  I  could  quote  extensively  from  the  fragments  of  these 
earnest  and  devout  old  philosophers,  to  prove  that  they  felt  the 
evidence  of  the  One  Divine  Existence  within  them ;  felt  the 
evidence  that  man  and  the  world  proceeded  from  the  Being 
thus  revealed ;  and  earnestly  sought,  throughout  the  world,  for 
the  subtle  essence  which  might  be  regarded  as  constituting  that 
energizing  existence.  How  these  early  gropings  of  Grecian 
speculation  reveal  the  longing,  and  even  the  necessity,  which 
the  human  mind  feels  for  something  sensible  to  call  its  God, 
or,  at  least,  the  shrine  of  its  God !  And  how  such  facts,  re- 
produced along  the  whole  historic  line  of  thought,  palliate  the 
idolatry  and  image-worship  which  have  defaced  the  records  of 
religious  sentiment,  and  so  often  obscured  or  eclipsed  the  di- 
vine reality  which  idols  and  pictures  have  symbolized ! 

But  the  dawn  of  a  phase  of  speculation  less  devout  had  al- 
ready passed.  The  essence  of  the  Eleatic  doctrine  was  the  im- 
mutability of  substance.  The  earlier  Eleatics,  who  were  monis- 
tic, maintained  the  unity  of  substance;  and,  in  their  theistic 
conceptions,  brought  themselves  into  relations  to  God,  almost 

(')  Ueberweg,  "  History  of  Philosophy,"  vol.  i.,  p.  49. 


58  THE  ELEATIC  DOCTRINE. 

as  simple  and  reverential  as  the  Ionics  and  Pythagoreans ;  and, 
in  their  notions  of  divine  personality,  excelled  them  in  clear- 
ness. Xenophanes  (569  B.C.)  combats  the  anthropomorphism 
of  Homer  and  Hesiod,  and  enounces  the  doctrine  of  One  God. 

Etc  Sf.bg  iv  TE  Stolen  kal  avdp&TrotGt  jueyioroe. 

Parmenides  of  Elea  (499-485  B.C.)  founds  the  doctrine  of  uni- 
ty on  the  conception  of  being.  He  was  ahead  of  Hegel  in  pred- 
icating being  of  thought,  for  he  says, 

To  yap  avro  rotlv  iariv  TE  /cat  el  vat. 

Zeno  of  Elea  (490-485  B.C.)  marks  the  emergence  of  the  skep- 
ticism which  was  to  swamp  all  faith.  He  denied  the  veracity 
of  sensuous  perceptions,  denied  all  motion,  and  denied  all  real- 
ity of  existence.  Melissus  of  Samos  put  forth  the  aphorism 
"  Only  the  One  is,"  disguising  under  this  cover  the  doctrine 
of  the  continuity  of  substance — a  sort  of  monistic  pantheism. 
Being,  with  him,  is  eternal,  and  will  not  perish ;  it  is  infinite. 

The  later  Eleatics  were  pluralistic — holding  to  the  distinc- 
\  tion  of  matter  and  spirit.  Empedocles  (about  500  B.C.)  taught 
that  Earth,  Water,  Air,  and  Fire  are  the  four  "  roots  "  of  things, 
the  moving  principles  of  which  are  "  love  "  and  "  hate."  He 
seems  to  have  glimpsed  those  forces  which  have  emerged  in 
modern  science  as  "  attraction  "  and  "  repulsion."  Anaxagoras 
of  Clazomense  (about  500  B.C.)  opens  wide  the  door  for  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Atomists.  He  maintained  that  there  exists  an  un- 
limited number  of  ultimate  elements,  which  he  calls  "  seeds  " 
(homo3omeria3  of  Aristotle).  These  were  originally  in  a  state 
of  chaos ;  but  the  divine  mind  (vovg),  which  he  holds  in  antithe- 
sis to  matter,  brought  order  out  of  them.  All  origin  and  decay 
are  thus  a  mingling  and  unmingling.^)  Organic  forms  come 

(')  We  have  here  the  germ  of  a  philosophy  of  the  evolution  of  the  het- 
erogeneous by  successive  differentiation  of  the  homogeneous. 


THE  LATER  ELEATICS.  59 

into  existence  through  the  fecundation  of  the  earth  by  germs 
previously  contained  in  the  air.  Anaxagoras  has  recourse  to 
the  divine  mind  only  in  the  domain  of  phenomena  inexplicable 
by  known  causes.  For  this,  Aristotle  reproaches  him  with  the 
suggestion  that  when  his  knowledge  should  have  become  more 
extended,  the  divine  mind  could  be  dispensed  with  altogether. 
This  reminds  one  of  the  reputed  atheism  of  Laplace,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  theistic  astronomers.  We  see,  at  least,  that 
the  divine  immanence  recognized  by  the  older  philosophers 
had,  in  Anaxagoras,  shrunk  to  a  remote  and  occasional  relation. 
This  shrinkage  of  divinity  was  carried  a  step  farther  in  the 
Atomists.  Leucippus  posited  the  full  and  the  void  as  princi- 
ples of  things.  The  full  consists  of  indivisible  primitive  parti- 
cles differing  only  in  form,  position,  and  arrangement.  These 
had  no  creator,  for  they  existed  from  eternity.  Their  orderly 
arrangements  in  the  world  do  not  result  from  "love"  and 
"  hate,"  nor  through  all-ruling  mind,  but  from  natural  necessi- 
ty. Democritus  (about  460  B.C.)  is  responsible  for  the  fuller 
development  of  a  system  which  has  seen  its  last  renaissance  in 
recent  times. (')  He  maintained  that  the  atoms  were  endowed 
with  an  eternal  motion.  He  foreshadowed  the  Cartesian  "  vor- 
tices "  and  perhaps  the  "  nebular "  cosmogony,  in  conceiving 
the  atoms  to  generate  a  vortical  movement  by  the  descent  of 
the  heavier  through  the  lighter,  and  attributing  the  evolution 
of  worlds  to  such  movements.  Organized  beings  were  thought 
to  be  generated  in  moist  earth. 

(')  While  the  conception  of  atomicity  enunciated  by  Professor  Tyndall 
bears  a  recognized  analogy  with  the  theories  of  Democritus  and  Bruno,  it 
is  not,  perhaps,  exact  to  represent  the  later  atomic  doctrine  as  a  revival  of 
the  older  ones.  Tyndall's  idea  of  "  matter  "  is  unique,  and  requires  new 
definitions,  as  he  intimates.  Indeed,  it  is  doubtful  whether  his  material- 
ism, in  spite  of  the  phraseology,  is  not  a  view  which  annuls  the  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  supernatural  by  disclosing  deductively  an  ultimate 
of  iiniversal  nature  which  lies  quite  beyond  the  domain  of  nature. 


60  THE  SOPHISTS. 

The  progressive  and  aggressive  movement  of  a  daring  and 
profane  intellectualism  is  still  further  exemplified  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  the  Sophists.  They  also  exhibit  a  transition  from  the 
cosmological  speculations  of  their  predecessors  to  the  strictly 
anthropocentric  studies  of  the  Socratic  and  Platonic  schools. 
They  were  egotists  and  rhetoricians — some  of  them  very  vain 
ones.  It  was  one  of  their  phrases  that  "  might  makes  right." 
Protagoras,  their  founder  (born  about  490  B.C.),  is  the  author  of 
the  saying,  "man  is  the  measure  of  all  things" — Travruv  XPVP"' 
Tb)v  fjLtrpov  uvOpw-iroQ.  This  was  his  fundamental  theorem.  He 
held,  with  some  modern  thinkers,  to  the  relativity  of  all  truth ; 
and  even  the  existence  of  the  gods  he  announced  as  a  subject 
so  beset  with  difficulties,  that  it  was  impossible  to  arrive  at  the 
fact.  In  this,  however,  he  undoubtedly  refers  to  the  popular 
divinities.  Gorgias  (483-375  B.C.)  went  quite  over  to  nihilism. 
"  Nothing  exists,"  he  says.  "  If  any  thing  existed,  it  would  be 
unknowable ;  and  if  any  thing  existed  and  were  knowable,  the 
knowledge  of  it  could  not  be  communicated  to  others."  Hip- 
pias  taught  that  law  is  the  tyrant  of  men.  Prodicus  says  truly 
that  the  men  of  the  earliest  time  deified  whatever  was  useful 
to  them — bread,  as  Demeter ;  wine,  as  Dionysus ;  fire,  as  He- 
phaestus, etc. ;  but  he  falsely  employs  the  fact  to  prove  that  all 
notion  of  divinity  is  of  human  origin.  The  "  Later  Sophists  " 
were  quite  numerous,  but  need  not  be  cited  at  length.  Critias 
said,  "  The  belief  in  the  gods  was  invented  by  a  wise  statesman 
as  a  means  of  keeping  the  people  in  subjection."  Xeniades 
affirmed  that  "  all  is  deception ;  every  idea  and  opinion  false ; 
and  that  whatever  comes  into  being  comes  from  nothing,  and  to 
nothing  returns'1'' — a  dogma  which  shows  that  the  Aristotelian 
"  Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit "  is  not  a  necessary  datum  of  thought,  as 
exclusive  of  the  concept  of  an  original  creation. 

Thus  we  see  demonstrably  how  the  Second  Cycle  of  Grecian 
thought  ended  with  a  precipitation  of  philosophy  into  the  bot- 
tomless gulf  of  universal  skepticism.  Before  this  extremity  had 


THE  SOCRATIC  SCHOOL.  61 

been  reached,  the  soul  of  man  had  summoned  itself  to  an  atti- 
tude of  oppugnance.  The  THIRD  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  had  begun. 
Its  Religious  Phase  stands  forth  in  the  history  of  thought, 
adorned  with  the  figure  of  Socrates — uncouth  in  exterior,  but 
radiant  with  beautiful  thought.  Socrates  was  born  about  471- 
469  B.C.  He  went  about  the  streets  of  scoffing  Athens  a  mis- 
sionary of  the  truth  of  the  One  God,  and  perished  for  his  fidel- 
ity to  that  truth.  His  system  is  too  well  known  to  require  ex- 
position. He  held,  in  brief,  that  the  world  is  governed  by  a 
supreme  divine  Intelligence,  and  that  a  special  Providence  cares 
for  men  in  this  life.  The  existence  of  contrivance  in  nature  is 
proof  of  a  contriving  mind.  The  Megaric,  Elian,  and  Cynic 
Schools,  which  succeeded  Socrates,  were  Socratic,  with  modifi- 
cations greater  or  less.  Among  the  Megarics,  Euclid  united  to 
the  ethical  principle  of  Socrates  the  Eleatic  theory  of  the  One, 
to  which  alone  true  being  could  be  ascribed.  Diodorus  Cronus 
taught  that  the  necessary  is  real ;  and  only  the  real,  possible. 
Among  the  Cynics,  Antisthenes  (born  444  B.C.)  taught  a  virtue 
more  rigorous  than  Socrates.  "The  essence  of  virtue,"  he  truly 
says,  "  lies  in  self-control."  He  accordingly  carried  self-control 
to  the  extent  of  abstinence  from  things  indifferent,  and  even  a 
resort  to  penal  self-inflictions.  He  isolated  himself  from  socie- 
ty and  government.  Yet,  as  to  the  religious  faith  of  the  peo- 
ple, he  held  it  to  be  as  little  binding  as  their  laws.  This  refers, 
undoubtedly,  to  their  polytheism.  Diogenes  of  Sinope  carried 
Cynical  asceticism  to  the  most  repulsive  extreme,  and  became 
more  a  "  dog  "  than  the  brutes  which  his  philosophy  satirized. 
Cynicism,  in  post -Stoic  times,  found,  also,  many  adherents 
among  the  Romans ;  but  it  was  rather  Socratic  in  mildness. 

The  Cyrenaic  School  marks  a  strong  divergence  from  So- 
cratic teaching.  It  is  an  incident,  however,  of  the  Religious 
Phase  inaugurated  by  Socrates,  and  constitutes  within  it  a  sub- 
ordinate cycle.  The  fundamental  factor  in  their  philosophy 
is  pleasure.  It  is  hence  called  "  Hedonism."  Aristippus  and 


62  PLATONISM. 

his  followers,  however,  maintained  that  it  is  wrong  to  be  con- 
trolled by  pleasure.  To  the  sensuous  pleasures  Anniceris  added 
the  pleasures  of  sympathy,  friendship,  gratitude,  piety  toward 
parents  and  fatherland,  social  intercourse,  and  the  strife  after 
honors.  It  may  be  added  that,  in  psychology,  Aristippus  was 
a  sensationalist ;  in  theology,  Theodorus  was  atheist ;  and  Eu- 
hemerus  maintained  that  a  belief  in  the  gods  began  with  the 
veneration  of  distinguished  men.  Hedonism  was  on  the  high- 
road to  Epicureanism.  Plato,  however,  towered  so  command- 
ingly  over  his  contemporaries  that  the  full  tide  of  religious  phi- 
losophy swept  on  for  a  hundred  years. 

Plato,  the  founder  of  the  "Academy,"  or,  by  distinction,  the 
"Old  Academy,"  was  born  427  B.C.,  and  wrote  thirty-six  com- 
positions in  fifty -six  books.  His  philosophy  centres  in  the 
theory  of  "ideas."  The  "idea"  of  Plato  is  archetypal.  The 
highest  idea  is  the  idea  of  the  "  good,"  which  is  equivalent  to 
God.  With  Plato,  the  world  is  generated ;  matter  is  eternal ; 
order  was  introduced  by  God ;  the  soul  is  immortal ;  the  high- 
est good  is  the  greatest  possible  likeness  to  God.  The  "ideas" 
of  Plato  have  proved  as  undying  as  he  really  believed  them. 
Platonism,  after  running  its  first  course,  was  revived,  with  mod- 
ifications, in  the  Middle  Academy,  and  again  revived,  with  res- 
torations, in  the  New  Academy.  Once  again  it  was  revived  by 
the  Neo-Platonists  of  Alexandria,  and  mingled  itself  with  the 
Judaism,  and,  later,  the  Christianity  which  invaded  that  ancient 
capital.  It  found  a  congenial  lodgment  in  the  breasts  of  many 
of  the  early  Christian  Fathers,  and  contended  with  Aristotelian- 
ism  through  all  the  Scholastic  ages ;  and  has  actually  inspired 
a  school  of  philosophy  in  one  of  the  modern  English  universi- 
ties. Plato  was,  par  excellence,  the  spiritual  theist  of  antiquity. 
The  proofs  of  this  are  accessible  to  all.  Some  of  his  most  dis- 
tinguished followers,  of  the  Old  Academy,  are  Speusippus,  who 
leans  pantheistically ;  Xenocrates  (339-314  B.C.),  who  identi- 
fies ideas  with  numbers ;  and  Heraclides  of  Pontus,  who  taught 


CARNEADES  AND  ARISTOTLE.  63 

the  daily  rotation  of  the  earth  from  west  to  east,  and  the  im- 
mobility of  the  firmament  of  the  fixed  stars. 

The  middle  portion  of  the  fourth  century  before  Christ  wit- 
nessed the  dawn  of  another  Intellectual  Phase,  and  a  period  of 
increasing  secularism,  irreligion,  skepticism,  and  speculative  rev- 
eries. We  notice  the  rise  of  five  lines,  or  schools,  of  freethink- 
ing.  Earliest,  and  in  some  respects  most  orthodox,  was  the 
Aristotelian ;  but  almost  simultaneously,  and  still  imbued  with 
the  theological  spirit  of  Socrates,  were  the  Cyrenaics,  whom  I 
have  already  grouped  on  the  religious  side  of  the  boundary, 
but  followed  by  the  Stoics,  who,  still  honoring  the  teachings  of 
Socrates,  were  gradually  led  into  peculiarities  of  principle  and 
practice  which  assign  them  to  a  fitting  place  on  the  speculative 
side  of  the  boundary.  On  one  side  of  these,  however,  were  the 
philosophers  of  the  Middle  Academy,  and,  on  the  other,  the 
Epicureans,  for  whom  history  has  found  a  place  among  the 
scoffers  at  religious  faith ;  and,  finally,  the  open  Skeptics,  the 
central  idea  of  whose  misnamed  philosophy  was  universal 
doubt.  A  few  comprehensive  characterizations  must  bring 
us  to  a  dismissal  of  these  philosophies.  Arcesilaus  (315-241 
B.C.)  was  the  founder  of  the  Middle  Academy,  but  Carneades 
(214-129  B.C.),  the  skeptic,  gave  it  its  character  and  fame.  He 
declared  knowledge  to  be  impossible,  and  constructed  a  philos- 
ophy of  the  probable.  Aristotle,  the  Peripatetic  (born  384 
B.C.),  was  a  monotheist,  holding  to  the  eternity  of  matter  and 
the  world,  in  which  the  mind  of  God  is  expressed  in  harmonies 
and  in  structural  relations.  God,  he  teaches,  is  a  spirit,  the  first 
principle  in  the  world,  existing  "  not  merely  as  a  form  imma- 
nent in  the  world,  like  the  order  in  an  army,  but  also  as  an 
absolute,  self-existent  substance,  like  the  general  in  an  army." 
Theophrastus,  a  disciple,  leaned  toward  the  doctrine  of  di- 
vine immanence  in  nature ;  while  Aristotle  inclined  to  a  belief 
in  divine  transcendence.  Eudemus  devoted  himself  to  theolo- 
gy. Strato  of  Lampsacus  (288  B.C.)  transformed  the  doctrine 


64  STOICS  AND  EPICUREANS. 

of  Aristotle  into  a  consistent  naturalism.  "  The  formation  of 
the  world,"  he  affirmed,  "  is  the  result  of  natural  forces."  Aris- 
totelianism  outcropped  in  Alexandria,  and  exerted  a  powerful 
influence  there  for  five  centuries.  During  the  Scholastic  peri- 
od, the  dialectic  of  Aristotle  was  the  favorite  instrument  for 
the  defense  of  doctrines ;  and,  to  this  day,  the  founder  of  the 
Peripatetic  School  is  reputed  the  creator  of  the  science  of 
zoology,  as  he  was  the  real  inaugurator  of  the  inductive  pro- 
cedure in  the  search  for  truth. 

The  Stoical  School  was  founded  by  Zeno  of  Cittium  (350- 
258  B.C.).  They  held  that  the  working  force  in  the  universe  is 
God.  The  beauty  and  adaptation  of  the  world  can  only  have 
come  from  a  thinking  mind.  They  incline  to  the  immanence 
of  the  divine  force.  They  discriminated  the  agreeable  and  the 
morally  good.  In  philosophy,  they  were  sensationalists.  Phys- 
ics includes  cosmology  and  theology.  Whatever  is  real  is  ma- 
terial. Matter  and  force  are  the  two  ultimate  principles.  The 
cosmos  undergoes  periodical  destructions  and  renovations.  The 
human  soul  is  a  part  of  the  Deity — a  doctrine  which  reminds 
us  of  Orientalism,  and  one  which  was  singularly  persistent 
through  the  Middle  Ages. 

Stoicism  was  honored  with  a  crowd  of  disciples.  Nearly  the 
oldest  of  these  was  Cleanthes,  author  of  the  celebrated  Hymn 
to  Jupiter.  Two  hundred  years  later,  it  secured  a  powerful 
hold  upon  the  Roman  mind,  and  numbered  among  its  adher- 
ents the  well-known  names  of  Seneca  (3-65  A.D.),  Lucan  (39- 

65  A.D.),  Epictetus,  and  Marcus  Aurelius. 

Epicurus  (371-270  B.C.)  marks  a  decided  antireligious  turn 
of  philosophic  thought.  In  natural  philosophy  he  was  an  At- 
omist.  In  psychology,  he  held  perceptions,  representations, 
and  feelings  to  be  criteria  of  truth.  In  respect  to  theology,  he 
held  it  to  be  useless,  as  God  is  an  unnecessary  explanation  of 
phenomena.  Every  thing  proceeds  from  natural  causes.  As 
nothing  can  come  from  non-existence,  and  nothing  which  exists 


THE  PYRRIIONISTS.  65 

can  cease  to  exist,  the  atoms  of -which  all  things  are  made,  and- 
the  space  in  which  they  eternally  move,  have  existed  from  eter- 
nity. The  soul  is  material,  and  composed  of  fine  atoms,  and 
has  no  existence  after  death.  In  ethics,  he  followed  the  Cy- 
renaics,  holding'  happiness  to  be  synonymous  with  pleasure, 
and  virtue  the  only  sure  and  possible  way  to  happiness.  Stand- 
ards of  ethics  are  not  innate,  nor  arbitrarily  imposed,  but  are 
the  best  judgments  of  the  wise  and  good  as  to  what  is  useful 
to  society.  Among  the  numerous  adherents  of  Epicureanism 
were  Apollodorus,  author  of  more  than  four  hundred  books ; 
some  of  the  Ptolemies  of  Alexandria,  Phsedrus,  Lucretius,  the 
author  of  the  poem  "  De  Rerum  Natura,"  and  Virgil,  who  sets 
forth  Lucretian  views  in  the  ^Eneid. 

The  aphelion  of  philosophic  thought  was  reached  again  in  the 
Skeptics.  Pyrrho  of  Elis  (about  360-270  B.C.),  professing  to 
be  disgusted  with  the  conflicting  and  mutually  destructive  opin- 
ions of  the  philosophers,  pretended  that  all  beliefs  are  a  matter 
of  equal  indifference  ;  and  that  every  thing  depends  on  human 
institutions  and  customs.  Timon  (325-235  B.C.)  considered 
all  the  Greek  philosophers  babblers,  except  Xenophanes,  who 
had  sought  for  real  truth,  and  Pyrrho,  who  had  found  it.  Our 
perceptions  and  representations  of  things  are  neither  true  nor 
false,  and  can  therefore  not  be  relied  upon. 

The  Skeptics  thus  mark  the  extreme  swing  of  the  pendulum 
of  thought.  We  listen  here  to  the  echoes  of  the  same  voices 
which  spoke  in  the  philosophy  of  the  Sophists.  The  Third 
Cycle  was  completed  by  steps  parallel  with  those  of  the  Second 
Cycle.  Socrates  and  Plato  mark  its  highest  religious  develop- 
ment, as  the  Ionics  and  Pythagoreans  had  done  in  the  pre- 
vious Cycle.  Thus,  also,  the  Cyrenaics,  Stoics,  Peripatetics, 
and  the  Middle  Academy  stand  collectively  for  the  phase  rep- 
resented in  the  Eleatics ;  and  the  Epicureans  answer  to  the  At- 
omists,  as  the  Skeptics  to  the  Sophists.  The  Third  Psychic 
Cycle  of  Grecian  history  was  real  and  complete. 


III. 

INTERACTION  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  INTELLECTUAL  FAC- 
ULTIES IN  CHRISTIAN  PSYCHIC  HISTORY. 

THE  Skeptical  spirit  which  completed  the  Third  Psychic 
Cycle  in  Greece  survived  and  struggled  into  a  new  develop- 
ment in  the  later  skeptics;  but  even  now  a  revulsion  was  at 
hand.  Another  cycle  of  Grecian  thought  had  already  dawned. 
This  dawn  we  must  regard  as  the  morning  rays  of  the  FIRST 
PSYCHIC  CYCLE  of  Christian  history.  Its  meridian  was  more 
than  a  century  in  the  future.  Its  Religious  Phase  is  manifest 
in  three  points  of  resurgence  from  the  chaos  of  doubt.  First, 
the  Eclectics,  of  whom,  perhaps,  Cicero  is  chief  (106-43  B.C.), 
manifested  the  initial  movement ;  second,  the  New  Academy 
brought  Platonism  back  to  its  pristine  spirituality ;  third,  Ju- 
daism, working  in  Alexandria,  leavened  the  Greek  philosophy 
which  had  found  its  way  thither. 

Cicero's  Eclecticism  consisted  in  his  adhesion  to  the  Skep- 
tical theory  of  cognition  taught  by  the  Middle  Academy ;  his 
indifference  to  physics,  and  his  wavering  attitude  in  ethics, 
between  the  doctrines  of  the  Stoics  and  the  Peripatetics.  He 
held  to  the  certainty  of  moral  consciousness,  and  the  doctrine 
of  innate  ideas,  and  hence  maintained  that  the  consensus  gen- 
tium is  a  criterion  of  truth.  He  is  particularly  attached,  like 
Socrates,  to  the  belief  in  Providence  and  immortality.  The 
Sextians,  originating  at  Rome,  were  also  Eclectic,  arising  about 
the  epoch  of  Christ,  and  holding  a  position  equidistant  from 
Pythagoreanism,  Cynicism,  and  Stoicism. 

A  somewhat  more  decided  revival  was  inaugurated  by  Philo 
of  Larissa,  the  founder  of  the  New  Academy,  during  the  life- 


JUDAISTIC  THEO SOPHY.  67 

time  of  Cicero.  It  is  sufficient  to  note  that  in  him  the  spirit 
of  Plato  re-appeared  in  many  of  its  original  lineaments.  This 
affords  Draper  the  opportunity  to  date  the  decline  of  Greek 
philosophy  from  the  opening  of  the  New  Academy.  Antio- 
chus  of  Ascalon,  a  successor  of  Philo,  betrays  already  another 
falling-off,  as  his  teaching  approximates  that  of  the  Stoics. 

The  most  signal  manifestation  of  the  religious  revival  was 
discerned  upon  the  southern  shore  of  the  Mediterranean.  It 
grew  into  existence,  like  most  of  the  great  events  of  history, 
from  an  insignificant  beginning.  Nebuchadnezzar  had  razed 
Jerusalem,  and  a  few  poor  exiles  from  the  captive  city  had  set- 
tled in  Egypt  by  permission  of  the  government.  By  the  time 
of  Ptolemy  Philadelphus  (284-247  B.C.)  they  had  exchanged 
their  native  language  for  the  Greek.  The  occasion  thus  arose 
for  a  Greek  version  of  the  Jewish  Scriptures.  This  was  under- 
taken under  the  patronage  of  Ptolemy — the  principal  canonical 
writings  being  completed  under  Ptolemy  Euergetes,  247  B.C., 
and  the  Hagiographa  as  late  as  136  B.C.,  and  perhaps  later. 
Hebrew  literature  was  thus  made  accessible  in  the  popular 
tongue.  Ptolemy  also  received  the  translators  with  the  high- 
est honors,  sometimes  entertaining  them  at  his  royal  table. 
Under  such  circumstances,  the  literature  and  institutions  of  the 
Jews  became  a  favorite  arid  fruitful  study;  and  their  excel- 
lencies were  ingrafted,  by  degrees,  upon  the  Greek  systems  ex- 
tant in  Alexandria.  Aristobulus  (181-145  B.C.)  had  already 
written  a  commentary  on  the  Pentateuch,  and  dedicated  it  to 
Ptolemy  Philometer.  His  faith  was  a  compound  of  Judaism, 
Aristotelianism,  and  Stoicism.  He  regarded  the  power  of  God 
which  dwells  in  the  world  as  distinguished  from  his  extramun- 
dane,  absolute  existence.  The  progress  of  Judaistic  theosophy 
is  notable  in  the  Second  Book  of  Maccabees — a  mixture  of 
Alexandrian  dogmas  and  Jewish  doctrines;  in  the  society  of 
Essenes,  who  combined,  with  aspirations  after  the  spirit  of 
prophecy,  the  abstemiousness  of  the  Cynics  and  something  of 


68  ALEXANDRIAN  PHILOSOPHERS. 

the  mysticism  of  the  Parsees ;  in  the  Therapeutes,  who  believed 
in  prophecy,  magic,  celibacy,  demons,  monasticism,  and  pre-ex- 
istence;  and,  most  of  all,  in  Philo  the  Jew  (born  about  25  B.C.), 
whose  philosophy  was  a  blending  of  Platonism  and  Judaism. 
Philo  was  eminently  theistic.  He  aspired  after  the  spirit  of 
prophecy,  and  maintained  that  God  is  accessible  by  direct  intu- 
ition. A  lower  degree  of  certainty  is  attainable,  he  thought, 
through  the  aesthetic,  or  moral,  and  the  teleological  view  of  the 
world.  He  rejects  the  doctrine  of  the  incarnation  of  the  Lo- 
gos, though  he  regards  the  Logos  as  the  instrument  through 
whom  God  formed  the  world. 

With  other  signs  of  the  coming  revival  must  be  reckoned 
Neo-Pythagoreanism,  which  arose  in  the  first  century  before 
Christ.  Introduced  by  P.  Nigridius  Figulus  of  Alexandria,  its 
best-known  adherent  was  Apollonius  of  Tyana,  who  held  that 
the  one  God  must  be  distinguished  from  other  gods,  and  that 
no  offerings  should  be  made  to  him.  He  is  sometimes  repre- 
sented as  a  miracle-worker  and  soothsayer,  ascetic  in  his  hab- 
its, and  desirous  of  introducing  reforms  in  morals  and  religion. 
Philostratus  has  compared  him  to  Jesus. 

The  Pythagorizing  and  Eclectic  Platonists  constitute  another 
link  in  the  series  leading  toward  spiritual  light.  They  renewed 
and  further  developed  the  Platonic  doctrine  of  transcendence, 
in  especial  opposition  to  Stoic  Pantheism  and  Epicurean  Natu- 
ralism. Their  ranks  are  illustrious  with  many  well-known 
names.  Thrasyllus  (died  36  A.D.),  the  grammarian,  and  arranger 
of  the  Platonic  dialogues;  Plutarch  (50-125  A.D.),  who  op- 
posed the  monism  of  the  Stoics,  and  postulated  two  cosmical' 
principles,  God  and  matter ;  Maximus  (146  A.D.),  Apuleius  (born 
126-132  A.D.),  and  Galen  are  the  names  of  thinkers  groping 
toward  the  twilight  already  shining  in  their  heavens.  Celsus, 
of  the  same  philosophic  school,  opposed  Christianity,  and  Nu- 
menius  held  to  three  Gods — the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Grand- 
son. 


CHRISTIANITY  AND  SKEPTICISM.  69 

The  advent  of  Christ,  and  the  rapid  spread  of  his  teachings, 
furnish  the  proof  that  Christianity  was,  at  length,  the  form  of 
religious  faith  for  which  the  world  was  longing  and  groping. 
Now  the  spirit  of  religion  rose  rapidly  to  its  culmination,  and 
its  influence  was  quickly  felt  in  all  the  civilized  countries  of  the 
world.  What  were  the  doctrines  of  this  new  teacher,  I  need 
not  indicate.  He  founded  a  school,  humanly  speaking,  which 
has  flourished  with  a  vigor  and  persistence  with  which  even  the 
schools  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  may  not  be  compared ;  since  all 
their  learning  has  been  useful  only  as  the  instrument  of  propa- 
gating the  learning  of  the  School  of  Christ. 

True  it  is,  nevertheless,  that  the  intellect  of  man  was  not  per- 
manently satisfied  with  the  simple  and  normal  pretensions  of 
the  faith  of  primitive  Christianity.  The  dawn  of  the  Intellect- 
ual Phase  of  this  cycle  was  even  now  apparent.  The  outspok- 
en Skeptics  of  the  philosophic  world  were  foremost  in  oppos- 
ing all  religious  belief.  JEnesidernus,  in  the  first  century  after 
Christ,  was  the  leader  of  the  Latin  Skeptics,  and  he  was  fol- 
lowed and  indorsed  by  Sextus  Empiricus  (200  A.D.);  while  the 
Roman  Favorinus,  who  lived  under  Hadrian,  made  theology, 
and  especially  the  doctrine  of  Providence,  the  object  of  especial 
attack.  The  learned  Varro  (100  B.C.-28  A.D.),  who  wrote  four 
hundred  and  ninety  books,  regarded  the  anthropomorphic  gods 
as  mere  emblems  of  the  forces  of  matter.  Though  counted 
with  the  Skeptics,  his  Skepticism  was  rather  opposed  to  the 
popular  mythology  than  to  the  spirit  of  rising  Christianity. 

A  more  conspicuous,  if  not  a  more  radical,  lapse  is  noticea- 
ble in  the  rise  of  Neo-Platonism.  This  was  a  theosophy  which 
waged  a  conflict  with  the  increasing  power  of  Christianity^1) 
It  was  the  expiring  effort  of  Greek  philosophy.  It  took  its 
stand  first  in  Alexandria.  Afterward  it  broke  out  in  a  Syrian 

(')  This  period  witnessed  the  "First  Great  Crisis  "  of  the  Christian  faith 
(Farrar,  "  History  of  Free  Thought,"  Lecture  II.). 


70  NEO-PLATONISM, 

School,  and,  about  the  same  time,  planted  itself  in  Athens. 
The  Alexandrian  -  Roman  School  was  founded  by  Ammonius 
Saccas  (175-250  A.D.),  who  was  brought  up  a  Christian.  Fol- 
lowing him  were  Origen  the  Platonist,  and  Origen  the  Chris- 
tian (185-254  A.D.),  and  Longinus  the  grammarian.  Plotinus 
(204-269  A.D.)  taught  at  Rome,  and  brought  Neo-Platonic  doc- 
trine to  a  system.  He  was  an  ascetic,  and  eat  no  flesh.  He 
carried  idealism  to  an  extreme.  He  was  not,  by  any  means, 
an  opposer  of  religion,  but  rather  an  erratic  and  vagarist.  He 
held  that  "  the  business  of  man  is  to  return  to  God,  whom  he, 
as  a  sensuous  being,  has  estranged  from  himself.  The  means 
by  which  this  return  is  to  be  accomplished  are  virtue,  philo- 
sophic thought,  and,  above  all,  the  immediate,  ecstatic  intuition 
of  God,  and  the  becoming  one  with  him."  Porphyry  (born 
232-'33  A.D.),  though  holding  that  the  end  of  philosophizing 
is  the  salvation  of  the  soul,  and  believing  in  the  mysticism  of 
Plotinus,  wrote  a  book  against  Christianity,  opposing  especially 
the  divinity  of  Jesus. 

The  Syrian  School  was  simply  a  fanatic  theurgy,  with  an 
exuberance  of  religious  faith — misguided  and  superstitious — 
which  makes  it  a  smaller  cycle  superimposed  upon  the  ascend- 
ing aspect  of  the  Intellectual  Phase,  which  was  now  in  progress. 
Jamblichus  (died  about  330  A.D.)  held  fully  to  the  polytheistic 
cultus,  and  practiced  magic  and  necromancy.  Hypatia,  the  last 
of  this  school  (415  A. D.),  though  the  teacher  of  Synesius,  the 
Christian  Father,  died,  herself,  in  a  Christian  city,  a  martyr  to 
polytheism. 

In  the  Athenian  School  of  Neo-Platonism,  the  theoretical  ele- 
ment was  again  dominant.  It  was  founded  by  Plutarch,  son  of 
Nestorius  (350-433) ;  it  embraced,  among  its  successive  schol- 
archs,  Proclus  (born  411),  who  wrote  a  book  against  the  Chris- 
tians, and  was  expelled  by  them  from  Athens ;  and  ended  with 
Damascius,  the  last  teacher  of  Greek  philosophy  at  Athens.  The 
edict  of  Justinian  closed  the  Athenian  schools  in  529  A.D.  The 


GNOSTICISM.  71 

teaching  of  Christianity  closed  over  the  chasm  as  if  no  void  had 
been  produced  by  the  extinction  of  a  system  which  had  reigned 
in  the  world  for  eleven  hundred  years. 

Meantime  intellect  had  begun  to  assert  itself  as  against  the 
claims  of  faith,  even  within  the  Church  itself.  The  Intellectual 
Phase  here  was  Patristic ;  and  Patristicism  was  Neo-Platonistic. 
It  represents  a  unity  of  philosophy  and  faith.  Early  in  the 
second  century  after  Christ,  Neander  tells  us,  a  diminished 
power  and  purity  of  the  religious  spirit  had  become  apparent. 
There  was  a  striving  after  forms  and  norms — -just  as  we  see  it 
in  the  century  succeeding  Luther.  Ritschl'thinks  the  Catholic 
Church  grew  out  of  this  struggle. 

But  especially  did  the  spirit  of  speculation  grow  rife ;  and 
Gnosticism  was  one  of  its  fruits.  This  was  a  theosophy — an 
attempt  to  advance  from  Christian  faith  to  Christian  knowl- 
edge. It  philosophized  on  the  relation  of  Christianity  to  Ju- 
daism and  Hellenism.  The  various  objects  of  religious  belief 
were  made  personal  beings,  and  a  semi  -  Christian  mythology 
was  organized.  In  the  more  heterodox  branch  of  Gnostics,  we 
rank  Simon  Magus ;  Basilides,  who  elaborated  a  system  of  the- 
osophy ;  Valentinus  (140  A.D.),  who  prepared  an  organon ;  Car- 
pocrates  (160  A.D.),  who  taught  a  universalistic  rationalism; 
also  the  Ophites  and  Perates  and  the  Bardessanes  (154-224), 
who  simplified  the  Gnostic  doctrine.  In  the  more  orthodox 
branch,  we  reckon  Flavius  Justinus  (150  A.D.),  the  philosophical 
apologist  for  Christianity,  who  held  that  the  idea  of  God  is  in- 
nate, as  well  as  the  most  general  moral  ideas ;  and  with  him, 
the  other  apologists,  Quadratus,  Aristides,  Melito  (170),  Bishop 
of  Sardis,  who  declares  Christianity  to  be  a  philosophy ;  Apol- 
lonius,  Miltiades,  Aristo,  Tatian  (160-170),  who  reviles  Hellenic 
literature  and  philosophy;  and  Athenagoras  (176-177),  who, 
like  Tyler  and  Lewis,  appeals  to  Greek  poets  and  philosophers 
against  polytheism,  and  makes  a  first  attempt  at  a  priori  proof 
of  the  unity  of  God.  Among  others  concerned  in  the  intellect- 

4 


72  EARLY  CHRISTIAN  FATHERS. 

ual  movement  may  be  mentioned  Hermias  (about  225  A.D.),  a 
quasi-eclectic  Platonist,  but  a  weak  philosopher;  Clement  of 
Alexandria,  who  appropriated  what  was  good  in  Gnosticism ; 
Origen  (185-254),  who  elaborated  the  first  body  of  Christian 
faith ;  Lactantius,  author  of  "  Institutiones  Divine,"  and  the 
long  list  of  theologians  who  engaged  in  the  controversies  re- 
specting Monarchianism,  Ebionitism,  Patripassianism,  Sabelli- 
anism,  and  Arianism  —  terms  which  are  the  signs  of  various 
heresies  respecting  the  Trinity. 

Such  progress  of  free  thought,  even  within  the  body  of  the 
Church  itself,  prompts  us  to  the  anticipation  of  another  tide  of 
religious  zeal.  The  theosophists,  orthodox  and  heterodox,  close 
the  FIRST  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  of  Christian  history. 

Irenaeus,  Tertullian,  and  the  First  Council  of  Nice  signalize 
the  Religious  Phase  of  the  SECOND  PSYCHIC  CYCLE.  Irenseus 
(140-202),  famous  as  an  opponent  of  the  Gnostics,  was  one  of 
the  chief  founders  of  the  Catholic  Church,  whose  doctrines  had 
become  consolidated  about  175  A.D.  Jews  and  Jewish  Chris- 
tians had  been  expelled  from  Jerusalem  as  early  as  135  A.D., 
after  the  rising  under  the  lead  of  Bar-Kochba;  and  now  Jew- 
ish Christians  were  joined  with  ultra-Pauline  Antinomians  and 
Gnostics  in  denunciation  for  heresy.  Tertullian  (160-220),  the 
extreme  and  merciless  opponent  of  heretical  thinking,  had  al- 
ready prompted  ecclesiastical  authority  to  lift  its  voice.  Phi- 
losophy had  been  pronounced  by  him  "  the  mother  of  heresies." 
Jerusalem  must  be  more  completely  separated  from  Athens — 
the  Church  from  the  Academy.  It  was  Tertullian  who  reach- 
ed the  unenviable  pinnacle  of  credulous  folly  in  the  saying, 
Credo  quia  absurdum  est.  And  yet,  with  all  his  passionate 
and  blindfold  orthodoxy,  he  maintained  that  "  all  which  is  real 
is  material."  Even  God  and  the  soul  were  composed  of  mat- 
ter. Tertullian  and  Tatian  went  to  the  greatest  extremes  in 
placing  faith  and  philosophy  in  antagonism  with  each  other. 

In  full  consonance  with  4he  dogmatic  spirit  of  Tertullian, 


PHILOSOPHIZING  FATHERS.  73 

the  First  Council  of  Nice,  in  325  A.D.,  established  a  positive 
rule  of  belief ;  and  by  a  relentless  dictum  crashed  out  heresies 
which  argument  had  not  been  able  to  silence.  Gregory  of 
Nyssa  (331-394)  was  the  first  to  harness  philosophy  to  the 
service  of  establishing  the  complex  of  orthodox  doctrines.  In 
the  doctrine  of  the  divine  essence,  as  distinct  from  the  persons 
in  the  Trinity,  he  anticipates  the  School-men.  With  him  we 
associate  Cyprian  (200-258),  Hilarius,  the  champion  of  Atha- 
nasianism  in  the  West — yet  holding  to  the  materiality  of  the 
soul ;  Cassianus,  Faustus,  Bishop  of  Regium,  and  Gennadius, 
all  of  like  belief ;  Gregory  of  Nazianzen,  Basil  the  Great,  and 
Methodius,  in  whose  hands  philosophic  thought  became  more 
enslaved  to  ecclesiastical  dogma. 

Before  the  intellect,  however,  had  been  repressed  to  that 
state  of  abject  servitude  which  marks  the  scholastic  %ages,  we 
witness  a  reaction  which  I  note  as  the  Intellectual  Phase  of 
this  cycle.  Aurelius  Augustine  (354-430)  was  one  of  the  pro- 
foundest  philosophers,  as  he  was  the  most  eminent  theologian, 
of  Christian  antiquity ;  and  while  it  is  not  necessary  to  repro- 
duce the  detail  of  his  teaching,  I  deem  it  safe  to  adopt  St.  Au- 
gustine as  the  exponent  of  a  noble  and  manly  movement  in  the 
realm  of  thought.  Synesius  cut  loose  from  the  doctrines  of 
the  final  destruction  of  the  world  and  the  resurrection  of  the 
dead,  and  inclined  to  a  belief  in  pre-existence.  Numenius,  also 
(about  450  A.D.),  believed  in  pre-existence,  and  denied  the  final 
catastrophe,  while  on  other  points  he  agreed  with  the  Neo-Pla- 
tonists  and  Aristotle.  Multiplied  were  the  labors,  and  many 
the  names,  of  the  theologians  who  appeared  upon  the  field  be- 
tween the  years  500  and  800  A.D. — such  as  ^Eneas  of  Gaza,  the 
Neo- Platonic  Christian  dogmatist;  Joannes  Philoponus,  who 
pronounced  the  ideas  of  Plato  the  thoughts  of  God ;  Joannes 
Damascenus  (700  A.D.),  who  wrote  a  system  of  theology  long 
in  use ;  Boethius  (470-526),  the  Neo-Platonic  Christian  ;  Beda, 
the  Anglo-Saxon  (673-735),  and,  finally,  Alcuin  (736-804),  who 


74  SALIENT  POINTS  OF  THIRD   CYCLK 

founded  the  "  cloister  schools,"  in  which  were  taught  the  sep- 
tem  artes  ac  disciplince  liberates. 

The  SECOND  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  of  Christian  history  here  ends, 
and  the  THIRD  begins.  The  Third  Cycle  runs  on  through  the 
periods  of  transition  to  Scholasticism,  the  full  dominion  of 
Scholasticism  and  the  Renaissance,  down  to  the  epoch  of  the 
French  Revolution  in  1790.  The  Religious  Phase  is  signalized 
by  the  strengthening,  and,  finally,  complete  ascendency  of  eccle- 
siastical authority  in  matters  of  opinion,  resisted  occasionally 
by  individuals,  at  the  peril  of  their  personal  liberty,  and  even 
their  lives,  and  provoking  three  historical  revolts — that  of  the 
Albigenses,  in  1207  ;  that  under  Wiclif,  in  1376  ;  and  that  led 
by  Luther,  who  shattered  the  power  of  unreasoning  tyranny, 
and  opened  the  way  for  the  rehabilitation  of  free  thought. 
The  Intellectual  Phase  may  be  regarded  as  beginning  with  what 
is  known  as  the  Revival  of  Letters,  quickened  by  new  methods 
of  investigation ;  rewarded  and  aggrandized  by  new  discoveries 
in  geography,  astronomy,  geology,  and  other  sciences ;  strength- 
ened and  rationalized  by  the  promulgation  of  the  great  philo- 
sophic systems  of  Bacon,  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Locke,  Leibnitz, 
and  Wolf ;  and,  finally,  according  to  the  law  of  progressive  as- 
sumption and  self-aggrandizement,  reaching  that  pitch  of 
haughty  domination  over  the  cowed  but  indestructible  relig- 
ious nature  of  man  which  broke  forth  in  the  blasphemous  and 
bloody  atheism  of  the  "  Reign  of  Terror." 

This  Religious  Phase  of  Christian  history  exhibits  a  marked 
tendency  to  a  subjective  divorce  of  philosophy  and  faith,  ac- 
companied by  an  outward  subservience  of  philosophy  to  faith. 
Hitherto  they  had  been  identical.  The  religious  system  had 
been  one  which  all  reason  could  defend ;  but,  with  the  adop- 
tion of  articles  of  faith  more  or  less  extraneous  and  incongru- 
ous, faith  and  philosophy  came  more  and  more  frequently  into 
collision.  The  final  establishment  of  an  arbitrary  standard  of 
belief  left  philosophy  no  field  for  exercise,  except  the  defense 


PHILOSOPHIC  vs.  RELIGIOUS  TRUTHS.  75 

of  dogmatic  faith.  Wherever  philosophy  and  theology  -came 
into  collision,  philosophy  must  yield  to  the  dictum  of  the 
Councils ;  and  obedience  was  enforced  even  under  pains  of  im- 
prisonment, torture,  and  the  fagot.  But  intellect  was  still 
forced,  by  a  law  of  its  nature,  to  discern  evidence  and  draw 
conclusions.  If  the  judgment  were  right,  how  could  the  con- 
clusion be  resisted  ?  The  Church  was  infallible,  and  how  could 
its  edicts  be  gainsaid  ?  Were  there  two  orders  of  truth — the 
one  apprehended  by  reason,  the  other  promulgated  by  author- 
ity and  received  by  faith  ?  This  was  the  despairing  conclusion 
of  the  thinkers  of  the  Middle  Ages.  This  conviction  tacitly 
runs  through  all  their  writings.  Philosophy  and  science,  they 
say,  teach  thus  and  so ;  but  they  do  not  reach  to  the  domain 
of  religious  truth.  By  faith  we  hold  to  such  and  such  opin- 
ions. Such  a  record  has  been  left  behind  by  Aquinas,  Scotus, 
and  Newton.  Such  recognition  of  conflict  was  acted  on,  but 
seldom  avowed.  Pomponatius  (1495)  openly  declared  that  the 
Catholic  creed  should  not  seek  defense  from  reason — that,  in 
fact,  there  are  two  species  of  truth ;  and  for  this  he  was  taken 
in  hand  by  the  Lateran  Council. 

Erigena  (born  800-820  A.D.)  first  taught  that  the  dicta  of 
the  Fathers  must  be  adopted  as  law ;  and,  though  he  professes 
to  regard  true  philosophy  as  identical  with  true  religion,  he  be- 
trays the  prevailing  disposition  to  leave  religion  to  determine 
what  is  true  philosophy.  Toward  the  close  of  the  eleventh 
century  arose  a  marked  intellectual  movement,  represented  by 
such  names  as  Berengarius  (990-1088),  who  took  rationalistic 
views  of  the  LordVsupper ;  Roscellinus,  who  was  led  through 
Nominalism  to  Tritheism ;  and  Abelard  (1079-1142),  who  failed 
in  respect  for  the  authority  of  the  Fathers.  But  the  ecclesias- 
tical power  was  vigilant  and  ready.  Roscellinus  was  summon- 
ed before  the  Council  of  Soissons  in  1092,  and  forced  to  re- 
cant ;  and  Abelard  was  condemned  by  the  Synod  of  Soissons 
in  1121,  and  the  Synod  of  Sens  in  1140.  The  close  of  the  epi- 


76  DOGMATIC  AND  RATIONAL  FAITH. 

cycle(1)  was  marked  by  Amalric  (died  1206-1207)  and  his 
followers,  who  philosophized  somewhat  pantheistically.  Their 
doctrines  were,  however,  condemned  by  the  Synod  of  Paris  in 
1209,  and  the  Lateran  Council  of  1215.  A  ban  was  also 
placed  on  Erigena,  and  on  the  physics,  and  afterward  the  met- 
aphysics, of  Aristotle. 

Ecclesiasticism  was  now  installed  in  supreme  power.  The 
dialectic  of  Aristotle,  after  serving  the  ends  of  the  adversaries 
of  the  Church  for  a  thousand  years,  was  gradually  brought  into 
the  service  of  the  Church  ;  but  not  without  many  a  misgiving, 
and  many  a  protest.  Alexander  of  Hales  (died  1245)  set  the  first 
conspicuous  example.  Albertus  Magnus  (born  1193)  remodel- 
ed the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  to  suit  the  requirements  of  the 
Church.  Thomas  Aquinas  (1225-1274)  drew  out  most  sharp- 
ly the  antithesis  between  dogmatic  and  rational  faith.  Yet  he 
maintained  that  the  dogmatic  faith  was  simply  unapproachable 
by  reason,  not  contrary  to  it.  Duns  Scotus  (died  1308),  while 
not  affirming  the  antagonism  of  reason  and  faith,  goes  beyond 
Aquinas  in  relegating  theological  propositions  to  the  category 
of  the  unprovable.  William  of  Occam  (died  1347),  however, 
lifted  his  arm  against  the  cherished  axiom  of  the  conformity 
of  faith  to  reason ;  and,  though  his  works  were  proscribed  by 
the  University  of  Paris  in  1339,  the  twofold  character  of  truth 
was  generally  recognized  among  Averroists  and  Alexandrists  at 
the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century,  especially  in  Northern  Italy. 
Among  these,  Pomponacci  is  most  conspicuous  and  worthy. 
The  Lateran  Council,  nevertheless,  in  1512,  condemned  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  two  orders  of  truth,  and  pronounced  ev- 
ery thing  false  which  was  in  conflict  with  revelation  as  inter- 
preted by  the  Church. (2)  Luther  (1483-1546)  broke  the  pow- 


(')  This  period  is  styled  by  Farrar  the  Second  Great  Crisis  in  the  history 
of  Christian  Faith  (Farrar,  "  History  of  Free  Thought,"  Lecture  III.). 
(2)  This  claim  of  the  consistency  of  faith  and  philosophy,  at  the  same 


LUTHER,  MELANCHTHON,  AND   CALVIN.  77 

er  of  the  Romish  Church,  without  fully  enfranchising  human 
thought.  In  his  own  person,  he  represents  merely  a  change  of 
masters.  "  The  Sorbonne,"  he  complains,  "  has  propounded  the 
extremely  reprehensible  doctrine  that  whatever  is  demonstrated 
as  true  in  philosophy  must  also  be  accepted  as  true  in  theolo- 
gy." Toward  philosophy  and  science  Luther  manifested  a  hos- 
tility as  fierce  as  had  been  shown  by  any  of  the  Scholastics.^) 
Melanchthon  (1497-1560)  also  opposed  philosophy  at  first; 
but  soon  discovered  that  philosophy  alone  could  reduce  the 
new  religious  movement  to  an  effective  system  ;  and  Luther,  at 
a  later  period,  acquiesced  —  convinced  perhaps  by  a  reflex  ac- 
tion of  the  free  spirit  which  he  had  himself  evoked,  and  which 
was  destined  to  gather  strength  with  the  unfolding  of  the  new 
ideas  which  now  began  to  fill  the  world.  Of  the  intolerance 
of  Calvin  and  other  apostles  of  the  Reformation  I  need  not 
speak ;  nor  of  the  bitter  and  despairing  contest  waged  by  Ro- 
manism with  the  rising  power  of  science. (2)  The  characteristic 

time  that  sheer  authority  pretends  to  dictate  faith  and  enchain  intellect, 
is  evidently  equivalent  to  a  confession  of  conflict  between  intellect  and  the 
faith  imposed  upon  it.  This  relation  of  the  two  great  factors  in  psychic 
history  is,  therefore,  the  reciprocal  of  that  in  which  intellect,  affirming,  sim- 
ilarly, a  conflict  with  faith,  presumes  to  prune  the  creed  so  far  as  to  trench 
upon  beliefs  which  are  universal  and  inoppugnable.  Between  these  antip- 
odal states  of  conflict  lie  two  states  in  which  the  combatants  observe  an 
armistice.  In  both,  the  full  authority  of  reason  is  recognized ;  but  in  one, 
the  authority  of  the  Church  is  held  of  equal  weight,  and  hence  the  system 
of  truth  is  conceived  to  be  a  duality ;  in  the  other,  the  authority  of  the 
Church  is  held  to  be  null  when  it  contravenes  the  dictates  of  reason,  and 
the  system  of  truth  is  conceived  as  a  unity.  In  the  former,  the  combat- 
ants agree  to  disagree ;  in  the  latter,  they  recognize  each  other  as  allies. 

(!)  Ueberweg,  "History  of  Philosophy,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  17.  Luther  and  Me- 
lanchthon were  both  violently  hostile  to  the  Copernican  system  in  astron- 
omy. See  the  references  in  President  White's  exhaustive  paper  on  "  The 
Warfare  of  Science,"  in  The  Popular  Science  Monthly  for  February,  1876, 
p.  394,  and  in  a  later  separate  issue. 

(2)  On  this  subject  see  the  paper  by  President  White,  already  cited ;  as 


78  REVIVAL  OF  LETTERS. 

features  of  this  prolonged  Religious  Phase  gradually  fade  out 
as  the  sun  of  modern  science  rises  in  the  heavens ;  and  ecclesi- 
astical authority  recedes,  at  first,  to  its  normal,  unaggressive  at- 
titude, and  then,  in  turn,  crouches  beneath  the  bitter  and  vin- 
dictive revilings  of  a  mad  and  resurgent  spirit  of  freethinking. 

The  rise  of  the  Intellectual  Phase  of  this  cycle  may  be  traced 
back  to  the  time  of  Roger  Bacon  (1214-1294),  who  "prefer- 
red to  study  nature  rather  than  busy  himself  in  scholastic  sub- 
tleties." He  atoned,  however,  for  his  opposition  to  the  spirit 
of  the  times  by  ten  years  of  imprisonment.^)  Eckart  (born 
after  1250),  a  chief  of  the  German  Mystics,  in  his  independ- 
ent attitude,  was  a  forerunner  of  modern  science ;  and,  through 
his  ethics,  prepared  the  way  for  the  Reformation.  He  affirmed 
that  all  religious  truth  lies  within  the  sphere  of  human  reason. 

The  "  revival  of  letters  "  was  now  fairly  inaugurated.  The 
new  literary  movement  was  largely  due  to  the  removal  into 
Italy  of  learned  men  from  Greece  and  Constantinople.  The 
Greeks  and  Arabs  had  always  kept  alive  an  acquaintance  with 
the  learning  of  antiquity.  The  Eastern  Christians  and  the  Mo- 
hammedans had  long  since  revolted  against  the  decrees  of  the 
early  Church ;  and  the  latter,  especially,  had  developed  an  In- 
tellectual Phase  to  which  Europe  now  became  largely  indebted. 
Alkendi  (870),  Alfarabi  (died  950),  Avicenna  (born  980),  and 
Algazel  (born  1059)  in  the  East,  and  Averroes  (1126-1198)  in 
the  West,  exerted  an  influence  which  had  now  spread  over  the 
whole  of  the  civilized  world.  Averroism,  especially,  asserted 

well  as  Draper,  "  The  Intellectual  Development  of  Europe,"  and  "  The  Con- 
flict between  Religion  and  Science." 

(')  Roger  Bacon  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable  intellects  which  the 
world  has  produced.  He  is  far  more  worthy  than  his  pompous  and  pam- 
pered namesake,  of  two  centuries  later,  to  be  regarded  as  the  restorer  of 
the  inductive  method  of  scientific  investigation.  For  a  full  notice  of  Friar 
Bacon  and  his  "  Opus  Majus,"  see  Whewell,  "  History  of  the  Inductive 
Sciences,"  vol.  i.,  p.  512-522. 


INTELLECTUAL   QUICKENING.  79 

its  presence  in  much  of  the  philosophy  and  theology  of  the 
world  down  to  a  recent  period.  Numerous  contributions  to 
science  were  also  introduced  from  Arabia.  Now,  also,  occurred 
a  renewal  of  industrial  and  commercial  activity.  Now  arose 
free  cities  and  free  citizens.  Now  a  new  secular  form  of  cult- 
ure grew  up.  "All  the  natural  and  moral  sentiments  proceed- 
ing from  contact  of  man  with  man  were  brought  into  promi- 
nence in  poetry  and  increased  in  importance."  To  these  re- 
sults Dante  (1265-1321),  Petrarch  (1304-1374),  and  Boccac- 
cio (1313-1375)  greatly  contributed.  A  wonderfully  increased 
mental  activity  next  resulted  from  the  invention  of  the  art  of 
printing,  in  1440;  and  then  the  discovery  of  America  thrilled 
the  civilized  world  with  new  ideas,  new  projects,  and  new  ac- 
tivities. In  consonance  with  the  developing  spirit  of  original 
inquiry,  Vives  (1492-1540),  returning  to  the  ancient  method 
of  Aristotle,  proclaimed,  as  Friar  Bacon  had  done,  that  nature 
could  only  be  known  through  direct  investigation  by  way  of 
experiment  and  observation.  To  make  no  further  allusion  to 
the  revolution  endogenous  within  the  field  of  philosophy  and 
theology,  we  can  not  overlook  the  influence  of  the  external 
pressure  exerted  upon  the  scholastic  system  by  the  develop- 
ment of  the  germs  of  science  which  had  been  planted  by  Friar 
Bacon,  Vives,  Cesalpino  (1509-1603),  Columbus  (1435-1506), 
and  Vanini  (1585-1619,  burned  at  the  stake  for  naturalism). 
Cusanus  (1401-1464)  had  revived  the  idea  of  the  earth's  axial 
rotation.  Copernicus  (1473-1543)  established  the  heliocentric 
theory  in  astronomy.  Kepler  (1571-1630)  discovered  the  fun- 
damental laws  of  planetary  motion.  Leonardo  da  Vinci  (1452 
-1519),  as  Hallam  says,  "within  the  compass  of  a  few  pages 
anticipated  almost  all  the  discoveries  which  have  been  made  in 
science  from  Galileo  to  the  contemporary  geologists."  Gas- 
sendi  (1592-1655),  the  medieval  Epicurean,  is  the  stepping- 
stone,  in  popular  estimation,  between  Lucretius  and  Tyndall. 
Telesio  (1508-1588)  abandoned  the  disputatious  philosophy 

4* 

' 

•„*  T  ^T  W  Y* 

' 


80  A   QUESTIONING  SPIRIT  ARISING. 

for  the  original  investigation  of  nature ;  and  founded  at  Na- 
ples the  Academia  Telesiana,  the  prototype  of  all  modern  acad- 
emies of  science.  Bruno  (1548-1600)  was  another  monadist — 
the  prototype  of  Leibnitz ;  for  his  monads  were  both  psychical 
and  material.  He  suffered,  however,  for  his  pantheism ;  for  he 
rotted  several  years  in  the  dungeons  of  the  Inquisition,  and  was 
finally  burned  at  the  stake  (1600).  Thomas  Carnpanella  also 
(1568-1639)  was  persecuted  and  imprisoned  thirty  years  for 
the  heresy  of  maintaining  that  we  have  a  twofold  revelation  of 
God — Nature  and  the  Bible.  The  service  of  Galileo  (1564- 
1641)  to  modern  science  needs  but  mention.  Sir  David  Brews- 
ter  regards  him  as  possessed  of  greater  merit  than  Lord  Ba- 
con in  the  establishment  of  an  inductive  philosophy  ;  and  Biot 
pronounces  Bacon  worthless  in  comparison.  Newton  (1642- 
1727)  may  be  regarded  the  last  great  light  of  science  preceding 
the  French  Revolution. 

The  independence  of  the  modern  philosophic  spirit  began 
now  to  be  sensibly  felt.  Persecutions  for  opinion's  sake  had 
nearly  ceased.  Macchiavelli  (1469)  made  war  on  the  Church  as 
an  obstacle  to  the  unity  and  freedom  of  his  country.  Mon- 
taigne (1533-1589),  while  admitting  the  necessity  of  a  revela- 
tion, attacked  Christianity  insidiously,  and  revived  the  spirit  of 
speculative  skepticism.  Taurellus  (1547-1606)  returned  to  the 
Platonic  attempt  to  rationalize  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  and 
creation.  Hobbes  was  a  strict  sensationalist,  and  a  skeptic  in 
philosophy  and  religion.  Descartes  (1596-1650)  made  the 
fact  of  thinking  his  point  of  departure  for  the  erection  of  a 
deductive  system  —  in  this,  following  Augustine,  Occam,  and 
Campanella.  His  doctrines  were  prohibited  by  the  Synod  of 
Dordrecht  in  1656,  and  his  writings  were  placed  in  the  "In- 
dex Librorum  Prohibitorum "  at  Rome  in  1663  ;  while  in  1671 
a  royal  order  forbade  the  teaching  of  Cartesianism  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Paris.  Bayle  (1647-1706)  employed  the  early  Prot- 
estant principle  of  the  contradiction  between  reason  and  faith 


SKEPTICISM  OUTSPOKEN.  81 

— always  a  blind  and  fatal  admission — to  expose  the  absurd- 
ities incorporated  in  the  orthodox  system.  Spinoza  (1632- 
1677)  transformed  the  Cartesian  dualism  into  a  pantheism, 
whose  fundamental  conception  was  the  unity  of  substance. 
Locke  (1632-1704),  the  eminent  sensationalist,  laid  the  founda- 
tion on  which  Berkeley  (1684-1753)  erected  his  system  of  uni- 
versal immaterialism  or  idealism;  while  Hartley  (1704-1757), 
on  the  same  basis,  reared  a  system  of  materialism ;  and  Priest- 
ley (1733-1804)  accepted  this  materialism  without  renouncing 
the  Christian  faith.  Leibnitz  (1646-1716),  while  professing 
a  moderate  orthodoxy,  introduced  into  his  monadology  princi- 
ples and  assumptions  which  have  rendered  service  to  religious 
doubters.  He  had  a  multitudinous  following ;  but  is  indebted 
to  Wolf  (1679-1754)  for  the  compilation  of  his  system.  Les- 
sing  (1729-1781)  offered  a  rationalizing  interpretation  of  the 
Trinity  and  other  Christian  doctrines. 

The  skeptical  bent  of  French  philosophy  was  even  more  de- 
cided than  that  of  English  and  German  thinking.  The  object- 
ive point  of  attack  was  the  system  of  received  dogmas,  and  the 
prevailing  tyranny  exercised  both  in  Church  and  State.  Fon- 
tenelle  (1657-1757),  by  his  popular  discourses  on  the  Plural- 
ity of  Worlds,  had  rooted  the  new  astronomy  in  the  common 
mind.  Voltaire  (1694-1778)  had  been  foremost  in  populariz- 
ing the  Newtonian  doctrines,  and  had  brought  the  antagonism 
of  the  Church  (both  Catholic  and  Protestant)  to  Copernican- 
ism  well-nigh  to  a  bitter  crisis.  Maupertius  (1698-1759),  by 
the  measurement  of  a  degree  of  latitude  in  Lapland,  contrib- 
uted to  the  prosperity  of  encroaching  science.  Montesquieu 
(1689-1775)  lifted  up  his  voice  against  absolutism  equally  in 
Church  and  State.  Rousseau  (1712-1778),  a  materialist  and 
pantheist,  would  raze  all  modern  systems  to  the  ground,  and 
start  the  work  of  reconstruction  from  a  new  chaos.  Mettrie 
(l  709-1 751),  the  forerunner  of  Bain  and  Maudsley,  traced  all 
psychical  activities  to  the  bodily  organization.  Condillac  (1715 


82  FliENCH  SKEPTICS. 

-1780)  threw  a  substructure  under  this  psychology,  by  surpass- 
ing Locke  in  denominating  all  knowlege  "  but  transformed  sen- 
sations." Bonnet  (1720-1793)  attempted  to  stand  with  one 
foot  on  the  land  and  one  on  the  sea;  but  did  not  succeed  to 
the  satisfaction  of  his  generation.  Diderot  (1713-1784)  and 
D'Alembert,  the  editors  of  the  "  Encyclopedic,"  were  brilliant 
skeptics — the  former  pantheistic,  the  latter  revolutionary.  Con- 
dorcet  (1743-1794)  preached  the  gospel  of  pure  reason.  Ro- 
binet  (1735-1820)  denied  divine  personality.  Helvetius  (1715 
-1771)  founded  his  ethics  on  self-love.  Buffon  (l  707-1 788) 
cherished  an  unavowed  belief  in  Naturalism,  and  cultivated 
physiology  and  psychology  in  a  materialistic  sense.  Hume 
(1711-1777)  was  an  empiric  and  a  doubter — denying  the  pos- 
sibility of  attaining  to  a  knowledge  of  God's  existence  or  the 
soul's  immortality.  D'Holbach  (1723-1789)  wrote  the  chef- 
d'oeuvre  of  materialism,  embodying  every  thing  which  was  het- 
erodox in  La  Mettrie,  Condillac,  Diderot,  and  Helvetius.  Fi- 
nally, the  fruitage  of  this  luxuriant  crop  of  skepticism  ripened, 
and  the  world  beheld  it  in  the  carnage  and  blasphemy  of  the 
Revolution  of  1790,  which  Volney  (1757-1820),  impenitent  to 
the  end,  pronounced  a  just  attempt  to  realize  the  ideal  of  the 
rule  of  reason. 

In  this  national  and  civil  chaos  we  reach  the  end  of  the 
Third  Psychic  Cycle  of  Christian  history,  and  begin  the  FOURTH. 
It  will  not  be  necessary  to  trace  the  course  of  the  agencies  and 
the  agents  concerned  in  the  revival  of  a  normal  religious  faith. 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  civilized 
world  manifested  a  revulsion.  The  tyranny  of  undevout  reason 
had  passed  the  limits  of  endurance.  God,  as  a  personal  power, 
was  again  recognized  ;  pantheism  in  its  protean  forms  was  tram- 
pled under  righteous  feet ;  Deity  and  the  soul  ceased  to  be  mon- 
ads ;  thought  and  volition  were  no  longer  the  products  of  exos- 
mose,  endosmose,  and  secretion ;  earthy  slime  ceased  to  gener- 
ate worms,  and  the  gospel  of  Lamarck  was  laid  upon  the  shelf. 


RECENT  INTELLECTUAL  MOVEMENT.  83 

The  close  of  the  Religious  Phase,  and  the  beginning  of  the 
Intellectual  one,  may  perhaps  be  ^regarded  as  marked  by  the 
appearance  of  the  anonymous  "Vestiges  of  Creation"  (1842) ; 
and  its  march  as  denoted  by  the  establishment  of  the  geolog- 
ical doctrine  of  the  great  age  of  the  world ;  uniformitarianism 
and  progressive  development  in  the  ancient  history  of  the 
world ;  the  unity  of  the  history  of  the  solar  system,  and,  in 
its  methods,  of  the  entire  cosmos;  the  establishment  of  the 
nebular  theory ;  the  doctrine  of  the  transmutation  and  conser- 
vation of  energy ;  the  unity  of  the  material  forces ;  the  theory 
of  the  physiological  origin  of  psychic  phenomena;  the  doc- 
trines of  heterogenesis,  derivation  of  species,  and  universal  evo- 
lution, with  or  without  the  exclusion  of  divine  intervention. 
These,  however  tenable  or  untenable  some  of  the  theories  may 
be,  are  the  exponents  of  a  recent  intellectual  movement,  which, 
if  we  interpret  the  history  of  thought  correctly,  has  recurred 
time  and  again  in  the  experience  of  our  race ;  and  is  destined, 
like  other  intellectual  phases,  to  be  superseded  by  the  return 
of  a  normal  trust  in  the  authority  of  our  religious  intuitions ; 
a  regenerated,  a  broader  and  stronger  religious  faith,  and  an 
actual  progress  toward  a  standard  of  absolute  truth. 

The  FIRST  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  of  Christian  history  was  char- 
acterized by  the  earnest  search  of  Thought  for  a  worthy  form 
of  Religious  Faith.  Its  Religious  Phase  was  Apostolicism, 
and  its  Intellectual  Phase,  Heresism.  The  SECOND  PSYCHIC 
CYCLE  was  characterized  by  the  Unity  of  Thought  and  Faith. 
Its  Religious  Phase  was  Tertullianism,  and  its  Intellectual 
Phase  was  Augustinism.  The  THIRD  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  was 
characterized  by  the  Servitude  of  Thought  to  Faith.  Its  Re- 
ligious Phase  was  Scholasticism,  and  its  Intellectual  Phase  was 
the  Renaissance.  The  FOURTH  PSYCHIC  CYCLE  has  been  char- 
acterized by  the  Divorce  of  Thought  from  Faith.  Its  Relig- 
ious Phase  has  been  Protestantism,  and  its  Intellectual  Phase 
Naturalism.  The  next  Psychic  Cycle,  it  seems  to  me,  will  wit- 


84  THE  NEXT  CYCLE. 

ness  a  Synthesis  of  Thought  and  Faith — a  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  impossible  for  reason  to  find  solid  ground  that 
is  not  consecrated  ground;  that  all  philosophy  and  all  science 
belong  to  religion ;  that  all  truth  is  a  revelation  of  God ;  that 
the  truths  of  written  revelation,  if  not  intelligible  to  reason, 
are  nevertheless  consonant  with  reason ;  and  that  Divine  agen- 
cy, instead  of  standing  removed  from  man  by  infinite  intervals 
of  time  and  space,  is,  indeed,  the  true  name  of  those  energies 
which  work  their  myriad  phenomena  in  the  natural  world 
around  us.  This  consummation — at  once  the  inspiration  of 
a  fervent  religion  and  the  prophecy  of  the  loftiest  science — is 
to  be  the  noontide  reign  of  wedded  Intellect  and  Faith,  whose 
morning  rays  already  stream  far  above  our  horizon. 


SCIENCE  AND  PHILOSOPHY  IN  RELIGION. 


IV. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSALITY. 
1.  Original  Causation. 

THE  lengthy,  and  yet  synoptical,  sketch  of  the  historical 
interactions  of  Intellect  and  Faith  presented  in  the  last  two 
lectures  was  little  more  than  a  bald  digest  of  recorded  facts. 
Want  of  time  prohibited,  and  still  prohibits,  the  utterance  of 
many  things  calculated  to  qualify  broad  statements,  to  add  to 
the  evidence,  and  strengthen  the  argument.  It  would  have  been 
gratifying  to  note  more  particularly  the  progress  of  scientific 
development  in  post-scholastic  times ;  the  influence  of  the  dis- 
covery and  settlement  of  America,  and  the  successful  war  for 
independence  in  the  United  States ;  the  great  influence  of  mar- 
itime discovery — the  doubling  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  the 
discovery  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  the  circumnavigation  of 
the  globe.  It  would  be  gratifying,  also,  to  note  the  real  serv- 
ice which  was  performed  for  literature  and  classical  learning, 
for  philosophy  and  the  dialectic  art,  by  the  Romish  Church 
during  the  Middle  Ages;  to  trace  the  history  of  medieval 
thought  among  the  Nestorians,  the  Mohammedans,  and  the 
Jews ;  and,  while  illustrating  the  laws  of  the  Interaction  of  the 
two  great  forces  of  humanity,  to  acknowledge  our  indebtedness 
to  Eastern  influences  for  the  Revival  of  Letters.  (')  It  would 

(')  Some  of  these  topics  are  treated  with  great  originality  by  Draper  in 
"  The  Intellectual  Development  of  Europe."  See,  also,  Whewell,  "  Histo- 
ry of  the  Inductive  Sciences."  These  two  authorities,  however,  are  wide- 
ly apart  in  their  estimate  of  the  indebtedness  of  civilization  to  Arabian 
thought.  But  see  Hallam,  "  Literature  of  Europe,"  vol.  i. 


88  THINGS  UNSAID. 

be  agreeable,  if  not  highly  desirable,  to  guard  myself  against 
misconstruction  when,  in  sketching  the  progress  of  religious 
phases,  I  have  found  myself  under  the  necessity  of  tracing 
them  into  ceremonialism  and  sacerdotalism,  sometimes  fanati- 
cism, and  of tener  a  rigorous  surveillance  over  the  intellect.  It 
might  be  well  for  me  to  guard  myself  against  misinterpretation 
when,  in  sketching  the  progress  of  an  intellectual  phase,  I  have 
had  to  bring  frecthinking,  materialism,  pantheism  or  some  form 
of  recognized  heresy,  into  an  antithesis  with  religious  excesses 
— as  if  sound  intelligence  must  necessarily  be  heretical  and  anti- 
religious. 

In  reference  to  this,  I  fall  back  upon  the  general  proposi- 
tions enunciated  in  my  first  lecture  for  explanation  and  de- 
fense. Both  these  forces  have  the  right  to  existence  and  free 
,  action.  It  is  the  law  of  faith  to  encroach  upon  intellect ;  and 
the  law  of  intellect  to  assert  its  freedom,  and  even  to  retaliate. 
This  interaction  is  an  ordination  of  Heaven,  and  is  beneficent ; 
it  is  the  condition  of  the  approximation  of  man  toward  high 
ideals  of  religion  and  knowledge.  These  two  forces  must,  nev- 
ertheless, learn  to  respect  each  other ;  and  each,  must  feel  that 
its  own  welfare  is  bound  up  in  the  tolerance  and  highest  activ- 
ity of  the  other.  Without  intelligence,  religion  degenerates  into 
a  fetichism,  which  is  next  to  the  negation  of  religion.  With- 
out religious  faith  dwelling  and  acting  in  the  human  heart,  so- 
ciety sinks  to  a  level  where  even  intelligence  expires  in  the 
ruins  of  public  and  private  morality.  There  is  a  system  of  be- 
neficent correlations  and  co-operations  between  Intellect  and 
Faith  which  all  interests  urge  us  to  recognize  and  cherish. 
There  are  services  which  intellect  is  able  to  render  to  religious 
faith,  which  faith  ought  to  be  eager  to  secure ;  and,  dropping 
all  mediaeval  fancies  or  fears  in  reference  to  possible  contradic- 
tions in  the  system  of  truth,  cheerfully,  cordially,  and,  interest- 
edly accept  the  complete  and  indissoluble  unity  of  truth,  and, 
as  a  corollary,  the  sacredness  of  all  truth  which  God  has  ordain- 


BASIS  OF  CO-OPERATION.  89 

cd  to  exist.  On  this  platform  we  can  bid  investigation  god- 
speed, and  hail  with  gratitude  every  trophy  which  it  brings 
back  to  us  from  the  field  of  the  unknown  —  fearing  nothing 
which  reason  can  prove  true,  but  only  that  which  reason  is  ca- 
pable of  proving  erroneous — assured  always  that  the  time  will 
come  when  all  which  science  can  establish  will  be  counted  an 
indispensable  auxiliary  to  a  purified  and  robust  faith. 

I  have  not  the  vanity  to  think  that,  after  all  the  earnest  en- 
deavor and  loyal  aspiration  which  have  marked  the  twenty 
centuries  of  reflective  thought,  I  am  the  first  to  discover  the 
methods  in  which  the  interests  of  Faith  may  be  subserved  by 
the  efforts  of  Intellect.  I  venerate  the  names  which  shine  in 
the  skies  which  have  bent  over  other  generations  of  men ;  and 
after  the  survey  which  I  have  taken  of  the  profound  intellect- 
ual labors  of  the  hundreds  who  have  gone  before,  no  less  ear- 
nest and  far  more  able  than  I,  it  seems  fitting  that  I  should  drop 
the  pen,  and  silence  the  tongue,  and  listen  reverently  to  the 
voices  which  come  up  from  antiquity ;  from  the  cloisters  of  the 
Middle  Ages ;  from  the  retirement  of  the  philosophers  whose 
wisdom  has  led  us  out  into  this  light  in  which  we  exult,  I  fear, 
with  less  of  gratitude  than  of  pride.  But  I  can  not  rest  inact- 
ive. The  throbs  of  brain,  like  the  pulsations  of  the  luminifer- 
ous  ether,  can  not  be  stilled.  Be  it  better  or  worse  than  others 
have  done,  the  brain,  as  long  as  it  lives,  must  work.  May  In- 
finite Wisdom  and  Goodness  open  the  way  to  eternal  truth ! 

I  have  said  that  faith  in  God  is  a  living  principle  in  the  life 
of  humanity.  Whence  comes  this  faith  ? 

I  deny,  first,  that  it  grows  out  of  a  superstitious  fear  of  in- 
visible powers,  as  taught  by  Hobbes,  Comtc,  Lubbock,  Biich- 
ner,  and  a  few  others.  I  deny,  in  the  second  place,  that  it  is  a 
feeling  descended  from  an  ancient  veneration  for  ancestors,  or 
for  the  wise  and  good,  as  taught  by  Euhemerus,  Burton,  and 
some  others.  I  deny,  thirdly,  that  it  is  a  faith  inculcated  or 
enforced  by  those  who  peopled  Olympus  with  divinities,  to  in- 


90  WHENCE  THE  IDEA  OF  GOD? 

spire  obedience  to  the  laws  of  society  and  the  State,  as  Critias, 
Mutius  Scaevola,  Pyrrho,  and  others  of  the  ancients  asserted. 
I  deny,  fourthly,  that  it  is  a  sentiment  derived  originally  from 
inspired  revelation,  propagated  by  the  chosen  people  of  God, 
and  quite  unfelt  among  tribes  whom  the  messages  of  the  Bible 
have  never  reached.  I  hold,  with  nearly  all  the  philosophers 
of  antiquity,  with  Spencer  and  Tyndall  and  Huxley,  and  near- 
ly all  the  leading  scientists  and  thinkers  of  modern  times,  that 
the  religious  sentiment  and  belief  arise  spontaneously  in  the 
human  soul,  and  are  absolutely  the  characteristic  of  universal 
humanity.  The  grounds  for  these  denials  and  this  affirmation 
have  not  received  from  me  a  casual  attention.  It  is  not  my 
purpose  to  spread  them  out  in  this  connection ;  but  reference 
has  been  made  to  them  in  a  former  lecture.^) 

How  comes  this  universal  theistic  conception  into  existence  ? 
My  reply  is  that  it  comes  through  two  channels:  1st.  INTUI- 
TION ;  2d.  DEDUCTION.  Intuition  alone  is  almost  the  only  light 
of  lowest  savages ;  but  deduction  along  various  brief  lines  of 
thought  comes  to  the  aid  of  the  mind  in  the  feeblest  infancy 
of  reflection,  and  strengthens  its  conclusions  more  and  more,  as 
long  as  reflective  thought  continues  to  grow  in  breadth  of  grasp 
and  clearness  of  discernment. 

There  is  no  need  to  hesitate  at  the  announcement  of  the  stu- 
pendous and  humbling  fact  that  God  is  revealed  directly  to  hu- 
man reason.  This  intuition  of  God  is  one  of  the  common  data 
of  human  intelligence.  We  find  it  in  us  and  in  all  men ;  like 
the  intuition  of  the  relation  subsisting  between  the  whole  and 
the  sum  of  its  parts ;  but  it  is  a  tremendous  fact,  when  we 
pause  to  think  upon  its  significance.  Much  could  be  adduced 
to  sustain  the  thesis  that  God  reveals  himself  directly  to  human 
consciousness.  The  very  universality  of  theistic  beliefs  shows 
that  humanity  can  not  dodge  the  divine  presence ;  more  than 

(!)  See,  also,  the  Seventh  Paper,  "Reason  for  the  Faith." 


INTUITION  OF  GOD.  91 

this  is  the  wide-spread  belief  among  philosophers  and  theolo- 
gians, that  direct  communion  with  God  is  both  possible  and 
normal.  I  only  need  refer  you  to  the  doctrines  of  some  of  the 
Pythagoreans,  and  especially  the  Neo-Pythagoreans ;  to  Socra- 
tes ;(')  to  Plato  and  the  Platonists,  and  especially  the  Neo-Pla- 
tonists  —  to  Philo  the  Jew,  Plotinus,  and  Jamblichus;  to  the 
Neo-Piatonistic  Fathers  and  Schoolmen;  to  Eckart  and  the 
Mystics ;  to  Cusanus,  Jacobi,  Schleiermacher,  Nitzsch ;  to  that 
Oriental  faith  in  divine  communication  manifest  in  Buddha 
and  the  Buddhists,  and  again  in  Magianism  and  Parseeism; 
and,  finally,  to  the  doctrine  of  Jewish  and  Christian  inspiration, 
and  to  the  pretensions  of  the  founders  of  nearly  all  religious 
systems.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  sentiment  of  the  philosophic 
world  is  strongly  in  support  of  a  doctrine  which,  in  recent 
times,  has  sunk  almost  into  forgetfulness,  if  not  rejection.  But 
I  shall  not  elaborate  the  evidences  which  sustain  me  in  this 
belief. 

(*)  "  Pythagoras  the  Great  always  applied  his  mind  to  prognostication ; 
and  Abaris  the  Hyperborean,  and  Aristaeus  the  Proconnesian,  and  Epi- 
menides  the  Cretan,  who  came  to  Sparta,  and  Zoroaster  the  Mede,  and  Em- 
pedocles  of  Agrigentum,  and  Phormion  the  Lacedaemonian ;  Polycrates,  too, 
of  Thasus,  and  Empedotimus  of  Syracuse ;  and,  in  addition  to  these,  Socra- 
tes the  Athenian,  in  particular.  '  For,'  he  says  in  the  "  Theages,"  '  I  am  at- 
tended by  a  supernatural  intimation  which  has  been  assigned  me  from  a 
child,  by  divine  appointment.  This  is  a  voice  which,  when  it  comes,  pre- 
vents what  I  am  about  to  do,  but  exhorts  never '  "  (Plato's  "  Theages,"  xi., 
ad  init.).  Clement  proceeds  to  name  many  others  reputed  to  be  prophets 
and  soothsayers  (Clem.  Alex.,  Strom.,  book  i.,  xxi.).  It  is  not  imagined,  of 
course,  that  the  pretense  of  soothsaying  is  any  evidence  of  the  intuition 
of  Deity ;  but  it  seems  certain  that  the  wide  prevalence  of  it  among  both 
civilized  and  barbarous  peoples  may  be  cited  as  evidence  of  opinion  re- 
specting the  possibility  of  intercourse  with  the  power  of  the  unseen  world. 
Clement  further  says :  "  By  reflection  and  direct  vision,  those  among  the 
Greeks  who  have  philosophized  accurately  see  God"  (Strom.,  book  i.,  chap, 
xix.).  The  higher  religious  intuition  Clement  calls  "  self -operating  wis- 
dom" (Strom.,  book  i.,  chap.  xx.). 


92  CREDULITY  EXPLAINED. 

The  doctrine  of  the  immediate  intuition  of  Deity  suffers,  at 
first  view,  no  little  disparagement  from  the  fact  that  so  many 
of  its  defenders  have  been  carried  away  by  a  spirit  of  creduli- 
ty or  enthusiasm — given  to  divination,  astrology,  alchemy,  and 
other  mysteries,  which,  in  the  history  of  speculation,  are  set 
down  as  characteristics  or  accessories  of  philosophic  mysticism. 
It  is  proper  to  bear  in  mind,  nevertheless,  that  those  possessing 
an  unusual  development  of  any  mental  power  are  correspond- 
ingly liable  to  fall  into  a  certain  class  of  failings  not  common 
to  the  average  mind.  An  excessively  and  exclusively  logical 
mind  is  abnormally  slow  of  conviction  under  the  force  of  moral 
evidence.  An  unusually  vivid  imagination  commits  a  multi- 
tude of  sins  of  which  the  prosaic  individual  would  be  incapa- 
ble. And  yet  the  logical  faculty  and  the  imagination  are  no- 
ble and  exalted  faculties,  not  to  be  reproached  for  the  sins  and 
errors  which  become  possible  under  a  development  which  may 
be  excessive  relatively  to  the  other  powers  of  the  mind.  Even 
excessive  amiability  has  its  concomitant  and  consequential  fail- 
ings ;  and  something  similar  may  be  said  of  morbid  conscien- 
tiousness, extravagant  affection,  or  unbridled  benevolence.  Yet 
none  of  these  failings  would  be  used  as  evidence  that  the  pow- 
ers from  whose  overdevelopment  they  arise  are  not  useful  and 
beneficent ;  still  less  that  they  do  not  really  exist,  or  that  their 
objects  are  unrealities.  So  those  in  whom  the  divine  intuition 
is  clearest  may  owe  this  excellence  to  auxiliary  susceptibilities 
which  make  them,  in  the  actual  world,  the  easy  victims  of  cre- 
dulity and  error. 

I  reply,  in  the  second  place,  that  the  universal  theistic  belief 
comes  into  existence  through  simple  processes  of  deduction. 
There  is  more  than  one  highway  to  the  cognition  of  God,  how- 
ever single  and  narrow  may  be  the  road  to  heaven.  The  con- 
census gentium,  as  Cicero  says,  is  one  of  the  grounds  of  belief. 
What  all  mankind  believe  must  be  true.  Vox  populi,  vox  Dei 
— I  do  not  mean  the  voice  of  the  rabble  or  of  the  majority — 


IDEA   OF  CAUSALITY.  93 

but  the  voice  of  humanity,  with  no  minority  dissenting.  Such 
a  faith  can  not  be  hollow  without  projecting  discord  into  a 
world  where  all  else  is  harmony.  But  this,  also,  is  a  line  of 
thought  which  I  propose  to  pass  by. 

Foremost  of  all,  then,  the  intuition  of  causality  affords  the 
most  important  datum  for  supporting  a  theistic. deduction.  To 
the  discussion  of  this  thesis  I  invite  your  attention. 

The  word  CAUSE  is  one  of  the  most  familiar  in  the  language. 
Every  person  believes  himself  to  know  what  it  means,  though 
few  persons  have  reflected  with  attention  on  the  complete  con- 
tent of  this  concept,  and  its  relation  logically  and  historically 
to  the  cognitive,  sensitive,  and  voluntary  powers  of  the  soul. 
That  the  idea  or  notion  of  causality  is  a  universal  datum  of  hu- 
man thought  all  admit,  as  they  must  admit ;  but  whether  it  be 
a  mere  acquired  belief,  or  an  endogenous  and  necessary  and 
characteristic  power  of  the  soul,  is  a  question  upon  which  en- 
tire unanimity  has  not  been  reached. 

It  may  illustrate  the  extravagance  and  bad  logic  of  specula- 
tive skepticism  to  state  that  the  Middle  Academy  denied  even 
that  causation  is  a  possibility — and  thence  concluded  the  inva- 
lidity of  the  notion  of  causality.  A  cause  is  a  relation,  says 
^Enesidemus,  for  it  is  not  to  be  conceived  without  that  which 
it  causes ;  but  the  relation  has  no  existence  except  in  thought. 
Again,  he  argues  that,  in  any  case,  cause  and  effect  must  be 
either  synchronous,  or  else  cause  or  effect  must  precede.  If  we 
suppose  them  synchronous,  it  is  impossible  to  determine  which 
is  cause.  If  we  suppose  effect  to  precede,  an  absurdity  is  at 
once  apparent.  If,  finally,  we  suppose  cause  to  precede,  this 
is  also  an  absurdity,  since  cause  is  no  cause  until  effect  exists ; 
and  this  results  in  a  synchronism  which  confounds  cause  and 
effect,  as  under  the  first  supposition.  Such  reasoning,  like 
Zeno's  argument  against  the  possibility  of  motion,  is  simply  a 
species  of  dialectic  legerdemain. 

The  various  theories  respecting  the  origin  of  our  notion  of 


94  ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA. 

causality  may,  I  think,  be  reduced  to  three :  1.  That  it  is  EX- 
OGENOUS, or  based  on  data  derived  from  without.  Hume  says 
it  is  habit  which  leads  us  to  expect  certain  sequences  from 
given  antecedents.  Glanville  says  we  do  not  experience,  but 
only  infer,  causation.  J.  S.  Mill  asserts  that  the  idea  of  cause 
is  merely  a  general  induction  from  facts  of  observation.  He 
gives  the  same  explanation  of  all  universal  and  necessary  be- 
liefs— not  excepting  our  belief  in  the  axioms  of  mathematics.^) 

2.  The  theory  that  the  notion  of  causality  is  ENDOGENOUS, 
or  developed  within,  as  held  by  Leibnitz,  Kant,  and  Cousin. 
Sir  William  Hamilton  also  maintained  that  our  idea  of  cause 
arises  only  from  "  a  subjective  necessity  " — our  inability  to  con- 
ceive of  any  thing  except  as  an  effect  proceeding  from  a  cause. 
Spencer  holds  that  universal  ideas  are  the  results  of  organized 
experience,  that  is,  the  inherited  experience  of  the  race. 

3.  The  theory  that  the  notion  of  causality  is  INNATE,  or 
born  within  us — an  essential  attribute  of  our  mental  being.     It 
is  not  implied  in  this  view  that  the  notion  would  ever  arise  in 
consciousness,  except  under  the  influence  of  the  co-ordinate  ac- 
tivity of  the  various  departments  of  the  mind.     The  notion 
of  cause,  for  instance,  though  innate,  may  not  be  awakened 
into  consciousness  except  by  the  discovery  of  uniform  sequences 
in  the  external  world,  as  is  rather  commonly  held ;  or  it  may, 
as  Maine  de  Biran,  Reid,  and  others  have  believed,  be  roused 
into  consciousness  by  observing  the  connection  between  acts  of 
volition  and  the  mental  states  or  external  changes  which  fol- 
low ;  or,  as  Coleridge  thought,  by  the  perception  of  the  activ- 
ity of  our  imaginations  and  the  accompanying  results.     A  be- 
lief in  the  innate  character  of  the  idea  was  entertained  by  Pla- 
to, by  Carneades,  by  the  Realists  among  the  Schoolmen,  by 
Descartes,  and  is  held  by  the  majority  of  modern  metaphysi- 
cians. 

(')  J.  S.  Mill,  "  Logic,"  book  ii.,  chap.  v. 


WHAT  THE  IDEA  IMPLIES.  95 

The  distinction  between  the  Innate  and  the  Endogenous 
origin  of  the  idea  does  not  seem  to  me  important.  In  either 
case  it  is  a  recognized  and  invariable  characteristic  of  the  mind 
— a  universal  datum  of  thought ;  and,  in  either  case,  it  is  con- 
sidered as  emerging  in  the  field  of  consciousness  only  on  the 
presentation  of  the  appropriate  occasion. 

That  the  idea  of  causal  relation  is  not  the  suggestion  of 
experience,  seems  to  be  extremely  obvious.  Experience  could  ' 
afford  only  the  idea  of  succession,  or,  at  most,  a  fixed  order 
of  succession,  like  that  of  the  individuals  in  a  procession.  It 
could  never  give  rise  to  the  notion  of  that  relation  between  the 
terms  which  we  denominate  causal.  And,  again,  should  the 
concept  of  a  causal  relation  arise  as  a  general  induction  from  a 
countless  number  of  sequences,  it  could  never  yield  us  that  cer- 
tain conviction  which  we  possess,  that  every  assignable  event 
proceeds  from  a  cause.  A  moment's  reflection  upon  our  own 
mental  states  must  convince  us  that  we  feel  a  certainty  beyond 
all  doubt  that  every  event  and  every  phenomenon  is  due  to 
the  exertion  of  some  causal  efficiency.  The  relation  between 
cause  and  effect  we  feel  to  be  more  than  a  uniform  sequence. 
Some  energy  has  been  put  forth  by  cause,  or  has  proceeded 
through,  and  emanates  from,  that  which  is  called  cause,  to  the 
effect. 

In  contemplating  the  essential  nature  of  the  causal  relation, 
we  perceive  that  it  implies  sequence,  efficiency,  adequacy,  direc- 
tion, and  application.  The  potential  cause  exists  before  the 
effect;  it  exerts  an  efficiency  to  produce  the  effect,  and  does 
not  stand  simply  as  an  invariable  antecedent ;  it  exerts  an  ade- 
quate efficiency,  both  in  amount  and  kind ;  its  efficiency  is  di- 
rected toward  the  effect  still  non-existent,  and  is  applied  to 
that  from  which  the  effect  is  evolved.  These  are  simple  con- 
stitutive ideas,  whose  shadowy  and  evanescent  forms  we  can 
recognize  inclosed  in,  or  dependent  on,  the  notion  of  causa- 
tion. 

5 


96  WHAT  IS  EFFICIENT  CAUSE. 

Now,  when  we  reflect  that  the  naked  and  disentangled  no- 
tion of  cause  is  simply  the  intuition  and  accompanying  belief, 
that  every  event  proceeds  from  adequate  efficiency,  directed 
toward,  and  applied  to,  that  substance,  actual  or  potential,  from 
which  effect  comes,  it  seems  to  me  that  we  dismiss  at  once  a 
mass  of  dialectic  and  scholastic  verbiage  which  has  darkened 
the  discussion  of  causality  ever  since  the  days  of  Aristotle. 
If  we  view  the  subject  in  the  clear  light  of  the  intuition  in  our 
own  souls,  it  seems  to  be  apparent  that  there  can  exist  but  one 
species  of  cause,  and  that  is  efficient  cause — the  entity  in  which 
efficiency  originates.^)  That  which  prompts  efficiency  to  its 
exertion  is  motive,  and  not  cause ;  and  we  introduce  confusion 
to  denominate  it  the  "  final  cause."  It  is  the  "  sufficient  rea- 
son." Its  relation  to  effect  is  recognized  as  essentially  differ- 
ent from  the  relation  between  efficiency  and  effect.  It  is  not 
the  causal  relation ;  and  although  the  notion  of  motivity  may 

(J)  The  term  "  efficient  cause  "  is  employed  here  in  a  restricted  sense.  It 
does  not  embrace,  according  to  the  views  of  Aristotle  and  the  Schoolmen, 
any  antecedent  of  an  effect  which  is  not  the  fountain  and  source  of  the 
efficiency  on  which  the  effect  depends.  Many  modern  physicists  and  nat- 
uralists employ  the  term  "  efficient  cause"  in  the  scholastic  sense;  but  meta- 
physicians, though,  for  convenience,  employing  the  term  cause  as  the  phys- 
icists do,  make  a  clear  distinction.  J.  S.  Mill  says,  "I  most  fully  agree 
with  M.  Comte  that  ultimate,  or,  in  the  phraseology  of  the  metaphysicians, 
efficient,  causes,  which  are  conceived  as  not  being  phenomena,  nor  percepti- 
ble to  the  senses  at  all,  are  radically  inaccessible  to  the  human  faculties. 
*  *  *  When  I  speak  of  causation,  I  have  nothing  in  view  other  than  those 
constant  relations  "  [of  succession  or  of  similarity]  ("  System  of  Logic," 
book  ii.,  chap,  v.,  §  9).  Professor  Jevons,  who  uses  the  term  "cause"  with 
great  latitude  of  meaning,  and  seems,  moreover,  to  misunderstand  both 
Bacon  and  Mill,  makes  the  same  distinction,  and  for  the  same  purpose : 
"We  must  not  confuse  this  supremely  difficult  question  [Is  there  any 
cause  for  the  event?]  with  that  into  which  inductive  science  inquires  on 
the  foundation  of  facts  "  ("  Principles  of  Science,"  vol.  i.,  p.  257).  Profess- 
or Morris  brings  out  the  distinction  with  clearness  ("  The  Final  Cause," 
Proc.  Phil.  Soc.,  London,  1875). 


UNREAL   CAUSES  EXCLUDED.  97 

arise  simultaneously  with  the  notion  of  cause,  the  two  notions 
are  clearly  distinguishable. 

Again,  the  material  acted  upon  by  efficiency,  or  from  which 
or  within  which  effect  arises,  is  in  no  sense  a  cause.  It  may 
be  an  essential  condition  of  the  production  of  the  effect,  but 
we  confound  ideas  again  to  designate  it  the  "  material  cause." 
It  sustains  no  causal  relation  to  the  effect. 

Neither  is  the  antecedent  concept  possessed  by  the  causal 
agent  clothed  with  the  attribute  of  efficiency.  The  so-called 
"  formal  cause  "  is  the  preconception  of  the  causal  intelligence, 
and  constitutes  one  of  the  numerous  conditions  of  the  realiza- 
tion of  effect.  Closely  related  to  this  is  the  "  exemplary  cause  " 
of  Pythagoras  and  Plato. 

Neither,  again,  can  the  changed  results  which  succeed  the 
removal  or  change  of  an  efficient  cause  be  referred  causally 
to  the  negation.  "  Negative  cause  "  is  an  imaginary  quantity. 
Effect  proceeds  from  something  real,  and  existent,  and  present, 
and  efficient.  "Negative  cause"  is  a  mere  verbal  contradic- 
tion. Nor  is  "  modal  cause  "  much  more  real ;  since  mode  is 
merely  a  state,  or  condition,  or  mode  of  action  of  that  which 
is  efficient,  "  substantial "  and  real  cause. 

These  exclusions  render  it  necessary  to  restrict  the  "  general 
definition  "  of  cause.  The  general  idea  of  cause  is  not,  as  Aris- 
totle affirms,  "that  without  which  another  thing  called  effect 
can  not  be ;"  but  rather,  according  to  Wolf,  "  that  which  con- 
tains in  itself  the  reason  why  another  thing  exists — Ens  quod 
in  se  continet  rationem  cur  alterum  existat.  Motive,  material, 
intermediation,  preconception,  efficiency,  being  regarded  as  spe- 
cific causes,  we  may  abstract  a  general  definition  of  cause ;  and 
we  may  render  ourselves  intelligible  by  using  terms  in  such 
senses ;  but  it  must  be  constantly  felt  that  "  efficient  cause," 
in  the  sense  as  qualified,  is  the  only  cause  which  is  underlaid 
by  our  intuition  of  causality ;  and  that,  though  the  other  Aris- 
totelian* and  scholastic  "  causes "  may  be  based  on  concepts, 


98  "SECOND  CAUSES"  RULED  OUT. 

some  of  which  are  invariable  concomitants  of  our  notion  of 
causation  (cause  in  action),  it  should  be  the  conceded  prerog- 
ative of  the  eliminated  intuition  of  causality  to  sanction  the 
employment  of  the  term  "  cause."  I  view  cause,  therefore,  as  a 
single  and  irresolvable  idea;  and  the  use  of  such  an  expres- 
sion as  "  cause  in  the  general  sense  "  is  an  setiological  solecism. 

Disencumbering  myself  of  the  verbal  jargon  of  the  past,(') 
and  recognizing  only  one  species  of  cause,  I  wish  to  abolish, 
further,  except  for  mere  convenience  of  phraseology,  the  dis- 
tinction of  "  primary  "  and  "  secondary  "  causation.  Secondary 
cause  is  simply  the  intermediation  through  which  primary 
cause  transmits  efficiency.  The  very  definition  dethrones  it  as 
cause.  The  millstone  is,  in  no  proper  sense,  the  cause  of  the 
flour.  The  hammer  is  not  the  cause  of  the  contusion.  These 
are  media,  or  instruments,  for  the  transmission  of  efficiency  by 
primary  causes.  The  naked  intuition  of  causality  is  only  an 
intuition  of  the  relation  between  effect  and  primary,  original 
moving  cause. 

In  the  next  place,  causal  efficiency  implies  spontaneity.  Dead 
substance  may  serve  as  the  medium,  or  instrument,  for  the  trans- 
mission of  efficiency.  Inanimate  matter  may  occupy  the  place 
of  so-called  secondary  causes ;  but  a  real  or  spontaneous  cause 
it  can  never  be.  A  dozen  terms  of  secondary  causation  may 
intervene  between  effect  and  first  cause,  but  first  cause  is  neces- 
sarily implied  in  every  instance — a  first  cause  acting  in  and  of 
itself,  having  inherent  energy,  put  forth  under  the  mandate  of 
will,  and  consequently  under  the  direction  of  intelligence.  We 

(')  St.  Clement  says :  "  Now,  all  the  causes  may  be  shown  in  order  in  the 
case  of  the  learner.  The  father  is  the  procatarctic  cause  of  learning  ;  the 
teacher,  the  synectic  ;  and  the  nature  of  the  learner,  the  co-operating  cause  ; 
and  time  holds  the  relation  of  cause  sine  qua  non.  *  *  *  Causation  is 
predicated  in  four  ways :  the  efficient  cause,  as  the  statuary ;  and  the  ma- 
terial, as  the  brass ;  and  the  form,  as  the  character ;  and  the  end,  as  the 
honor  of  the  Gymnasiarch  "  (Clem.  Alex.,  Strom.,  book  viii.,  chap.ix.). 


IDEA  OF  FIRST  CAUSE.  99 

may  think  of  efficient  causation  between  the  terms  of  the  series 
of  natural  phenomena ;  but  unless  we  can  posit  intelligence  and 
will  in  the  antecedent,  the  thought  is  illusory.  We  may  say 
that  the  lightning  has  caused  the  destruction  of  a  building ; 
but  unless  we  clothe  lightning  with  the  attributes  of  intelli- 
gence and  will,  the  phrase  can  imply  no  more  than  secondary 
causation,  which,  as  I  have  said,  is  no  causation  at  all,  in  the 
sense  implied  in  the  intuition. 

To  get  back  through  the  chain  of  secondary  causes,  so  called, 
to  real  or  first  cause,  may  demand  the  passage  of  a  vast  num- 
ber of  links — nay,  an  indefinite  number  of  links;  but  real,  vol- 
untary, and  intelligent  cause  must  be  disclosed  at  last.  In  the 
world  of  human  activities,  human  will  is  seen  standing  as  the 
first  term  of  series  of  results,  each  of  which  becomes  the  instru- 
mental cause  of  the  succeeding  term.  In  the  natural  world,  the 
regress  backward  from  phenomenon  loses  itself  in  a  realm  of 
mystery  and  impenetrableness ;  but  human  reason  does  not 
abate  one  jot  of  its  confidence  in  the  presence  of  intelligent  ef- 
ficiency at  the  initial  end  of  the  series.  The  Arabian  philoso- 
pher Alfarabi  says,  as  all  change  and  all  development  must  pro- 
ceed from  a  cause,  so  the  sum  of  all  changes  must  flow  from  a 
First  Cause.  Albertus  Magnus,  in  the  face  of  the  prevailing 
sentiment  of  antiquity,  follows  the  instinct  of  causality  to  its 
legitimate  conclusion,  and  affirms  that  even  matter  is  an  effect. 
Descartes  denies  that  the  regressus  in  infinitum  affords  the  in- 
tellect any  relief,  and  feels  impelle'd  to  posit  primordial  causa- 
tion in  eternity,  as  the  logical  antecedent  of  the  cosmos.  In- 
deed, the  notion  of  primordial  causality  is  twin  to  the  intui- 
tion of  cause.  To  say  absolutely  that  nothing  in  the  universe 
exists  except  as  an  effect  is  to  deny  the  possibility  of  all  exist-1 
ence.  The  human  mind  promptly  reposes  itself  on  the  idea  of 
uncreated  and  uncaused  cause.  Wandering  off  into  the  realm 
of  the  undiscoverable,  unable  to  climb  the  infinite  steps  which 
descend  from  primal  efficiency,  it  feels  that  First  Cause  reigns 


100  COGNITION  OF  DEITY. 

at  the  beginning ;  and,  in  spite  of  the  axiom  of  reason  which 
dominates  in  all  the  cognizable  realm,  that  "whatever  exists 
has  been  caused  to  exist,"  the  soul  which  rises  to  such  heights 
as  to  gaze  into  the  infinite  and  eternal,  finds  a  supporting  and 
unimpeachable  testimony  arising  out  of  the  obscure  ground  of 
its  own  consciousness,  and  affirming,  in  accents  which  interdict 
all  doubt,  an  eternal  Self -existence,  filling  the  immensity  which 
is  mirrored  in  its  own  consciousness.  Thus,  I  maintain  that 
the  idea  of  primordial  cause — why  may  I  not  say  the  intui- 
tion of  Deity  ? — is  a  datum  of  reason  as  clear,  as  necessary,  as 
universal  as  the  apperception  of  causality  in  the  finite  sphere. 

This  necessary  idea  of  primordial  causality  is,  to  claim  no 
more,  but  one  remove  from  the  intuition  of  Deity.  As  soon  as 
reason  recognizes  the  necessary  truth  of  primitive  causality — 
uncaused — without  a  term  beyond,  it  passes  by  the  necessary 
law  of  substance  to  the  concept  of  real  being  in  whom  the  at- 
tribute of  primordial  causality  inheres.  Without  the  conscious- 
ness of  a  process  of  thought,  all  which  characterizes  the  abso- 
lute and  infinite  reveals  itself  as  the  investiture  of  the  primi- 
tive causal  existence,  on  whose  will  hangs  all  dependent  exist- 
ence. 

This  supreme  datum — ultimate  and  initial — is  not  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  mere  possibility  of  thought.  I  do  not  embrace  the 
doctrine  that  whatever  is  possible  in  thought  is  a  reality  in  ex- 
istence, The  specialty  of  this  ultimate  theistic  concept  is  its 
necessity  and  universality.  Whether  we  be  able  to  recognize 
one,  two,  or  three  steps  leading  to  the  concept  of  Deity,  every 
step  is  taken  in  obedience  to  an  inexorable  law  of  the  universal 
reason.  It  is  simply  the  primitive  notion  of  causality  leading 
to  the  primitive  notion  of  self-existent  causality,  combined  with 
the  primitive  belief  that  every  attribute  implies  real  existence 
in  which  it  inheres.  Every  link  is  a  necessary  and  universal 
belief  of  humanity ;  and  unless  we  are  prepared  to  maintain 
the  deceitfulness  of  all  primitive  beliefs,  we  must  accept  the 


REAL  CAUSE  IMPLIED.  101 

conclusion  that  these  also  answer  to  realities ;  and  the  corre- 
lates for  which  they  stand  are  facts  in  the  system  of  existence. 

This  conclusion  means:  1st.  That  efficient  causation  is  a  fact; 
2d.  Air  causation  proceeds  from  intelligent  volition;  3d.  The 
reality  of  an  initial  term  in  the  series  bound  by  a  causal  nexus ; 
4th.  A  real  existence  at  the  beginning  of  things,  clothed  in  all 
the  attributes  implied  in  the  existence,  not  only  of  the  cosmos 
of  finite  observation,  but  in  the  infinitudes  of  time  and  space 
whose  reality  is  mirrored  in  human  reason. 

Having  eliminated  the  datum  of  primordial  causality,  I  sus- 
pend, for  the  moment,  the  claim  that  this  becomes  a  necessa- 
ry stepping-stone  to  the  cognition  of  Deity,  and  invite  your 
attention  to  a  systematic  unfolding  of  the  necessary  truths 
inclosed  in  the  idea  of  efficient  causation  —  premising  only 
that  such  causation  stands  at  the  beginning  of  every  series  of 
events  ;  that  it  implies  intelligent  will ;  and  that  the  first  caus- 
ative effort  put  forth  in  the  realm  of  existence  was  a  primor- 
dial and  creative  one,  and  that  nothing  exists  within  the  pur- 
view of  reason  to  preclude  a  conviction  that  creative  causation 
has  been  continuous. 

Causation  implies,  FIRST  of  all,  the  existence  of  a  real  cause. 
Nothing  could  come  into  existence  in  the  absence  of  an  enti- 
ty clothed  with  causative  efficiency.  Chance  is  not  a  cause. 
Cause  is  substantive  ;  chance  is  modal.  The  ascription  of  any 
event  or  series  of  events  to  chance  must  be  an  act  of  io-no- 

& 

ranee;  or  it  must  be  done  with  qualifications  of  the  phrase 
which  deprive  it  of  all  meaning.  There  may  be  an  indiffer- 
ence or  equipollency  of  probabilities,  which  leaves  the  determi- 
nation of  an  event,  in  some  cases,  to  conditions  which  can  not 
be  foreseen ;  and  we  may  say  there  exist  equal  chances  one 
way  or  the  other;  or,  by  an  accommodation  of  language,  that 
chance  turns  the  scale,  and  causes  the  result  which  ensues.  But 
this  is  a  misuse  of  terms ;  since  every  one  must  perceive  that 
whatever  result  ensues  is  produced  by  real  causes,  in  which 


102  ATOMISM  AND  CHANCE. 

miscalled  chances  exert  no  more  than  a  conditioning  influence. 
The  structure,  harmony,  and  order  of  the  cosmos  have  been 
ascribed  to  the  "fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms"  having  an 
eternal  existence  and  eternal  motion ;  and  it  has  been  assumed 
that  such  an  origin  of  the  cosmos  dispenses  completely  with 
the  doctrine  of  "  creation  "  and  an  ordering  intelligence.  I  do 
not  assert  that  such  an  exclusion  of  Deity  has  been  contem- 
plated by  the  school  of  atomists,  from  Leucippus  to  Epicurus, 
and  from  Lucretius  to  Gassendi  and  Tyndall.  Indeed,  I  believe 
that  every  one  of  the  leading  atomists  has  recognized  divine 
existence,  though  some  of  them  may  have  conceived  his  rela- 
tion to  the  world  as  exceedingly  remote  and  possibly  unessen- 
tial. Many  recognized  theists  have  equally-  maintained  the 
eternity  of  matter,  force,  and  motion ;  though  it  is  impossible 
for  me  to  comprehend  how  these  postulates  can  be  granted  by 
philosophy.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  discern,  the  atomistic  the- 
ory demands  Deity  for  its  working.  Its  very  data  present 
three  things  to  be  accounted  for:  1st.  The  eternal  atoms;  2d. 
The  eternal  motions;  3d.  The  correlations  presented  by  the 
world — correlations  of  structural  part  to  structural  part;  cor- 
relations of  structure  to  intelligible  end;  correlations  of  struct- 
ures to  persistent  plans  or  archetypes;  'and  especially  correla- 
tions of  an  anticipatory  character— all  necessarily  interpreted 
by  reason  in  terms  of  intelligence,  foresight,  and  beneficence. 
Now,  to  admit  the  eternity  of  an  atom  does  not  abolish  the 
law  of  causality.  An  eternal  atom  needs  a  cause  as  truly  as  a 
finite  one,  unless,  indeed,  we  are  prepared  to  ascribe  to  it  all 
those  predicates  which  reason  affirms  of  primordial,  creative, 
but  self  -  existent  cause.  Leibnitz  conceived  of  monads  en- 
dued with  intelligence  and  will;  but  even  such  monads  were 
held  to  be  created  things.  The  same  must  be  affirmed  of  eter- 
nal motion.  Its  eternity  does  not  strip  it  of  the  need  of  causa- 
tion. An  existence  or  a  phenomenon  persisting  from  eternity 
is  still  the  effect  of  adequate  causation.  I  am  ready  to  admit 


A  TOMISM  NOT  A THEISTIC.  103 

the  expression  "  caused  from  eternity ;"  though  I  should  deny 
the  necessary  existence  of  matter  or  motion  from  eternity,  or 
from  any  other  assignable  epoch.  I  can  conceive  that  before 
the  beginning  of  the  existence  of  the  present  cosmos,  or  even 
its  matter,  Deity  had  ordained  an  infinite  series  of  schemes  of 
existence,  none  of  which  involved  the  employment  of  what  we 
call  matter.  Thus,  it  seems  to  me,  the  fundamental  postulate 
of  what  we  call  atomism  can  only  be  granted  by  creation. 
Still  more  does  the  existence  of  correlations  in  the  world  imply 
the  thought  and  providence  of  a  Being  clothed  with  such  at- 
tributes as  creation  implies.  This  thesis,  however,  which  opens 
a  wide  field  in  science  and  philosophy,  will  be  taken  up  here- 
after. Finally,  it  still  remains  to  determine  the  nature  of  the 
motions  in  the  atomic  universe;  for  it  is  important  to  know 
whether  these  are  simply  propagated  from  a  primordial  im- 
pulse, or  generated  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  demands; 
and  if  propagated  un diminished  from  the  beginning  of  exist- 
ence, we  must  inquire  whether  they  vary  in  quantity,  quality, 
and  direction,  simply  according  to  the  mechanical  laws  of  ac- 
tion and  reaction,  or  receive  from  time  to  time  the  impress  of 
extraneous  power.  The  atomistic  philosophy,  therefore,  is  not 
necessarily  atheistical ;  and  the  records  show  that  it  has  not 
been  so  regarded  by  its  adherents ;  while  it  must  be  confessed 
that,  to  shallow  thinking,  it  may  seem  to  present  the  current 
of  events  as  a  stream  of  flour  ground  out  by  the  mechanical 
revolutions  of  a  mill,  with  all  inquiry  respecting  the  origin  of 
the  mill  and  the  grain  conclusively  silenced.  Whatever  aspect 
such  a  cosmology  may  present,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
fortuitousness  of  the  concurrences  and  arrangements  of  the 
atoms  is  not,  after  all,  a  cause  which  accounts  for  the  move- 
ments of  the  atoms.  The  atomistic  theory,  therefore,  even  if 
a  true  cosmology,  can  not  denude  existence  of  a  real  causative 
being. 

In  the  NEXT  place,  causative  reality  must  be  antecedent  to  all 


104  .  SUBJECTIVITY  AND  OBJECTIVITY. 

its  effects.  To  assert  that  effect  can  precede  cause  is  to  assert 
that  a  cause  can  act  before  it  exists;  while  I  have  just  shown 
that  real  existence  is  implied  in  the  exertion  of  all  causal  effi- 
ciency. Indeed,  the  proposition  would  require  no  proof,  if  it 
had  not  been  sometimes  ignored  in  the  attempt  to  thrust  non- 
existence  or  modal  existence — the  negation  of  substantial  ex- 
istence— into  the  position  of  cause.  The  universe,  as  an  effect, 
must  be  subsequent  to  its  cause.  The  existence  of  matter  can 
not  run  parallel  with  the  being  of  Deity.  Matter  may  be  eter- 
nal in  the  mathematical  sense ;  but  the  being  of  God  is  prece- 
dent both  logically  and  historically.  This  is  a  necessary  dic- 
tum of  reason.  In  this  discussion,  I  am  affirming  only  neces- 
sary ideas. 

In  the  THIRD  place,  the  notion  of  causality  implies  correla- 
tive subjectivity  and  objectivity — the  cause  acting  and  the  other- 
ness toward  which  its  efficiency  is  directed.  In  the  field  of  or- 
dinary human  activity,  man  is  the  subjective  factor,  and  matter 
the  objective  one.  Man  only  acts  upon  matter.  If  my  causal 
efficiency  leave  an  impression  upon  wax,  I  act  upon  matter; 
if  it  produce  a  picture  in  the  imagination  of  another,  this  is 
through  the  intermediation  of  matter — the  tongue  or  the  gest- 
ure on  my  part,  and  the  auditory  or  optic  nerve  on  the  part  of 
the  other  person.  If  iny  causal  efficiency,  in  the  form  of  a  vo- 
lition, produce  a  picture  in  my  own  imagination,  the  volition 
first  impresses  itself  upon  the  cerebral  organism,  and  thence 
succeeds  the  picture.  I  do  not  assert  the  absolute  dependence 
of  mind  upon  matter :  I  deny  it ;  I  only  maintain  that  our  nor- 
mal— at  least,  our  usual — mental  acts  are  effected — objectified, 
through  the  intermediation  of  matter. 

In  the  realm  of  creative  activity,  the  objective  datum  is  not 
actual,  but  potential.  While  only  creative  efficiency  exists,  oth- 
erness is  a  mere  capacity  of  existence;  and  yet  effectuation 
must  be  directed  objective  ward.  Potential  effect  must  exist, 
ideally  differentiated  from  cause ;  as,  otherwise,  cause,  by  the 


THE  CAUSAL  AGENT  CONSCIOUS.  105 

addition  of  effect  to  itself,  would  lose  its  identity ;  or  we  must 
accept  the  absurd  proposition  that  creative  action  can  take 
place  while  yet  causal  existence  is  incomplete.  Whether,  in 
this  case,  effect  rise  into  existence  ab  extra,  or  be  evolved  from 
creative  cause,  its  relative  objectivity  is  a  necessity  of  thought. 
The  necessary  sequence  of  effect,  and  the  necessary  differentia- 
tion of  cause  and  effect — as  subjective  (and  in  se)  uncondition- 
ed existence,  and  objective  conditioned  existence,  rends  the 
system  of  monism  from  centre  to  circumference.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  comprehend  how  that  which  is  self-existent,  and  in  it- 
self absolute  and  unconditioned,  can  be  one  with  that  which  is 
created,  finite  and  dependent.  If  we  assert  the  First  Cause  to 
be  homogeneous  with  matter,  we  are  lacking  in  the  first  datum 
of  evidence  that  matter  possesses  a  single  one  of  the  attributes 
which  characterize  First  Cause.  If  we  assert  that  matter  is 
homogeneous  with  First  Cause,  we  utter  a  simple  hypothesis, 
and  one  which  not  only  lacks  all  support  from  the  field  of  hu- 
man knowledge,  but  is  in  conflict  with  modern  science,  and  the 
reflective  thought  of  all  time.  We  are  bound  to  a  dualism. 
It  is  safe  to  fall  back  on  the  consensus  gentium  and  the  intui- 
tions of  humanity  in  accepting  as  an  axiom  the  proposition 
that  the  being  who  stands  in  the  relation  of  cause  is,  in  no 
sense,  to  be  confounded  with  that  which  is  caused. 

The  notion  of  causality  implies,  in  the  FOURTH  place,  the 
possession  of  consciousness  by  the  causal  efficiency.  A  cause 
without  consciousness  would  sleep  forever  in  potentiality.  In 
order  to  become  an  actual  cause,  it  must  have  knowledge  of 
its  own  existence,  and  of  the  possibility,  at  least,  of  other  ex- 
istence, and  of  the  possession  of  efficiency.  It  must  have  a 
further  consciousness  of  all  the  relations  subsisting  between 
cause  and  effect,  and  of  all  the  conditions  which  modify  its 
causal  activity.  This  necessity  excludes  the  possibility  of  any 
system  which  is  a  pure,  unconscious  materialism,  or  a  pure,  un- 
conscious dynamism.  A  mechanism  called  into  being  may  run 


106  EFFECT  PRECONCEIVED. 

on  through  indefinite  ages  without  the  intervention  of  con- 
sciousness; but  a  conscious  intelligence  must  have  produced 
the  mechanical  structure  and  animated  it  with  propulsive  pow- 
er. Such  a  conception  of  the  cosmos  may  remove  creative 
power  to  an  indefinite  distance  from  things  present  here  and 
now  ;  but  yet  it  is  not  a  godless  scheme.  How  utterly  and  al- 
most absurdly  improbable  it  is,  that  a  Being  capable  of  creat- 
ing a  universe  should  never  after  exert  his  power  in  any  way,  I 
need  only  to  remind  you.  How  much  evidence  exists  that  that 
power  is  perpetually  exerted,  I  hope  will  appear  in  the  sequel. 

In  the  FIFTH  place,  the  notion  of  causation  implies  that  the 
causal  agent  shall  be  able  to  form  a  conception  of  a  specific 
non-existent  effect,  and  shall  form  such  a  conception.  This  is 
the  "formal"  causality  of  the  Aristotelians.  The  production 
of  effect  without  premeditation  does  not  develop  the  essen- 
tial character  of  cause.  If  it  were  possible  for  me  to  produce 
effect  without  the  antecedent  conception  of  effect,  my  act,  like 
the  act  of  an  unconscious  thing,  would  be  only  an  instance  of 
secondary  or  mechanical  causation.  This  .is  not  to  assert  that 
every  specific  result  which  flows  from  my  causal  endeavor  must 
have  been  previously  discerned  by  me.  Such  claim  would  be 
a  claim  to  indefinite  foreknowledge,  and  consequently  absurd. 
I  do  maintain,  however,  that  in  any  case  of  causal  effectiveness 
on  my  part,  I  have  an  antecedent  conception  of  some  effect, 
near  or  remote,  at  which  I  aim  my  efficiency,  or  which  I  con- 
template as  lying  within  the  circumference  of  my  efficiency. 
What  series  of  secondary  effects  may  flow  from  this  contem- 
plated one,  assuming  the  character  of  secondary  causes,  no 
finite  intelligence  can  completely  foreknow.  It  is  an  incident 
of  human  limitations  that  no  human  being  is  able  clearly  to 
discern  an  end,  and  so  gauge  and  direct  his  efficiency  as  not 
to  touch  and  disturb  the  world  of  existence  which  environs  it. 
It  is,  moreover,  an  incident  of  the  ordained  constitution  of  the 
world,  that  the  energy  put  forth  by  me  shall  not  be  gathered 


PlilNClPLE  OF  CAUSALITY  COGNIZED.  107 

up  in  an  isolated  effect,  but  shall  run  on  in  a  stream  of  actions 
and  reactions,  indefinitely  prolonged. 

With  reference  to  the  activity  of  that  cause  which  imposes 
conditions  on  all  things,  and  is  conditioned  by  nothing  except 
its  own  will,  we  can  not  affirm  those  qualifications  of  fore- 
knowledge which  limit  man.  In  the  realm  of  involuntary  ex- 
istence, we  can  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  the  least  and  re- 
motest event  transpires  according  to  foresight,  calculation,  and 
purpose.  This  conclusion  issues  equally,  whether  we  conceive 
the  relation  of  God  to  the  world  to  be  "  transient,"  as  in  a 
mechanical  system,  or  "  immanent,"  as  held,  pantheistically,  by 
Hegel,  or  dualistically  by  some  others.  In  the  realm  of  volun- 
tary existence,  the  relation  of  divine  foreknowledge  to  the  vo- 
lition of  finite  beings  presents  a  problem  which  has  buffeted 
the  world's  attempts  at  a  final  solution ;  and  I  need  not  argue 
it  here.  My  own  belief  holds  to  divine  foreknowledge  abso- 
lutely unlimited. 

In  the  SIXTH-  place,  the  consciousness  of  the  principle  of  cau- 
sality must  arise — the  possibility  of  connecting  efficiency  with  a 
given  effect,  and  calling  it  from  thought  into  actuality.  How- 
ever unnoticed  may  be  our  consciousness  of  subscribing  to  the 
truth  of  the  judgment  of  causality,  such  recognition  of  its  truth 
is  implied  in  every  act  of  volition.  With  complete  ignorance 
of  the  nexus  joining  cause  and  effect,  it  would  never  occur  to 
our  intelligence  that  a  contemplated  effect,  however  desired, 
could  be  brought  into  existence ;  and  all  energy  would  lie  as 
uninspired  and  unmoved  as  if  intelligence  itself  were  blotted 
out. 

In  the  SEVENTH  place,  the  effectuation  of  original  causation 
implies  the  presentation  of  motive.  Before  efficiency  acts,  it 
must  discern  a  reason  why  it  should  act.  The  motive  to  ac- 
tion, it  is  sometimes  asserted,  may  exist  either  objectively  or 
subjectively.  If  I  extend  my  arm  to  shake  the  hand  of  a 
friend,  the  motive  is  objective ;  if  I  extend  it  to  relieve  a  wea- 


108  CAUSALITY  IMPLIES  MOTIVE. 

riness  caused  by  long  use  of  the  pen,  the  motive  is  said  to  be 
subjective ;  still  more,  if  I  desist  from  writing  to  relieve  a  wea- 
ried brain.  But,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  the  motive,  in  every  case, 
is  properly  objective  to  the  mind.  The  efficient  cause  is  the 
will,  and  the  moving  cause,  or  motive,  must  be  something  dif- 
ferentiated from  it,  even  if  existent  in  my  body  or  my  mind. 
In  the  last  case  the  mind  becomes  subject-object,  or  object  in 
reference  to  its  own  activity. 

Motive,  ascribed  to  the  activity  of  the  First  Cause,  is  com- 
monly known  as  "  Final  Cause ;"  and  the  doctrine  of  the  exist- 
ence of  ends,  or  final  causes  in  the  world,  is  teleology.  The 
belief  that  such  ends  may  be  discovered  has  been  generally 
cherished  since  the  most  ancient  times.  The  Old  Testament 
abounds  in  teleological  passages.  Socrates  defended  the  be- 
lief in  divine  existence  from  the  structure  of  organized  beings, 
maintaining  that  whatever  exists  for  a  use  must  be  the  work  of 
intelligence.  Aristotle  based  his  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  su- 
preme immaterial  Spirit  on  the  development  in  nature  of  ob- 
jects whose  form  and  structure  indicate  design,  founding  the 
reasoning  on  the  general  principle  that  all  transition  (dv^aiq) 
from  the  potential  to  the  actual  depends  on  an  actual  cause. 
Again,  he  says,  "  All  motion  in  nature  is  directed  to  an  end." 
"  God  and  nature  do  nothing  in  vain."  The  Stoics  maintained 
that  "  the  beauty  and  adaptation  of  the  world  can  only  have 
come  from  a  thinking  mind,  and  prove,  therefore,  the  exist- 
ence of  Deity."  "Deum  agnoscimus  ex  operibus  ejus,"  said 
Cicero(1)  (we  know  God  from  his  works).  Lactantius,  in  his 
book  "  On  the  Workmanship  of  God ;  or,  The  Formation  of 
Man,"  goes  elaborately  over  the  entire  mechanism  of  the  hu- 
man body,  and  outdoes  Paley  in  praising  its  utility,  conven- 
ience, and  beauty.  Galen,  the  celebrated  physician,  believed 
that  in  the  structural  organization  of  animals  is  disclosed  ade- 

(')  Cicero,  I.  Tuscul. 


BELIEVERS  IN  "DESIGN."  109 

quatc  proof  of  a  designing  intelligence.  Gregory  of  Nyssa 
grounded  the  belief  in  God  on  the  art  and  wisdom  displayed 
in  the  order  of  the  world.  Cud  worth,  against  the  atheism  of 
Hobbes  and  his  followers,  "  vindicated  the  right  of  final  causes 
to  a  place  in  physics ;"  and  Samuel  Parker,  of  the  same  period, 
"  founded  the  belief  in  God's  existence  chiefly  on  the  marks  of 
design  manifest  in  the  structure  of  natural  objects."  With 
Newton,  "the  proof  of  God's  existence  is  found  in  the  exqui-* 
site  art  and  intelligence  which  are  exhibited  to  us  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  world,  and  particularly  in  the  organism  of  ev- . 
ery  living  being."  Locke  held  that  the  being  of  God  is  de- 
monstrable by  means  of  the  cosmological  and  the  teleological 
arguments ;  and  Voltaire,  agreeing  with  him,  exclaims,  "  All 
nature  cries  out  to  us  that  God  exists."  Herbart,  with  all  his 
skepticism,  holds  to  the  validity  of  the  teleological  argument 
for  the  being  of  God.  Galileo,  throughout  his  works,  loses  no 
opportunity  to  insist  on  final  as  well  as  efficient  causes;  and 
Cuvier  made  the  belief  in  "  ends  "  the  guiding  principle  which 
conducted  him  to  that  marvelous  insight  of  the  structure  and 
habits  of  animals  long  extinct,  which  is  set  forth  especially  in 
his  "  Ossemens  Fossiles,"  and  which  conferred  upon  him,  liter- 
ally, the  gift  of  seership.  Such  has  been  the  general  sentiment 
of  the  philosophic  world,  and  such  it  still  remains^1)  Kant, 

(')  Compare  M'Cosh,  "Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation;" 
Morris  (G.  S.),  "  The  Final  Cause  as  Principle  of  Cognition  and  Principle 
in  Nature,"  Jour.  Trans.  Victoria  Institute,  or  Phil.  Soc.  of  Great  Britain, 
1875  ;  Cocker,  "The  Theistic  Conception  of  the  World;"  Hartmann  (Ed- 
ward von),  "  Wahrheit  und  Irrthum  in  Darwinismus.  Eine  kritische  Dar- 
stellung  der  organischen  Entwickelungstheorie,"  Berlin,  1875  ;  Zeller,  "Ue- 
ber  die  Aufgabe  der  Philosophic,"  p.  20  f. ;  Gyzicki  (Georg  von),  "  Philo- 
sophische  Consequenzen  der  Lamarck-Darwin'schen  Entwickelungstheo- 
rie," Leipzig  und  Heidelberg,  1876;  Bianconi,  "La  Theorie  Darwinienne 
et  la  Cre'ation,"  1874;  Kronig,  "Das  Dasein  Gottes,"  1874;  Wigand,  "Der 
Darwinismus  und  die  Naturforschung  Newtons  und  Cuviers,"  2  Bde. ;"  Duke 
of  Argyll,  "Anthropomorphism  in  Theology,"  1875;  Rudolph  Schmid,  "Die 


110  TELEOLOGY  REVIVED. 

however,  wliile  accepting  theism  as  an  article  of  faith,  cast 
doubt  on  the  validity  of  the  teleological  and  other  arguments 
in  support  of  that  belief  ;(J)  and  the  modern  school  of  nescien- 
tists,  while  accepting  divine  existence,  or,  at  least,  proclaiming 
no  argument  against  it,  maintain  that  it  is  not  competent  for 
finite  intelligence  to  ascribe  motives  to  the  Unknowable ;  and 
hence  make  light  of  all  attempts  to  interpret  nature  in  a  the- 
istic  sense.  Nevertheless,  the  doctrine  of  Final  Cause  is  regain- 
ing its  ground,  both  in  science  and  philosophy.  No  assertions, 
however  deducible  from  the  postulates  of  a  system  of  philoso- 
phy, can  expel  from  credence  a  principle  grounded  in  the  nec- 
essary implications  of  thought.  Professor  Huxley  says :  "  Per- 
haps the  most  remarkable  service  to  the  philosophy  of  biology 
rendered  by  Mr.  Darwin  is  the  reconciliation  of  teleology  and 
morphology,  and  the  explanation  of  the  facts  of  both,  which 
his  views  offer."(2)  "  The  teleological  and  mechanical  views  of 
nature  are  not,  necessarily,  mutually  exclusive.  On  the  con- 
trary,  the  more  purely  a  mechanist  the  speculator  is,  the  more 
firmly  does  he  assume  a  primordial  molecular  arrangement,  of 
which  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  are  the  consequences ; 
and  the  more  completely  is  he  thereby  at  the  mercy  of  the  tele- 
ologist,  who  can  always  defy  him  to  disprove  that  this  primor- 
dial molecular  arrangement  was  intended  to  evolve  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  universe."(3)  Similarly  Von  Hartmann,  with  his  usu- 
al force :  "  Were  the  mechanism  of  the  laws  of  nature  not  tele- 
ological, it  would  not  be  by  any  means  a  mechanism  of  orderly 

Darwinischen  Theorien  und  ihre  Stellung  zur  Philosophic,  Religion  und 
Moral,"  1876,  p.  269-274. 

(2)  Kant  maintains  that  we  are  compelled  to  contemplate  the  world  un- 
der the  influence  of  the  notion  of  final  cause,  but  that  this  notion  is  only  a 
regulative  principle  of  thought,  subjective  in  its  origin,  and  not  necessarily 
answering  to  objective  reality. 

(2)  Huxley,  "Critiques  and  Addresses,"  Am.  ed.,  p.  272. 

(3)  Ibid.,  p.  274. 


GENERALLY  ACCEPTED.  Ill 

laws,  but  a  mindless  chaos,  an  ox-headed,  capricious  power.'^1) 
Gyzicki  says:  "A  voice  speaks  to  us  from  the  Universe,  I  am 
who  is  there,  who  was  there,  who  will  be  there."(a)  Professor 
Asa  Gray's  recent  utterance  is  as  follows :  "  Under  the  teleolog- 
ical  aspect,  which  was  once  thought  to  be  expelled  from  natu- 
ral history,  but  which  has  come  back  in  full  force,  a  bur  is  an 
adaptation  for  the  dissemination  of  seeds  by  cattle  and  other 
animals."(3)  In  short,  at  this  moment  little  seems  to  be  urged, 
on  the  part  of  science  and  philosophy,  against  the  doctrine  of 
Final  Cause,  save  what  we  find  in  the  late  writings  of  L.  Biich- 
ner,  D.  F.  Strauss,  Haeckel,  O.  Schmidt,  Helmholtz,  and  the 
editor  and  some  of  the  contributors  of  Das  Ausland. 

I  join  here  in  swelling  the  testimony  of  antiquity  and  of  the 
large  majority  of  thinkers  of  all  ages,  that  Deity  is  proclaimed 
in  the  creation ;  that  it  is  legitimate  to  deduce  divine  motives 
from  the  structure  of  the  cosmos,  and  to  point  out  motives  as 
the  moving  causes  of  divine  activity.  I  stated  that  the  intui- 
tion of  causality  does  not  consider  the  magnitude  of  cause  or 


(!)  "Ware  der  Mechanismus  der  Naturgesetzc  nicht  teleologisch,  so  ware 
er  auch  gar  kein  Mechanismus  geordneter  Gesetze,  sondern  ein  blodsinnig- 
es  Chaos  stierkopfig  eigensinniger  Gewalten"  ("Wahrheit  und  Irrthum  in 
Darwinismus  ").  See,  also, Von  Hartmann's  earlier  work,  "  Philosophic  des 
TJnbewussten,"  though  he  seeks  here,  by  absurd  reasoning,  to  deny  the  ex- 
istence of  a  conscious  subject  of  the  design  for  which  he  argues. 

(2)  Gyzicki,  "  Philosophische  Consequenzen,"  p.  85. 

(3)  American  Naturalist,  vol.  x.,  p.  1,  Jan.,  1876.     Of  similar  purport  are 
the  utterances  of  Lyell,  "  Natural  Selection  not  Incompatible  with  Natu- 
ral Theology,"  London,  1861,  pp.  29,  38;  Owen,  "Comparative  Anatomy," 
and  Trans.  Zocil.  Soc.  of  London,  vol.  v.,  p.  90 ;  A.  Braun,  "  Bedeutung 
der  Entwickelung  in  der  Naturgeschichte,"  p.  49 ;  K.  E.  von  Baer,  "  Stu- 
dien  aus  dem  Gebiete  der  Naturwissenschaften,"  1876,  II.  "Ueber  den 
Zweck  in  den  Vorgangen  der  Natur,"  p.  49-106,  IV.  "Ueber  Zielstrebig- 
keit  in  den  organischen  Korpern  ins  besondere,"  p.  170-234  (see,  however, 
a  critical  review  of  Von  Baer  by  Seidlitz,  "  Beitrage  zur  Descendenz-The- 
orie,"  Leipzig,  1876). 


112  DESIGN  AND  INTELLIGENCE. 

effect.  Effect  may  be  infinite  in  magnitude  or  duration ;  but 
yet  it  demands  a  cause.  So,  I  maintain,  the  intuition  of  in- 
telligence from  design  does  not  consider  the  vastness  of  the 
intelligence,  or  of  the  being  possessing  it:  The  correlation 
between  contrivance  and  intelligence  is  absolute.  Wherever 
we  discover  contrivance,  we  feel  impelled  to  recognize  intelli- 
gence— however  small  a  portion  of  the  whole  intelligence  our 
apprehensions  may  grasp.  It  is  intelligence,  qualitatively,  and 
not  quantitatively,  considered,  which  the  intuition  proclaims. 
I  contemplate  a  structure  in  which  part  is  shaped  to  part  and 
acts  with  part,  and  the  whole  action  subserves  a  necessary  and 
beneficent  end.  Contemplating  this,  I  proclaim  intention  and 
intelligence.  My  intuition  knows  no  more  of  the  finite  or 
infinite  character  of  its  author  than  my  hearers  do  before  I 
declare  what  this  piece  of  mechanism  is.  It  is  the  correla- 
tion of  parts,  abstracted  from  authorship,  in  which  I  discern 
intelligence.  Now,  when  I  declare  this  piece  of  mechanism 
to  be  a  model,  with  all  the  parts  of  a  human  hand — -bones, 
ligaments,  nerves,  vessels,  and  coverings  —  every  one  exclaims, 
"  How  admirable  and  ingenious  a  contrivance !"  But  when  I 
declare  it  to  be  the  human  hand  itself,  instead  of  a  model  from 
the  manikin,  the  exclamation  becomes,  "  Oh,  we  know  nothing 
about  any  contrivance  in  that.  Its  Author  is  so  superior  to  us 
in  knowledge  and  power,  that  possibly  it  was  not  intelligence 
which  planned  the  thing  whose  human  copy  reflects  so  much 
intelligence."  The  sentiment  of  all  time  and  of  all  humanity 
is  against  such  nonsense.  It  continues  to  see  God's  designs  in 
nature.  The  universal  common  sense  will  sweep  such  a  bastard 
affectation  of  philosophy  into  the  realm  of  the  "  unknown " 
and  "  unknowable." 

I  acknowledge  that  a  profound  consciousness  of  the  limita- 
tions of  human  thought  and  knowledge  may  suggest  the  indis- 
cretion and  the  uncertainty  of  attributing  designs  to  the  cause 
of  existence  whose  height  and  depth  and  breadth  are  equally 


DESIGN  A  NECESSAB  Y  IDEA.  113 

immeasurable  and  impenetrable.  I  confess  that  the  specific 
designs  of  omniscience,  which,  in  some  cases,  we  seem  to  have 
discovered,  may  be  fatally  misconceived  by  us.  The  same  might 
be  true  of  the  product  of  human  efforts.  The  question  is  not 
as  to  the  existence  of  a  specific  design,  but  as  to  the  existence 
of  any  design.  I  might  grant,  without  detriment  to  the  argu- 
ment, that  the  ends  of  creation,  if  they  exist,  transcend  so  in- 
finitely all  human  power  of  comprehension,  that  the  full  pur- 
pose of  no  combination  of  parts  has  as  yet  been  revealed  to: 
our  intelligence.  Imagine  this  to  be  the  case ;  would  it  be  pos- 
sible to  suppress  the  conviction  that  the  world  and  the  parts  of 
the  world  exist  for  a  purpose  ?  Could  we  even  rid  ourselves  of 
the  belief  that  in  the  adjustments  of  the  human  hand  we  had 
discovered  at  least  a  part  of  the  purposes  of  that  structure? 
Could  we  conceive  of  (infinite)  causality  exerting  itself  without 
a  sufficient  reason  for  so  doing  ?  It  seems  to  me  the  answer  is 
inseparable  from  the  question.  The  denial  of  ends  is  the  de- 
nial of  the  possibility  of  causation — the  denial  of  all  finite  ex- 
istence. 

It  is  the  custom  of  certain  biologists  to  treat  with  levity  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes.  I  have  sought  diligently  for  their  ar- 
guments, but  I  find  only  the  reiterated  assertion  that  the  inva- 
riable laws  of  development  of  the  individual  and  of  the  species, 
and  the  necessary  influence  of  the  environment,  suffice  for  the 
determination  of  all  structures  which  exist.  Coupled  with  this 
is  the  customary  disparagement  of  the  attainments  of  those  who 
hold  to  the  necessity  of  final  cause,  as  a  condition  of  the  activ- 
ity of  efficient  cause ;(')  and,  not  unfrequently,  the  allegation 

(J)  As  an  example  of  the  argumentation  to  which  I  allude,  see  one  of 
Hacckel's  latest  works,  "Ziele  und  Wege  dcr  heutigen  Entwickelungs- 
geschichte,"  Jena,  Oct.,  1875,  which  is  a  rejoinder  to  several  of  the  leading 
opponents  of  his  "  monistic,"  pantheistic  views.  The  most  prominent  feat- 
ure of  the  book  is  his  conspicuous  contempt  for  all  his  foes.  He  does  not 
condescend  to  reply  by  citations  of  pertinent  evidence,  but  assails  their 


114  HAECKELISM. 

that  the  defenders  of  final  cause  repel  the  doctrine  Of  efficient 

competency,  and  their  scientific  and  private  characters,  with  a  profusion 
of  sarcasm  and  a  gay  and  reckless  irony  more  worthy  of  a  jester  than 
of  a  philosopher  in  search  of  the  profoundest  truth.  The  late  Professor 
Louis  Agassiz,  to  whom  all  the  world  has  paid  its  homage,  is  not  more 
honored  with  an  argument  than  Wilhelm  His,  and  Alexander  Goette,  and 
Friederich  Michaelis.  The  pages  (78-85)  devoted  to  a  reply  to  Agassiz 
are  occupied  with  ridicule  of  his  reverent  spirit,  and  gross  disparagement 
of  his  scientific  work  and  personal  character.  "  Agassiz,"  says  Haeckel, 
"has  been  so  prominently  set  forth  in  recent  times  by  orthodox  theology, 
and  specially  by  Christian  philosophy,  as  the  '  pious  naturalist '  adorned 
with  the  glory  of  a  holy  radiance,  that  we  feel  charmed  to  investigate  a 
little  more  closely,  with  the  spectroscope,  the  true  nature  of  its  changing 
Iris-hues."  In  place  of  argument  and  evidences  to  rebut  the  arguments 
of  one  of  the  first  naturalists  of  the  age,  Haeckel  now  proceeds  to  impugn 
his  honor,  to  charge  him  with  dishonest  appropriation  of  the  work  of  oth- 
ers, as  being  an  "  indefatigable  knight  of  industry  "  and  the  practitioner 
of  "  charlatanry."  No  cause  can  be  so  strong  as  not  to  suffer  from  such 
defense.  That  Haeckel  is  not  so  completely  "  without  sin  "  as  to  be  en- 
titled to  throw  stones,  appears  clearly  from  the  recorded  opinions  of  his 
countrymen,  and  even  his  adherents.  His  affirms  that  some  of  Haeckel's 
figures  (in  his  "  Anthropogenic ")  purporting  to  be  original  are  "theils 
hochst  ungetreu  "  (His,  "  Unsere  Korperf orm  und  das  physiologische  Pro- 
blem ihrer  Entstehung,"  p.  170).  Semper,  who  pronounces  Haeckel  "The 
Apostle  of  a  new  Faith,"  and  says  that  the  gospel  (Darwinism)  according 
to  Haeckel  "ought  to  be  the  religion  of  every  naturalist,"  nevertheless  af- 
firms that  he  could  cite  many  similar  instances ;  that,  for  instance,  the  seo- 
tion  of  the  embryo  of  an  earth-worm,  taken  from  Kowalevsky,  is  "  com- 
pletely falsified,  and  that  of  Amphioxus  partly  so  "  (Semper,  "  Der  Haeck- 
elismus  in  der  Zoologie,"  Hamburg,  1874,  p.  35).  His  accuses  Haeckel  of 
a  disposition  to  indulge  in  "  a  wanton  sporting  with  facts,  more  dangerous 
still  than  his  sporting  with  words."  "According  to  my  judgment,"  His 
continues,  "  he  has,  through  his  style  of  campaigning,  himself  forfeited 
all  right  to  be  counted  in  the  circle  of  earnest  scientists  as  one  of  equal 
birth."  To  which  Semper  adds,  "  I,  on  my  part,  indorse  these  words  with 
the  fullest  conviction"  (op.  cit.,  p.  36).  Nevertheless,  with  such  qualifica- 
tions, I  gladly  concede  to  the  researches  of  Haeckel  a  degree  of  origi- 
nality, acuteness,  and  vigor  which  has  seldom  been  equaled,  and  regard 
him  as  the  source  of  a  powerful  impulse  in  recent  biological  studies. 


SHALL 0  W  PHIL OSOPHY  OF  PROFO  UND  SCIENCE.     115 

causes^1)  Let  it  be  understood  that  the  recognition  or  denial 
of  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  is  a  procedure  lying  exclusively 
in  the  field  of  deductive  thought ;  and  no  amount  of  familiar- 
ity with  the  details  of  animal  structure  could  constitute  the 
slightest  preparation  for  a  decision.  The  most  authoritative 
decision  must  be  that  prompted  by  the  most  attentive  study  of 
the  laws  of  thought ;  while  it  is  evident  that  those  who  derive 
the  structural  adaptations  of  nature  from  the  orderly  modes  of 
change  and  succession,  which  are  so  apparent,  do  not  penetrate 
to  the  discovery  even  of  efficient  cause,  still  less  to  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  infrangible  law  of  "  sufficient  reason."  They  reach 
no  principle,  necessary  and  all-underlying,  which  reveals  an  in- 
compatibility with  the  doctrine  of  final  cause,  resting,  on  its 
part,  upon  a  universal  datum  of  reason.  They  have  discovered, 
possibly,  the  method  of  effectuation  of  results,  and  have  not  the 
discernment  and  candor  to  admit  that  method  (law)  is  simply 
modal,  and  not  causal,  and,  instead  of  being  the  limit  of  a  ra- 
tional analysis,  itself  implies  an  ulterior  principle  as  an  efficient 
datum ;  and  a  reason  why,  as  the  condition  of  the  actualization 
of  efficiency.  The  doctrine  of  derivation  must  be  settled  by  an 
appeal  to  the  facts  of  biology  ;  it  is  a  question  of  science.  The 
doctrine  of  final  cause,  like  that  of  supramaterial  causation, 
must  be  settled  by  an  appeal  to  the  facts  of  reason ;  it  is  a 
question  of  philosophy. 

In  the  EIGHTH  place,  the  efficient  cause,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  must  be  self-conscious  and  intelligent,  may  discern  a  con- 
tingency or  condition  which  stands  in  some  relation  either  to 
cause  or  effect,  and  may  modify  the  amount  or  direction  of 
the  causal  efficiency,  or  else  the  kind  or  amount  of  the  effect. 

(l)  "On  one  side  stand  the  Dualists  and  Teleologists,  who  seek  the  true 
camcs  of  soul-life,  as  of  organic  development,  in  ideas  acting  in  organic 
bodies,  consequently  in  purposive  final  causes  "  (Haeckel,  "  Ziele  und  Wege," 
p.  5).  This  charge  was  in  effect  made  by  Kant  and  Laplace,  according  to 
M'Cosh  ("  Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation,"  p.  53,  Eng.  ed.). 


116          CONDITION,  DESIRE,  FREEDOM,  INTENTION. 

A  contingency  influencing  the  effect  directly  is  simply  a  sec- 
ondary cause,  and  will  be  discussed  hereafter.  Moreover,  con- 
tingency may  be  either  disclosed  or  hidden.  A  contingency 
influencing  the  cause  simply  annexes  a  new  term  to  motive, 
and  constitutes  a  part  of  it.  Such  contingency  must  be  dis- 
closed, since  nothing  can  constitute  motive  which  is  not  cog- 
nized. It  is  external,  nevertheless,  and  indirectly  influences 
effect,  through  motive  actuating  cause.  Under  this  analysis, 
contingency  loses  its  importance  as  a  distinct  concept  in  the 
process  of  causation. 

In  the  NINTH  place,  the  influence  of  the  contingency  on  the 
motive  must  be  cognized.  This  is  simply  implied  in  the  fact 
that  the  contingency  becomes  incorporated  with  the  motive. 
This,  as  I  have  just  stated,  could  not  be  if  the  contingency  re- 
mained concealed. 

In  the  TENTH  place,  the  causal  agent  must  be  conscious  of  a 
desire  to  direct  efficiency  toward  the  contemplated  effect.  It 
must  also  be  conscious  of  freedom  to  act  according  to  desire. 
Without  freedom,  causation  is  simply  intermediation,  or  sec- 
ondary causation.  The  effect  flows  from  that  which  coerces 
causal  action.  An  act  performed  by  an  agent  under  constraint 
is,  for  the  agent,  an  act  not  performed.  He  is  .merely  the  in- 
strument in  the  hands  of  the  will  which  controls. 

In  the  ELEVENTH  place,  the  concept  of  causality  implies  an 
intention  to  direct  efficiency  toward  the  contemplated  effect. 
The  intention  to  act  must  follow  the  consciousness  of  freedom 
to  act,  and  must  necessarily  follow  the  desire  to  act.  The  de- 
sire can  only  be  awakened  in  the  presence  of  a  known  and 
contemplated  and  desirable  effect.  The  intention  to  put  forth 
causal  efficiency  implies  also  a  cognition  of  cause  as  the  neces- 
sary antecedent  of  effect.  Intentionality,  therefore,  implies  and 
incloses  all  these  ideas.  It  follows  that  every  effect,  wheth- 
er simple  or  complex,  implies  intentionality,  and  this  implies 
intelligence.  From  the  moment  when  we  recognize  the  world 


DEDUCTION  TO  DEITY.  117 

as  an  effect*  we  arc  compelled,  by  the  necessary  laws  of  thought, 
to  recognize  also  intelligence.  I  do  not  refer  here  to  the  char- 
acter of  the  effect,  but  simply  to  the  fact  that  the  world  is  an 
effect.  I  shall  show,  hereafter,  that  the  composition  of  the 
cosmical  effect  reveals  an  infinite  realm  of  intentionality,  and 
explains  why  the  human  mind,  in  all  ages,  has  felt  forced  to 
recognize  the  existence  of  Supreme  Intelligence  as  the  correla- 
tive of  the  world.  The  steps  by  which  the  universal  reason 
has  ascended  from  the  phenomena  of  nature  to  the  creative 
efficiency  have  been  seldom  noted.  The  common  mind,  which 
is  as  richly  furnished  with  intuitive  judgments  as  the  cultivated 
mind,  seems  to  reach  supreme  causation  by  a  leap.  I  have 
already  expressed  rny  belief  in  a  direct  intuition  of  Deity ;  but 
here  is  another  path  by  which  the  common  mind,  as  well  as 
the  philosophic  mind,  ascends  to  the  very  presence  of  the  light 
which  had  been  seen  sinning  from  without  into  the  chambers 
of  the  soul.  Intuition  of  Deity  is  the  diffused  light.  Deduc- 
tion to  Deity  is  the  discovery  of  the  certain  path  to  a  better- 
comprehended  existence.  But  yet  this  path  is  so  short,  the 
steps  are  so  easily  and  so  dexterously  taken,  that  the  common 
reason  seems,  even  here,  to  leap,  by  one  intuition,  to  God. 
Philosophy,  instead  of  discovering  and  pointing  out  this  way 
to  God,  plods  and  flounders  in  the  very  attempt  to  travel  where 
common  sense  skips  along  with  more  than  the  agility  of  a  kid. 
Philosophy  has  its  use,  however,  in  disclosing  the  fact  that  the 
path  is  a  real  one,  on  solid  ground,  and  that  the  common  mind, 
in  rising  habitually  to  God,  is  not  winged  by  imagination  to 
a  bright  cloud  which  floats  merely  in  the  air. 

FINALLY,  the  consummation  of  the  causal  act  implies  the  ex- 
ertion of  will.  There  must  be  an  executive  determination  of 
conscious  efficiency  toward  the  contemplated  effect  which  has 
awakened  desire  and  purpose.  All  the  other  causative  steps 
converge  here.  Will  is  the  last  condition  of  effect.  Being  the 
last  condition,  Will  always  implies  Intelligence  and  Sensibility. 


118  WILL  AS  SOLE  CAUSE. 

"Will  is  the  synthesis  of  Reason  and  Power.'X1)-    In  strict 
language,  "intelligent  will"  is  a  tautological  phrase. 

Will  is  the  only  force  in  existence.  Our  earliest  volitions 
disclose  the  transformations  of  will  into  efficiency.  We  have 
no  revelation  of  any  other  source  of  efficiency.  From  will 
proceeds  all  intermediation ;  and  back  to  will  must  be  traced 
every  thing  which  can  be  cognized  as  an  effect.  As  the  results 
of  human  volition  are  our  earliest  intimations  of  the  nature  of 
force,  so  back  to  will  we  return  after  the  most  discriminating 
analysis.  Search  the  world  through;  consider  the  fall  of  an 
apple  moved  by  terrestrial  gravitation ;  the  rush  of  the  chem- 
ical atoms  marshaled  by  their  affinities;  the  quiver  of  the  needle 
upon  its  pivot,  struggling  to  maintain  its  fidelity  to  the  pole ; 
the  reaction  of  the  pent-up  spring,  actuating  the  mechanism 
of  the  watch ;  none  of  these  energies  find  their  explanation  in 
themselves,  nor  in  the  matter  which  is  moved  by  them.  Think 
of  the  reaction  of  the  spring  as  a  phenomenon  of  inherent 
force,  and  you  can  not  fail  to  inquire,  "Where  are  the  evi- 
dences of  volition,  of  choice,  of  discernment,  of  desire,  of  pur- 
pose which  the  very  act  of  original  causation  implies?"  That 
energy  is  transmitted  through  the  spring,  and  impinges  upon 
an  object,  is  apparent  enough ;  but  this  still  is  but  a  sluice-way 
of  force,  and  not  a  repository  of  force.  Elasticity,  magnetism, 
affinity  —  these  are  modes  of  intermediation  by  which  cause 
reaches  its  ends.  To  this  subject  I  intend  to  return.(3) 


(')  Cocker,  "Theistic  Conception  of  the  World,"  p.  197. 

(a)  "  In  the  only  case  in  which  we  are  admitted  into  any  personal  knowl- 
edge of  the  origin  of  force,  we  find  it  connected  (possibly  by  intermediate 
links  untraceable  by  our  faculties,  but  yet  indisputably  connected)  with  vo- 
lition, and,  by  inevitable  consequence,  with  motive,  with  intellect,  and  with 
all  those  attributes  of  mind  in  which — and  not  in  the  possession  of  arms, 
legs,  brains,  and  viscera- — personality  consists  "  (Sir  John  Herschel,  "Fa- 
miliar Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects,"  Amer.  ed.,  p.  462). 

"  We  can  not  predicate  of  any  physical  agency  that  it  is  abstractedly  the 


CA  USA  TION  IMPLIES  PERSONALITY.  119 

Will,  then,  closes  the  circuit  of  causation.  Will  completes 
and  implies  the  exercise  of  the  three  classes  of  psychic  activi- 
ties which  characterize  personality.  Intellect,  Sensibility,  AVill 
— these  are  the  prime  factors  of  a  personal  differentiation  from 
the  objective  datum  of  causality.  Once  before  we  reached  the 
principle  of  duality.  Now  we  perceive  that  one  term  of  the 
duality  must  be  a  personality.  It  is  impossible  to  interpret 
truly  an  effect  without  discovering  Intellect,  Sensibility,  and 
Will ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  think  of  these  except  as  the  at- 
tributes of  a  personal  existence. 

The  term  personality,  however,  is  unfortunate  and  mislead- 
ing. It  is  weakly  anthropomorphic.  Adopted  as  the  antithe- 
sis of  monism  and  pantheism,  its  associations  carry  the  mind 
irresistibly  into  a  narrow  field  of  view.  We  must  banish  all 
thoughts  of  figure  and  locality ;  we  must  not  think  of  motion, 
nor  of  body.  Personality  is  not  the  alternative  of  divine  im- 
manence, as  has  been  generally  believed;  but  is  compatible 
with  the  recognition  of  divine  agency  in  all  the  phenomena  of 
the  natural  world.  This  view,  as  we  shall  see,  while  it  repro- 
duces the  simple  theism  of  the  primeval  world,  and  those  awe- 
inspiring  conceptions  of  nature  which  characterize  our  Jewish 
Scriptures,  promises  to  be  the  ultimate,  but  not  distant,  conclu- 
sion of  the  most  advanced  science  and  philosophy. 

cause  of  another ;  and  if,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  the  language  of  sec- 
ondary causation  be  permissible,  it  should  be  only  with  reference  to  the 
special  phenomena  referred  to,  as  it  can  never  be  generalized"  (Grove, 
"Correlation  of  Physical  Forces,"  Youmans's  ed.,  p.  15).  "An  essential 
cause  is  unattainable  [in  the  study  of  phenomena].  Causation  is  the  will, 
Creation  the  act,  of  God"  (ib.,  p.  199).  See,  for  numerous  other  citations, 
Cocker,  "  Theistic  Conception  of  the  World,"  p.  235-243 ;  and  the  refer- 
ences already  made  in  the  present  paper. 

6 


Y. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSALITY—  CONTINUED. 
2.  Causal  Intermediation. 

CAUSE  is  a  word  which  I  have  used  in  a  sense  somewhat  re- 
stricted. I  have  not  admitted  as  real  cause  any  agency  sup- 
posed to  be  exerted,  in  the  natural  world,  by  what  we  call  mat- 
ter. The  energy,  however,  which  emerges  from  matter,  and  im- 
pinges upon  matter,  has  generally  been  taken  as  the  type  of 
efficient  causation.  It  has  been  assumed  that  energy  may  be 
pocketed  in  portions  of  matter,  to  be  let  loose  on  certain  occa- 
sions, and  produce  effects.  Not  denying,  for  the  moment,  the 
possibility  that  matter  may  become  the  repository  of  force,  it 
is  impossible  for  me  to  conceive  of  matter  as  a  fountain  of 
force.  A  thing  which  is  itself  an  effect  must  be  an  effect  in 
all  its  parts  and  in  all  its  attributes.  All  energy  emanating 
from  an  effect  must  be  itself  an  effect ;  and  all  results  of  its 
efficiency  must  be  results  of  the  first  or  original  cause.  Now, 
we  may  attach  the  term  cause  to  that  form  of  matter  which 
immediately  precedes  a  given  effect  ;(')  we  may  attach  it  to  the 
energy  which  proceeds  from  that  form ;  but  it  must  be  appar- 
ent that  the  word  cause,  thus  employed,  means  a  very  different 
thing  from  that  implied  when  we  speak  of  the  ultimate  effi- 
ciency which  can  not  be  viewed  as  an  effect.  It  is  a  common 
phraseology,  in  speaking  of  a  succession  of  serially  dependent 

(')  This  is  all  that  is  meant  by  "  cause  "  in  the  generality  of  discussions. 
J.  S.  Mill  expressly  shuts  out  all  consideration  of  "  efficiency  "  in  connec- 
tion with  causes,  holding  the  attainment  of  knowledge  respecting  efficient 
causes  to  transcend  the  powers  of  the  human  mind  ("Logic,"  book  ii.,  chap. 
v,  §§  2,  9). 


PHYSICAL  ANTECEDENTS  NOT  CAUSAL.  121 

events,  to  say  that  each  is  the  effect  Of  its  predecessor,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  the  cause  of  its  successor.  To  my  mind,  how- 
ever, the  difference  of  meaning  between  cause  in  this  case  and 
cause  in  the  case  of  voluntary  agency,  is  so  great  that  different 
terms  should  be  employed.  The  meanings  are,  indeed,  antip- 
odal. In  the  one  case,  we  have  intelligence  and  will ;  in  the 
other,  neither.  In  the  one  case,  the  energy  is  primitive ;  in  the 
other,  derivative.  In  the  one  case,  the  efficiency  is  self-moving ; 
in  the  other,  it  is  moved.  In  the  one  case  we  have  that  which 
is  exclusively  cause ;  in  the  other,  that  which  is  primarily  effect. 
The  only  escape  from  this  antithesis  is  self-destruction.  It 
is  the  admission  that  matter  itself  is  sentient,  cognitive,  and 
voluntary.  Heraclitus,  it  is  true,  conceived  all  matter  to  be 
animated ;  and  Thales  and  other  Hylozoists  thought  the  world 
to  be  an  immense  animal.  Leibnitz,  also,  conceived  all  exist- 
ence to  be  composed  of  sentient  monads.  God,  with  him,  is  a 
monad ;  the  soul  is  a  monad ;  minerals  are  composed  of  mon- 
ads. But  Leibnitz  is  not  a  monist ;  there  are  spiritual  monads 
as  well  as  material ;  and  between  these  all  gradations  of  sub- 
stance. But  none  of  these  philosophers  clothed  matter  with 
absolute  freedom  of  will.  The  Hylozoists  recognized  a  su- 
preme principle — be  it  water,  or  air,  or  fire,  or  chaos,  or  mind, 
as  Anaxagoras  suggested;  and  this  principle  introduced  con- 
trol, subordination,  harmony,  rhythm.  The  monads  of  Leib- 
nitz, too,  while  capable  of  various  degrees  of  thought,  were  con- 
trolled in  their  movements  by  mechanical  laws ;  and  the  con- 
sonance between  the  psychical  and  bodily  motions  was  effected 
only  by  a  divine  prearrangement  or  pre-established  harmony. 
Thus  the  assumption  of  independent,  originative  volition  in 
matter  would  be  a  new  thing  in  philosophy — a  theory  sound- 
ing a  dissonance  with  the  tenor  of  human  thought ;  and  awak- 
ing in  antagonism  the  historical  instincts  of  humanity.  More- 
over, the  investiture  of  matter  with  thinking  and  voluntary  at- 
tributes would  summon  us  to  the  funeral  of  God  and  the  soul. 


122  RELATION  OF  FORCE  TO  MATTER. 

If  matter  thinks,  there  is  no  need  to  postulate  spirit.  If  mat- 
ter creates,  and  ordains,  and  co-ordinates,  this  is  our  god  which 
we  trample  under  our  feet  and  sweep  from  our  door-sills.  Here, 
again,  in  reference  to  the  insensibility  of  matter,  the  consensus 
gentium  has  been  standing  steadily  on  the  rock  to  which  rea- 
son must  return,  after  long  floundering  in  search  of  a  more 
royal  standing-place. 

It  is  perfectly  safe  to  assume  that  matter  is  not  self-conscious 
and  self -motive.  Two  alternatives  remain.  It  may  be  con- 
ceived as  absolutely  passive  and  adynamic  —  a  mere  channel 
for  the  transmission  of  energy  from  some  original  fountain  of 
force ;  or,  as  is  conceivable,  at  least  as  a  formula  of  words,  it 
may  be  a  repository  of  delegated  force.  The  latter  alternative 
approaches  the  current  conception ;  which,  however,  represents 
natural  force  as  a  blind  energy  resident  in  matter,  and  constitu- 
ting an  essential  property  of  matter.  Let  me  inquire,  first,  what 
is  involved  in  the  popular  idea  that  force  inheres  in  matter. 
Under  the  prevailing  conception,  the  myriad  motions  of  the 
physical  world  are  but  the  phenomena  produced  by  the  effort 
of  force  to  reach  a  state  of  equilibrium.  Gravitation  .is  the 
cause  of  myriads  of  movements.  The  vapor  of  the  atmosphere, 
condensed  in  rain-drops,  descends  to  reach  a  resting-place  which 
it  does  not  find  in  the  air.  Fluent  as  the  waters  are,  they  find 
no  rest  on  the  hill-slope,  but  hurry  off  through  rill  and  rivulet 
to  the  lowest  levels  attainable ;  and  there  they  rest.  There 
they  would  rest  to  all  eternity,  but  for  the  intervention  of  an- 
other source  of  moving  energy — the  sun.  Warmed  more  or 
less  by  the  sun,  vapory  particles  steal  from  the  watery  mass 
into  the  superincumbent  atmosphere — absorbed,  borne  up,  and 
transported  by  it.  The  unequal  distribution  of  solar  heat,  by 
expanding  portions  of  the  atmosphere,  changes  their  relative 
weight,  and  they  no  longer  counterpoise  adjacent  portions,  but 
are  displaced  by  their  lateral  pressure.  Hence  arise  vertical  and 
horizontal  movements  of  the  air.  Hence  the  relations  of  hu- 


WHAT  INHERENT  FORCE  IMPLIES.  123 

midity  to  temperature  are  changed ;  and  under  certain  condi- 
tions the  excess  of  vapor  is  again  disengaged  as  rain.  Should 
the  sun  cease  to  emit  heat,  the  waters  of  the  world  would  soon 
settle  to  the  lowest  levels,  and  remain  stagnant.  The  ascent  of 
vapor  is  simply  an  effort  to  attain  a  position  where  equilibrium 
will  ensue.  The  movement  of  winds  is  an  effort  to  restore  the 
impaired  equilibrium  of  different  positions  of  the  atmosphere. 
The  descent  of  rains  and  rivers  is  the  search  of  the  waters  for 
equilibrium.  So  the  flash  of  lightning  in  the  clouds  is  the 
spiteful  reaction  of  a  disturbed  equilibrium  in  the  electric  ele- 
ments. The  rebound  of  a  spring  of  steel  or  a  cylinder  of  com- 
pressed air  is  the  recovery  of  that  state  of  equilibrium  which 
had  been  disturbed  by  some  external  agency.  Reasoning  in 
this  way  from  the  sources  of  the  motions  and  changes  which 
make  np  the  world  of  physical  phenomena,  we  are  led  to  the 
conviction  that  all  which  we  witness  is  merely  the  ferment  of 
a  set  of  forces  struggling  toward  a  state  of  rest,  but  mutually 
jostling  each  other  in  their  progress,  and  undoing  work  which 
immediately  must  be  done  again. 

These  are  the  results  supposed  to  be  wrought  out  by  the  ac- 
tivity of  forces  inherent  in  matter.  On  this  assumption,  I  wish 
to  direct  thought  in  two  directions.  The  first  thought  is,  that 
if  these  undiscerning  mechanical  forces  inhere  in  matter,  they 
must  have  been  made  inherent  by  some  agent  or  cause.  If  so 
made,  the  event  must  have  transpired  in  time.  The  theory  ne- 
cessitates an  intelligent,  uncaused  Author  of  matter,  with  its 
properties.  This  is  the  current  theistic  conception. 

The  other  thought  is  an  anticipation  of  the  end  of  this  phys- 
ical ferment,  and  the  quest  for  some  datum  not  involved  in  the 
final  subsidence  of  cosmical  activities.  The  transmission  of 
heat  from  the  sun  to  the  earth,  and  from  the  earth's  interior 
to  external  space,  has  been  the  physical  cause  of  the  terrestrial 
changes  of  millions  of  years.  But  the  heat  which  escapes  from 
the  earth  never  returns  to  it ;  and  the  sun  loses  not  only  the 


124  INHERENT  FORCE  UNTHINKABLE. 

thermal  energy  imparted  to  the  earth  and  the  other  heavenly 
bodies,  but  the  infinitely  greater  amounts  disseminated  through 
the  unoccupied  spaces  of  the  universe.  Hence  the  basis  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  "  dissipation  of  energy.'^1)  The  epoch  is  sep- 
arated from  us  by  only  a  finite  interval,  when  these  great  per- 
ennial sources  of  physical  activity  shall  have  been  exhausted, 
and,  however  the  ferment  may  be  prolonged  by  agencies  im- 
possible to  compute,  the  whole  world,  the  whole  solar  system, 
shall  have  settled  at  length  into  that  condition  of  stagnation 
and  death  toward  which  creation  is  daily  marching  with  strides 
as  visible  as  the  approach  of  those  wintry  frosts  which  are  brown- 
ing the  meadows  and  shaking  the  scarlet  leaflet  to  the  ground. 
This  impending  crisis  marks  an  end  of  the  cosmical  ferment  as 
sharply  as  its  historical  purport  pronounces  a  beginning ;  and 
leaves  us  at  both  extremities  of  existence,  with  no  support  but 
the  same  All-sufficiency  already  revealed  in  the  dependent  nat- 
ure of  force  and  motion  and  matter. 

Such  conclusions  are  necessarily  involved  in  the  popular  idea 
that  force  inheres  in  matter.  It  remains  to  establish  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  thesis.  Is  it  thinkable,  for  instance,  that  a  mole- 
cule of  inert  matter  should  be  made  the  repository  of  an  en- 
ergy which  should  perpetually  draw  its  neighboring  molecule 
toward  it,  and  of  another  energy  which  should  perpetually 
repel  it;  or  that  these  two  forces  should  act  respectively  at 
certain  distances,  and  cease  to  act  at  distances  greater  or  less 
than  these ;  or  that,  both  forces  acting,  they  should  be  found 
in  equilibrium  at  several  different  intervals  of  distance  between 

(J)  The  idea  of  the  final  refrigeration  of  the  earth  and  sun,  and,  in  short, 
the  ultimate  complete  stagnation  of  the  material  universe,  was  shadowed 
forth  by  the  author  as  an  original  speculation  in  the  Michigan  Journal  of 
Education  in  1860,  and  more  explicitly  in  the  Ladies'  Repository,  Cincin- 
nati, for  November  and  December,  1863,  and  January,  1864.  The  doctrine 
of  the  "  dissipation  of  energy  "  seems  to  have  been  first  broached  by  Sir 
William  Thompson,  Trans.  Roy.  Soc.  Edinb.,  1852. 


ACTION  AT  A  DISTANCE.  125 

the  molecules?  Is  it  thinkable  that  either  atomic  or  molar 
matter  is  capable  of  exerting  efficiency  at  a  distance?  Is  it 
not  a  necessity  of  thought  that  efficiency  requires  presence  in 
space  as  well  as  in  time — activity  here  as  well  as  now?(^}  I 
confess  that,  with  all  my  efforts  at  abstraction  and  invention, 
I  am  unable  to  think  "dead"  matter — for  that  is  the  kind  of 
which  I  speak — as  acting,  or  as  the  seat  of  a  "dead"  energy 
which  acts.  If  others  can  think  this,  and  believe  it,  I  com- 
mend them  to  that  thread  of  thought,  already  disclosed,  which 
leads  hence,  from  this  world  of  dependence,  to  the  eternal  Self- 
supporter  revealed  already  in  their  intuitive  consciousness. 

Of  delegated  force  residing  in  matter  I  can  form  no  other 
conception  than  that  it  is  actuated  by  the  delegating  power — 
a  sort  of  form  or  husk,  the  substance  and  vitality  within  which 
is  imparted  from  some  source  superior  to  matter.  This  con- 
ception, denying  that  force  inheres  in  matter,  presents  it  as 
an  exotic  power,  exerting  a  vicarious  activity,  without  essential 
dependence  on  its  environment;  but,  like  the  hermit-crab, 
using  it  merely  as  a  seat  of  operations.  If  such  force  is  dele- 
gated, it  is  dependent,  and  destitute  of  autonomy ;  and  it  can 

(')  Gravitation  has  been  regarded  an  instance  of  the  exertion  of  (sec- 
ondary) efficiency  at  a  distance ;  but  this  was  not  the  view  of  Newton. 
He  repels  the  charge  that  the  theory  of  gravitation  is  in  conflict  with  the 
philosophical  maxim  that  "  a  thing  can  not  act  where  it  is  not."  "  It  is 
inconceivable,"  he  writes  to  Dr.  Bentley,  "that  inanimate  brute  matter 
should,  without  the  mediation  of  something  else  which  is  not  material, 
operate  upon  and  affect  other  matter  without  mutual  contact.  *  *  *  That 
gravity  should  be  innate,  inherent,  and  essential  to  matter,  so  that  one 
body  may  act  on  another  at  a  distance,  through  a  vacuum,  without  the 
mediation  of  any  thing  else,  by  and  through  which  their  action  and  force 
may  be  conveyed  from  one  to  another,  is  to  me  so  great  an  absurdity,  that 
I  believe  no  man  who,  in  philosophical  matters,  has  a  competent  faculty  of 
thinking  can  fall  into  it.  Gravity  must  be  caused  by  an  agent  acting 
constantly  according  to  certain  laws!"  (Playfair,  "Dissertation  on  the 
Progress  of  Mathematics  and  Physical  Science  "). 


126  MATTER  VIEWED  AS  ADYNAMIC. 

only  be  a  matter  of  mere  speculation  whether  its  accredited 
power  is  enduring,  or  requires  to  be  instantly  renewed.  In 
any  case,  the  very  form  of  words  implies  a  source  of  power 
superior  to  matter  and  material  energy,  and  no  interest  re- 
mains in  the  question,  save  as  a  mere  contingency  of  science. 

The  other  alternative  respecting  the  relation  of  matter  to 
force  conceives  matter  as  purely  adynamic.  In  this  view,  all 
natural  force  proceeds  from  a  dynamic  Intelligence  superior 
to  matter.  Two  sub-alternatives  present  themselves  here  also. 
Matter  may  serve  merely  as  the  vehicle  which  transmits  pri- 
mordial force ;  or  it  may  be  the  seat  of  an  immanent  and  ever- 
acting  force.  The  first  conception  is  not  difficult  to  entertain. 
The  activities  of  force  are  subordinated  to  laws  of  a  mechanical 
and  exact  character.  They  come  within  the  grasp  of  the  science 
of  quantity.  But  for  the  complexity  of  their  mutual  pertur- 
bations, it  would  be  possible  to  chart  their  results  for  indefinite 
periods  of  time.  As  it  is,  the  movements  of  planetary  bodies, 
projectiles,  tides,  streams,  and  many  other  molar  aggregates 
have  been  reduced  to  numerical  expression  which  is  very  exact. 
Atoms  and  molecules  elude  our  scrutiny,  but  chemistry  is  ver- 
ging on  an  exact  science,  and  we  have  some  foreshadowings  of 
the  subjugation  of  the  whole  realm  of  atomic  physics  to  the 
reign  of  calculable  law.  With  such  indications,  it  is  eminently 
conceivable  that  the  omniscient  Disposer  should  be  able  to  so 
discern  the  endless  series  of  actions  and  reactions  as  to  impart 
an  initial  impulse  which  should  thrill  through  the  chain  of  be- 
ing in  predetermined  effects.  The  line  of  thought,  however, 
here  bifurcates  again.  Are  the  myriad  phenomena  of  existence 
the  unfolding  results  of  a  single  primordial  impulse,  or  of  an 
impulse  momentarily  and  instantly  renewed?  Either  theory 
is  rational.  The  former  supposes  divine  agency  to  be  sepa- 
rated from  the  present  by  the  whole  life-time  of  cosmic  exist- 
ence. The  latter  contemplates  God  as  ever-presiding  and  ever- 
energizing.  If,  however,  the  cycles  of  events  roll  forth  from 


FORCE  AND  DIVINE  VOLITION.  127 

a  primordial  impulse,  they  must  inevitably  reach  at  last  a  con- 
dition of  rest.  Phenomenon  is  but  the  disturbance  of  the  equi- 
librium of  force.  All  disturbances  tend  to  repose.  No  cycle 
of  motions  can  be  self-perpetuating.  To  whatever  extent  we 
widen  the  cycle,  by  annexing  new  realms  of  dynamic  activity, 
the  widest  realm  is  finite,  and  the  universe  of  atomic  agitations 
must  finally  become  quiet.  This  is  the  same  outcome  reached 
when  we  reasoned  on  the  molar  activities  of  the  cosmos.  In 
philosophy,  all  roads  lead  to  God.  If  we  conceive  the  contin- 
uous renewal  of  the  impulse  applied  at  the  periphery  of  exist- 
ence, we  bring  Deity  into  intimate  relations  to  the  world — sep- 
arated from  phenomenon  only  by  a  film  of  matter.  In  this  case, 
and  indeed  in  either  case,  the  question  arises,  Why  should  Dei- 
ty choose  to  exert  his  energy  from  a  distance  ?  In  the  latter 
case,  too,  the  human  imagination  is  burdened  with  all  the  re- 
luctance which  is  aroused  in  some  minds  at  the  contemplation 
of  Deity  as  ever  active  in  the  sustentation  of  his  universe.  If, 
however,  an  active  relation  to  the  universe  is  admissible,  the 
view  which  follows  seems  simpler  and  more  plausible. 

This  view  is,  that  natural  force  has  no  existence  except  as  the 
direct  effort  of  the  Supreme  Will.  It  supposes  matter  to  be 
absolutely  inert  and  naked  of  energy.  Every  form  of  force  is 
a  particular  mode  of  divine  activity.  Every  movement  and 
every  change  reveals  directly  the  presence  of  the  Supreme  Pow- 
er ;  and  man  is  surrounded  by  an  array  of  admonitions  of  the 
divine  presence  the  most  awe-inspiring  possible.  Nay,  man 
himself  is  the  vehicle  of  the  voice  of  God  to  his  own  sensori- 
um.  The  changes  of  matter  are  in  progress  in  our  own  bodies. 
Infinite  agency  permeates  our  very  selves,  assorting  our  nutri- 
tion, building  us  up,  effecting  repairs,  wasting  our  tissues,  and 
carrying  us  into  the  grave — nay,  not  forsaking  us  even  there, 
but  tenderly  bearing  the  effete  molecules  which  we  can  use  no 
longer  into  new  situations  and  collocations,  to  subserve  other 
predetermined  uses  in  the  economy  of  nature. 

6* 


128  DIVINE  IMMANENCE. 

Either  phase  of  the  theory  of  divine  immanence,  though  the 
general  doctrine,  as  I  have  said,  has  found  many  advocates,  is 
obnoxious  to  an  objection  proceeding  from  the  impotence  of 
the  human  mind.  It  seems,  at  first,  incompatible  with  the 
majesty  of  God  to  think  of  him  as  ever  active  and  careful  and 
cognizant  of  the  affairs  of  the  universe,  and,  most  especially, 
of  all  their  subordinate  details.  The  relation  even  of  creator 
and  disposer,  without  the  implication  of  immanent  activity, 
has  brought  down  the  reproachful  phrase,  "  carpenter  theory  " 
of  the  universe.  Such  misgivings  and  such  reproaches  are 
prompted  only  by  human  finiteness  and  incapacity.  Activity 
is  the  central  law  of  existence.  Nothing  exists  for  repose,  but 
every  thing  for  work.  Indolence  is  a  human  invention.  The 
only  evidence  of  existence  is  action.  Whatever  ceases  to  act  is 
dead.  God,  the  author  of  life  and  fountain  of  living  force, 
can  not  be  less  active  than  the  modes  of  existence  which  rep- 
resent him.  But  we  must  not  overlook  the  meaning  of  om- 
nipotence and  omniscience  and  omnipresence.  We  must  not 
overlook  the  fact  that,  with  Deity,  willing  is  accomplishing. 
We  must  not  forget  that  God  is  without  organs  to  be  wearied 
or  wasted  with  use.  With  Omniscience,  the  knowledge  of  all 
things  is  easier  than,  with  us,  the  knowledge  of  one  thing. 
With  Omnipotence,  the  accomplishment  of  all  things  is  easier 
than,  with  us,  the  accomplishment  of  one  thing.  After  much 
reflection,  this  seems  to  me  the  most  philosophic  conception  of 
the  relation  of  the  Supreme  Being  to  the  world. 

The  theories  of  matter  and  force  which  I  have  thus  far  dis- 
cussed suppose  matter  to  have  a  substantive  existence.  There 
is  a  counter-theory  which  regards  matter  merely  a  manifesta- 
tion of  force.  In  this  view,  the  so-called  properties  of  matter 
have  no  subjective  ground.  The  resistances  which  it  presents 
are  not  resistances  of  a  material  substance.  The  last  two  views 
presented — divine  immanence  in  matter  and  divine  immanence 
through  matter — suggest  the  query,  What,  then,  can  matter  be  ? 


D  YNAMICAL  VINW  OF  MA  TIER.  129 

If  the  energies  emanating  from  matter  do  not  appertain  to  mat- 
ter, then  those  modes  of  energy  known  as  resistance,  elasticity, 
adhesiveness,  color,  and  the  like,  have  no  material  ground.  Ex- 
tension and  figure,  which  relate  only  to  the  space  over  which 
the  energies  just  mentioned  are  active,  are  not  properties  of 
any  material  substances.  Indeed,  as  all  properties  are  but 
modes  of  energy,  the  properties  of  matter  are  completely  de- 
tached from  matter,  and  we  are  left  to  the  conception  of  a  sub- 
stance without  attributes.^)  Such  substance  is  a  figment  of 
the  imagination.  We  know  nothing,  and  can  know  nothing,  of 
any  substance  save  by  its  attributes.  If  the  so-called  proper- 
ties of  matter  do  not  belong  to  matter,  then  matter  as  a  ground 
of  phenomena  has  no  existence.  But  the  properties  of  matter 
so  called  remain ;  they  can  not  be  ignored.  Those  forces  which 
we  have  supposed  to  emanate  from  matter  are  realities.  But  it 
is  not  possible  to  thought  to  substitute  abstract  force  or  forces 
for  all  which  we  have  regarded  as  forms  of  matter.  Force  can 
only  be  exerted  by  a  real  agent.  Attribute  does  not  float  about 
creation  without  a  substantial  ground  to  rest  on.  Force  is  nei- 
ther fatherless  nor  orphan,  flitting  about  without  haven  and 
without  allegiance.  Force  is  efficiency  sent  forth  by  substan- 
tial existence.  It  is  not  force,  indeed,  which  produces  effects, 
but  the  free-will  whence  dynamic  influence  proceeds.  Force 
is  an  attribute  of  will.  Elasticity,  resistance,  color,  which  are 
both  impressions  made  upon  our  sensorium,  and  thus  subject- 
ive, and  also  energies  exerted  to  produce  those%  impressions,  and 
thus  objective — these,  also,  are  attributes  of  will.  The  dynam- 

(')  This  view  is  less  accepted  than  it  has  been.  Professor  F.  Schneider 
says,  "  The  theory  that  the  atoms  have  no  extension  in  space  and  are  mere- 
ly centres  of  force  *  *  *  is,  in  view  of  the  results  of  investigation  in  various 
provinces  of  molecular  physics,  no  longer  tenable"  (Meyer,  "  Jahrbuch," 
for  1873).  Nearly  all  physical  speculations  are  now  based  on  the  assump- 
tion of  the  atomic  constitution  of  matter  (see  Barker's  Address  before  the 
Physical  Section  of  the  American  Assoc.  Adv.  Science,  Buffalo,  1876). 


130  DYNAMICAL  THEORY  PANTHEISTIC. 

ical  theory  of  matter,  therefore,  precipitates  us  immediately 
and  irretrievably  upon  divine  agency.  We  may  loosely  speak 
of  atoms  of  matter  as  mere  foci  of  force,  and  aggregates  of 
matter  as  mere  spheres  of  resistance ;  but  such  language  is 
empty  and  vain.  There  must  be  something  which  exerts  force. 
There  must  be  something  which  resists.^) 

Thus  we  find  ourselves,  by  whatever  path  we  pursue  our  ex- 
plorations through  the  mysteries  of  matter  and  force,  always 
confronted  by  the  divine  presence.  We  can  not  flee  from  De- 
ity. There  is  no  way  to  invent  a  world  which  must  not  depend 
first  and  last  upon  divine  support.  There  is  no  way  to  think 
of  an  atom  of  matter,  or  that  which  may  be  called  an  atom, 
without  conceiving  it  afloat  in  the  breath  of  divine  power. 

Recapitulation  of  Possible  Conceptions  of  Matter  and  Force. 

A.  The  Dynamical  conception  of  matter. 

B.  The  Substantive  conception  of  matter. 
I.  Matter  self-motive  (Hylozoistic). 

II.  Matter  not  self -motive. 
1.  Endowed  with  force. 

(a)  The  force  inherent  (Popular  view). 

(b)  The  force  delegated. 

(*)  Should  the  dynamical  theory  of  matter  become  established,  we  should 
be  forced  into  a  modified  pantheism.  The  theory  means  that  no  material, 
inert  substance  underlies  the  phenomena  which  we  style  the  phenomena  of 
matter.  But  reason  declares  that  all  phenomena  are  manifestations  of 
some  entity ;  and  hence,  if  there  be  no  matter,  material  phenomena  are 
manifestations  of  Deity,  and  the  substance  or  entity  revealed  by  the  prop- 
erties of  matter  is  Deity — tJie  material  universe  is  Deity.  But  if  we  ever 
find  ourselves  resting  in  this  conclusion,  we  shall  arise  and  re-affirm  these 
unimpeachable  dicta  of  reason — that  reason  which  is  the  offspring  of  God : 
1.  Man  possesses  an  independent  identity  and  a  free-will ;  2.  The  Being 
whose  activities  constitute  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  without  the 
veil  of  matter  intervening,  is  a  personality — discerning  ends,  prompted  by 
motives,  executing  by  volition. 


UNPHILOSOPHIZING  SCIENCE.  131 

2.  A  mere  channel  for  transmission  of  force. 
(a)  The  force  initial  or  peripheral. 

(aa)  One  primordial  impulse. 

(bb)  Impulse  constantly  renewed. 
(6)  The  force  proceeds  from  an  immanent  cause. 

Science  is  sometimes  heard  to  object  to  these  theistic  con- 
ceptions of  matter  and  of  the  universe ;  but  this  is  only  because 
science  does  not  philosophize.  As  I  have  before  intimated, 
there  is  no  fact  of  science  from  which  philosophy  can  not  find 
a  path  leading  directly  to  God.  If  the  scientist  does  not  find 
the  path,  it  is  because  he  does  not  seek  it.  He  contents  him- 
self with  partial  knowledge,  rather  than  go  beyond  the  data 
and  the  methods  of  science.  Amusing  himself  with  the  means, 
he  loses  sight  of  the  end.  He  is  a  man^sent  by  the  Almighty 
to  rear  a  temple ;  and  finding  some  prettily  colored  stones  in 
the  quarry,  he  entertains  himself  with  these,  instead  of  laying 
them  in  the  massive  wall.  He  is  a  child  studying  the  alpha- 
bet, who  thinks  the  acquisition  of  the  letters  the  end  of  all 
learning. 

The  scientist  sometimes  declares  that  the  admission  of  divine 
will,  divine  motive,  divine  providence,  is  the  introduction  of 
chaos  or  caprice  into  nature.^)  All  things,  he  says,  move  for- 

(')  "  In  the  intellectual  infancy  of  a  savage  state,  man  *  *  *  regards  all 
passing  events  as  depending  on  the  arbitrary  volition  of  a  superior,  but  in- 
visible, power  "  (Draper,  "  Intellectual  Development  of  Europe,"  p.  2).  "As 
science  demands  the  radical  extirpation  of  caprice,  and  the  absolute  reli- 
ance upon  law  in  nature,  there  arose  with  the  growth  of  scientific  notions 
a  desire  and  determination  to  sweep  from  the  field  of  theory  this  mob  of 
gods  and  demons  "  (Tyndall,  "  Belfast  Address,"  Appletons'  ed.,  p.  38).  It 
must  be  noticed,  however,  that  when  the  order  and  certainty  of  phenomena 
under  natural  law  are  brought  into  antithesis  with  divine  agency,  it  is  some 
crude  conception  of  supernaturalism  which  is  disparaged — the  Greek  or 
mediaeval  anthropomorphism — and  not  the  recognition  of  every  kind  and 
mode  of  divine  agency  in  the  world.  Such  passages  are  not  intended  to 


132  LAW  AND  DIVINE  A GENC Y. 

ward  with,  regularity  under  the  dominion  of  law.^)  It  is  ab- 
surd to  attribute  events  to  divine  agency,  when  science  demon- 
strates them  the  effects  of  the  forces  of  matter,  acting  accord- 
ing to  invariable  law.  The  subjective  natures  of  matter  and  of 
force  are  admitted  to  be  involved  in  mystery.  We  may  make 
it  a  matter  of  faith  that  divine  agency  has  been  concerned  at 
some  time  and  in  some  way ;  but  the  palpable  phenomena  and 
the  fixed  sequences  are  so  obtrusive  that,  like  the  child  or  the 
savage,  he  is  ready  to  recognize  ultimate  causal  efficiency  in  the 
last-discovered  antecedent,  and  satisfy  himself  with  that.  Long 
habituated  to  reason  from  sensible  phenomena,  he  thinks  noth- 
ing is  real  which  can  not  be  measured  or  weighed ;  or,  if  there 
be  other  realities,  they  are  matters  of  opinion,  or  conjecture,  or 
faith,  which  offer  no  reward  for  their  search. 

Now,  I  wish  to  assert  emphatically,  that,  so  far  as  I  can  dis- 
cern, any  theory  of  divine  immanence  does  not  conflict  with  the 
doctrine  of  law,  nor  with  the  science  based  on  the  atomic  doctrine. 

That  law  reigns  in  the  world  is  an  admirable  fact,  which  I 
not  only  acknowledge,  but  argue,  with  rejoicing.  The  reign 
of  law,  however,  is  modal,  and  not  efficient.  Law  effectuates 

be  taken  in  an  atheistic  sense.  Dr.  Draper  says,  "  It  is  a  more  noble  view 
of  the  government  of  this  world  to  impute  its  order  to  a  penetrating,  primi- 
tive wisdom,  which  could  foresee  consequences  through  a  future  eternity, 
and  provide  for  them  in  the  original  plan,  at  the  outset,  than  to  invoke  the 
perpetual  intervention  of  an  ever-acting,  spiritual  agency"  ("Intellectual 
Development  of  Europe,"  p.  74).  Professor  Tyndall  says,  "  The  profession 
of  that  atheism  with  which  I  am  sometimes  so  lightly  charged  would,  in 
my  case,  be  an  impossible  answer  to  this  question  "  (whether  there  are  not 
in  nature  manifestations  of  knowledge  and  skill  superior  to  man's) ("Bel-, 
fast  Address, "  appendix,  Appletons'  ed.,  p.  102). 

(')  "  The  investigation  of  the  aspects  of  the  skies  in  past  ages,  and  all 
predictions  of  its  future,  rest  essentially  upon  the  principle  that  no  arbi- 
trary volition  ever  intervenes,  the  gigantic  mechanism  moving  impassive- 
ly in  virtue  of  a  mathematical  law  "  (Draper,  "  Intellectual  Development  of 
Europe,"  p.  3). 


LA  W  IMPLIED  MIND.  133 

nothing'.  Law  is  the  method  according  to  which  a  lawgiver 
effectuates.  Law  never  planned  "  equivalent  proportions,"  and 
"  inverse  squares,"  and  "  ratios  of  squares  and  cubes,"  and  "  ho- 
mological  relations."  Lawgiver  planned  these  things;  and 
whether  he  works  or  his  dynamical  agents  work,  it  is  lawgiver 
who  observes  these  uniform  methods  from  which  formulated 
laws  have  been  generalized.  "  The  laws  of  nature,"  says  Von 
Baer,  "  are  the  permanent  expressions  of  the  will  of  a  Creative 
Principle.'^1)  Even  if  it  were  conceivable  that,  in  the  absence 
of  cosmical  intelligence,  the  cosmos  should  go  harmoniously,  it 
is  infinitely  more  rational  to  conceive  correlation,  fitness,  utility, 
beauty,  regularity,  to  proceed  from  an  ordering  mind.  An  or- 
dering mind  in  nature  does  not  imply  caprice ;  it  implies  the 
very  order  which  we  observe;  it  is  the  necessary  correlative 
and  cause  of  order,  harmony,  law.  It  is  supposable,  certainly, 
that  intelligence  may  impose  upon  itself  fixed  modes  of  activ- 
ity. As  the  world  is  constituted,  the  happiness  of  man  and 
beast  depends  upon  fixed  methods  in  nature.  It  is  infinitely 
more  probable  that  mind  has  planned  correlations  than  that 
unguided  force  has  fallen  upon  them  by  any  chance.  Mind  is 
a  better  explanation  of  the  structural  affinities  of  animals  than 
any  principle  of  inheritance,  unguided  and  unpurposed  by 
mind.  Mind  is  the  best  explanation,  and  the  only  explanation 
admissible  in  philosophy,  of  the  complex  of  phenomena  reveal- 
ed in  the  panorama  of  nature. 

Even  should  we  receive  the  dynamical  theory  of  matter,  and 
recognize  every  lump  of  earth  as  only  a  manifestation  of  force, 
of  which  the  real  ground  is  the  divine  existence,  still  we  may 
continue  to  reason  and  to  conclude  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
the  atomic  constitution  of  matter  were  proved  true.  The  the- 
ory of  the  solar  system  has  been  established  on  the  assumed 

(J)  K.  E.  Von  Baer,  "Studien  aus  dem  Gebiete  der  Naturwissenschaft- 
en,"  p.  232. 


134  THE  SCIENTIFIC  FIELD. 

truth  of  the  Newtonian  doctrine  of  gravitation ;  but  a  different 
doctrine  is  supposable,  and  different  doctrines  are,  indeed,  un- 
der discussion, (')  which,  while  they  would  sweep  the  popular 
theory  of  gravitation  from  existence,  would  leave  the  principles 
of  mathematical  astronomy  untouched,  and  would  disclose  no 
fundamental  proposition  which  must  be  unlearned.  Though 
the  stone  built  into  the  dizzy  tower  of  the  cathedral  be  but  a 
bundle  of  resistent  forces  exerted  directly  by  Infinite  Will,  we 
have  no  cause  to  fear  that  Infinite  Will  is  disposed  to  withdraw 
that  exertion  of  energy,  or  for  one  instant  to  cease  acting  ac- 
cording to  formulas  prescribed  from  the  beginning  of  the  world. 

I  have  discussed  sufficiently  the  general  relations  of  matter 
and  force.  I  have  pointed  out  the  inevitable  tendency  of 
thought  toward  a  theistic  solution  of  the  problem,  under  what- 
ever aspect  it  may  be  presented.  Thus  I  have  reached  certain 
general  principles  which  I  desire  to  apply  to  certain  dogmatic 
propositions  found  in  scientific  literature. 

Science  proper  is  concerned  only  with  the  phenomena  of 
causal  intermediation.  With  primary  causation,  or  the  nature 
of  efficiency  in  causation,  it  has  nothing  to  do.  Its  data  are, 
especially,  the  phenomena  of  the  physical  world.  To  these 
may  be  added  the  phenomena  of  society,  the  phenomena  of 
the  psychical  activities,  and  the  primary  data  given  in  the  uni- 
versal reason.  But  social,  psychical,  and  rational  phenomena  are 
the  data  of  science,  in  its  recent  acceptation,  only  so  far  as  they 
may  be  employed  inductively.  Induction  is  commonly  regard- 
ed the  logic  of  science.  Deduction  is  the  logic  of  philosophy. 
Nevertheless,  deduction  may  be  employed  to  develop  scientific 
qusesita.  Such  qusesita  may  belong  to  the  realm  of  actuality 
or  to  that  of  potentiality.  If  the  former,  deduction  becomes 
a  seer ;  if  the  latter,  a  prophet.  The  predictions  of  astronomy 

(')  See  Cocker,  "  Theistic  Conception  of  the  World,"  p.  210-222,  for 
statements  and  references  on  this  subject. 


DEDUCTION  IN  SCIENCE.  135 

are  prophetic  deductions  from  principles  induced  from  observa- 
tion. The  story  of  nebular  geology  is  the  revelation  of  a  seer 
drawn  out  by  the  thread  of  deduction. (l)  On  the  basis  of  the 
theory  of  descent  from  a  common  stock,  Haeckel  and  other  ev- 
olutionists deductively  infer  the  characters  which  the  unknown 
stock  must  bear,  and  infer,  guided  by  scattered  facts,  what  must 
have  been  the  nature  of  the  ramifications.  Such  deductive 
inferences  have  been  often  confirmed  by  actual  discovery. 
Marsh  having  traced,  as  he  believed,  the  lineage  of  the  one- 
toed  horse  back  in  time  to  a  four-toed  horse,  predicted  that 
from  the  deposits  of  some  earlier  geological  period  would  be 
obtained  evidences  of  the  existence  of  a  five-toed  horse.  In 
November,  1876,  that  prediction  was  fulfilled  by  the  discovery 
of  Eohippus. 

As  there  is  a  science  of  mind,  so  we  have  a  philosophy  of 
science.  Indeed,  philosophy  can  not  be  strictly  dissevered 
from  science ;  as  the  annihilation  of  the  data  of  science  would 
impoverish  philosophy.  Philosophy  would  thus  become  a 
magnificent  mill,  with  no  corn  to  grind.  It  is  unnatural,  and 
indeed  impossible,  to  work  science  and  philosophy  in  separate 
fields ;  for  they  are  yoked  together.  Every  step  of  scientific 
reasoning  employs  a  philosophic  principle.  Even  induction, 
the  much-vaunted  engine  of  science,  binds  conclusion  to  scien- 
tific, or  a  posteriori,  datum,  by  means  of  a  philosophic,  or  a 
priori,  datum.  For  instance,  take  the  generalized  proposition 

(')  I  have  long  protested  against  the  exaggerated  importance  which, 
since  Bacon,  science  has  been  inclined  to  concede  to  the  inductive  method 
of  investigation ;  noticing,  as  I  have,  that  a  large  part  of  the  reasoning  of 
science — in  fact,  every  thing  which  can  properly  be  called  reasoning — pro- 
ceeds on  d  priori  grounds  (see  a  lecture  on  "  Scientific  Education,"  de- 
livered at  the  dedication  of  the  Judd  Hall  of  Science  of  the  Wesleyan  Uni- 
versity, in  July,  1870 ;  also  "  Sketches  of  Creation,"  March,  1870,  pp.  52,  66, 
435,  436).  It  is,  of  course,  gratifying  to  find  similar  views  set  forth  in  a 
work  of  such  authority  as  Jevons's  "  Principles  of  Science." 


136  INDUCTION  LEANS  ON  DEDUCTION. 

that  the  skins  of  Hottentots  are  black.     The  reasoning  is  skel- 
etonized in  the  following  syllogism  : 

Whatever  color  of  skin  is  possessed  by  A,  B,  C,  and  a  hun- 
dred other  Hottentots,  must  be  the  color  of  Hottentots 
in  general. 
A,  B,  C,  and  a  hundred  other  Hottentots,  possess  a  black 

skin. 

Therefore,  Hottentots  in  general  possess  black  skins. 
Now,  it  is  an  a  priori  datum  of  reason  which  validates  the 
passage  from  the  particular  to  the  general  in  the  major  premise. 
Moreover,  what  is  the  ground  of  belief  that  A,  B,  C,  and  a 
hundred  other  Hottentots,  submitted  to  observation,  are  black  ? 
It  is  the  antecedent  and  primitive  belief  that  things  are  as  our 
senses  report  them  to  us.  This,  again,  is  an  a  priori  datum ; 
and  we  observe  that  it  lies  at  the  very  root  of  the  initial  process 
in  all  inductive  or  scientific  reasoning — the  verification  of  facts. 
No  scientist  thinks  of  the  possibility  of  a  flaw  in  his  logic  at 
this  point ;  and,  indeed,  there  is  no  occasion  for  it ;  the  proced- 
ure is  valid.  I  can  not  avoid  adding,  parenthetically,  that  the 
veracity  of  consciousness  is  worth  no  more  in  this  case  than  in 
any  other.  The  belief  that  objects  exist  as  sense  reports  them  to 
us,  is  no  more  binding  than  the  belief  that  intelligible  correla- 
tions imply  intelligence.  Accept  the  first  proposition  as  true, 
it  is  idiocy  to  reject  the  latter.  Reject  the  latter,  it  is  idiocy 
to  accept  the  first.  Credibile  in  uno,  credibile  in  omnibus. 

Thus  the  antithesis  of  science  and  philosophy  does  not  exist. 
Nor  are  their  fields  entirely  apart.  The  scientist  is  bound  to 
philosophize,  and  ought  to  philosophize,  more  than  he  does.^) 

(J)  The  most  eminent  and  original  scientists  feel  least  scruple  at  the  em- 
ployment of  deductive  data.  Professor  Tyndall  says,  "  By  an  intellectual 
necessity,  I  cross  the  boundary  of  the  experimental  evidence,  and  discern 
in  that  matter  which  we,  in  our  ignorance  of  its  latent  powers,  and  not- 
withstanding our  professed  reverence  for  its  creator,  have  hitherto  covered 
with  opprobrium,  the  promise  and  potency  of  all  terrestrial  life  "  (Tyndall, 


IMPLICATIONS  OF  SECONDARY  CAUSE.  137 

The  philosopher  depends  on  the  data  of  science,  and  ought  to 
be  as  profound  a  scientist- as  the  scientist  who  is  no  philosopher. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  most  eminent  philosophers  have  had 
the  largest  command  of  the  treasury  of  science :  witness  Aris- 
totle, Leibnitz,  Comte,  Whewell,  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Spencer. 
And  the  most  eminent  scientists  have  been  most  conversant 
with  the  ideas  of  philosophy  :  witness  Aristotle,  Galileo,  Bruno, 
Gassendi,  Newton,  Cuvier,  and  Agassiz.  Let  science  and  phi- 
losophy, wedded  by  nature,  remain  undivorced. 

Now  let  us  turn  the  discussion  to  the  implications  and  legit- 
imate uses  of  the  facts  of  causal  intermediation,  which  consti- 
tute the  peculiar  data  of  science.  Henceforward,  I  shall  shape 
my  phraseology  with  especial,  though  not  exclusive,  reference 
to  physical  science. 

Causal  intermediation  or  secondary  causation  implies,  first, 
primary  causation  as  the  antecedent  and  responsible  and  only 
actual  efficiency. 

It  implies,  secondly,  the  absence,  or  latency,  of  the  attributes 
characterizing  primary  cause.  That  is,  it  implies  the  absence 
of  self-consciousness,  cognition  of  the  relation  between  cause 
and  effect,  motivity,  intentionality,  volition,  and  personality. 
These  attributes  do  not  belong  to  the  world  of  natural  phenom- 
ena, so  far  as  we  regard  matter  itself  the  ground  of  dynamic 
effort.  If  we  posit  in  matter  an  exotheistic  ground  of  energy, 
we  necessitate  a  materialistic,  hylozoistic  pantheism,  against 

"  Belfast  Address,"  Appletons'  ed.,  p.  89).  And  Haeckel :  "  Wer  noch 
heute  die  Entwickelungsgeschichte  als  eine  rein '  descriptive  Wissenschaft ' 
betrachtet  —  (eine  Contradictio  in  adjecto)  —  wer  noch  heute  den  Unter- 
schied  zwischen  Wissen  und  Wissenschaft,  zwischen  Kenntniss  und  Er- 
kenntniss  nicht  kennt,  der  hat  iiberhaupt  unter  den  Vertretern  wahrer 
Wissenschaft  nicht  mitzureden ;  und  der  verfolgt  auch  in  der  Entwickel- 
ungsgeschichte nur  eine  unterhaltende  '  Gemiiths-  und  Augen-Ergotzung,' 
aber  keine  wahrhaf  t  wissenschaftlichen  Ziele  "  (Haeckel, "  Ziele  und  Wege," 
p.  4-5). 


138  CONGRUITY  OF  TERMS. 

which  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  direct  an  argument.  If  we 
posit  in  matter  an  endotheistic  ground  of  energy,  we  reach  a 
position  from  which  the  explanation  of  phenomena  is  simple, 
and  consonant  with  the  instincts  of  humanity  and  reason.  It 
is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  whether  we  assume  the  ex- 
otheistic  or  endotheistic  view  of  matter,  its  phenomena  remain 
equally  the  legitimate  data  of  scientific  processes. 

Thirdly,  causal  intermediation  implies  a  congruity  between 
antecedent  and  consequent.  Like  begets  like.  Modal  activity 
does  not  come  from  mechanical  action,  but  only  material  form 
and  motion.  Life  is  not  generated  by  mire,  nor  thought  se- 
creted by  brain ;  though  life  may  be  generated  in  mire,  and 
from  mire,  by  primary  cause;  and  thought  may  issue  from 
brain,  or  through  brain,  emanating  from  a  thinking  cause.  This 
congruity  is  not  necessary  in  original  causation.  Though  mat- 
ter, itself  an  effect,  can  not  generate  will,  it  may  be  generated 
by  will.  Though  the  dislodgment  of  a  rock  on  a  distant 
mountain  -  side  might  be  repeated  a  thousand  times,  it  could 
never  produce  a  psychic  motion  in  me;  still  less,  a  psychic 
power.  Should  psychic  motion  succeed,  the  fall  of  the  rock 
could  be  no  more  than  occasion ;  my  will  must  be  the  cause. 
But  will  can  cause  the  fall  of  the  rock.  Sitting  in  my  chair,  I 
can  decree  a  train  of  instrumentalities  which  will  dislodge  the 
granite  from  its  socket ;  as  will  may  prompt  a  set  of  physical 
preparations  in  Boston,  or  determine  the  movements  of  a  hun- 
dred thousand  soldiers  in  the  field.  But  even  original  cause, 
if  finite,  can  not  create  matter  or  force;  as  it  is  impossible 
for  finite  intelligence  to  conceive  how  that  event  can  be  pro- 
duced^1) 

(*)  I  find  this  law  of  (secondary)  causation  enunciated  by  Coleridge. 
"The law  of  causality,"  he  says,  "  holds  only  between  homogeneous  things, 
i.  e.,  things  having  some  common  property  "  ("  Biographia  Literaria,"  chap. 
8).  So,  also,  Spinoza :  "  Quae  res  nihil  commune  inter  se  habent,  earum  una 
alterius  causa  esse  non  potest  "  ("  Ethica,"  book  i.).  J.  S.  Mill,  however, 


EFFICIENCY  AND  CONDITIONALLY.  139 

Fourthly,  a  relation  of  efficiency  must  subsist  between  the 
antecedent  and  consequent,  even  in  secondary  causation.  But 
it  does  not  follow  that  the  antecedent  is  the  source  of  the  effi- 
ciency ;  it  may  only  transmit  it.  In  a  question  of  secondary 
causation,  therefore,  two  separate  quaesita  exist.  First,  does  a 
relation  of  efficiency  subsist  between  two  given  terms;  second, 
if  so,  is  the  efficiency  original  or  transmitted?  The  last  ques- 
tion I  have  discussed  generally,  and  have  pointed  out  the  vari- 
ous views  which  it  is  possible  to  entertain  respecting  the  pri- 
mordiality  of  the  force  manifest  in  the  natural  world.  I  have 
shown  that  there  is  but  one  possible  view  which  does  not  con- 
duct thought,  setiologically  and  necessarily,  to  a  Prime  Mover, 
the  field  of  whose  activity  embraces  not  only  matter,  but  every 
possible  mode  of  existence. 

Fifthly,  causal  intermediation  is  susceptible  of  arrest,  or  de- 
flection, or  acceleration,  by  conditions.  Unlike  conditions  in 
primary  causation,  these  exist  only  as  a  mechanical  influence. 
They  are  the  objective,  in  distinction  from  the  subjective,  con- 
ditions of  primary  causality. 

These  five  principles  are  applicable  in  all  reasoning  from  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  whatever  view  we  may  take  of  the  nat- 
ure of  matter,  or  the  relations  subsisting  between  matter  and 
force.  If  we  accept  either  phase  of  divine  immanence,  we 
may  assume  that  Deity  conditions  himself  spontaneously  by 
the  same  laws  as  we  are  compelled  to  regard  necessary  laws,  on 
the  hypothesis  of  the  inherency  of  force  in  matter. 

The  principles  of  efficiency  and  conditionally  are  the  two 
rocks  on  which  scientific  reasoning  has  most  frequently  split. 
Sometimes  a  relation  of  succession  or  concomitance  has  been 
mistaken  for  an  efficient  relation.  Sometimes  a  condition  has 


denounces  the  proposition  as  a  fallacy  ("  System  of  Logic,"  p.  474).  And 
yet  he  qites  some  admirable  instances  of  the  supremacy  of  the  principle  of 
congruity  (p.  486-487). 


140  CONDITIONS  NOT  CAUSES. 

been  so  mistaken.  The  line  of  false  reasoning  from  neglect  of 
the  principle  of  conditionality  bifurcates.  There  are,  as  I  have 
before  stated,  two  classes  of  conditions — those  which  are  sub- 
jective to  moving  cause,  and  those  which  are  objective.  Condi- 
tions which  enter  into  the  constitution  of  motive  are  subject- 
ive. They  co-exist  with  intentionality,  and  condition  it.  Con- 
ditions which  modify  or  annul  the  efficiency  proceeding  from 
cause,  either  primary  or  secondary,  are  objective,  and  act  me- 
chanically. Organic  conditions  are  objective;  they  are  often 
privative  or  permissive.  It  is  a  somewhat  frequent  error  of 
science  to  confound  subjective  and  objective  conditionality,  as 
well  as  to  transmute  condition  into  efficiency.  Those  who  fail 
or  refuse  to  recognize  intentionality  in  nature  must  consistently 
ignore  all  but  objective  conditions.  Still,  on  their  own  stand- 
ing-plane, they  practice  false  induction  when  they  clothe  con- 
dition with  efficiency. 

I  shall  now  attempt  to  point  out  and  classify,  by  way  of  il- 
lustration, some  leading  examples  of  false  philosophy  in  the 
methods  of  recent  science.  This  task  is  difficult,  and  requires, 
probably,  more  acumen  than  I  possess;  but  I  shall  venture, 
tentatively,  to  arrange  these  examples  in  five  classes. 

1.  Subjective  Condition  mistaken  for  Objective  Condition,  and 
then  mistaken  for  Efficiency. 

The  coadaptation,  which  every  one  has  remarked,  between 
organic  nature  and  its  physical  environment  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  different  interpretations.  De  Maillet,  Lamarck,  Geof- 
froy-St.-Hilaire,  and  many  others,  down  to  Darwin  and  his 
disciples,  have  conceived  the  organism  as  impressed  and  fash- 
ioned by  the  direct  influence  of  the  environment.  That  is,  the 
environment  has  been  regarded  as  exerting  an  efficient  causa- 
tion, in  the  capacity  of  an  objective  condition.  On  the  con- 
trary, Cuvier,  Agassiz,  Dawson,  and  the  whole  line  of  believers 
in  "  Final  Causes,"  from  Socrates  to  M'Cosh,  have  maintained 


ENVIR  ONMENT  NO  T  EFFICIENT.  141 

that  the  organism  is  not  the  product*  of  the  environment,  but 
a  product  which  intelligence  has  correlated  with  the  environ- 
ment. In  other  words,  the  environment  has  been  the  existent 
fact  which  has  conditioned  the  INTENTION  of  the  causal  intelli- 
gence. If  this  latter  view  be  correct,  Lamarckianism  and  kin- 
dred theories,  so  far  as  they  maintain  that  environment  is  the 
seat  of  causal  efficiency,  have  mistaken  a  subjective  condition 
for  an  objective  one,  and  have  then  conceived  it  as  exerting 
causal  efficiency.  The  correctness  of  the  Darwinian  view,  un- 
der the  aspect  just  stated,  it  appears,  depends  on  the  proof  of 
efficiency  proceeding  from  environment  to  organism.  But  this 
does  not  seem  to  be  probable.  Admitting  the  environment  to 
bef,  as  it  is  in  some  cases,  an  objective  as  well  as  a  subjective  con- 
dition, it  is  only  a  condition — that  is,  it  is  a  fact  which  stands 
either  in  a  permissive  relation  to  efficient  cause,  providing  the 
possibility  for  the  production  of  a  certain  result ;  or  else,  if  effi- 
ciency emerges  from  it,  it  is  only  transmitted  efficiency,  the  di- 
rection of  which  it  determines  within  certain  limits.  In  either 
case,  efficiency  does  not  reside  in  environment ;  but  the  latter 
case,  moreover,  is  incapable  of  proof,  since  the  efficient  cause  of 
organic  growth  acts  in  the  organism ;  and  the  external  condi- 
tions obviously  sustain  only  a  permissive  relation  to  this  activi- 
ty.^) If  external  conditions  permit  only  a  dwarfed  develop- 
ment, the  efficient  cause  can  proceed  only  to  the  limits  assigned. 
If  external  conditions  do  not  permit  the  elaboration  of  color- 
cells,  the  organism  remains  colorless.  Often,  however,  we  find 

(!)  This  discrimination  has  already  been  made  by  Huxley.  "  Conditions 
are  not  actively  productive,  but  are  passively  permissive;  they  do  not 
cause  variation  in  any  given  direction,  but  they  permit  and  favor  a  tend- 
ency in  that  direction  which  already  exists  (Huxley,  "  Critiques  and  Ad- 
dresses," p.  276).  I.  II.  Fichte,  also,  speaks  pertinently  to  this  point  as  a 
philosopher :  "  Nothing  extraneous  to  any  individual  existence  can  trans- 
form it,  but  can  only  excite  it  to  self-wrought  development "  ("  Die  Theis- 
tische  Weltanschauung,"  Leipzig,  1873,  p.  225). 


142  ABSENT  CONDITIONS. 

structures  in  the  organism  which  could  not  result  from  restrict- 
ive or  privative  conditions — such  as  the  development  of  molars 
for  trituration  in  animals  having  a  digestive  apparatus  suited  to 
a  vegetable  diet ;  or  elongated  and  prehensile  organs,  as  in  the 
giraffe  and  the  proboscideans,  where  the  food  is  not  attainable 
with  the  ordinary  structure ;  or  legs  and  lungs  in  aquatic  em- 
bryos developing  for  terrestrial  life,  where  the  influence  of  the 
environment,  if  any  were  conceivable,  would  be  exerted  against 
the  development  of  the  organ.  A  triturating  molar,  an  elon- 
gated tongue  or  snout,  an  unused  pair  of  lungs  growing  in  the 
water — these  are  not  developments  arrested  by  external  condi- 
tions, but  developments  invited  by  external  conditions,  actual 
or  future,  and  pushed  forward  by  some  force  acting  in  the  or- 
ganism, and  acting  with  a  discernment  of  the  character  of  the 
environment,  either  actual  or  future.  Thus  the  environment 
exerts  no  efficiency  whatever.  It  may  condition  in  two  ways, 
by  limitation  and  by  solicitation;  while,  in  some  cases,  the 
structure  is  in  anticipation  of  environment,  though  in  these 
cases  as  truly  conditioned  by  environment  as  in  any  other  case. 
But  all  cases  of  conditioning  environment  are  alike  in  failing 
to  yield  the  evidence  of  efficient  causation,  even  of  the  second- 
ary kind.  This  critique  is  equally  applicable  to  the  doctrine 
of  progressive  improvement  of  animal  life  in  geological  time, 
conceived  as  the  product  of  the  improving  conditions  of  the 
world. 

2.   Subjective  Condition  mistaken  for  Efficiency. 

Here  that  which  is  a  motive,  or  final  cause,  determining  a 
method  of  activity,  is  mistaken  for  a  necessary  mode  of  exist- 
ence, growing  out  of  the  assumed  efficiency  of  secondary  causes. 
One  of  the  explanations  of  the  fact  of  a  method  of  evolution 
in  nature  falls  under  this  head.  That  a  method  of  evolution 
prevails  can  not,  I  think,  be  successfully  disputed.  It  has 
been  remarked  by  scientists  since  the  times  of  Leibnitz,  La- 


EVOLUTION  IN  THE  WORLD.  143 

place,  and  Von  Baer;  by  sociologists  from  Plutarch  to  Comte 
and  Buckle  and  Spencer ;  by  theologians  from  St.  Clement  to 
modern  thinkers.  Some  have  attempted  to  explain  evolution 
as  an  issue  emerging,  in  every  case,  from  some  necessary  rela- 
tions of  matter  and  the  material  forces.  But  evolution  is  a 
manifestation  of  order.  Evolution  implies  foresight  of  an  end 
involved  in  a  beginning.  It  is  a  predetermined  and  perma- 
nent modality  or  mode  of  efficiency.  A  predetermined  mode  of 
action  impresses  intentionality.  The  method  of  evolution  is  a 
subjective  condition.  It  conditions  effectuation ;  but  it  does 
not  effectuate.^) 

A  general  method  of  evolution,  in  a  world  full  of  differen- 
tiated sections  of  existence,  implies  various  aspects  of  evolu- 
tionary manifestation  and  agency.  There  must  be  evolution  in 
the  cosmos ;  evolution  of  continents  and  seas ;  evolution  of  life 
and  organic  types ;  evolution  of  individuals ;  evolution  of  civ- 
ilization ;  evolution  of  systems  of  education  and  of  religion. 
Everywhere  must  be  a  procedure,  as  Spencer  phrases  it,  from 
the  more  homogeneous  to  the  more  heterogeneous.  Different 
forms  of  force  or  modes  of  energy  must  be  manifest  under  the 
different  circumstances.  In  the  cosmos,  speaking  after  the 
usual  fashion,  mechanical  forces  may  suffice ;  in  determining 
the  succession  of  organic  forms  in  the  individual,  in  the  race, 
or  in  the  world,  physiological  forces  may  be  instrumental ;  in 
sociology,  education,  and  science,  the  force  of  ideas,  variously 
conditioned,  may  effectuate  the  orderly  advance  ;  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  life,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  any  thing  short  of 
immediate  creative  power,  since  between  life  and  not -life,  or 
between  life  and  matter,  is  an  incongruity  which  secondary 
causation  is  incompetent  to  bridge  over.(a) 

(J)  "  The  whole  process  of  evolution  is  the  manifestation  of  a  power  ab- 
solutely inscrutable  to  the  intellect  of  man"  (Tyndall,  "Belfast  Address," 
Appletons'  ed.,  p.  91). 

(2)  "  If  we  look  at  matter  as  pictured  by  Democritus,  and  as  defined  for 

7 


144  EVOLUTION  MODAL,  NOT  CAUSAL. 

But,  admitting  the  reality  of  secondary  efficiency  proceeding 
from  the  material  forms  which  constitute  or  environ  the  evolu- 
tionary series,  I  have  shown  that  this  implies  primary  causal- 
ity and  all  which  that  concept  incloses.  If  gravitation,  and 
centrifugal  force,  and  thermal  exchanges  are  the  intermedia  of 
cosmic  differentiations,  there  is  a  supreme  Master  whose  will 
they  administer.  If  inheritance,  effectuated  through  physiolog- 
ical forces,  results  in  specific  deviations  and  race  improvements, 
these  are  not  the  results  of  the  law  of  heredity,  since  that  law, 
like  all  others,  marks  only  a  rule  of  action  ordained  by  a  com- 
petent lawmaker.  If  the  principle,  or,  more  properly,  the  mode, 
designated  as  the  "  survival  of  the  fittest " — which  is  only  an- 
other phrase  for  "  natural  selection  "  and  "  sexual  selection  " — 
results  in  a  slow  improvement  of  the  species,  this  is  not  because 
a  mode  effectuates  any  thing.  The  forces  of  life  are  the  posi- 
tive agents,  and  whatever  subject  controls  these  is  the  real  cause 
of  specific  advance.  And  so,  if  successive  acquisitions  of  ideas 
lead  to  the  unfolding  of  more  complicated  and  more  advanced 
social  systems,  these  ideas  are  but  agencies  employed  by  In- 
telligence which  has  contemplated  ends  concealed  from  every 
finite  mind.  As  before  intimated,  however,  I  prefer  to  regard 
Supreme  Intelligence  as  acting  without  intervention.  In  the 
evolution  of  life's  beginnings,  I  again  insist,  no  other  concep- 
tion is  rationally  possible.  This  is  affirmed  by  Darwin  and 
Huxley ;  and  still  more  explicitly  by  the  majority  of  those  who 
hold  to  the  derivation  of  species,  and  the  general  doctrine  of 
evolution. 

In  the  same  category  belong  certain  explanations  offered  of 

generations  in  our  scientific  text-books,  the  notion  of  any  form  of  life 
whatever  coming  out  of  it  is  utterly  unimaginable  "  (Tyndall,  "Belfast  Ad- 
dress," Appletons'  ed.,  p.  87).  "  Considered  fundamentally,  then,  it  is  by 
the  operation  of  an  insoluble  mystery  that  life  on  earth  is  evolved,  species 
differentiated,  and  mind  unfolded  from  their  prepotent  elements  in  the  im- 
measurable past"  (?'£>.,  p.  91). 


PHYSIOLOGICAL  CONDITIONS  NOT  CAUSAL.          145 

homological  and  teleological  relations  in  the  natural  world ;  but 
I  reserve  my  critique  for  a  fuller  discussion. 

3.  Objective  Condition  mistaken  for  Efficiency. 

The  universally  recognized  influence  of  physiological  condi- 
tions on  the  psychical  activities  has  led  some  thinkers  to  the 
extent  of  assigning  these  conditions  to  the  position  of  cause  of 
psychical  activities.  Thus,  the  body  is  the  basis  of  mental  phe- 
nomena, and  mind  is  a  figment.  In  reasoning  against  this  view, 
I  desire  to  say,  in  limine,  that  the  theory  annihilates  both  soul 
and  immortality,  and  thus  wars  against  the  intuitions  of  hu- 
manity. This  has  always  been  a  warfare  of  a  hopeless  kind. 
Next,  the  theory  violates  the  principle  of  congruity.  Unless 
the  body  is  a  voluntary  actor,  we  have  matter,  as  secondary 
cause,  producing  thought.  This,  as  Tyndall  insists,  is  incon- 
ceivable.(')  Obviously,  bodily  matter  is  only  an  objective  con- 
dition of  the  permissive  or  privative  variety.  In  the  order  of 
human  nature,  thought  and  will  are  manifest  only  through  cer- 
tain states  of  matter.  The  manifestation  must  be  co-ordinated 
to  the  degree  of  permission.  Nothing  further  needs  to  be  said. 

The  "  unconscious  cerebration  "  of  Carpenter  is  a  material- 
istic phrase  which  seems  to  imply  that  brain  is  capable  of  elab- 
orating thought  during  our  periods  of  unconsciousness.  Yet 
this  interpretation  is  contrary  to  the  positive  tenor  of  Dr.  Car- 
penter's teaching.  By  "  unconscious  cerebration  "  he  means 
exactly  the  same  thing  as  Sir  William  Hamilton  means  by 
"  unconscious  mental  states  "  or  "  mental  latency  ;"(2)  and  this 

(J)  "When  we  endeavor  to  pass  *  *  *  from  the  phenomena  of  physics 
to  those  of  thought,  we  meet  a  problem  which  transcends  any  conceivable 
expansion  of  the  powers  we  now  possess  "  (Preface  to  the  seventh  ed.  of 
"  Belfast  Address,"  Appletons'  ed.,  p.  28).  "  The  passage  from  the  phys- 
ics of  the  brain  to  the  corresponding  facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinka- 
ble" ("Scientific  Materialism,"  Appletons'  ed.,  p.  117). 

(a)  Hamilton,  "  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,"  Lect.  XVIII. 


146  ENVIRONMENT  A  PERMISSIVE  CONDITION. 

means  that  the  mind  continues  to  act  during  suspended  con- 
sciousness, as  in  sleep  ;  and  sometimes  elaborates  conclusions 
whose  processes  have  escaped  our  notice.  "  Unconscious  cere- 
bration "  of  thought,  in  the  literal  sense,  is  a  hypothesis  ame- 
nable to  all  the  objections  just  urged  against  the  physiological 
causation  of  thought.  It  is  the  same  thing. 

I  should  add  that  the  environment  of  organic  forms,  which 
plays  so  conspicuous  a  role  in  Lamarckian  and  Darwinian  the- 
ories, seems  sometimes  to  stand  in  the  relation  of  an  objective 
condition  of  the  permissive  variety.  For  instance,  the  exist- 
ence of  shell-bearing  mollusks  is  permitted  only  by  the  exist- 
ence of  lime -yielding  water.  The  growth  of  trees  requiring 
silica  in  their  constitution  is  possible  only  in  soils  affording 
silica;  as  a  hundred  other  requirements  or  conditions  of  or- 
ganic existence  must  be  answered  before  each  particular  form 
of  existence  is  permitted.  Now,  what  have  these  permissive 
conditions  to  do  with  efficient  causation  ?  Obviously,  the  cause 
of  whatever  does  grow  acts  in  the  organism,  and  co-ordinates 
its  action  to  the  external  conditions.  Efficiency  implies  will, 
which  includes  intelligence ;  and  co-ordination  also  implies  in- 
telligence. Hence  the  assertion  that  a  forest  of  pines  is  caused 
by  a  sandy  soil  is  the  acme  of  the  illogical. 

4.  Instrumental  Relation  mistaken  for  Cause. 

I  have  made  allusion  to  a  class  of  organic  structures  devel- 
oped in  antagonism  to  the  environment,  and  hence,  by  no  pos- 
sibility, its  product.  It  seems  to  be  considered  by  some  Dar- 
winists a  sufficient  explanation  of  this  phenomenon,  that  the  or- 
ganization is  hereditary.  The  branchiae  of  the  tadpole  do  not 
disappear,  and  the  lungs  develop,  during  aquatic  life,  through 
the  influence  of  the  surroundings,  but  in  obedience  to  the  law 
of  heredity.  Well,  this  means  that  our  tadpole  acquires  lungs 
at  the  same  time  that  it  must  use  gills,  because  its  ancestors 
did  this.  But  how  did  its  ancestors  get  this  peculiarity  to 


HEREDITY  MODAL,  NOT  CAUSAL.  147 

transmit  ?  Did  they  acquire  lungs  in  the  water  through  the  in- 
fluence of  the  environment  ?  Oh  no ;  it  was  a  hereditary  tend- 
ency with  them  also.  But  go  back  a  hundred  generations,  or 
a  thousand ;  go  back  to  the  first  brood  of  tadpoles — there  must 
have  been  a  first  brood — was  there  any  hereditary  tendency  in 
them  ?  It  seems  to  me,  to  whatever  distance  we  remove  the 
acquisition  of  this  hereditary  tendency,  we  must  necessarily 
recognize  a  beginning,  at  which  air-breathing  organs  were  ac- 
quired in  the  water  without  the  impulse  of  heredity .  We  may 
conceive  the  amphibian  characteristics  to  have  been  gradually 
assumed ;  but  always,  just  in  the  same  degree  as  amphibian 
characteristics  began  to  develop,  they  began  without  the  influ- 
ence of  heredity.  The  organic  differential  could  never  be  so 
small  as  to  elude  the  necessity  of  a  causal  influence,  which  the 
unfriendly  element  could  not  exert,  and  which,  as  each  differ- 
ential came  first  into  existence,  heredity  could  not  be  summon- 
ed to  explain.  In  the  several  increments  of  its  origin,  the  am- 
phibian character  was  necessarily  independent  of  heredity ;  in 
its  integral  development,  therefore,  heredity  has  nothing  to  do. 
The  lungs  of  the  tadpole  can  not  be  ascribed  to  the  environ- 
ment, whether  we  seek  for  its  influence  upon  the  individual  or 
upon  the  species;  and  when  we  trace  the  increments  of  the 
organism,  severally,  back  to  their  inception,  the  influence  of 
heredity  is  excluded  by  hypothesis.  We  demand  some  cause 
which  can  originate  a  differential  character  de  novo — independ- 
ently of  heredity  and  in  opposition  to  the  influence  of  surround- 
ings— and,  what  is  most  significant  of  all,  in  anticipation  of  an 
environment  which,  in  the  animal's  plan  of  life,  will  surround 
it  at  maturity.  Heredity  is  but  an  instrument  through  which 
a  needful  organism  is  brought  into  existence,  in  spite  of  ad- 
verse influences,  by  some  efficient  cause  capable  of  discerning 
physical  adaptations,  and  realizing  them  in  a  manner  conform- 
able to  general  plans. 


148  "ORGANIZED  EXPERIENCES"  IMAGINARY. 

5.  Cause  arbitrarily  assumed. 

Here  I  would  class  Mr.  Spencer's  doctrine  of  "  organized  ex- 
periences." By  this  phrase  he  means  that  those  necessary 
ideas,  notions,  beliefs,  which  I  have  shown  to  be  innate,  and 
which  only  a  small  school  of  empiricists  can  recognize  as 
growth  within  the  individual,  are  the  result  of  a  slow  growth 
within  the  race.  Now,  first  of  all,  such  an  acquirement,  if  it 
were  such,  would  not  be  comparable  with  the  inherited  dispo- 
sition of  the  pointer  and  setter,  among  dogs,  since  the  latter  is 
a  case  of  complete  transmission  in  a  single  generation,  and  not 
a  gradually  accumulated  inheritance.  Secondly,  if  these  nec- 
essary concepts  were  gradually  accumulated  and  strengthened, 
as  the  theory  implies,  they  would  be  of  different  degrees  of 
strength  and  clearness  in  individuals  or  races  reared  under  dif- 
ferent conditions.  But  no  such  disparity  exists ;  nor  is  there 
the  least  evidence  that  they  have  added  a  particle  to  their 
strength  since  the  date  of  earliest  traditions.  Thirdly,  the  hy- 
pothesis of  incrementation  violates  the  principle  of  heredity. 
Heredity  transmits  what  it  receives — nothing  more.  Heredity 
itself  declares  that  these  concepts  have  been  transmitted  from 
the  first  man;  and  that  declaration  I  accept,  fourthly,  the 
hypothesis  violates  the  principle  of  congruity.  The  forces  of 
heredity  are  physiological ;  the  concepts  which  Spencer  places 
at  interest  in  their  custody  are  ideas  of  the  reason.  "  Men  do 
not  gather  grapes  of  thorns,  nor  figs  of  thistles."  This  doctrine 
is  a  "  non  causa  pro  causa" 

Under  the  same  category  I  would  range  the  doctrine  of  abi- 
ogenesis,  restricting  the  term  to  the  generation  of  life  by  that 
which  is  non-life.  Have  we  not  learned  that  "like  begets 
like  ?"  This,  at  the  outset,  is  another  violation  of  the  princi- 
ple of  congruity ;  and  stands  forth  as  such  without  a  shred  of 
apology  to  cover  the  naked  absurdity  of  hurling  absolute  iner- 
tia into  the  chair  of  creative  efficiency. 


MATTER  CONCEIVED  AS  "GROSS."  149 

May  I  ask  you  to  note  particularly  the  force  of  the  terms 
which  I  employ  ?  In  this  discussion  I  always  conceive  of  mat- 
ter as  absolutely  inert — "  gross  " — "  brute  " — a  different  matter 
from  that  pangenetic  entity  in  which  Professor  Tyndall  sees 
every  thing  in  potentiality.  If  we  conceive  matter  self-efficient, 
or  exerting  a  delegated  efficiency,  we  can  conceive  it  the  cause, 
primary  or  mediate,  of  physical  effects ;  but  life  is  an  entity 
which  has  nothing  in  common  with  matter ;  and,  though  it 
may  be  revealed  in  forms  of  matter  styled  organic,  its  com- 
mencement demands  a  cause  generically  differentiated  from 
matter.  This  is  not  to  assert  that  the  cause  of  life  acts  invari- 
ably through  a  pre-existent  germ.  The  rule  does  not  preclude 
exceptions.  We  all  believe,  in  fact,  that  life  upon  the  earth 
has  descended  from  one  or  many  absolute  beginnings.  If  life 
has  been  once  or  more  introduced  without  the  intervention  of 
germs,  it  may  have  been  so  introduced  in  a  myriad  instances, 
running  down  to  yesterday.  But  to  conceive  the  potency  of 
life  shut  up  in  matter  is  either  to  wander  from  the  accepted 
signification  of  the  term,  or  to  confound  simple  material  con- 
comitance with  efficient  causation. 

The  views  which  have  opened  before  me  during  the  progress 
of  these  discussions  have  rolled  forth  with  a  copiousness  by 
which  I  have  felt  embarrassed.  Would  that  I  had  conceived 
them  with  clearer  eyes,  and  phrased  them  with  more  expressive 
words !  I  thought,  when  I  assigned  two  lectures  to  the  discus- 
sion of  the  doctrine  of  causality,  I  should  be  able  to  exhaust 
the  well  of  my  deepest  convictions,  and  give  ample  attention 
to  those  views,  sometimes  attributed  to  science,  which  impinge 
against  the  eternal  principles  of  truth  revealed  in  human  rea- 
son. But  I  have  only  given  you  the  conspectus  of  a  discus- 
sion. I  have  lifted  the  veil ;  I  have  afforded  a  glimpse  within 
the  adytum  of  truth ;  I  can  do  no  more.  I  beg  you  to  rend 
the  veil  with  your  own  hand ;  enter  and  commune. 


YI. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  INTENTIONALITY. 

IN  my  fourth  lecture  I  stated,  in  effect,  that  faith  in  God 
may  be  based  on — 

I.  The  feeling  or  intuition  of  his  existence. 

II.  The  knowledge  of  his  existence. 

This  knowledge  I  stated  to  be  attainable  in  various  ways, 
among  which  are — 

1.  The  common  consent  of  mankind. 

2.  The  intuition  of  causality  (^Etiological). 

3.  The  evidence  of  intentionality  in  nature  (Teleological). 
It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  attempt  to  develop  the 

ideas  inclosed  in  the  necessary  concept  of  original  causality,  I 
enunciated  intentionality  as  one  of  them  ;  and  pointed  out  the 
fact  that  in  every  effect  where  intention  is  manifest,  mind  is 
implied.  I  also  reminded  you  that  the  world  is  full  of  in- 
stances of  intentionality,  since  it  is  full  of  facts  of  co-ordina- 
tion, which  we  necessarily  apprehend  as  the  result  of  intention. 

Now,  the  intentionality  of  which  I  am  to  speak  in  particular 
is  not  that  of  which  we  become  convinced  in  viewing  the  world 
simply  as  an  effect.  The  mere  fact  of  simple  causation  does 
evince  intentionality;  but  the  fact  of  co-ordination  of  effects 
evinces  reflective  intentionality.  It  yields  additional  evidence 
of  the  activity  of  mind.  It  is  this  stronger  evidence  to  which 
I  invite  your  attention. 

Philosophically  speaking,  it  is  not  necessary  to  spread  before 
you  an  extended  array  of  examples.  If  that  primitive  judg- 
ment is  valid  by  which  we  deduce  intelligence  from  correlation, 
then  the  discovery  of  a  single  instance  of  correlation  in  all  the 


INTUITION  OF  INTENTIONALITY.  151 

universe  makes  just  as  strong  a  case  in  defense  of  theism  as 
the  production  of  a  hundred  instances.  The  battle-ground,  in 
these  times,  is  on  the  threshold  of  the  teleological  argument. 
Nescience  meets  us  at  the  door,  and  attempts  to  bar  us  com- 
pletely upon  the  outside.  It  proposes  to  invalidate  the  very 
basal  proposition  which  lies  deeper  than  Socrates,  or  Galileo, 
or  Butler,  or  Paley  ever  explored — unconscious  as  they  were 
that  all  their  reasoning  assumed  an  antecedent  truth  which 
could  be  challenged.  The  prior  proposition  of  teleology  is 
the  affirmation  that  intelligence  is  implied  in  intelligible  corre- 
lations. 

The  general  tenor  of  my  last  two  lectures  is  an  argument 
which  may  be  applied  to  the  support  of  this  proposition.  For 
this  reason,  I  shall  not  enter  here  upon  any  preliminary  dis- 
cussion. I  need  only  remind  you  that  the  truth  of  this  propo- 
sition is  revealed  in  the  universal  reason  of  humanity — like  the 
truth  of  the  axioms  of  geometry ;  that,  being  a  simple  truth, 
a  first  step  in  reasoning,  there  are  no  steps  by  which  it  is  possi- 
ble to  reach  it  with  an  argument ;  that,  in  the  sphere  of  human 
affairs,  its  validity  has  never  been  questioned,  and  that,  in  the 
realm  of  nature,  its  invalidity  is  only  the  recent  claim  of  a  lim- 
ited number  of  thinkers;  that  even  these  do  not  assert  its  inva- 
lidity, but  only  its  possible  invalidity,  since  the  effects  which 
we  observe  in  the  natural  world  emanate  from  a  source  which 
entirely  transcends  our  apprehensions ;  and  that  these  thinkers, 
nevertheless,  generally  incline  to  recognize  the  world  as  the 
product  of  intelligence  akin  to  our  own,  while  they  regard  it 
most  becoming  to  science  and  philosophy  to  restrict  themselves 
to  the  phenomena  of  the  finite.  I  remind  you,  lastly,  that  this 
intuition  is  one  which  takes  no  cognizance  of  the  distinction 
between  finite  and  infinite;  but  renders  its  testimony  as  em- 
phatically and  unreservedly  when  it  interprets  a  phenomenon 
in  the  natural  world  as  when  it  enters  the  shop  of  an  artisan ; 
that  the  impeachment  of  the  authority  of  this  intuition  is  an 

7* 


152  VSE  OF  NUMEROUS  INSTANCES. 

• 

implied  impeachment  of  all,  and  the  logical  result  is,  to  precip- 
itate man  into  a  wilderness  of  misleading  and  Fichtean  unreali- 
ties— a  very  insanity  of  philosophy. 

This  is  the  skeleton  of  a  treatment  of  the  fundamental  ques- 
tion, which  has  been  incidentally  filled  out,  in  parts,  in  the 
progress  of  the  last  two  lectures,  and  the  full  development  of 
which  must  satisfy  the  most  exacting  of  the  validity  of  the 
basis  of  the  teleological  argument. 

Though  one  instance  of  design  is  as  good  as  a  hundred  in 
fixing  a  philosophical  conviction,  it  is  not  as  good  as  a  hun- 
dred in  moving  the  religious  nature.  There  are  two  avenues  to 
religious  conviction;  one  is  the  rational,  the  other  the  emo- 
tional. Both  are  excellent  ways;  but  some  are  too  feeble  to 
pursue  the  rational,  while  others  are  too  proud  to  pursue  the 
emotional.  Both  roads  converge  at  the  same  end,  and  the 
Judge  who  sits  there  never  asks  the  individual  by  what  route 
he  has  traveled.  Now,  while  a  display  of  the  economy  of  nat- 
ure is  not  purely  an  appeal  to  the  emotional,  like  the  effort  of 
the  religious  exhorter,  it  is  partly  so.  Every  one  is  aware  of 
awakened  emotions  in  contemplating  nature.  These  spring 
not  simply  from  the  beauty,  or  sublimity,  or  complexity,  or 
vastness  of  nature;  but  there  is  irresistibly  mingled  with  the 
sentiments  which  these  characteristics  awaken,  a  feeling  of 
reverence  and  awe,  in  view  of  the  manifestation  of  God.  And 
can  it  be  that  the  instinct  is  illusory  which  so  quietly,  so 
universally,  and  so  instantly  ascends  from  the  harmonies  and 
grandeur  of  the  world  to  an  adequate  Author  of  these  mani- 
festations, already  revealed  in  the  soul?  No.  The  very  emo- 
tions, then,  which  the  contemplation  of  nature  awakens  imply 
the  truth  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  teleology.  But  be- 
cause the  wonders  of  the  universe  awaken  emotions — religious 
emotions — the  multiplication  of  instances  may  strengthen  a 
religious  nature  which  never  dreams  of  the  philosophic  expla- 
nation of  its  emotions,  and  is  innocent  of  the  possibility  of  re- 


MECHANICAL  CORRELATIONS.  153 

flective  doubt.  More  than  this,  it  may  turn  the  balance  in  a 
noble  mind,  in  which  religious  faith  is  beginning  to  cower  be- 
fore the  arrogant  demeanor  of  a  vigorous  intellect. 

The  correlations  discoverable  in  nature  may,  I  think,  be  all 
embraced  under  two  general  heads:  MECHANICAL  CORRELA- 
TIONS and  MODAL  CORRELATIONS.  The  former  are  coadapta- 
tions  of  parts  of  a  structure  intended  for  action ;  they  imply 
contrivance,  by  which  the  principles  of  mechanics  are  made  op- 
erative and  effective  in  forms  shaped  and  coadjusted  in  the  req- 
uisite manner.  The  parts  thus  become  either  instruments  or 
the  constituents  of  a  machinery.  Such  are  the  chiseling  beak 
of  the  woodpecker,  the  climbing  beak  of  the  parrot,  and  the 
straining  beak  of  the  duck.  Such  are  the  muscles  which  ex- 
tend and  flex  the  forearm,  and  that  admirable  bony  and  liga- 
mentous  structure  which  gives  breadth  and  prehensile  power 
and  marvelous  dexterity  to  the  human  hand.  But  there  is  an- 
other concept  which  coexists  with  that  of  contrivance  in  every 
instance  of  natural  mechanism.  The  mechanism  subserves  some 
objective  end.  It  generally  subserves  utility  or  beauty.  The 
sufficient  reason  for  its  existence  is  not  subjective  in  the  de- 
signer, but  objective  in  some  sentient  being  whose  happiness 
is  promoted  by  it.  It  might  still  be  a  mechanism  demonstra- 
tive of  intelligence,  if  it  sustained  no  relation  to  the  happiness 
of  sentient  beings — the  sufficient  reason  for  its  existence  resid- 
ing in  the  consciousness  of  the  designer.  I  mention  the  rela- 
tion of  utility  only  as  an  objective  fact,  not  as  a  necessary  cor- 
relation of  contrivance.  It  enhances,  however,  the  significance 
of  the  contrivance  to  find  not  only  its  parts  adapted  to  each 
other,  but  the  whole  adapted  to  utility.  As  a  mechanism,  it 
implies  intelligence ;  as  a  useful  mechanism,  it  implies  intelli- 
gence twice-told. 

Modal  correlations  are  coadaptations  of  parts  or  wholes  in 
conformity  to  plan.  They  imply,  1st,  the  conception  of  a 
plan;  2d,  the  ordering  of  effects  so  as  to  give  expression  to 


154  MODAL  CORRELATIONS. 

the  plan.  Plans  in  nature  are  as  various  as  the  fields  in  which 
effects  are  displayed.  We  recognize  them  in  the  organization 
of  the  body  of  man,  in  that  of  each  of  the  types  of  animals, 
and  in  the  general  conception  of  an  animal  at  large.*  We  rec- 
ognize them  in  the  correlation  of  the  intellectual  faculties,  in 
the  moral  faculties,  in  the  voluntary  faculties,  and  in  the  in- 
teractivities of  all  the  faculties.  We  recognize  plan  in  the  sys- 
tem of  correlations  between  the  psychic  and  bodily  natures; 
we  discern  it  in  the  structure  of  the  solar  system,  in  the  geo- 
logical history  of  the  world,  in  the  interaction  of  the  physical 
forces,  and  in  the  progressive  changes  of  the  cosmos  as  a  whole 
and  in  its  parts.  We  discover  plan  in  the  disengagement  of 
results  through  the  method  of  evolution,  and  in  the  subordi- 
nation and  action  of  the  various  agencies  employed  by  the 
Prime  Evolver  in  working  the  plan — be  those  agencies  physical 
forces,  heredity,  natural  selection,  sexual  selection,  hybridity, 
prolonged  gestation,  accelerated  or  retarded  development  of  the 
embryo,  occasional  extraordinary  births,  parthenogenesis,  influ- 
ence of  the  environment,  or  an  inherent  conative  quality  of  nat- 
ure.^) Each  of  these  agencies,  or  systems  of  instrumental  ef- 
fectuation, has  been  set  forth  as  operative,  more  or  less,  in  the 
evolution  of  organic  series.  I  believe  them  all  influential.  I 
believe  the  tendency  of  each  of  these  agencies  may  be,  gen- 
erally, toward  the  evolutionary  result.  But  I  recognize  each 
system  of  agencies  operated  according  to  a  method  which  reg- 
ulates its  particular  activities;  and,  most  of  all,  I  recognize 
higher  plan  in  the  thoughtful  convergence  of  all  these  thought- 
elaborated  systems  toward  one  harmonious,  homogeneous  re- 
sult— evolution.  Evolution  is  the  method  of  methods ;  and  is 


(*)  In  a  little  work  entitled  "  The  Doctrine  of  Evolution,"  the  present 
writer  has  endeavored  to  give  a  popular  exposition  of  the  general  subject, 
and  of  the  various  opinions  entertained  respecting  the  Causes  of  the  as- 
sumed derivation  of  species. 


PLAN  AND  END.  155 

one  of  the  strongest  possible  attestations  of  the  dominion  of 
thought  in  the  universe.  Evolution  in  itself,  however,  is  only 
a  method  of  effectuation.  It  implies,  1st,  a  Designer  of  the 
method ;  2d,  an  Operator  of  the  method.  Evolution  possess- 
es no  efficiency.  He  who  contents  himself  with  discovering 
this  method  in  nature  contributes  nothing  to  the  philosophy 
of  causality.  He  leads  us  along  the  rills  of  phenomena,  but 
only  tantalizes  the  innate  thirst  to  drink  from  the  fountain  of 
truth.C) 

In  historical  order,  the  recognition  and  study  of  mechanical 
correlations  long  preceded  the  recognition  of  modal  correla- 
tions. The  former  were  styled  teleological,  as  they  disclosed 
an  end,  which  seemed  to  be  sought  by  a  designer.  Modal  cor- 
relations also  disclose  conformity  to  plan  as  an  end  to  be 
sought ;  and  hence  may  also  be  styled  teleological.  But  the 
end  in  one  case  is  objective  utility  toward  sentient  beings ;  in 
the  other,  it  is  objective  conformity  to  a  subjective  concept. 
This  conformity  may,  at  the  same  time,  be  designed  for  a  use- 
ful end ;  and  thus,  even  the  dominance  of  plan  may  reveal  a 
characteristically  teleological  character.  But  the  distinction  be- 
tween mechanical  teleology  and  modal  is  so  clear  and  funda- 
mental, and  the  term  teleology  has  become  so  definitely  restrict- 
ed, by  long  usage,  to  the  mechanical  kind,  that  I  shall  employ 
another  term  to  express  modal  teleology.  In  the  comparative 

(!)  I  have  taken  great  pleasure  in  the  perusal  of  a  work  by  Kudolf 
Schmid,  Stadtpfarrer  in  Friedrichshafen,  entitled  "  Die  Darwin'schen  The- 
orien  und  ihre  Stellung  zur  Philosophie,  Religion  und  Moral,"  Stuttgart, 
1876,  in  which  the  complete  compatibility  of  the  derivative  hypothesis 
with  the  Christian  religion  is  intelligently  maintained.  Wigand's  earlier 
work  ("  Der  Darwinismus  und  die  Naturforschung  Newtons  und  Cuviers, 
Beitrage  zur  Methodik  der  Naturforschung  und  zur  Speciesfrage,"  2  Bd., 
Braunschweig,  1874-1876)  assumes,  in  this  respect,  a  similar  position.  See, 
also,  K.  E.  Von  Baer,  "  Studien  aus  dem  Gebiet  der  Naturwissenschaf  ten," 
St.  Petersburg,  1876,  containing  two  papers  on  Teleology  and  one  on  Dar- 
winism.- 


156  HOMOL OGT  S UBSER VES  TELEOL OGY. 

study  of  organic  structures,  those  which  are  built  upon  a  com- 
mon plan  are  said  to  be  homologous.  Thus  nails,  hollow  horns, 
hoofs,  and  hair  are  homologous,  because  equally  outgrowths 
from  the  dermis.  Transferring  the  term  to  this  discussion,  ho- 
mology  is  the  doctrine  that  PLAN  implies  intelligence;  while 
teleology  is  the  doctrine  that  CONTRIVANCE  implies  intelli- 
gence. 

The  theologians  of  a  recent  period  were  reluctant  to  admit 
the  existence  of  plans  and  archetypes,  through  fear  that  they 
might  be  incompatible  with  the  doctrine  of  ends,  so  clearly  sub- 
stantiated. The  execution  of  the  plan  might  be  claimed  as 
the  sole  end.  But  we  have  learned  that  the  intervention  of 
the  homological  plan  is  the  quickest  way  to  the  teleological  end. 
Homology  supervenes  on  teleology.  The  two  always  co-exist. 
No  useful  design  is  realized  except  in  subordination  to  a  gen- 
eral method.  The  existence  of  the  method  does  not  nullify 
the  end  which  it  subserves ;  it  sheds  a  light  upon  it  and  en- 
hances its  meaning.  Moreover,  in  homological  relations  an  ob- 
jective end  is  discoverable,  sharply  distinct  from  the  teleolog- 
ical end,  though  co-existing  with  it.  This  is  the  influence  of 
intelligible  plan  upon  the  human  intelligence,  before  'which  it 
is  wrought  out.  This  might  be  termed  psychic  teleology,  in 
distinction  from  ordinary  mechanical  teleology.  Psychic  tele- 
ology is  further  distinguishable  into  noetic  (addressed  to  the 
intelligence)  and  sesthetic  (addressed  to  the  consciousness  of 
the  beautiful).  I  have  long  felt  convinced  that  the  revelations 
of  lofty  thought  and  all-penetrating  prescience,  with  which  the 
scheme  of  nature  is  enriched,  were  intended  to  stir  the  intellect 
of  man,  and  lift  it  up  toward  the  realities  which  transcend  the 
sphere  of  sense.  "  God  geometrizes,"  says  Plato,  beautifully 
and  truthfully.  Let  us  strive  to  think  the  thoughts  of  God. 
Not  less  have  I  been  convinced  that  the  beautiful  in  nature  has 
a  teleological  meaning.  It  implies  man  fore-ordained ;  it  im- 
plies sesthetic  cognition  and  sesthetic  susceptibility ;  and  pur- 


HOMOL OGY  SECURED  THRO  UGH  HEREDITY.         157 

poses  by  the  exercise  of  this  order  of  faculties  to  multiply  the 
sources  of  happiness. 

The  doctrine  of  homology  in  organic  structures,  after  having 
enjoyed  great  favor  from  the  time  of  Goethe  to  Richard  Owen, 
has  fallen,  like  teleology,  into  a  degree  of  disfavor  with  a  cer- 
tain class  of  anatomists,  who  think  the  principle  of  heredity  is 
sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  affiliations  of  structure  which 
group  forms  together  under  the  shadow  of  one  plan.  Now,  let 
us  open  the  way  for  heredity,  by  all  means.  It  is  one  of  the 
intelligible  instrumentalities  by  which  Intelligence  effectuates 
the  objectization  of  plans.  If  animals  belonging  to  different 
species,  genera,  or  orders  exemplify  an  identical  plan  of  struct- 
ure, and  it  can  be  shown  that  they  have  descended  from  a  com- 
mon ancestry,  then  all  hail  heredity !  We  have  discovered  the 
method  and  agency  by  which  directive  Intelligence  transmits 
and  perpetuates  the  objective  expression  of  its  conceptions. 
But,  let  it  be  observed,  first,  that  this  conclusion  must  be  based 
on  discovery,  and  not  on  conjecture  ;  and,  secondly,  that  the  dis- 
covery will  not  be  the  disclosure  of  efficiency,  but  only  of  the 
mode  of  activity  of  efficiency.  Heredity  accounts  for  nothing ; 
it  is  only  the  objective  condition  of  resemblances  in  structure. 

The  theological  uses  of  teleology  have  been  almost  exhaust- 
ively worked  out  by  Paley.(')  He  has,  indeed,  employed  but  a 
limited  number  of  instances  of  design  in  nature,  and  has  fol- 
lowed in  the  path  blazed  out  by  Socrates  and  Xenophon  twen- 
ty-three centuries  since;  but  he  has  selected  admirable  and 
fruitful  examples,  and  has  pressed  them  on  this  side  and  that, 
until  it  is  impossible  to  extract  further  meaning  from  them,  or 
from  any  other  example  of  the  teleological  class.  Since  Pa- 
ley's  time,  however,  the  extension  of  our  knowledge  of  organic 

(')  The  design  revealed  in  the  structure  of  the  human  body  was  gone 
over  with  singular  fullness  and  elaborateness  by  Lactantius  in  his  book  on 
the  "  Workmanship  of  God,  or  the  Formation  of  Man." 


158  TELEOLOOICAL  WRITERS. 

structures,  particularly  the  lower  forms  of  animals,  has  vastly 
enriched  the  treasury  of  examples  to  select  from ;  and  Bell,^) 
Owen,(2)  Balfour,(3)  Clark,(4)  Chadbourne(5)  and  many  others, 
not  omitting  Cooke,(6)  in  chemistry,  have  supplemented  the 
archdeacon's  imperishable  labors;  while  in  the  field  of  astron- 
omy, Chalmers(7)  and  Mitchel(8)  have  continued  the  work  be- 
gun by  Galileo,  and  Kepler,  and  Newton. (9)  In  the  science  of 
geology,  new  facts  and  new  views  have  shown  to  how  large  an 
extent  the  physical  and  organic  changes  of  the  world  have  con- 
stituted a  preparation  for  man. 

The  field  of  homological  correlations,  for  reasons  already  in- 
dicated, has  been  less  worked  in  the  interests  of  theology,  though 
Dr.  M'Cosh  has  ably  broken  the  ground.(10)  I  therefore  invite 
your  attention  to  a  few  illustrative  examples. 

(')  "  Bridgewater  Treatise." 

(2)  Exeter  Hall  Lecture :  "  The  Power  of  God  in  his  Animal  Creation." 

(3)  "  The  Religion  of  Botany." 

(4)  "  Mind  in  Nature." 

(5)  "  Lectures  on  Natural  Theology." 

(6)  "  Religion  and  Chemistry." 

(7)  "Natural  Theology,"  vol.  i.,  book  ii.,  chap.  iii. :  "A  Series  of  Dis- 
courses on  the  Christian  Revelation,  viewed  in  Connection  with  the  Mod- 
ern Astronomy." 

(8)  "The  Astronomy  of  the  Bible." 

(9)  Darwin  in  his  various  works  has  brought  together  a  large  fund  of 
instances  of  mechanical  and  modal  adaptations  in  the  organic  world. 

(10)  "  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,"  book  ii. ;  and  "  Typical  Forms 
and  Special  Ends  in  Creation."     The  theological  significance  of  homol- 
ogy  has  been  fully  appreciated  by  Richard  Owen  and  by  Louis  Agassiz, 
as  may  be  learned  from  many  of  their  writings.     See,  also,  Whewell, 
"Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sciences."     Older  writers  recognizing  the 
theological  bearing  of  homological  relations  of  things  are  Plato,  "  Leges," 
book  iv. ;  book  x.,  cap.  ix. ;  book  xii. ;  book  xiii.,  cap.  xiii. ;  Cicero,  "  De 
Natura  Deorum,"  lib.  ii.,  cap.  v.,  vli.,  xx.,  xxxii.,  xxxv.,  xliv. ;  Plutarch,  "  De 
Plac.,"  i.,  vi. ;  Samuel  Clark,  "  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attributes 
of  God ;"  Newton,  "  Optics."    Spinoza  says,  "  The  laws  of  nature  are  noth- 


DIVERSITY  OF  ANIMAL  HOMES.  159 

The  first  example  is  the  existence  of  fundamental  types  of 
animal  structure.  Cuvier,  and  most  naturalists  after  him, 
have  recognized  four — Vertebrates,  Articulates,  Mollusks,  and 
Radiates.  Whether,  as  some  believe,  more  than  these  should 
be  recognized,  or  not,  the  persistence  of  these,  from  the  dawn 
of  animal  life  upon  the  earth,  (')  is  a  fact  of  profound  signifi- 
cance. The  existing  world  affords  almost  an  infinitude  of  sit- 
uations for  the  occupancy  of  animal  forms.  It  is  one  of  the 
intelligible  economies  of  nature  to  populate  all  these  situations 
with  animal  life.  The  solid  land,  the  water,  and  the  air  teem 
with  tribes  innumerable.  The  grassy  plain,  the  reeking  jungle, 
the  gloomy  forest,  the  mountain  solitude,  the  wilderness  of 
rifted  granite  blocks — these  all  are  the  chosen  retreats  of  air- 
breathing  animals,  severally  correlated,  in  all  their  structures 
and  instincts,  to  their  diversified  habitats.  Not  alone  upon  the 
surface  of  the  earth  do  forms  of  life  declare  the  existence  of 
a  co-ordinating  intelligence.  The  woodchuck  burrows  in  the 
earth  to  find  a  place  of  shelter  and  protection ;  the  mole,  to 
abide  there.  The  beaver  resorts  to  the  water  for  safety  and 

ing  else  than  the  eternal  decrees -of  God ;"  and  similarly  K.  E.  Von  Baer : 
"  Die  Naturgesetze  sind  die  permanenten  Willensausserungen  eines  Schaf- 
fenden  Principes  "  (Studien,  p.  232) ;  and  Montesquieu  affirms,  "  Ceux  qui 
ont  dit  qu'une  Fatalite  aveugle  a  produit  tous  les  effets  que  nous  voyons 
dans  le  monde,  ont  dit  une  grande  absurdite ;  car  quelle  plus  grande  ab- 
surdite, qu'une  fatalite  aveugle  qui  aurait  produit  des  etres  intelligents  ?" 
(Those  who  have  declared  that  a  blind  necessity  has  produced  all  the  ef- 
fects which  we  see  in  the  world,  have  declared  a  grand  absurdity;  for 
what  greater  absurdity  than  a  blind  necessity  which  should  have  produced 
intelligent  beings?)  ("Esprit  des  Lois,"  L,  i.)  See,  also,  the  references 
under  "  Original  Causality  "  in  the  present  work. 

(')  I  do  not  ignore  the  Dawn-animal  (EoziJon),  which,  as  far  as  we  know, 
was  the  earliest  manifestation  of  life,  and  could  not  be  ranged  under  any 
one  of  the  four  types  named.  I  speak  generally,  and  conceive  the  dawn 
of  life  to  mean  the  appearance  of  the  teeming  populations  of  the  Silurian 
— the  first  great  age  of  animalization. 


160  EVERY  CONDITION  POPULATED. 

for  a  home ;  while  the  squirrel  seeks  his  in  the  tree.  Of  the 
water-breathing  tribes,  some  seek  fresh  water,  some  brackish, 
and  some  brine.  Some  thrive  best  in  cold  water;  some  in 
mild.  Certain  animals  are  confined  to  shallow  waters;  others 
retire  to  the  dim  and  quiet  depths  of  the  ocean.  Some  are 
fond  of  an  agitated  stream ;  others  loll  in  the  stagnant  pool. 
Of  those  which  inhabit  the  air,  some  discover  the  fitting  condi- 
tions near  the  town,  some  in  the  meadow,  some  in  the  forest, 
and  others  among  the  lightning -blasted  pines  which  cling  to 
the  dizzy  mountain-cliff.  Even  the  types  of  insects  are  found 
swarming  in  all  conceivable  situations — darting  like  a  beam  of 
light  through  the  air,  crawling  over  the  ground,  burrowing  be- 
neath the  bark  of  a  tree,  diving  under  the  water  or  dancing 
upon  its  surface,  fervid  with  activity  at  high  noon,  or  flitting 
among  crepuscular  shadows,  or  prowling  about  in  the  dead  of 
night.  And  thus,  in  respect  to  endurance  of  temperatures,  how 
varied  are  animal  natures !  From  the  heats  of  the  tropical 
plain  to  the  rigors  of  the  arctic  ice-floe ;  from  the  bee  hum- 
ming in  the  sunny  vale,  to  the  coleopter  skipping  upon  the 
surface  of  high  Alpine  glaciers;  from  the  infusorian  which 
withstands  the  temperature  of  boiling  water,  to  the  ovum  lodged 
in  a  crevice  upon  the  bark  of  a  tree,  and  resisting,  without 
injury,  the  piercing  frost  of  a  wintry  night — in  all  terrestrial 
temperatures,  as  in  all  conceivable  situations,  the  plan  of  ani- 
mal life  has  found  a  suitable  home  for  some  percipient  creat- 
ure to  dwell  in. 

And  yet  a  world  teeming  with  populations,  conformed  and 
adapted  to  situations  too  various  for  enumeration,  presents  us 
but  four,  or  at  most,  but  few,  fundamental  plans  of  animal 
structure.  Throughout  the  world — over  the  vast  stretch  of 
continents,  through  the  awful  depths  of  the  oceans  —  whatev- 
er the  emergencies,  however  extreme  the  situation,  the  scheme 
of  life  clings  to  the  few  types.  If  this  persistence  of  plan  is 
amazing,  what  shall  be  said  of  the  fact  that  the  same  plans 


PERSISTENCE  OF  PLANS.  161 

have  persisted  through  all  the  ages  of  the  habitable  world  — 
through  the  period  of  tepid  oceans  lashed  by  cyclic  storms; 
over  the  dripping  shores  just  emerging  from  the  briny  ooze ; 
under  the  shade  of  ferns  and  sigillarise  nurtured  by  a  carbon- 
laden  atmosphere,  and  reeking  with  the  moisture  of  a  conti- 
nental jungle ;  under  all  the  changing  phases  and  vicissitudes 
of  ever  -  widening  land -areas,  and  ever  -  shrinking  oceans,  and 
ever-upspringing  mountains,  and  ever -wasting  islands;  in  the 
progress  of  appearing  and  disappearing  populations;  extinc- 
tions of  species  and  genera  and  families ;  unfolding  of  compre- 
hensive types,  specialization  of  faunas,  and  gradual  approxima- 
tion to  a  fitness  for  the  advent  of  man  ?  Is  there  not  intelligi- 
ble purpose  here — in  such  a  restriction  of  plans  to  meet  such 
an  infinitude  of  emergencies  ?  Why  have  not  the  external  con- 
ditions, in  their  revolutions,  revolutionized  the  plans  of  animal 
structure?  Why  has  not  the  perpetual  survival  of  the  fittest 
evolved  a  plan  of  life  which  would  fail  to  recognize  either  of 
the  others  as  its  remotest  ancestor?  If  lines  of  descent,  as  der- 
ivationists  believe,  have  diverged  from  the  molluscan  to  the 
vertebrate  type,  how  is  it  that  the  lowest  orders  of  all  the 
types  have  persisted  to  the  present,  and  each  of  the  types,  on 
its  first  appearance  in  the  world,  was  as  clearly  characterized 
as  after  the  lapse  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years?  Because 
Intelligence  planned  and  ordained  these  types  of  structure ; 
and  to  whatever  uses  heredity  and  natural  selection  have  been 
appointed,  they  have  never  had  the  license  to  override  the  pri- 
mordial decree. 

Contemplate  one  of  these  types  with  more  particularity. 
The  skeleton  may  be  taken  as  expressing  the  fundamental  con- 
ception of  the  vertebrate  type.  This,  in  man,  presents  an  ex- 
treme diversity  of  forms.  In  the  vertebral  column  and  in  the 
ribs  we  have  series  of  similar  forms;  but  the  two  pairs  of 
limbs  would  be  regarded  as  dissimilar,  while  the  cranium  as  a 
whole,  or  in  its  several  parts,  seems  to  offer  no  hint  of  resem- 


162  THE  VERTEBRATE  PLAN. 

blance  to  any  other  bones  in  the  body.  If,  however,  we  com- 
pare with  this  skeleton  the  skeletons  of  other  vertebrates,  in 
descending  order,  to  the  fish,  we  observe  that  the  bones  of  the 
different  parts  of  the  body  present  a  constantly  diminishing 
degree  of  differentiation  from  each  other.  We  thus  arrive  at 
the  discovery  that  the  entire  length  of  the  skeleton  is  but  a  se- 
ries of  similar  segments,  differently  modified  in  different  parts 
of  the  body,  to  constitute  the  various  bony  bases  of  the  organs 
which  subserve  the  needs  of  the  animal. (J)  We  find  that  each 
one  of  these  segments — taking  no  account  of  the  modifications 
— consists  essentially  of  a  central,  more  or  less  cylindrical  bone, 
commonly  known  as  "  vertebra "  (and,  in  human  anatomy,  as 
"  body  of  the  vertebra "),  supporting  above  a  bony  arch  con- 
sisting of  two  pieces  on  each  side  of  the  median  line  of  the  an- 
imal, with  a  central  piece,  or  key-stone,  completing  the  arch, 
and  supporting  below  another  bony  arch  similarly  constituted. 
When  all  these  segments  are  placed  together  in  a  series,  the 
"  centrums  "  form  the  mass  of  the  "  backbone ;"  the  upper,  or 
"  neural,"  arches  form  the  channel  in  which  the  spinal  marrow 
is  lodged ;  and  the  lower,  or  "  haamal,"  arches  inclose  the  cav- 
ity which  holds  the  visceral  organs.  The  cranium  embraces 
four  segments.  The  brain-box  is  made  by  the  expansion  and 
flattening  of  the  bones  which  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the 
four  neural  arches.  As  the  brain  is  only  a  prolongation  of  the 
spinal  marrow,  the  skull  is  only  a  prolongation  of  the  vertebral 
column.  The  ribs  are  the  lower,  or  haemal,  arches  of  the  body, 
while  the  two  jaws  are  the  ha3mal  arches  of  the  two  anterior 
segments  of  the  cranium.  In  the  fish,  the  haBinal  arches  of  the 
three  anterior  segments  of  the  cranium  are  distinctly  seen  in 
the  bones  of  the  upper  jaw,  the  lower  jaw,  and  the  tongue. 
The  limbs  are  viewed  as  appendages.  The  pelvis,  when  it  ex- 

(!)  For  an  elementary  elucidation  of  this  subject,  see  Owen,  "  The  Skele- 
ton and  the  Teeth ;"  also  Huxley,  "  Anat.  Vert.  Animals,"  chap.  i. 


MODIFICA  TIONS  OF  PLAN.  163 

ists,  is  a  haemal  arch,  and  answers,  like  each  of  the  jaws,  to  a 
pair  of  ribs,  including  the  cartilages,  connecting  them  with  the 
sternum.  Posteriorly,  the  haemal  arches  diminish  by  disap- 
pearance of  distal  parts,  and  then  disappear.  Farther  back, 
the  centrums  of  the  vertebra  generally  diminish,  as  also  the 
neural  arches,  and  so  gradually  dwindle  into  the  caudal  ap- 
pendage. It  is  a  plan  of  organic  structure  that  tail  and  brain 
are  in  inverse  proportion.  In  mankind  the  tail  is  reduced  to 
the  os  coccygis. 

The  vertebrate  "  archetype,"  so  called,  is  a  series  of  bony 
segments,  consisting  of  centrums  and  upper  and  lower  arches, 
each  formed  of  its  several  pieces.  This,  of  course,  has  no  act- 
ual existence;  but  the  skeleton  of  every  actual  vertebrate  is 
composed  of  more  or  less  of  the  archetype,  with  the  bony 
pieces  more  or  less  varied  in  shape,  though  never  varied  in 
their  relative  positions  and  connections.  The  ends  of  the  an- 
imal's existence  are  sometimes  best  effected  with  numerous 
segments,  as  in  the  serpent  ;  sometimes  with  few,  as  in  the 
mammal.  The  abdominal  haemal  (lower)  arches  are  sometimes 
complete,  with  their  five  pieces,  as  in  the  alligator  and  the  liz- 
ard ;  those  of  man,  and  most  vertebrates,  have  two  of  the  pieces 
(one  on  each  side)  cartilaginous  or  wanting.  In  the  latter  case, 
of  course,  the  central  piece  is  also  wanting.  In  the  alligator, 
these  arches  become  abbreviated,  and  their  sides  soldered  to- 
gether, beneath  the  tail,  to  constitute  the  "chevron"  bones; 
in  the  ox  they  are  entirely  obsolete.  In  most  mammals,  one 
of  the  haemal  arches  is  strengthened  and  consolidated  into  a 
pelvis;  in  the  fish  the  pelvis  is  absent.  In  reptiles,  the  verte- 
brae which  support  the  pelvis  remain  distinct;  in  mammals 
they  are  consolidated  in  a  "  sacrum."  In  the  fish,  the  pieces 
which  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the  skull  remain  distinct, 
and  thus  aSord  a  clue  to  the  archetypal  constitution  of  all 
skulls;  in  man,  the  pieces  of  the  brain  -box  are  so  coalesced 
that  its  conformity  to  the  archetype  is  much  obscured.  In 


:H!VEI!3IT7 


164  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  SKELETON. 

most  vertebrates,  two  pairs  of  appendages  are  present ;  in  oth- 
ers we  find  but  one  pair — either  anterior  or  posterior ;  and  in 
still  others  both  pairs  are  absent.  In  the  fish  we  find  the  ante- 
rior pair  articulated  to  the  posterior  neural  arch  of  the  crani- 
um ;  in  most  vertebrates  they  are  detached,  and  the  proximal 
pieces,  or  "  scapula,"  are  imbedded  in  the  dorsal  muscles  of 
the  thorax.  Thus  the  forms  of  the  pieces  of  the  skeleton  are 
endlessly  varied,  and  their  relative  dimensions  are  equally  so — 
as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  contiguous  pieces  are  consoli- 
dated together,  or  "  anchylosed."  But  every  bone  which  is 
present  can  always  be  recognized  as  a  piece  of  the  archetype, 
and  can  be  referred  to  its  place  in  the  archetypal  segment. 

This  archetype  expresses  the  plan  of  the  vertebrate  as  far  as 
the  bony  structure  is  concerned ;  but  the  nervous,  vascular,  re- 
spiratory, nutritive,  and  other  departments  of  the  organism  are 
correlated  with  it,  and,  similarly,  give  expression  to  the  plan. 
Each  of  the  other  fundamental  plans  of  animal  structure  might 
be  shown  to  manifest  a  similar  conformity  to  an  archetype. 
Each  class,  also,  conforms  to  a  class-archetype,  which  is  a  me- 
thodical and  constant  modification  of  the  fundamental  arche- 
type. 

The  vertebrate  skeleton,  in  the  progress  of  geological  time, 
has  undergone  what  may  be  described  as  a  gradual  develop- 
ment or  evolution.  Fishes  were  the  earliest  representatives  of 
the  type;  and  here  the  skeleton  presented,  as  it  still  presents, 
the  minimum  modification  of  the  archetype.  The  different 
segments  approach  most  nearly  to  identity.  Batrachian  rep- 
tiles next  appeared,  and  then  the  tribes  of  scaly  reptiles,  with 
the  skeleton  successively  more  differentiated.  In  birds,  which 
next  came  upon  the  scene,  the  skeleton  was  further  specialized; 
while  in  mammals,  the  last  class  in  order  of  appearance,  the 
archetype,  through  the  superadded  modifications  which  it  has 
undergone,  is  thrown  into  a  state  of  comparative,  but  not  im- 
penetrable, disguise.  Nevertheless,  the  archetypal  conception 


WHAT  CONSERVES  THE  PLAN?  165 

runs   through   the   entire    series   of   beings,  stretching   down 
through  eons  of  vast  and  unknown  duration. 

Now,  what  means  this  persistence  of  an  idea — this  imperish- 
ability of  an  abstract  thought  ?  Shall  we  say  that  these  forms, 
having  descended  from  a  common  stock,  retain  their  funda- 
mental resemblances  through  the  influence  of  the  law  of  inher- 
itance ?  Or  shall  we  maintain,  with  Cuvier  and  Agassiz,  that 
the  first  representative  of  each  class,  ordinal,  generic,  and  spe- 
cific type  is  a  new  existence  —  a  special  creation  ?  The  latter 
view  seems,  at  first,  more  consonant  with  the  theistic  instincts 
of  man;  but  let  us  consider  what  the  other  view  necessarily  im- 
plies. It  is  the  law  of  inheritance  to  perpetuate  identity.  This 
alone,  then,  would  not  account  for  continuous  or  periodical  ac- 
cretions of  improvement.  Moreover,  if  genetic  affiliations  run 
from  end  to  end  of  the  vertebrate  line,  they  must  run  from 
end  to  end  of  the  animal  line ;  and  this  conclusion  vastly  aug- 
ments the  magnitude  of  the  obstacles,  the  least  of  which  he- 
redity is  incompetent  to  surmount.  If  the  hereditary  lineage 
is  a  fact,  we  must  seek  for  some  other  cause  to  account  for  the 
wide  divergencies  which  conflict  with  the  principle  of  heredity. 
Shall  we  say  that  diversified  conditions  of  existence  have  de- 
flected the  genetic  line  in  various  directions?  These,  I  have 
said,  can  not  be  regarded  as  real  causes,  nor,  generally,  the  seat 
of  activity  of  real  cause.  The  cause  which  effectuates  what- 
ever results  in  animal  forms,  acts  in  the  animal  organism  exact- 
ly where  the  principle  of  heredity  operates,  and  through  exact- 
ly the  same  instrumentalities  which  heredity  employs.  There 
exists  in  the  animal,  then,  a  tendency  to  persistence  of  form, 
and  an  antagonizing  tendency  to  divergence  of  form — a  force 
centripetal  and  a  force  centrifugal.  If  we  call  the  centripetal 
force  heredity,  what  name  have  we  for  the  centrifugal  ?  Shall 
we  call  it  an  inherent  tendency  to  divergence,  as  heredity  is  an 
inherent  tendency  to  parallelism  ?  The  character  of  inherent 
tendency  does  not  satisfy  the  requirements.  This,  like  any 


166  DERIVATION  A  PERPETUAL  CREATION. 

other  unintelligent  force,  must  act  in  a  straight  line  ;  but  the 
divergences  for  which  we  seek  to  account  are  as  sinuous  as  the 
myriad  conditions  to  which  the  structures  of  animals  are  co- 
ordinated. The  force  producing  them  discerns  the  various  con- 
ditions, and  varies  its  action  to  conform  to  them.  Discernment 
is  an  act  of  intelligence,  and  does  not  belong  to  matter.  There 
must  be,  consequently,  an  external  intelligence  acting,  or  direct- 
ing activity,  within  the  organism.  How  shall  we  dodge  this 
exit  of  the  argument  ? 

The  doctrine  of  derivation  implies,  then,  that  external  intel- 
ligence acts  perpetually  in  the  organism.  The  doctrine  of  suc- 
cessive creations  implies  that  intelligence  acts  periodically ;  and 
is,  therefore,  the  less  theistic  view.  Derivation  necessitates  con- 
tinual creation  ;  and  Descartes  expressed  this  idea,  long  ago,  in 
reference  to  the  perpetuation  of  his  own  existence;  while  the 
Cuvierian  view  necessitates  only  occasional  creations.  Science 
is  not  yet  prepared  to  settle  unreservedly  upon  either  of  these 
views.  There  remain  great,  apparently  not  insuperable,  diffi- 
culties in  the  way  of  the  doctrine  of  derivation  of  organic 
forms;  but,  most  assuredly,  we  may  remain  content  to  leave 
science  to  work  out  the  problem  at  its  opportunity. 

The  persistence  of  the  vertebrate  idea  means,  therefore,  the 
overshadowing  presence  and  efficiency  of  intelligence.  The 
homological  conformities  are  ordered  by  intention.  The  tele- 
ological  subserviencies  are  arranged  by  intention.  The  whole 
world-wide  and  time-long  panorama  of  vertebrate  life  is  a  nev- 
er-ceasing and  never-dimming  revelation  of  God. 

I  desire  to  unfold  this  view  with  other  details.  Consider  a 
particular  portion  of  the  vertebrate  skeleton.  The  anterior  ap- 
pendages of  vertebrates  are  composed,  osteologically,  of  a  def- 
inite series  of  pieces— scapula,  humerus,  radius  and  ulna,  car- 
pals,  metacarpals,  and  phalanges.  Preliminarily,  observe  that 
the  posterior  appendages  are  composed  of  an  identical  series 
of  bones  identically  coadjusted.  Now,  when  we  consider  the 


VARIATIONS  OF  MEMBRAL  ARCHETYPE.  167 

different  uses  of  the  anterior  and  posterior  extremities,  in  many 
of  the  vertebrates,  especially  in  man,  it  is  remarkable  that  the 
same  plan  of  structure  is  employed  for  both ;  and  we  feel  com- 
pelled to  admit  that  not  alone  the  needs  of  the  animal,  nor  the 
conditions  of  its  existence,  have  guided  the  efficiency  which  pro- 
duced limbs ;  but  an  abstract  concept — conformity  to  a  plan — 
has  also  been  a  guiding  motive. 

Next,  consider  the  variations  which  have  been  played  upon 
this  membral  archetype  as  a  fundamental  theme  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  anterior  pair  of  extremities.  We  contemplate  the 
arm  and  hand  of  man,  and  deem  the  member  admirably  adapt- 
ed to  the  function  of  grasping  and  lifting ;  but  the  arm  of  the 
cat  or  dog,  which  neither  grasps  nor  lifts,  but  performs  other 
functions  with  admirable  dexterity,  has  the  same  osteological 
composition.  The  broad,  shovel-like  hand  of  the  mole,  affixed 
to  the  extremity  of  a  twisted  fore-arm,  shows  us  again  the 
same  bones  teleologically  modified  to  serve  the  behests  of  a 
different  group  of  instincts,  and  the  needs  of  a  different  bodily 
system.  In  the  ox  and  horse  the  same  series  of  bones  is  te- 
leologically modified  for  simple  locomotion  on  the  land ;  and 
this  function  is  better  performed  with  this  species  of  extrem- 
ity than  would  be  possible  with  the  modification  existing  in 
the  mole,  the  monkey,  or  almost  any  other  quadruped.  As 
these  herbivora  are  the  predestined  prey  of  carnivores,  and  prey 
themselves  upon  no  other  animal,  this  endowment  of  fleetness 
is  something  co-ordinated  to  their  exposed  situation,  while,  at 
the  same  time,  it  becomes  effective  only  through  the  further 
co-ordination  of  instinctive  alertness  and  timidity.  Next,  the 
same  membral  archetype  is  further  modified  for  aerial  locomo- 
tion. In  the  bat,  a  wing  is  formed  by  the  extension  of  a  thin 
membrane  over  the  elongated  phalangeal  frame-work.  In  the 
bird,  the  phalangeal  frame- work,  on  the  contrary,  is  foreshort- 
ened, consolidated,  and  obsolescent;  and  becomes,  with  the 
fore-arm,  a  solid  base  of  support  for  an  expansion  of  quills  and 

8 


168  ENVIRONMENT  NOT  AN  EXPLANATION. 

feathers — themselves  a  marvelous  structure,  presenting  a  maxi- 
mum of  surface  and  strength  with  a  minimum  of  material  and 
weight.  Lastly,  the  fish  has  wings  for  the  watery  element.  Its 
pectoral  fins  present  a  bony  composition  in  which  the  membral 
archetype  is  shadowed  forth  without  ambiguity ;  as  the  abdom- 
inal fins  answer,  homologically,  to  the  posterior  extremities. 

Now,  it  is  futile  to  assert  that,  through  all  this  range  of  con- 
ditions and  co-ordinated  instincts  and  functions,  the  environ- 
ment is  the  efficient  cause  of  modifications.  In  the  self -same 
atmosphere,  and  sunlight,  and  temperature,  the  insectivorous 
bat  presents  us  one  modification,  the  insectivorous  swallow 
another.  So,  under  the  same  conditions,  the  honey -loving 
humming-bird  possesses  the  same  plan  of  wing  as  the  carri- 
on-eating vulture,  but  a  fundamentally  different  one  from  the 
honey-loving  butterfly  !  The  resemblances  and  the  differences 
exist  in  defiance  of  the  nature  of  environment.  There  is  a 
more  occult  principle  which  reigns  in  the  system  of  morphol- 
ogy. It  is  not  heredity;  for  that  is  essentially  antagonistic 
to  variation.  The  whole  problem  resolves  itself,  as  soon  as  we 
recognize  the  existence  of  fundamental  plans  in  nature,  deflect- 
ed endlessly,  in  conformity  to  the  endless  conditions  which  sur- 
round animals  founded  upon  the  same  or  different  fundamental 
plans,  class-plans,  ordinal  plans,  family  plans,  or  generic  plans. 
Intelligence  is  the  solution  of  all  problems  which  surround  us. 

It  will  be  interesting  to  still  further  specialize  our  mention 
of  membral  hornologies.  The  recent  researches  of  Professors 
Leidy,  Marsh,  and  Cope  have  brought  to  light  the  former  ex- 
istence, in  our  Western  regions,  of  several  quadrupeds  possess- 
ing structural  affinities  with  the  domestic  horse.  In  the  Eo- 
cene, or  oldest  Tertiary  deposits  of  Wyoming  and  Utah,  are 
found  the  remains  of  equine  quadrupeds  of  the  size  of  a  fox, 
but  having  four  hoofs  in  front  (three  behind).  They  belong 
to  the  genus  Orohippus.  In  the  Miocene,  or  next  following 
stage,  occur,  in  Oregon  and  Nebraska,  the  remains  of  Miohip- 


PLAN  OF  EQUINE  EXTREMITIES. 


169 


pus  and  Mesohippus,  about  the  size  of  a  sheep,  and  having 
three  hoofed  digits  before,  of  which  the  middle  one  is  the 
largest.  In  the  Pliocene,  or  next  younger  stage  of  the  Tertia- 
ry, we  find  the  remains  of  the  Anchippus,  Hipparion,  and  Pro- 
tohippus,  having  the  bulk  of  an  ass,  and  ranging  from  Oregon 
through  Nebraska  to  Texas.  These  genera  are  characterized 
by  the  possession  of  a  stout  middle  digit,  and  a  lateral  one 
on  each  side  not  reaching  the  ground.  There  also  occurs,  in 
the  Pliocene  of  Nebraska,  another  generic  type,  Pliohippus,  in 
which  the  lateral  hooflets  have  become  reduced  to  a  pair  of 
"splint-bones,"  as  in  the  domestic  horse.  Lastly,  the  same 
conformation  exists  in  the  remains  of  the  genus  Equus,  discov- 
ered in  the  Quaternary,  and  having  the  size  of  the  domestic 
horse,  but  belonging  to  a  species  which  has  become  extinct. 

We  have  here  a  chronological  succession  of  forms  possessing 
the  highest  interest.  Between  Orohippus  and  Equus,  the  old- 
est and  newest  of  these  equine  genera,  and  representing  the 
two  extremes  in  structure,  we  may  interpolate  Miohippus  and 
Protohippus,  representing  the  intermediate  structures.  This 
gradation  is  intelligibly  set  forth  in  the  conformation  of  the 
digits  of  the  anterior  extremity. 


\n 


Orohippus. 
(Eocene.) 


Miohippus. 
(Miocene.) 


m 

Protohippus.  Equus. 

(Pliocene.)  (Quaternary.) 


170  GENETIC  RELATION  SUGGESTED. 

Here  a  certain  order  of  change  seems  clearly  to  be  establish- 
ed ;  and  we  may  project  the  line  of  analogies  deductively  both 
into  the  past  and  the  future.  It  seems  legitimate  to  antici- 
pate that  an  equine  genus  of  later  origin  may  yet  exist,  in  which 
the  "splint-bones"  shall  have  completely  disappeared;  and  to 
conjecture,  with  Professor  Marsh, (^  that,  at  some  period  ear- 
lier than  the  epoch  of  Orohippus,  an  equine  quadruped  prob- 
ably existed  having  five  toes  before  and  four  behind ;  and,  at  a 
still  earlier  period,  a  genus  possessing  five  toes  before  and  five 
behind,  according  to  the  norm  of  vertebrates.  (3) 

Two  possible  explanations  of  this  series  of  phenomena  pre- 
sent themselves.  Both  must  recognize  the  existence  of  correla- 
tion of  structure,  which  constitutes  plan.  We  may  assume  that 
these  successive  forms  sustain  no  genetic  relationship,  but  are 
distinct  creations — the  continuity  subsisting  only  in  thought ; 
or  we  may  assume  that  each  is  lineally  descended  from  its  pred- 
ecessor. This  idea  is  favored  by  the  succession  in  time  corre- 
sponding to  the  gradation  in  type ;  by  the  circumstance  that 
the  several  types  are  so  related  geographically  as  not  to  imply 
improbable  migrations ;  and  by  the  fact  that  with  the  manifest 
progress  in  the  structure  of  the  anterior  extremities  co-existed 
a  regular  advance  in  the  assemblage  of  characters — in  the  in- 
creasing size ;  in  the  relative  enlargement  of  the  brain ;  in  the 

(1)  Amer.  Jour.  Sci.  and  Arts,  vol.  vii.,  March,  1874,  p.  257.     Compare, 
however,  opposing  considerations  by  Owen,  "  Anatomy  of  Vertebrates,"  vol. 
iil,  pp.  792,  793. 

(2)  It  is  a  striking  fulfillment  of  this  prediction — a  fact  as  useful  here 
as  in  a  scientific  treatise — that  in  November,  1876,  Professor  Marsh  an- 
nounced the  actual  discovery  of  an  equine  quadruped  having  rudiments 
of  the  fifth  digits  behind,  and,  probably,  also  before  (Amer.  Jour.  Sci.  and 
Arts  [3],  xii.,p.  401).    Professor  Marsh  informed  the  writer  that  he  sought 
methodically  for  these  remains  among  a  vast  quantity  of  material  obtained 
from  the  lowest  Eocene  beds  ("  Coryphodon  beds  ")  of  New  Mexico,  dis- 
tinctly older  than  the  strata  which  had  yielded  Orohippus.     This  new, 
archaic,  pentedactyl  horse  has  been  named  Eohippus. 


FACTS  FAVORING   GENETIC  RELATION.  Ill 

gradual  elongation  of  the  head  and  neck ;  in  the  widening  of 
the  "  diastema "  (space  for  the  bit) ;  in  the  disappearance  of 
the  first  premolars  and  of  the  fangs  of  the  molars ;  in  the 
lengthening  of  the  crowns  of  the  molars ;  in  the  diminishing 
size  of  the  canines  and  the  enlargement  of  the  incisors,  with  the 
acquisition  of  the  characteristic  pit  of  the  modern  horse.  To 
these  indications  must  be  added  the  analogies  of  embryonic  de- 
velopment, (J)  and  of  similar  series  of  forms  in  other  orders  of 
animals  and  other  geologic  ages.(a) 

(J)  "  The  embryonic  life  of  man  is  almost  an  epitome  of  the  animal 
kingdom,  beginning  with  characters  common  to  the  moners  and  the  worms, 
and  ending  with  the  Vertebrates  "  (Packard,  "  Life  Histories  of  Animals, 
including  Man,"  p.  239).  According  to  Haeckel,  the  stages  of  the  human 
embryo  exemplify  not  less  than  twenty-two  types  of  organization  in  a  reg- 
ular progression.  These  may  be  generalized  as  follows :  Structureless 
protoplasm  (moner),  egg,  morula,  planula,  gastrula  (sack-stage),  ascidian 
(exhibiting  what  some  regard  the  homologue  of  a  spinal  marrow),  amphi- 
oxus,  low  shark,  amphibian,  monotreme,  marsupial,  lemuroid,  tailed  monk- 
ey, tailless  ape,  Papuans  ("Anthropogenic,"  Lectures  XIV.-XIX.). 

(2)  Leidy,  "The  Ancient  Fauna  of  Nebraska,"  Smithsonian  Contribu- 
tions to  Knowledge,  1853  ;  "  Extinct  Mammalia  of  Dakota  and  Nebraska," 
in  Journal  Acad.  Nat.  Sci.,  Philadelphia,  vol.  vii.,  1869;  "Extinct  Verte- 
brate Fauna  of  the  Western  Territories,"  Hayden  Survey,  1873.  Cope, 
"  Extinct  Batrachia  and  Reptilia  of  N.  Amer. ;"  Proc.  Amer.  Phil.  Soc., 
1869,  Feb.,  1873 ;  Proc.  Acad.  Nat.  Sci.,  Philadelphia,  Jan.,  1873,  Feb., 
1873,  Aug.,  1874,  1875  (p.  261),  May,  1876,  July,  1876;  Bulletin  U.  S. 
Geol.  Surv.  Territories,  No.  1 ;  Hayden  Survey,  Annual  Rep.,  1873,  pp.  498, 
519;  Hayden  Rep.,  vol.  ii.,  4to;  Wheeler  Survey,  Systematic  Catalogue, 
Vertebrata,  New  Mexico,  1875 ;  Ann.  Rep.  Chief  of  Engineers,  1874,  p. 
604.  Marsh,  Amer.  Jour.  Sci.  and  Arts  (3),  July,  1871,  Sept.,  1872,  May, 
1873,  March,  1874,  March,  1875,  Nov.,  1876;  New  York  Tribune  extra, 
No.  8.  The  descent  of  the  horse  was  discussed  by  Professor  Huxley  in 
his  New  York  lectures  (see  Tribune  extra,  No.  36). 

The  extinct  Palceotlierium,  Anchitherium,  and  Hipparion  of  the  Old 
World  are  similarly  connected  with  the  modern  horse.  Modern  birds  are 
connected,  through  sundry  intermediate  forms,  with  the  Dinosaurian  rep- 
tiles ;  the  Eocene  Amblypoda  (Cope)  are  a  type  connecting  the  elephantine 


172         SUCCESSIONAL  FACTS  INADEQUATE  PROOFS. 

I  think,  nevertheless,  that  we  are  not  authorized  to  assume  a 
genealogical  descent  satisfactorily  proved  by  the  simple  fact 
of  a  graduated  succession  of  forms ;  and  to  proceed,  as  some 
scientists  do,  on  this  basis  of  evidence,  to  discourse  about  the 
genealogy  of  the  horse  with  as  little  reserve  as  we  feel  in  treat- 
ing of  the  royal  line  of  the  Prince  of  Wales.  This  assumed 
genealogy  implies  that  one  generic  form  may  be  derived  from 
another ;  while  all  the  facts  which  have  fallen  under  our  ob- 
servation fail  to  supply  a  single  species  certainly  derived  from 
another^1)  While  this  is  the  case,  the  circumstance  of  con- 
secutiveness  falls  far  short  of  logical  proof  of  descent.  A  link 

and  equine  types  with  the  regularly  clawed  quadrupeds;  the  Creodonta 
are  intermediate  between  Insectivores,  Carnivores,  and  lowest  Quadruma- 
na;  the  Taeniodonta  are  intermediate  between  Creodonta,  Edentates,  and 
Rodents;  Anaptomorphus  connects  Lemurs  and  true  Monkeys,  and  Tomi- 
tJi&'ium  connects  Lemurs  with  Creodonta.  Thus,  as  we  trace  the  records 
of  mammalian  life  backward  to  the  commencement  of  the  Eocene,  we  find 
forms  presenting  an  ever -diminishing  amount  of  differentiation — forms 
less  and  less  distinct  from  each  other  —  forms  more  and  more  "  gener- 
alized," "synthetic,"  "comprehensive,"  or  " undecomposed " — forms  ap- 
proaching more  and  more  closely  to  a  small-brained,  five-toed,  plantigrade 
stock  or  primitive  ancestor,  from  which,  according  to  derivative  doctrine, 
have  'diverged  the  various  lines  which  terminate  in  the  living  types  of 
mammals.  However  we  may  interpret  this  retral  convergence  toward  an 
ancient  Eocene  stock,  the  fact  is  demonstrated  (compare  Dana,  "Manual 
of  Geology,"  pp.  382,  597). 

(')  "I  doubt  whether  any  case  of  perfectly  fertile  hybrid  animal  can  be 
considered  as  thoroughly  well  authenticated  "  (Darwin,  "  Origin  of  Species," 
Amer.  ed.,  p.  223).  "  In  extremely  rare  exceptions  the  fertility  persists  in 
the  offspring,  but  it  is  much  diminished.  It  diminishes  still  more  in  the 
grandchildren,  and  it  is  extinguished  in  the  third  or  fourth  generation  at 
the  most"  (Quatrefages,  "Natural  History  of  Man,"  Amer.  ed.,  p.  25).  On 
the  other  hand,  see  Notes  C,  D,  and  E,  by  the  editor  of  the  above-named 
work,  in  reference  to  unlimited  fertility  of  hybrids  of  the  common  and  the 
Chinese  goose,  and  of  two  species  of  woodpeckers.  On  these  hybrids  of 
geese,  as  well  as  hybrid  plants,  see,  also,  Darwin,  "  Origin  of  Species,"  p. 
222.  On  hybrid  woodpeckers,  see  Baird,  Pacif.  R.  R.  Rep.,  ix.,  122. 


A  LOGICAL  INCONSEQUENCE.  173 

missing  destroys  the  chain  of  evidence.  The  lack  (if  such  re- 
ally exists)  of  conclusive  evidence  of  the  possibility  of  the  der- 
ivation of  a  species  is  as  total  and  fatal  a  failure  of  proof, 
in  this  case,  as  if  there  were  no  order  in  the  succession,  or 
as  if  the  succession  were  one  of  inorganic  instead  of  organic 
structure.  I  attempted  once  to  expose  this  fatal  inconse- 
quence by  publishing  an  ironical  jeu-tf esprit  on  the  "Geneal- 
ogy of  Ships."(J)  My  little  projectile  elicited  a  number  of  re- 
sponses, (2)  of  which  two  maintained  that  my  implied  argument 
was  unsound  in  consequence  of  the  disparity  in  the  natures  of 
ships  and  animals.  (3)  Indeed,  that  disparity,  which  I  was  sup- 
posed stupidly  to  have  overlopked,  furnished  the  very  gist  of 
my  little  argument.  It  was  that  which  gave  the  theory  of  der- 
ivation (as  far  as  proof  from  succession  goes)  a  reductio  ad  ab- 
surdum. 

But  suppose  a  genetic  descent  provable,  as,  in  view  of  the 
whole  range  of  evidence,  it  seems  to  be.  That  alternative  is 
precisely  as  satisfactory  to  theology  as  the  other.  We  shall 

(')  New  York  Tribune,  May  16th,  1874.  The  idea  had  been  previously 
set  forth  by  the  writer  in  "  The  Doctrine  of  Evolution,"  1874,  pp.  90,  91. 

(a)  New  York  Tribune,  May  25th,  and  June  2d,  1874. 

(3)  Still,  Wallace  asks,  "Are  not  improved  steam-engines  or  clocks  the 
lineal  descendants  of  some  existing  steam-engine  or  clock?"  ("Natural  Se- 
lection," p.  295).  The  analogy  is  also  brought  out  by  Von  Hartmann,  and 
exactly  the  same  point  is  made.  "  Wenn  z.  B.  gesagt  wird,  dass  der  go- 
thische  Dom  aus  dem  romanischen,  dieser  aus  der  Basilika,  und  diese  aus 
einer  Art  romischer  Markthallen  entstanden  sei,  wenn  ferner  zwischen  den 
genannten  Typen  fliissige  Uebergangsformen  aufgezeigt  werden,  so  wird 
doch  niemand  daraus  folgern,  dass  etwa  ein  bestimmtes  Bauwcrk  im  go- 
thischen  Baustil  jemals  durch  effectiven  Umbau  der  Rundbogen  in  Spitz- 
bogen  hervorgegangen  sei"  (Von  Hartmann,  "Wahrheit  und  Irrthum  in 
Darwinismus,"  1875,  pp.  12,  15,  16).  It  is  a  case  exactly  similar  when 
we  affirm,  as  Von  Hartmann  does,  and  others  before  him,  that  the  system- 
atic relations  of  minerals  are  no  proof  of  genetic  affinity,  or  that  the  de- 
rivatively related  hyperbola,  parabola,  ellipse,  circle,  and  right  line  have  no 
other  than  an  ideal  relation. 


174  EVOLUTION  A  SCHEME  OF  HOMOLOGIES. 

then  know  that  the  intelligible  plan  of  membral  structure  is 
perpetuated  by  descent ;  and  that,  instead  of  occasional  crea- 
tions to  renew  the  expression  of  its  existence,  the  method  is, 
to  exert  creative  power  perpetually  y  whenever  and  wherever  the 
activities  which  result  in  descent  are  in  existence. 

The  class  of  homological  relations  may  be  legitimately  ex- 
tended beyond  the  range  of  organic  structures.  Homology  im- 
plies correlations  which  express  plan.  I  have  already  said  that 
evolution  is  a  vast  plan ;  and  that  the  various  series  of  instru- 
mentalities through  which  evolution  is  effected  give  expression 
to  so  many  plans  of  effectuation,  and  imply  in  their  separate 
as  well  as  their  concerted  action  an  ordering  Intelligence.  The 
plan  of  world-life  involves  one  of  the  grandest  of  these  conspir- 
ing series  of  effects. 

The  plan  of  world-life ! — it  is  simply  a  process  of  cooling. 
The  plan  of  the  cosmos ! — it  is  simply  a  system  of  exchanges 
of  temperature  in  search  of  an  equilibrium.  The  proofs  of  this 
stupendous  induction  are  excluded  by  the  circumstances  which 
surround  me.  The  great  fact  suffices  to  illustrate  my  argu- 
ment. The  primordial  condition  of  cosmical  matter  is  either 
that  of  a  fire-mist,  or  an  antecedent  non-luminous  vapor  which, 
by  condensation,  becomes  a  fire-mist.  This  condition  is  exem- 
plified in  the  irresolvable  nebulae.  Excess  of  heat  is  relieved 
by  escape  of  heat.  Sometimes  a  curdled  or  discontinuous  con- 
dition of  the  fire-mist  ensues,  as  exemplified  in  resolvable  nebu- 
lae. Sometimes  a  condensation  about  the  centre  gives  rise  to 
a  "  planetary  nebula."  Sometimes  a  rotary  motion  is  gener- 
ated, which  develops  the  form  of  the  "  spiral "  nebula.  Some- 
times the  curve  of  rotation  returns  to  itself,  and  the  mass,  as  a 
total,  is  held  in  equilibrium  while  it  rotates.  In  course  of  time, 
the  peripheral  portion  becomes  segregated,  and  produces  an 
"  annular  "  nebula.  In  the  nebular  history  with  which  we  are 
best  acquainted,  annulation  seems  to  be  a  normal  stage  of  the 
evolution.  According  to  the  theory  which  best  harmonizes 


THE  PLAN  OF  WORLD -LIFE.  175 

with  the  facts,  and  best  accounts  for  them,  a  succession  of  de- 
tached rings,  continuing  to  rotate,  results,  by  successive  rupt- 
ures and  condensation,  in  a  series  of  planetary  bodies,  consti- 
tuting a  system.  It  is  conceivable,  as  I  have  elsewhere  sug- 
gested^1) that  a  ring  may  preserve  its  equilibrium  for  an  ex- 
ceptionally prolonged  period,  during  which  a  sort  of  stratifica- 
tion ensues,  segregating  an  indefinite  number  of  rings,  so  that 
the  delayed  rupture  should  result  in  an  indefinite  number  of 
small  planetary  bodies  grouped  at  a  somewhat  uniform  distance 
from  the  centre  of  rotation.  This  might  account  for  an  aster- 
oidal  zone.  The  residual  sphere  of  fire  -  mist  remains  all  the 
time  a  central  sun.  The  planetary  masses  suifer  cooling  and 
annulation,  like  the  primary.  Their  annuli  break  up  into  sat- 
ellites. In  one  case  within  our  own  system,  we  note  the  strati- 
fication of  the  annulus,  which  I  have  suggested  as  a  step  toward 
an  asteroidal  group.  But  the  Saturnian  rings  have  escaped  the 
contingency  of  rupture  till  they  seem  to  have  cooled  to  the  con- 
dition of  dust.  All  the  planets  and  satellites,  self-luminous  at 
first,  become  incrusted  and  darkened.  All  suns  are  marching 
toward  the  same  goal.  Before  complete  liquefaction  ensues, 
darkened  clouds  of  cooler  matters  float  in  their  fiery  photo- 
sphere, or  ensue  on  the  outburst  of  mineral  vapors  from  the  cen- 
tral nucleus.  A  sun  in  this  condition  is  a  "  variable  star." 
Such  is  our  own  sun.  After  the  incrustation  of  a  cosmical 
body,  a  long  period  ensues,  during  which  the  consolidating 
crust  suffers  many  ruptures,  permitting  the  imprisoned  fires 
to  pour  forth,  and  send  an  unwonted  gleam  through  the  uni- 
verse. These  are  the  "  temporary  stars."  The  "  white  "  stars, 
the  "  yellow  "  stars,  and  the  "  red,"  are  only  suns  in  progressive 

(')  "  The  Geology  of  the  Stars,"  in  "  Half -hour  Recreations  in  Popular 
Science,"  No.  VII.,  p.  285.  In  this  essay  the  probable  succession  of  cosmical 
conditions  is  more  fully  set  forth.  See,  also,  articles  in  Methodist  Quar- 
terly Review  for  April,  1873,  and  January,  1874;  also,  "Sketches  of  Crea- 
tion," where  the  terrestrial  history  is  more  especially  dwelt  upon. 

8* 


176  GREAT  MORPHOLOGICAL  CONCEPTIONS. 

stages  of  cooling,  after  which  follow  the  variable  stars  and  the 
temporary  stars.  In  the  lapse  of  time,  after  the  incrustation 
of  a  cosmical  body,  clouds  of  watery  vapor  gather  about  it,  and 
a  cyclical  storm  descends  upon  its  surface.  In  such  a  condition 
is  Jupiter ;  and  such  a  condition  has  left  its  records  upon  our 
earth.  Then  areas  of  dry  land  begin  to  emerge ;  the  storms 
abate,  and  the  procession  of  animals  begins  its  march  across 
the  scene.  The  zoic  period  is  exemplified  in  our  own  earth, 
and  probably  also,  but  more  advanced,  in  Mars.  In  the  lapse 
of  ages,  the  cosmical  mass  becomes  cooled  to  the  centre ;  the 
waters  and  the  atmosphere  are  absorbed;  organic  existence  is 
swept  from  being,  and  the  body  hangs  a  mere  fossil  world, 
like  the  moon,  to  admonish  us  of  a  fate  impending  over  all 
worlds.  (') 

Such,  in  most  respects,  is  the  best  accepted  view  of  the  sweep 
of  cosmical  events.  What  a  picture  to  spread  before  the  im- 

(')  It  is  a  noteworthy  circumstance  that  the  three  great  morphological 
conceptions  of  modern  science  have  been  broached  by  thinkers  who  are 
commonly  reputed  to  have  been  indifferent  to  religion,  and  who  are  even 
popularly  accused  of  presenting  their  hypotheses  as  substitutes  for  su- 
pernatural creative  activity.  Goethe  discovered  that  the  leaf  is  the  arche- 
type of  all  the  structures  of  the  plant.  Oken  first  exhibited  a  vertebra  as 
the  archetype  of  a  cranial  segment.  Laplace  generalized  the  history  of 
planetary  worlds.  These  three  discoveries  were  equally  regarded  by  re- 
ligionists as  atheistical  in  tendency,  and  were  earnestly  opposed  ;  but  they 
are  now  equally  approved  by  science,  and  equally  adapted  to  exalt  our  ap- 
prehension of  supreme  wisdom  and  power.  The  doctrine  in  relation  to 
plants  and  animals  is  a  morphology,  and  probably  a  phylogeny;  in  rela- 
tion to  planetary,  and,  as  now  completely  generalized,  to  cosmical  exist- 
ence, it  is  also  a  morphology,  and  almost  demonstrably  a  phylogeny  or 
material  continuity.  If  the  phylogenetic  relations  of  plants  and  animals 
shall  ever  be  fully  established,  we  shall  have  in  that  doctrine  (the  deriva- 
tion of  species)  another  example  of  a  scientific  doctrine  first  employed  in 
the  interests  of  atheism  (only,  however,  by  the  opponents  of  the  doctrine), 
then  established,  and  found  to  be  a  weapon  peculiarly  available  in  the  in- 
terests of  theism. 


COSMIC  MQRPHOL  OGY.  1 f  V 

agination  !  What  a  generalization  to  address  to  the  intellect ! 
What  a  stupendous  plan  to  utter  the  name  of  the  Infinite,  and 
awaken  the  religious  sentiments  of  the  soul !  What  an  all- 
embracing  unity  of  method  is  here  to  proclaim  one  empire, 
one  lawgiver,  one  God  !(') 

It  is  time  that  I  leave  the  discussion  to  your  reflections.  My 
heart  has  burned  with  a  desire  to  break  through  the  crust  of 
sensible  things,  which  obscures  the  spiritual  eye-sight,  and  help 
you  to  glimpse  the  sublime  realities  of  the  realm,  of  thought 
and  spirit,  which  "  is  not  far  from  every  one  of  us."  How  fee- 
ble have  been  my  efforts ! — may  the  Source  of  Truth  to  whom 
I  have  aspired  forgive  my  failures !  But,  however  impuissant 
may  have  been  my  endeavors  to  rise  to  the  substantial  First 
Principle  of  all,  may  I  exhort  you  to  seek  still  its  revelation  in 
the  facts  and  thoughts  of  nature  which  lie  around  you.  FEAR 
NO  TRUTH — embrace  all  truth,  for  it  is  God's  and  yours ;  and 
as  embassadors  of  God,  take  all  His  Truth,  and  use  it  to  con- 
vince the  world. 

(')  Further  illustrations  of  "  intentionality "  in  nature  will  be  found  in 
the  last  paper  of  this  volume. 


VII. 

EEASON  FOR  THE  FAITH. (') 

"It  is  of  much  more  importance  to  give  our  assent  to  doctrines  upon 
grounds  of  reason  and  wisdom  than  on  that  of  faith  merely." — ORIGEN, 
Contra  Celsum,  book  i.,  chap.  xiii. 

"  Which  subject  he  [Cyprian]  did  not  handle  as  he  ought  to  have  done ; 
for  he  [Demetrian]  ought  to  have  been  refuted,  not  by  the  testimonies  of 
Scripture,  which  he  plainly  considered  vain,  fictitious,  and  false,  but  by  ar- 
guments and  reason." — LACTANTIUS,  Institutiones  Divince,  book  v.,  chap.  iv. 

TIME,  which  keeps  all  appointments,  lias  brought  the  anni- 
versary of  culminating  interest  in  collegiate  life.  You  who 
have  labored  assiduously  and  long,  through  the  rigorous  cur- 
riculum, have  seen  the  events  of  the  final  trial  and  triumph 
slowly  rising  in  the  horizon.  We  who  have  watched  your  ef- 
forts and  prayed  for  your  success,  experience  more  keenly  than 
ever  the  sense  of  responsibility  for  faithfulness  to  our  trusts. 
I  feel  it  a  relief  that  the  present  occasion  affords  an  opportu- 
nity to  impress  upon  you,  and  all  who  hear  me,  a  few  words 
of  wisdom,  which,  of  all  the  lessons  you  have  learned,  I  would 
commend  to  the  deepest  and  warmest  and  most  exclusive  place 
of  lodgment  in  your  heart.  As  our  relations  to  the  world  of 
invisible  realities  transcend  in  importance  all  other  human  in- 
terests, I  have  thought  it  might  be  useful  to  bring  before  you 
a  systematic  statement  of  the  Reason  of  the  Faith  which,  as 
Christians,  we  entertain.  I  shall  undertake,  therefore,  to  pre- 
sent a  conspectus  of  the  rationale  of  Christian  belief.  I  shall 

(!)  A  baccalaureate  address  to  the  candidates  for  graduation  in  the  Col- 
lege of  the  Liberal  Arts  of  the  Syracuse  University. 


CAUSES  OF  SKEPTICISM.  179 

speak,  not  as  a  divine,  resting  on  Scriptural  authority,  but  as  a 
scientist  and  philosopher,  seeking  after  the  authority  on  which 
Scripture  itself  rests. 

I  feel  that  an  inquiry  of  this  kind  may  be  peculiarly  appro- 
priate to  the  intellectual  mood  of  the  times.  It  is  a  question- 
ing, iconoclastic  age,  which  holds  nothing  sacred  because  it  has 
been  revered;  and  demands  that  even  divine  existence,  divine 
providence,  and  religious  faith  commend  themselves  to  human 
reason.  I  feel  that  I  hazard  nothing  in  accepting  that  issue. 
Bishop  Butler  tells  us,  "Reason  is  the  only  faculty  we  have 
wherewith  to  judge  concerning  any  thing,  even  revelation  it- 
self." From  that  starting-point  I  see  an  open  highway  to  a 
theistic  faith  and  a  Christian  life. 

Many  obstacles  to  the  progress  of  our  argument  will  dis- 
appear on  a  summary  statement  of  the  causes  of  the  modern 
phase  of  skepticism.  We  shall  see  that  these  causes  are  emo- 
j^onal,  superficial,  or  inconsequential,  andhence  are  not  such 
causes  as  he  who  appeals  to  logic  can  pronounce  sum'cient;  and 
thatlie~lvfau  pleads  them  ia  not  bLUilding  squarely  to  the  battle- 
front,  but  is  skulking  under  subterfuges. 

The  first  cause  of  skepticism  is  the  evil  heart.  It  is  the  old 
clamor  of  the  appetites  and  passions  to  be  released  from  the 
restraints  which  all  religions  impose.  It  is,  therefore,  not  pe- 
culiar to  our  times ;  but  stands  by  perpetually  to  prompt  and 
abet  the  questionings  of  the  intellect. 

The  second  cause  is  the  enforced  abandonment  of  certain  po- 
sitions of  traditional  faith,  necessitated  by  the  progress  of  hu- 
man ft/fifiwl.p.dgp  Thus,  it  used  to  be  maintained,  by  authority 
of  the  Church,  that  the  earth  was  the  centre  of  the  universe. 
It  was  a  heresy  to  assert  the  doctrine  of  the  habitability  of 
other  worlds.  The  Jesuit  Scheiner  was  compelled  to  publish 
anonymously  his  discovery  of  the  spots  on  the  solar  disk.  Not 
yet  wholly  silenced  are  the  murmurs  of  dissent  from  the  doc- 
trine of  the  high  antiquity  of  the  world;  or  the  reality  of 


180  SCIENTIFIC  AND  RELIGIOUS  BELIEFS. 

physical  death  before  the  sin  of  our  first  parents ;  or  the  local 
character  of  the  Noachian  deluge.  Still  more  audible  are  the 
sounds  of  disapproval  when  we  assert  that  the  history  of  plan- 
ets is  a  slow  evolution  of  results  wrought  out  by  forces  still 
active,  and  according  to  methods  exemplified  before  our  eyes. 
And,  again,  how  slow  have  we  been  to  discern  and  admit  the 
fact  that,  to  our  apprehension,  all  spiritual  manifestations  are 
conditioned  by  matter !  Yet  on  all  these  questions  the  Church 
is  taking,  as  it  must  take,  an  affirmative  position.  Men  not 
controlled  by  their  religious  instincts,  seeing  the  abandonment 
of  old  positions  which  it  once  defended  with  arguments  and 
anathemas,  and  sometimes  with  cruelties,  hastily  assume  that 
Christian  faith  has  nothing  whatever  in  it  which  can  stand  per- 
sistently the  tests  of  reason  and  science.  But  every  one  must 
perceive  the  inconclusive  character  of  such  reasoning.  In  fact, 
it  is  no  reasoning  at  all,  but  an  illogical  generalization,  like  that 
of  a  man  who,  from  sundry  unsuccessful  attempts  to  digest  a 
supper  of  oyster-shells,  should  conclude  that  the  human  stom- 
ach is  not  adapted  to  oysters.  The  most  puerile  intelligence 
must  discern  that  the  position  of  the  earth  in  the  universe  can 
not  be  a  question  of  religious  faith,  but  is  a  question  of  obser- 
vation and  mathematical  calculation.  Whether  other  worlds 
are  habitable,  must  be  inferred  from  data  which  address  them- 
selves to  the  intellect.  Whether  the  procedure  in  world-mak- 
ing has  been  slow,  and  according  to  the  method  of  evolution, 
is  of  no  consequence  in  the  question  of  divine  existence,  or  of 
creative  and  formative  activity.  It  has  been  natural,  in  times 
past,  to  associate  all  generally  accepted  doctrines  and  dogmas 
with  beliefs  which  are  strictly  religious;  and  then  to  forget 
the  distinctions  among  the  beliefs  incorporated  in  the  religious 
system.  An  age  of  intellectual  sluggishness  would  favor  such 
confounding  of  doctrines ;  an  age  of  mental  activity  would  be 
sure  to  expose  the  fallacy,  and  involve  religious  and  secular 
truth  in  common  peril.  Against  this  we  must  guard.  The 


ILL  -ME  A  NT  FALSE  INDUCTIONS.  181 

world  truly  moves,  as  Galileo  asserted  ;  but  prayer  may  still  be 
a  human  duty,  as  the  Church  maintained. 

The  third  cause  of  skepticism  is  the  habit  of  rash  and  disin- 
genuous generalizations  on  the  part  of  the  evil-disposed.  There 
are  those  who  would  rejoice  to  see  science  and  Christian  faith 
in  irreconcilable  conflict.  There  are  others  who  sincerely  be- 
lieve that  they  sustain  no  natural  relations  to  each  other.  Per- 
sons of  the  former  class  make  haste  to  seize  upon  every  new 
development,  or  suggestion,  or  intimation  which  makes  its  ap- 
pearance in  the  field  of  science,  and,  without  waiting  for  that 
due  certification  which  is  the  first  canon  of  Baconian  generali- 
zation, they  proclaim  oracularly  the  final  overthrow  of  the  "  su- 
perstition of  Christianity."  Thus,  when  relics  of  pottery  were 

nt  n  pprfqin    rlpptTi  breath  the  alluvium  pf 


the  JNile,  all  the  world  was  at  once  informed  that  the  Bible  con- 
tained egregious  misstatftrnftnta  respecting  the  antiquity  of  the 
human  race  ;  and  the  whole  system  based  upon  such  authority 
must  be  abandoned.  It  was  not  the  careful  scientist  who  made 
this  proclamation.  It  was  the  careful  scientist,  M.  de  Lanoye, 
who  proceeded  to  test  the  alleged  fact,  and  was  thereupon  led 
to  publish  to  the  world  his  conclusion,  that  geological  Egypt  is 
an  alluvium  twenty-six  feet  in  maximum  thickness,  laid  upon 
a  bottom  of  marine  sand;  that  of  this  alluvium  four  -tenths 
(0.4134)  of  a  foot  is  deposited  in  one  hundred  years;  so  that 
the  whole  Nilotic  deposit  is  but  six  thousand  three  hundred 
and  fifty  years  old.  So,  when  human  relics  were  exhumed  from 
the  Mississippi  delta,  even  Sir  Charles  Lyell  was  disposed  to 
yield  to  the  plausible  claim  of  immense  antiquity  for  our  race  ; 
but  now  Humphreys  and  Abbot,  in  their  patient  and  masterly 
study  of  the  hydraulics  of  the  Mississippi  valley,  formally  enun- 
ciate the  conclusion  that  the  entire  delta  does  not  exceed  five 
thousand  years  in  age.  So  with  the  illogical  claim  that  the  dis- 
covery of  the  perpetual  conservation  and  convertibility  of  phys- 
ical force  proves  the  mechanism  of  the  universe  self-sustaining. 


182  COWARDICE  OF  BELIEVERS. 

Suppose  this  true,  does  it  prove  that  force  is  self-existent,  and 
self-convertible,  and  self-conservative  ?  Is  it  proved — granting 
heat  to  be  "  a  mode  of  motion  " — that  motion  can  take  place 
without  a  mover  ?  Is  it  proved — granting  the  method  of  crea- 
tion to  be  an  evolution — that  there  was  no  intelligence  to  de- 
vise the  method,  no  power  to  evolve  ?  The  claim  that  this  and 
similar  propositions,  even  supposing  them  proved,  militate  fa- 
tally against  religious  faith  is  shallow,  if  it  is  not  malignant. 
The  whole  foundation  of  religious  faith  rests  behind  all  these 
questions,  and  too  deep  for  their  agitation  to  disturb. 

The  fourth  cause  of  skepticism  is  the  cowardice  of  believers. 
Unwittingly,  if  not  stupidly,  they  second  the  attacks  of  the 
preceding  class.  The  evil-wisher  dogmatically  asserts  that  such 
and  such  conflicts  exist.  The  weak-kneed  believer  is  too  prone 
to  admit  that  it  appears  to  be  so — that  it  is  so ;  and  then,  as 
he  can  not  ignore  his  religious  instincts,  there  is  no  alternative 
but  to  arraign  science  as  their  foe.  He  acknowledges  the  sta- 
tus belli;  but  then,  instead  of  seizing  his  sword,  he  incases  him- 
self in  coat  of  mail,  and  meekly  stands  the  raps,  to  the  infinite 
contempt  of  those  who  feel  that  he  ought  to  surrender  his  posi- 
tion or  defend  it.  Shame !  If  I  have  ever  felt  indignation,  it 
has  been  at  the  sight  of  these  believers  cowed  by  such  whips 
of  straw.  Accept  no  unauthoritative  interpretation  of  the  facts 
of  nature,  or  application  of  them  to  matters  of  faith.  Accept 
no  unattested  statement  of  the  facts.  Be  sure  you  stick  to  the 
letter  of  the  allegations  of  science,  and  avoid  premature  infer- 
ences— especially  inferences  made  by  third  parties,  who  possess 
no  qualifications  for  scientific  investigation.  Do  not  attribute 
to  original  scientists  opinions  which  they  do  not  avow.  Your 
field  is  too  narrow  to  enable  you  to  discern  what  theological 
beliefs  may  seem  most  truthful  to  them.  Stick  to  that  which 
the  scientific  world  recognizes  as  well  established ;  and  never 
surrender  your  faith  in  religion  or  science  at  the  bidding  of 
cither  bully  or  upstart. 


NON-ESSENTIALS  HELD  ESSENTIAL.  183 

A  fifth  cause  of  skepticism  is  the  mistaking  of  the  non-essen- 
tial for  the  fundamental  in  matters  of  theology.  How  fatal  and 
how  frequent  has  been  this  error !  The  whole  history  of  the- 
ological dogma  and  hierarchical  oppression  is  an  illustration  of 
our  point.  The  numerous  attempts  to  which  allusion  has  al- 
ready been  made,  to  decide  questions  of  science  by  decree  of 
council  or  pope,  have  repeatedly  involved  the  Christian  faith 
in  confusion  and  reproach.  It  is  hazardous  to  make  Chris- 
tianity sponsor  for  crude  theorizers  in  natural  science.  Their 
default  becomes  a  stain  upon  her  name.  If  she  voluntarily 
vouches  for  their  opinions,  and  stakes  her  integrity  upon  their 
soundness,  the  world  will  be  inclined  to  leave  her  to  the  conse- 
quences of  their  overthrow.  Christian  truth  needs  keep  no 
disreputable  company.  Even  in  the  domain  of  ecclesiasticism 
the  Church  has  failed  to  preserve  the  distinction  between  hu- 
man opinion  and  rational  truth.  As  Socrates  was  condemned, 
under  a  polytheistic  religion,  for  asserting  the  heresy  of  mono- 
theism, so  modern  bigots  have  inflicted  persecutions  for  opin- 
ions far  less  radical  than  that.  For  denying  the  spiritual  su- 
premacy of  the  pope,  fifty  thousand  Protestants  suffered  death 
on  St.  Bartholomew's ;  and  Servetus  was  burned  at  the  stake  by 
his  fellow  Protestants  for  maintaining  the  homoiousian  view  of 
the  nature  of  Christ,  in  opposition  to  the  orthodox  homoousian. 
In  the  same  spirit  we  have  seen  Hyacinthe  and  Dollinger  ex- 
communicated and  anathematized  for  denying  the  dogma  of 
infallibility. 

We  confess  no  approval  of  such  deeds  as  these ;  but  yet  are 
there  not  modern  and  Protestant  dogmas  upon  which  men 
ought  to  be  permitted  to  differ,  without  the  accusation  of  un- 
christian heresy  ?  Does  the  safety  of  Christianity  demand  that 
we  all  profess  a  uniform  belief  in  respect  to  the  specific  unity 
of  the  human  races ;  in  respect  to  the  method  of  human  crea- 
tion; in  respect  to  the  antiquity  of  man;  in  respect  to  the 
spiritual  condition  of  the  heathen ;  in  respect  to  baptismal  re- 


184  SOME  RELIGION  INEVITABLE. 

generation ;  in  respect  to  predestination,  .infant  salvation,  and 
apostolical  succession  ?  I  hold  it  to  be  perilous  to  the  interests 
of  fundamental  truth  to  stake  its  credibility  on  the  fortunes  of 
a  human  opinion. 

Now,  I  think  it  will  be  admitted  that  radical  skepticism, 
founded  on  any  such  pretexts  as  above  specified,  has  no  right 
to  existence  in  the  mind  of  any  man  who  professes  to  follow 
the  leading  of  reason.  The  light  of  reason,  when  we  discern 
it,  leads,  as  I  think  it  can  be  shown,  in  quite  the  contrary  di- 
rection. Let  us  look  about  us  in  this  light,  and  discover  where, 
in  the  realm  of  realities,  we  find  ourselves  situated.  We  shall 
not  attempt  to  elaborate  the  argument,  but  to  take  you  to  the 
top  of  a  mountain,  whence  you  can  survey  the  field.  You 
may  explore  it  hereafter  at  your  leisure. 

I.  The  Necessity  of  Some  Religion  is  upon  us. 

Few  men  have  brought  themselves  to  the  point  of  denying 
this.  Yet  this  admission  implies  much.  For  the  sake  of  learn- 
ing how  much,  let  us  review  the  evidences. 

Every  one  of  us  is  conscious  of  the  presence,  in  his  own 
mind,  of  certain  religious  notions,  sentiments,  and  impulses. 
These  may  differ,  in  different  persons,  in  every  particular  ex- 
cept two — 1st,  they  exist;  2d,  they  are  religious.  They  have 
a  Supreme  Intelligent  Power  for  their  object,  and  tend  to  ex- 
press themselves  in  certain  religious  acts.  This  religious  con- 
sciousness is  something  so  universal  in  Christian  communities, 
that  we  might  feel  justified  in  pronouncing  it  an  original  and 
indestructible  constituent  of  human  nature,  like  the  notion  of 
number  or  of  self-personality.  But,  as  it  is  easy  to  assert  that 
all  this  is  the  result  of  education,  let  us  take  a  wider  view,  and 
attempt  to  discover  the  natural  religious  status  of  man  with  the 
influence  of  education  eliminated. 

Taking  a  comprehensive  view  of  peoples  in  the  history  of 
the  world  who  have  attained  to  any  considerable  degree  of  in- 


EGYPTIAN  AND   CUSHITE  RELIGIONS.  185 

tellectual  activity,  we  can  not  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  universal 
exhibition  of  religious  phenomena.  The  religious  sentiment  has 
been  no  less  conspicuous  and  controlling  than  the  acquisitive 
or  the  maternal.  Out  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  great 
nations  that  have  rested  for  ages  in  isolation  from  their  neigh- 
bors have  grown  up  twelve  great  systems  which  have  domi- 
nated over  nine-tenths  of  the  populations  of  the  world.  Five 
of  these  have  originated  with  the  Aryan  race,  three  with  the 
Semitic,  two  with  the  Chinese,  and  one  each  with  the  Cushites 
and  the  Egyptians.  Besides  these,  the  Peruvian  and  Aztec  sys- 
tems of  religion,  if  we  may  rely  upon  the  Spanish  chroniclers, 
are  almost  equally  worthy  to  be  embraced  in  the  enumeration. 

Egypt,  the  seat  of.  the  oldest  civilization  which  the  world  has 
seen,  was  for  centuries  the  theatre  of  the  most  elaborate  cere- 
monials. The  very  government  of  the  country,  as  among  all 
primitive  peoples,  was  hierarchical — a  fact  which  of  itself  dem- 
onstrates the  dominance  of  the  religious  sentiments  in  the  an- 
cient land  of  Mizraim. 

The  Cushites,  who  belonged,  perhaps,  to  the  Turanian  race, 
planted,  2700  years  B.C.,  the  first  civilization  known  in  the  re- 
gion of  Susiana  and  Babylonia.  Invaded  and  gradually  ab- 
sorbed by  Phoenicians,  Babylonians,  and  Assyrians,  they  be- 
queathed their  religion,  as  well  as  their  civilization,  to  their  Se- 
mitic conquerors,  and  thus  perpetuated  their  religious  beliefs 
and  ceremonies  through  a  period  of  twenty-five  centuries. 

At  a  date  not  long  subsequent  to  the  rise  of  Cushite  civiliza- 
tion, Abraham  went  out  from  Ur  of  the  Chaldees,  an  old  Cush- 
ite city,  into  Egypt,  and  became  the  founder  of  the  Jewish  the- 
ocratic system,  which,  as  we  all  know,  usurped  all  political  func- 
tions, and  illustrated  in  Jewish  history  the  potency  of  the  re- 
ligious factor  of  human  nature. 

Out  of  Judaism  came  forth  Christianity,  the  second  great 
Semitic  religion.  We  have  nothing  to  do  here  with  the  divin- 
ity of  its  founder.  We  cite  Christianity  as  a  secular  phenom- 


186  SEMITIC  AND  ARYAN  RELIGIONS. 

enon,  illustrating  further  the  power  of  the  religious  instincts  to 
assert  themselves  and  control  the  lives  and  destinies  of  millions 
of  subjects.  According  to  Berghaus,  nearly  thirty -one  per 
cent,  of  the  population  of  the  globe  are  now  adherents  of  this 
system. 

Islamism  was  the  third  great  Semitic  religion,  springing  up 
six  hundred  years  after  Christ,  and  swaying  the  sceptre,  at  one 
time,  over  Arabia,  Persia,  Syria,  Jerusalem,  Egypt,  Spain,  Gaul, 
Asia  Minor,  and  Turkey.  In  later  periods  it  has  extended  into 
the  eastern  and  central  parts  of  Africa,  where  its  adherents 
number  one  hundred  millions  of  souls.  It  prevails  in  parts 
of  Russia,  in  Persia,  Afghanistan,  Beloochistan,  Tartary,  India, 
China,  and  the  Malay  Archipelago,  comprising  at  present  nearly 
sixteen  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  the  world. 

Of  Aryan  religions,  the  oldest  is  Brahmanism,  arising  about 
2000  B.C.,  spreading  over  India,  and  maintaining  sway,  in  our 
own  times,  over  more  than  thirteen  per  cent,  of  the  population 
of  the  world. 

Zoroastrianism  appeared  next.  It  was  originally  an  improved 
or  restored  Brahmanism,  and  is  still  perpetuated,  to  a  limited 
extent,  in  the  form  of  Parseeism.  It  had,  at  one  time,  extend- 
ed itself  so  far  as  to  threaten  to  become  the  religion  of  the 
East.  Had  the  battles  of  Marathon  and  Salamis  been  lost,  Ju- 
piter might  have  succumbed  to  Ormuzd,  and  Magianism  be- 
come the  worship  of  the  peninsula  and  isles  of  Greece. 

Buddhism  was  the  third  great  Aryan  religion.  It  rose  in 
the  North  of  India  about  477  B.C.  It  was  the  Protestantism 
of  the  Brahmanic  people,  marking  a  revulsion  of  the  religious 
instincts  of  humanity  from  the  corrupt  and  unsatisfying  wor- 
ship which  had  supplanted  primitive  Brahmanism.  It  holds 
powerful  sway  in  many  of  the  surrounding  countries,  and, 
though  itself  corrupted,  counts  among  its  adherents  thirty-one 
per  cent,  of  the  population  of  the  world. 

Hellenic  mythology  was  a  fourth  system  of  Aryan  religion, 


CONSTANT  FACTORS  IN  ETHNIC  RELIGIONS.         187 

first  embodied  in  forin  by  Hesiod,  and  afterward  greatly  en- 
riched by  Homer.  Whatever  we  may  think  of  it  as  a  human- 
itarian cultus,  the  religious  character  of  Greek  mythology  can 
not  be  gainsaid.  Nor  can  there  be  a  difference  of  opinion  in 
reference  to  the  pervading  character  of  its  influence  in  society, 
in  literature,  in  art,  and  in  political  life,  in  all  the  regions  to 
which  Grecian  dominion  extended. 

Among  religions  of  Mongolian  origin,  the  first  of  which  we 
have  any  knowledge,  is  Tao-ism,  founded  by  Lao-tse  about  600 
B.C.  This,  with  Confucianism,  which  arose  about  500  B.C.,  and 
Buddhism,  an  Aryan  religion,  constitute  the  three  great  state 
religions-  of  China  and  Japan,  with  their  hundreds  of  millions 
of  adherents. 

Now,  in  this  phenomenon  of  vast,  pervading,  and  persistent 
religious  systems,  we  have  a  fact  which  can  not  be  otherwise 
than  full  of  significance.  I  think  it  may  be  fairly  assumed 
that  no  such  general  expression  of  religious  feelings  and  beliefs 
would  have  been  at  all  likely  to  obtain,  had  there  not  been  a 
common  religious  principle  or  law  implanted  in  human  nature. 
But  scan  the  contents  of  these  ethnic  religions  carefully,  and 
what  do  we  find  to  be  the  common  properties  of  all  ?  I  have 
analyzed  these  systems  with  care  and  candor,  and,  after  elimi- 
nating every  thing  of  a  circumstantial  character,  I  have  found 
them  to  yield  me  the  following  constant  factors :  The  first 
great  fact  of  the  ethnic  religions  is  Deity ;  the  second  is  the 
sense  of  Moral  Obligation;  the  third  is  faith  in  Immortali- 
ty; the  fourth  is  Prayer;  the  fifth  is  Sacred  Symbolism;  the 
sixth  is  a  body  of  Sacred  Writings.  These  great  facts  —  the 
preambles  of  the  Christian  system — are  no  more  the  peculiar 
property  of  Christianity  than  of  Islam  or  Buddhism.  These 
primitive  faiths  are  absolutely  the  common  possession  of  hu- 
manity— if  we  neglect  the  tenth  part  of  the  race  resting  in  a 
state  of  savagism.  We  must  feel  compelled  to  admit  that  the 
Author  of  our  nature  has  implanted  a  body  of  intuitions,  which 


188  RELIGIOUS  NATURE  OF  SAVAGES. 

lead  universally  and  necessarily  to  the  formulating*  of  a  body  of 
doctrines  which  constitute  the  very  marrow  of  the  religion  of 
Christianity. 

But  we  summon  the  barbaric  hordes  to  render  a  similar  tes- 
timony. It  has  been  repeatedly  asserted  that  some  of  the  low- 
est tribes  of  savages  are  utterly  destitute  of  religious  ideas. 
Now,  if  this  were  proved  true,  the  state  of  the  facts  might  be 
that  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  thousandths  of  the  human 
family  are  known  to  manifest  such  ideas,  while  one  thousandth 
are  incapable  of  making  any  definable  religious  manifestations. 
The  nine  hundred  and  ninety -nine  thousandths  embrace  all 
the  normally  developed  representatives  of  humanity,  while  the 
one  thousandth  consists  of  a  few  squalid,  miserable  outcasts,  in 
whom  it  is  almost  equally  difficult  to  discern  an  intellect  above 
that  of  the  brute.  Now,  who  can  honestly  hesitate  to  decide 
which  fraction  represents  the  norm  of  humanity  ?  Which  frac- 
tion has  the  right  to  testify  for  humanity  ? 

But  I  do  not  desire  to  leave  the  subject  even  in  this  position. 
I  have  critically  and  patiently  examined  the  evidences  in  re- 
spect to  all  those  tribes  reported  destitute  of  religious  ideas, 
and  these  are  my  conclusions  on  the  general  subject  of  the  re- 
ligion of  savages : 

1.  Travelers  report  nearly  all  savages  with  whom  they  have 
had  intercourse   as  addicted  to  some  kind  of  religious  prac- 
tices. 

2.  Christian  missionaries  have  often  reported  savages  desti- 
tute of  religion,  when  a  careful  study  of  the  facts  has  shown 
simply  that  their  religious  practices  were  abhorrent  to  Chris- 
tianity.    In  citing  and  execrating  these  unchristian  rites,  these 
missionaries  do  virtually  testify  to  the  existence  of  the  religious 
principle  among  them. 

3.  Other  travelers,  irreverent  toward  Christianity,  have  simi- 
larly reported  a  destitution  of  all  religion,  because  they  have 
failed  to  discern  the  essentially  religious  character  of  certain 


GRADES  OF  RELIGIOUS  INTELLIGENCE.  189 

rites  and  observances  which  to  civilized  eyes  are  vicious,  cruel, 
or  absurd. 

4.  Of  some  tribes  reported  without  religion,  it  is  certain  that 
our  information  is  yet  insufficient  to  enable  us  to  assert  a  neg- 
ative opinion. 

5.  But  three  tribes  are  known  to  me,  of  whom  I  should  con- 
sider it  a  fair  representation  of  the  ascertained  facts  to  assert 
that  no  religious  consciousness  has  been  discovered.    These  are 
the  Andamaners,  the  Gran  Chacos  of  South  America,  and  the 
Araf uras  of  Vorkay. 

6.  The  religious  condition  of  savages  presents  us,  as  might 
be  expected,  a  graduated  scale  of  religious  intelligence.      The 
higher  savages  recognize,  more  or  less  distinctly,  the  existence 
of  one  supreme,  beneficent  Creator,  with  or  without  the  notion 
of  a  devil,  but  accompanied,  generally,  by  a  belief  in  many  sub- 
ordinate deities.     In  the  next  step  below,  the  idea  of  one  be- 
neficent Deity  becomes  more  or  less  vague ;  but  the  belief  in 
good  and  evil  spirits  is  controlling.     In  the  third  grade,  all  no- 
tions of  a  beneficent  Deity  disappear,  and  the  Supreme  Power 
assumes  the  character  of  a  malignant  divinity.     This  faith  is 
generally  accompanied  by  a  belief  in  subordinate  divinities.    In 
the  fourth  grade,  the  evil  deity  is  superseded  by  an  undefined 
faith  in  many  evil  but  powerful  spirits.     In  the  fifth  grade,  the 
notion  of  spirits  of  every  kind  becomes  extremely  vague,  and 
nothing  remains  but  a  sensus  numinis — an  undefined  senti- 
ment of  the  supernatural.     In  the  sixth  and  lowest  grade,  we 
detect  no  trace  of  a  consciousness  of  any  existence  above  them- 
selves and  the  material  objects  by  which  they  are  surrounded. 
Through  all  these  grades,  except  the  lowest,  a  belief  in  future 
existence  accompanies  the  theistic  concept ;  and  some  form  of 
worship  is  everywhere  present,  varying  from  prayer  and  the  use 
of  temples  and  altars,  through  adoration  of  sun,  moon,  stars, 
mountains,  elements,  as  the  divine  embodiments  and  interces- 
sors, to  rude  sacrifices,  sorcery,  and  witchcraft. 


190  RELIGION  OF  THE  STONE -FOLK. 

And  all  this  is  our  conclusion  in  reference  to  that  one-tenth 
of  the  human  family  not  embraced  under  the  influence  and  con- 
trol of  one  of  the  twelve  great  ethnic  religions. 

But  my  researches  have  led  me  even  farther  than  this.  We 
have  gained  some  intimations  of  the  religious  character  of  peo- 
ples whose  existence  antedates  all  our  histories  and  traditions. 
Among  the  relics  of  the  Hewn -stone  Age  we  find  ruined 
hearths,  with  the  remnants  of  the  feasts  which  commemorated 
the  dead,  in  accordance  with  a  custom  still  extant  in  China ; 
and,  mingled  with  the  bones  of  the  dead,  are  arrow-heads  and 
trinkets  which,  like  the  beads  and  hatchets  of  the  American  In- 
dians, were  undoubtedly  votive  offerings,  intelligibly  proclaim- 
ing a  belief  that  the  departed  had  not  passed  beyond  the  sphere 
of  consciousness,  but  still  lived  in  another  land.  In  the  Pol- 
ished-stone Age  these  evidences  become  more  positive,  and  are 
accompanied  by  relics  of  rude  inclosures  which,  to  our  eyes, 
seem  prophetic  of  the  temple-building  of  later  times.  In  the 
Bronze  Age  we  find,  added  to  all  the  foregoing  evidences,  the 
ruins  of  massive  temples — as  at  Stonehenge  and  Abury,  in  En- 
gland— in  which  primitive  men  seem  to  have  assembled  to  pay 
worship  to  the  supreme  power  to  whose  mercy  they  consigned 
their  dead  in  the  populous  burial-places  with  which  they  sur- 
rounded their  rude  temples. 

This  array  of  evidences,  it  seems  to  me,  ought  to  be  regard- 
ed as  conclusive  that  the  religious  instinct  is  native  to  man. 
There  are  certain  ethical  propositions  in  which  all  mankind  are 
agreed.  Man  is  gifted  by  nature  with  certain  religious  intui- 
tions which,  as  all  intuitions  must  do,  have  exerted  a  control- 
ling influence  over  his  life.  In  other  words,  man  is  created  for 
religion,  adapted  to  religion,  predisposed  to  religion ;  and  this 
is  the  key  to  the  religious  phenomena  of  the  race.  It  is  futile 
to  ignore  the  evidences  or  resist  the  religious  law  of  our  being. 
Whether  there  be  a  God  or  not ;  whether  prayer  be  futile  or 
not ;  whether  hope  of  hereafter  be  vain  or  not ;  whether  devo- 


THE  INTUITIONS.  191 

tions  and  rites  be  absurd  or  not,  all  this  is  contemplated  and  de- 
termined and  ordained  in  the  constitution  of  our  nature.  And 
so,  I  repeat,  the  necessity  of  some  religion  is  upon  us. 

II.  Constructive  or  Deductive  Theistic  Belief. 

To  most  minds  it  would  be  sufficient  to  have  proved  that  re- 
ligion is  the  law  of  human  existence.  No  question  of  the  va- 
lidity and  binding  character  of  the  law  would  be  entertained. 
Deity,  and  the  fundamental  propositions  which  depend  upon 
divine  existence,  would  be  at  once  conceded.  But,  in  reality,  a 
vast  field  of  positive  evidence  remains  to  be  examined.  The 
theistic  proposition,  with  all  its  corollaries,  may  be  built  upon 
the  intuitions  of  the  reason ;  and  I  proceed  to  sketch  the  meth- 
od by  which  the  idea  of  God  may  be  logically  constructed. 

By  intuitions  of  the  reason,  we  mean  those  apperceptions  of 
simple  truths  which  are  common  to  all  human  intelligences : 
like  the  intuition  of  externality ;  the  intuition  of  self ;  the  in- 
tuition of  causality ;  the  intuition  of  reality  or  substance.  They 
are  the  most  elementary  propositions,  like  the  axioms  of  math- 
ematics, into  which  all  complex  knowledges,  on  analysis,  resolve 
themselves.  Like  the  axioms  of  mathematics,  these  proposi- 
tions are  self-evident.  They  neither  require  proof  nor  admit 
of  proof.  We  do  not  believe  them  because  they  have  been 
proved  or  taught.  We  intuit  the  truth  of  them,  and  believe 
them  because  we  feel  that  we  must.  It  is  only  a  belief — a 
primitive  elementary  belief — and  yet  we  feel  that  it  is  knowl- 
edge ;  there  is  no  knowledge  of  which  we  are  more  certain,  or 
upon  which  we  feel  it  more  safe  to  rest. 

Great  care  must  be  exercised  in  determining  what  beliefs  are 
really  primordial.  The  criteria  generally  relied  upon  are  uni- 
versality and  necessity. 

These  beliefs,  we  say,  are  spontaneous.  But  we  must  have 
the  candor  to  admit  that  a  certain  school  of  philosophers,  from 
Locke  to  J.  S.  Mill,  maintain  that  they  come  to  us  from  with- 

9 


192  THE  INTUITIONS  INNATE. 

out.  We  can  not,  of  coarse,  argue  the  question  at  length,  but 
we  may  make  note  of  the  following  points :  1.  The  onus  pro- 
bandi  rests  with  the  sensationalists.  2.  These  beliefs  bear  no 
quantitative  nor  qualitative  relation  to  experience;  being  as 
clear  and  controlling  in  the  infant  as  in  the  adult,  in  the 
savage  as  in  the  philosopher.  3.  If  all  primitive  beliefs  are 
grounded  in  observation,  certainty  in  any  universal  proposition 
is  an  impossibility ;  and  yet  no  one  asks  to  be  more  confident 
of  any  truth  than  that  "  the  whole  of  a  thing  is  equal  to  the 
sum  of  all  its  parts,"  or  that  "every  change  is  the  effect  of 
some  adequate  cause."  4.  Since,  on  the  sensational  hypothe- 
sis, we  could  not  construct  universal  propositions  possessing 
absolute  certainty,  every  step  we  should  take  in  the  progress  of 
an  argument  would  lead  us  farther  and  farther  from  certainty. 
And  yet,  in  the  demonstration  of  a  proposition  in  geometry, 
we  feel  that  every  step  is  immovably  secure,  and  the  conclu- 
sion as  certain  as  the  axioms  on  which  it  rests.  5.  On  the  sen- 
sational hypothesis,  I  could  have  no  certain  knowledge  of  sub- 
stance or  reality.  I  should  float  in  a  world  of  appearances, 
without  being  able  to  make  a  single  affirmation  that  would 
yield  me  the  satisfaction  of  certainty.  6.  Certain  primitive 
beliefs,  like  that  in  the  existence  of  space  and  time,  can  not 
possibly  be  the  sequences  of  experience.  Space  and  time  are 
not  the  objects  of  experience ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  as  Kant 
has  observed,  they  are  the  antecedent  conditions  of  the  possi- 
bility of  experience.  7.  The  idea  of  cause  can  not  possibly  be 
referred  to  experience,  since  that,  at  best,  would  afford  us  only 
a  strong  presumption  that  any  given  effect  had  a  cause ;  while, 
in  fact,  we  feel  the  most  unreserved  certainty  that  every  effect 
has  a  cause.  8.  The  whole  doctrine  of  sensationalism  rests 
upon  a  petitio  principiit  since  the  primitive  beliefs  are  the  very 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  experience.  Experience  implies 
that  we  know  the  consciousness  has  been  impressed  by  some- 
thing; but  this  knowledge  is  the  very  intuition  which  J.  S.  Mill 


AUTHORITY  OF  INTUITIONS.  193 

proposes  to  set  down  as  the  result  of  experience.  Now,  it  is 
obvious  that  if  intuition  is  the  necessary  antecedent  of  experi- 
ence, it  can  not  be  the  necessary  sequent  of  experience. 

For  such  reasons,  briefly  stated,  I  maintain  that  the  primitive 
beliefs  found  in  existence  in  all  minds  are  spontaneous,  inborn, 
and  necessary. 

The  question  of  the  authority  of  these  beliefs  is  still  another 
one.  Suppose  they  are  inborn,  what  do  they  mean?  Do  they 
correspond  to  realities?  Do  they  represent  things  as  they  are? 
If  all  men  must  believe  in  a  world  external  to  themselves,  are 
we  certain  that  such  a  world  is  a  reality?  If  I  must  believe 
that  every  event  or  change  implies  a  cause,  have  I  warrant  for 
assuming  that  this  belief  corresponds  to  the  reality  of  things? 
This  is  a  question  of  the  utmost  importance.  Few  philoso- 
phers, whatever  their  opinion  of  the  origin  of  these  beliefs, 
have  had  the  temerity  to  impeach  their  authority.  As  before, 
it  is  impracticable  to  argue  the  question  here,  but  I  may  offer, 
again,  a  few  considerations. 

1.  There  are  some  intuitions  which  can  not  be  questioned 
without  involving  the  questioner  in  self -stultification.  In  every 
act  of  consciousness  there  is  a  dual  character — first,  the  con- 
sciousness of  self  as  thinking;  and,  second,  the  consciousness  of 
something  not  self.  The  first  belief  in  logical  order  is  the  be- 
lief in  the  reality  of  the  act  of  consciousness.  Now,  if  I  doubt 
the  reality  of  the  act  of  consciousness,  I  must  be  conscious  of 
some  contradiction  or  absurdity  upon  which  I  may  base  a 
doubt ;  so  that,  in  the  very  act  of  denying  the  testimony  of 
consciousness,  I  must  appeal  to  consciousness  for  proof.  The 
doubt  annihilates  itself.  It  is  impossible  to  doubt  the  author- 
ity of  consciousness  in  this  case.  From  similar  considerations 
appears  the  self -stultification  of  doubting  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness in  respect  to  the  reality  of  that  which  is  not  self. 

In  regard  to  the  contents  pf  consciousness,  or  the  particular 
knowledge  or  report  brought  by  consciousness,  this  witness  is 


194  AUTHORITY  OF  INTUITIONS. 

not  necessarily  veracious ;  and  we  have  to  examine  its  credibil- 
ity. Our  belief  in  its  testimony  is,  however,  one  of  the  primi- 
tive beliefs  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  it  must  stand  or  fall  with 
the  others. 

2.  The  validity  of  the  primitive  beliefs  ought  to  be  pre- 
sumed until  the  contrary  is  proved.     The  universal  assent  of 
mankind,  the  impossibility  of  mental  or  bodily  activity  not 
predicated  on  the  validity  of  these  beliefs,  afford  the  strongest 
presumption  that  they  correspond  to  realities. 

3.  They  exert  the  most  absolute  control  over  our  lives.     We 
rest  upon  them  with  the  most  unreserved  confidence.    I  believe 
the  external  world  a  reality,  and  shape  every  act  by  that  con- 
viction.    I  have  a  representation  of  a  past  sensation,  and  call 
it  a  recollection,  and  fully  believe  the  representation  truthful ; 
I  take  my  oath  upon  it ;  I  stake  my  life  upon  it. 

4.  These  beliefs,  or  intuitions,  are  closely  analogous  to  the 
instincts  of  the  lower  animals.     The  instincts  act  as  regulative 
and  controlling  principles  of  the  actions  of  the  animal ;  and  no 
one  thinks  of  asserting  that  they  do  not  answer  to  certain  real- 
ities to  which  they  are  correlated.     The  primitive  beliefs  are 
equally  regulative  and  controlling  principles  of  human  actions. 
They  are,  in  truth,  a  species  of  instinct  of  the  reason,  and  we 
are  bound  to  presume  they  answer  equally  to  realities  in  the 
world  in  which  we  are  placed. 

5.  The  primitive  beliefs  establish  a  complex  and  wonderful, 
but  beneficent,  correlation  between  man  and  the  world  in  which 
he  seems  to  live ;  or,  rather,  they  give  efficiency  to  a  correlation 
already  existing.     Now,  can  it  be  admitted  that  a  body  of  be- 
liefs, whose  activity  opens  a  field  of  co-ordinations  so  compli- 
cated, so  vast,  so  admirable,  and  so  beneficent,  and  whose  ac- 
tivity only  saves  all  that  is  from  a  state  of  nugatoriness,  is,  aft- 
er all,  but  a  body  of  beliefs  which  mislead  us,  and  answer  to 
nothing  which  is  real  ?  a  vast  machinery  without  a  real  object 
to  act  upon,  or  a  real  end  to  be  sought  in  its  action  ? 


CONSEQUENCE  OF  DENIAL.  195 

6.  If  I  deny  the  veracity  of  consciousness  as  to  the  external 
world,  I  abandon  all  evidence  that  the  world  appears  to  me  as 
it  is — nay,  I  have  no  evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  external 
world;  I  must  ever  remain  in  doubt  whether  these  are  real 
trees,  and  skies,  and  persons,  and  voices,  or  merely  images  flit- 
ting before  my  consciousness,  like  the  phantasms  of  a  diseased 
vision.  Nay,  worse  than  this;  if  consciousness  is  a  false  wit- 
ness in  respect  to  external  objects,  it  may  be  equally  false  in 
respect  to  subjective  reality.  I  do  not  know  even  that  I  suffer, 
or  move,  or  think.  To  my  own  existence  even  I  can  not  cer- 
tify. I  seem  to  be  something,  surrounded  by  something,  and 
engaged  in  doing  something ;  but  all  this  seeming  may  be  illu- 
sory. I  can  only  assert  that  phantasms  exist ;  nay,  I  can  not 
even  assert  this,  for  my  consciousness  of  phantasms  may  be  il- 
lusory. Alas !  could  a  more  pitiable  condition  of  a  rational  in- 
telligence be  conceived  ?  Yet  this  is  the  logical  consequence  of 
denying,  in  a  single  particular,  the  authority  of  consciousness. 
Hear  what  Fichte  says,  who  followed  out  this  dreary  philoso- 
phy to  its  issue : 

"  I  know  absolutely  nothing  of  any  existence,  not  even  my 
own.  I  myself  know  nothing,  and  am  nothing.  Images  there 
are;  they  constitute  all  that  apparently  exists;  and  what  they 
know  of  themselves  is  after  the  manner  of  images  —  images 
that  pass  and  vanish  without  there  being  aught  to  witness  their 
transition — that  consist,  in  fact,  of  the  images  of  images,  with- 
out significance  and  without  aim.  I  am  myself  one  of  these 
images ;  nay,  I  am  not  even  thus  much,  but  only  a  confused 
image  of  images." 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  state  that  no  philosopher  has  car- 
ried such  a  philosophy  into  consistent  practice.  Even  in  his 
speculations,  Fichte  reached,  at  length,  a  sounder  conclusion. 
In  his  "Practical  Philosophy,"  written  later  in  life,  he  says: 
"  I  have  found  the  instrument  by  which  to  seize  on  this  reality, 
and  therewith,  in  all  likelihood,  on  every  other.  *  *  *  The  in- 


196  INTUITION  OF  DEITY  VALID. 

strument  I  mean  is  Belief.  *  *  *  All  my  conviction  is  only 
Belief."  And  so  the  prince  of  doubters  came  around,  in  his 
old  age,  to  the  position  which  we  shall  be  safe  in  assuming  at 
the  outset. 

Now,  let  us  make  an  application  of  the  positions  proved. 
We  have  shown  that  the  human  mind  finds  itself  in  possession 
of  certain  primitive  beliefs,  which  are  the  ultimate  constituents 
of  all  that  which  we  call  knowledge.  We  have  shown  that 
these  beliefs  arise  spontaneously  from  within,  and  are  not  the 
outgrowth  or  consequence  of  external  conditions.  We  have 
shown  that  it  is  necessary  to  accord  them  absolute  authority; 
and  that,  consequently,  they  correspond  to  realities,  about  which 
it  is  futile,  absurd,  and  impossible  to  entertain  doubts.  We 
have  shown  that  among  the  primitive  and  universal  beliefs  of 
man  is  the  belief  in  divine  existence  and  its  corollaries.  It  fol- 
lows, therefore,  that  divine  existence  is  a  reality ;  and  all  those 
propositions  of  the  ethnic  religions  which  cluster  around  it  and 
flow  out  of  it  are  propositions  which  answer  to  realities,  and 
which  a  sound  philosophy  calls  upon  us  to  accept. 

I  have  assumed  that  the  theistic  notion  is  primitively  a  di- 
rect intuition.  I  have  reflected  much  upon  the  subject.  I  find 
myself  in  accord  with  Jacobi  and  Schleiermacher,  and  probably 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  in  this  respect.  I  entertain  a  strength- 
ening conviction  that  by  no  other  means  could  rude  savages 
rise  to  any  notion  of  divine  existence.  Yet  there  is  a  less  di- 
rect method  by  which  reason  may  ascend  through  a  brief,  spon- 
taneous, deductive  process  to  the  theistic  concept.  Let  us  ex- 
amine the  steps. 

The  intuition  of  real  being  leads  to  the  affirmation  of  such 
axiomatic  judgments  as  the  following:  "Every  quality  im- 
plies substance  to  which  it  belongs  ;"  "  Every  attribute  implies 
real  being."  A  moment's  reflection  will  show  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  conceive  the  contraries  of  such  propositions.  They 
necessarily  condition  all  thought.  But,  from  what  we  have 


INTUITION  OF  CAUSALITY.  197 

shown,  these  propositions  must  not  only  seem  true,  but  must 
be  true. 

The  intuition  of  causality  leads  to  the  affirmation  of  the  axi- 
omatic judgment  that  "  Every  effect  implies  an  adequate  cause." 
The  intuition  of  effect  as  depending  upon  cause  is  accompa- 
nied by  the  notion  of  conditioned  existence.  The  relation  of 
effect  to  cause  suggests  a  remoter  cause  of  which  the  first  cause 
was  the  effect;  and,  similarly,  the  remoter  cause  is  presented 
as  sustaining  the  relation  of  effect  to  a  cause  still  more  remote ; 
and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  The  simple  intuition  of  causality, 
therefore,  leaves  us  at  last  with  an  endless  series  of  effects  still 
unaccounted  for.  Or  perhaps,  more  correctly,  we  have  no  in- 
tuition of  real  cause,  but  only  of  secondary  cause,  until  we 
reach  the  notion  of  primordial  causation.  This  notion  sat- 
isfies the  reason ;  and,  though  we  can  give  no  account  of  its 
mode  of  existence,  we  rest  satisfied  in  the  belief  that  efficient 
or  primordial  causation  is  a  fact.  The  notion  of  primordial 
causation  is  accompanied  by  the  notion  of  unconditioned  exist- 
ence ;  and  this  is  accompanied  by  the  notion  of  infinity.  I  do 
not  mean  to  assert  that  this  is  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  in- 
finity ;  I  only  desire  it  to  appear  that  this  notion  exists  among 
the  notions  which  cluster  around  the  intuition  of  causality. 

We  might  pause  here  and  apply  these  principles  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe.  Here  is  a  series  of  effects.  Trace 
them  to  their  causes,  and  these,  in  turn,  put  on  the  character 
of  effects.  Thus  the  universe  appears,  at  first,  an  endless  chain 
of  events  sustaining  mutually  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect. 
But  now  arises  the  notion  of  primordial  causation,  uncondition- 
ed existence,  and  infinity ;  and  the  mind  feels  relief  in  ascribing 
the  chain  of  events  to  unconditioned  primordial  power.  This 
is  the  "^Etiological  Argument."  The  ontological  intuition  now 
assigns  primordial  power  to  real  existence,  and  we  have  a  faith- 
ful concept  of  an  Infinite,  Unconditioned,  Causative  Being. 

In  the  next  place,  the  intuition  of  intelligence  leads  to  the 


198  OTHER  INTUITIONS. 

affirmation  of  such  axiomatic  judgments  as  these :  "Adaptation 
of  means  to  ends  implies  intelligence ;"  "  Contrivance  implies 
intelligence ;"  "  Correlation  of  ideas  implies  intelligence."  Ap- 
plying these  principles  to  the  universe,  we  are  led  to  declare 
that  every  instance  of  mechanism  in  the  animal  economy  is  the 
product  of  intelligence.  Organic  contrivances  are  suited  to  par- 
ticular ends,  because  intelligence  so  ordained.  This  is  the  "  Te- 
leological  Argument."  The  ontological  intuition  transfers  this 
intelligence  to  real  being,  and  we  have  an  Intelligent  Being  as 
the  author  of  organic  contrivances.  Again,  the  relationships 
of  plan  and  method  which  subsist  among  animals  of  different 
orders  and  classes,  and  between  the  successive  stages  of  an  evo- 
lution in  the  organic  or  inorganic  world,  are  evidences  of  the 
exercise  of  intelligence ;  and  here  we  have  what  I  have  called 
the  "  Homological  Argument,"  which  reaches  real  being,  as  be- 
fore, through  the  ontological  intuition. 

Next,  we  have  the  intuition  of  ethicality,  which  leads  to  the 
affirmation  that  certain  acts  are  essentially  right,  and  others  es- 
sentially wrong.  This  is  accompanied  by  the  notion  of  duty 
or  obligation ;  and  this  implies  a  tribunal  which  imposes  the 
obligation — an  authority  which  must  not  be  evaded.  The  on- 
tological intuition  implants  this  authority  in  real  being,  and  we 
reach  the  concept  of  supreme  justice  and  a  Moral  Governor. 
This  law  of  justice  we  find  exemplified  in  the  world  of  jiature 
and  humanity.  This  may  be  styled  the  "  Ethical  Argument." 

Finally,  we  discover  in  our  minds  the  intuition  of  goodness — 
that  is,  goodness  is  a  quality  the  notion  of  which  arises  sponta- 
neously. It  forms  the  rational  basis  of  prayer,  and  supposes 
that  justice  is  approachable  for  forgiveness.  We  look  about  us 
in  the  world  of  nature,  and  discover  numerous  relations  exist- 
ing which  are  distinctly  beneficent.  They  are  inwrought  in  the 
contrivances  and  plans  of  creation.  We  affirm,  therefore,  that 
here  are  not  only  evidences  of  intelligence,  but  also  of  good- 
ness. Thus  we  reach  an  argument  which  may  be  styled  the 


DEDUCTIVE  CONCLUSION.  199 

" Agaihologvcol"  The  intuition  of  real  being  transfers  the  at- 
tribute of  goodness  to  an  entity,  and  we  get  the  concept  of  a 
Being  possessed  of  goodness  as  vast  as  the  creation. 

Now,  finally,  summing  up  the  results,  we  find  that  these  four 
primordial  intuitions — the  intuition  of  causality,  the  intuition 
of  intelligence,  the  intuition  of  ethicality,  and  the  intuition  of 
goodness,  supply  our  minds  with  the  necessary  concepts  of  in- 
finite power,  infinite  intelligence,  infinite  justice,  and  infinite 
goodness ;  while  the  intuition  of  real  being  affirms  that  these 
are  necessarily  the  attributes  of  a  real  being — and  that  being, 
endowed  with  these  attributes,  is  God.  The  Deity,  then,  which 
exists  in  the  sanctions  of  the  reason  is  a  Real  Being,  a  First 
Cause,  a  Moral  Governor,  unconditioned  and  infinite  in  intelli- 
gence and  goodness,  and  approachable  by  prayer. 

This,  I  confess,  is  but  a  bare  outline  of  the  method  of  the 
rational  argument.  I  fear  the  subject  is  too  abstruse  to  be  en- 
tertaining, but  I  shall  not  regret  it  if  I  have  given  you  occasion 
for  close  attention  and  subsequent  study. 

III.  Deductions  from  the  Theistic  Proposition. 

We  thus  arrive  at  the  formal  proposition  that  God  exists — 
God,  infinite;  unconditioned,  without  beginning  of  years;  the 
cause  of  all  things ;  the  fountain  of  justice  and  of  moral  law ; 
as  infinite  in  goodness  as  in  power ;  pleased  to  cause  happiness 
or  to  remove  distress ;  apprecable  by  those  who  have  merited 
the  frown  of  his  justice,  or  have  fallen  into  the  pit  of  suffer- 
ing. How  much  is  implied  in  this  conclusion !  And  yet  we 
are  bound  to  it.  Whether  an  intuition  direct,  or  a  spontane- 
ous, deductive  conclusion  from  the  axioms  of  reason,  we  know 
not  how  to  evade  it.  The  conviction  of  its  truth  comes  into 
our  minds — imbeds  itself  there ;  it  sets  up  a  dominion  there ; 
it  sways  a  sceptre  over  our  lives,  and  over  all  human  lives. 
And,  still  more,  we  are  glad  to  receive  it:  we  give  it  hospital- 
ity, and  it  comforts  us;  it  resolves  our  doubts;  it  dissipates 

9* 


200  REAL  DEITY,  THOUGH  "UNTHINKABLE." 

our  fears ;  it  affords  a  resting-place  for  the  reason  and  the  con- 
science ;  nay,  we  rejoice  with  joy  unspeakable  to  have  found  a 
way  to  a  solution  of  the  mysteries  which  surround  us ;  to  have 
reached  a  Being  who  is  both  a  potentate  and  a  friend,  and 
whose  character  answers  to  all  the  deepest  longings  of  the  hu- 
man soul.  Oh,  how  many  millions  have  been  comforted  in 
leaning  upon  this  arm!  How  many  hearts  have  been  eased 
in  breathing  the  passionate  or  the  tender  requests  of  trusting 
prayer !  How  blank,  and  desolate,  and  utterly  miserable  would 
the  world  of  humanity  be  without  this  faith ! 

How  irrelevant,  how  heartless,  to  be  reminded  that  all  this 
is  something  which  we  can  not  understand,  and  to  which,  there- 
fore, we  can  not  yield  a  rational  assent !  What  boots  it  that 
the  method  of  divine  existence  be  all  "unthinkable?"  that  the 
act  of  creation  from  nothing  is  "  unthinkable  ?"  that  the  world 
is  governed  by  immutable  law,  and  our  feeble  prayers  must  be 
futile  ?  Shall  we  abandon  the  citadel  we  have  won  because  un- 
able to  carry  it  on  our  backs?  We  make  no  pretense  of  com- 
prehending God  and  his  ways ;  but  we  feel  certified  of  certain 
predicates  respecting  God.  Nor  does  reason  demand  that  a 
proposition  shall  be  comprehended  before  we  can  yield  it  a  ra- 
tional assent.  We  have  followed  the  lead  of  reason  in  reach- 
ing a  proposition  which  is  "unthinkable."  Indeed,  we  can 
give  to  thought  no  exposition  of  the  grounds  of  a  single  one 
of  our  primitive  beliefs.  Shall  we  renounce  them  because  their 
ground  is  "unthinkable  ?"  Shall  we  deny  infinite  space  because 
"unthinkable,"  or  infinite  duration?  Finite  space  and  finite 
duration  are  equally  "  unthinkable ;"  and  yet,  are  we  not  cer- 
tain that  time  and  space  are  either  finite  or  infinite  ?  Let  us 
stick  to  our  conquests ;  we  have  won  them  fairly. 

But  we  must  go  farther.  We  have  found  out  a  Being  infi- 
nitely powerful,  wise,  and  good.  We  know  another  being  finite, 
imperfect,  and  consciously  responsible  to  the  first  for  all  his 
acts.  We  find  this  finite  being  infinitely  correlated  to  the  infi- 


PROBABILITY  OF  REVELATION.  201 

nite  one — the  product  of  his  creation  ;  dependent ;  an  offender 
against  his  justice ;  the  recipient  of  his  goodness ;  hopeful  of 
his  mercy ;  aspiring  to  present  and  future  happiness.  We  find 
him  longing  for  communion  with  a  loving  God  ;  a  loving  God 
desiring  communion  with  him,  and  having  all  power  at  his  con- 
trol for  opening  communion  with  his  feeble  subject.  What,  now, 
I  ask,  is  probable  in  the  case  ?  What  is  probable  if  we  reason 
as  in  a  court  of  justice  in  reference  to  the  influence  of  motives  ? 

1.  It  is  probable  that  this  communion  will  be  established. 
It  will  not  be  alone  the  voice  of  prayer  ascending  from  the 
subject  to  the  ear  of  God.     It  will  be  also  a  response  coming 
down  to  the  consciousness  of  the  petitioner.     It  will  be  a  com- 
munication of  good  tidings,  of  good-will,  and  of  providential 
purposes.    This  will  be  the  common  privilege  of  humanity.    In 
exceptional  cases  it  will  become  remarkably  clear  and  complete. 

2.  It  is  probable  that,  in  the  history  of  the  world,  numerous 
instances  would  occur  in  which  these  extraordinary  communi- 
cations would  be  put  on  record,  and  preserved  as  written  reve- 
lations from  God ;  and  that  bodies  of  such  writings  would  be- 
come the  sacred  books  of  the  peoples  to  whom  they  were  com- 
municated. 

3.  There  is  no  antecedent  improbability  that  these  commu- 
nications would  come  to  representatives  of  various  races  and 
peoples.    Infinite  goodness  would  be  as  likely  to  favor  one  race 
as  another ;  and  no  race  would  be  expected  to  perform  the  su- 
perhuman work  of  consulting  the  records  of  all  the  other  races 
in  search  of  the  mind  of  God. 

"  Who  shall  say  that  to  no  mortal 
Heaven  e'er  oped  its  mystic  portal, 
Gave  no  dream  or  revelation 
Save  to  one  peculiar  nation  ? 
Souls  sincere,  now  voiceless,  nameless, 
Knelt  at  altars  fired  and  flameless, 
Asked  of  Nature,  asked  of  Reason, 
Sought  through  every  sign  and  season, 


202  REVELATION  TO  THE  "GENTILES." 

Seeking  God ;  through  darkness  groping, 

Waiting,  striving,  longing,  hoping, 

Weeping,  praying,  panting,  pining, 

For  the  light  on  Israel  shining ! 

Oh,  it  must  be !  God's  sweet  kindness 

Pities  erring  human  blindness ; 

And  the  soul  whose  pure  endeavor 

Strives  toward  God,  shall  live  forever ; 

Live  by  the  great  Father's  favor, 

Saved  by  an  unheard-of  Saviour.'^1) — G.  L.  TATLOE. 

4.  It  would  unavoidably  be  the  case  that  these  communi- 
cations would  be  somewhat  tinctured  by  the  human  media 
through  which  they  should  come.  They  would  necessarily 
suffer  from  the  imperfections  of  the  human  intellect;  the 
cloudiness  of  the  spiritual  apprehensions  which  should  take 
hold  on  the  thoughts  of  God,  and  the  defects  of  human  lan- 
guages. It  would  follow  that  the  most  spiritually  minded  na- 
tion or  race  would  receive  the  purest  and  completest  revelation 
of  the  mind  of  Deity. 

(')  St.  Clement  of  Alexandria  regards  the  Greek  philosophy  as  proba- 
bly given  by  inspiration.  "  Perchance,  too,  philosophy  was  given  .to  the 
Greeks  directly  and  primarily,  till  the  Lord  should  call  the  Greeks" 
(Strom.,  book  i.,  chap.  v.).  *  *  *  "  But  all  [the  philosophers],  in  my  opin- 
ion, are  illuminated  by  the  dawn  of  light "  (Strom.,  book  i.,  chap.  xiii.).  *  *  * 
"So,  then,  the  barbarian  and  Hellenic  philosophy  has  torn  off  a  fragment 
of  eternal  truth  "  (Strom.,  book  i.,  chap.  xiii.).  In  his  "  Exhortation  to  the 
Heathen,"  after  quoting  admiringly  from  Plato,  Antisthenes,  Socrates,  Xen- 
ophon,  Cleanthes,  and  the  Pythagoreans,  he  concludes  as  follows  :  "  For 
the  knowledge  of  God,  these  utterances,  written  by  those  we  have  men- 
tioned, through  the  inspiration  of  God,  and  selected  by  us,  may  suffice  " 
(Cohortatio,  chap,  vii.,  adfinem).  So  Lactantius,  after  quoting  with  appro- 
bation from  Cicero's  "Republic,"  adds:  "Who  that  is  acquainted  with  the 
mystery  of  God  could  so  significantly  relate  the  law  of  God  as  a  man  far 
removed  from  the  knowledge  of  the  truth  has  set  forth  the  law  ?  But  I 
consider  that  they  who  speak  true  things  unconsciously  are  to  be  regarded 
as  though  they  prophesied  [divinent]  under  the  influence  of  some  spirit  " 
("  Institutiones  Divinae,"  book  vi.,  chap.  viii.). 


MYSTERIES  IN  REVELATION.  203 

5.  I  think  it  should  be  expected  that  the  full  import  of  the 
communications  would  transcend  the  intelligence  of  the  human 
recipient,  and  would  frequently  transcend  the  general  intelli- 
gence of  his  race.  The  thoughts  and  methods  of  infinite  wis- 
dom, expressed  in  the  plainest  of  human  words,  must  some- 
times remain  inscrutable.  Hence  divine  revelations  might  in- 
volve some  mysteries  and  some  uninterpretable  statements. 
These  should  not  be  hastily  rejected,  but  should  be  reverently 
accepted  on  the  authority  of  their  author.  This  is  the  dictate 
of  the  highest  reason.  As  the  very  germs  of  all  our  knowl- 
edge are  but  simple  acts  of  faith,  for  which  we  can  furnish  no 
grounds,  so  here,  in  the  opposite  direction,  faith  supersedes 
knowledge,  without  robbing  us  of  that  sense  of  assurance  and 
satisfaction  which  is  the  proper  attribute  of  knowledge.  The 
progress  of  human  inquiry  may  be  expected  to  resolve  some  of 
these  mysteries;  but  others  must  resist  all  efforts  to  penetrate 
them. 

IV.  The  Christian  Scriptures  answer  to  these  Deductions. 

1.  They  asstfme  the  idea  of  God  pre-existent  in  the  human 
mind.    Indeed,  there  could  be  no  revelation  from  God  to  a  race 
not  possessed  already  of  some  notion  of  God.     It  would  be 
like  the  attempt  to  explain  the  hues  of  the  violet  to  a  man 
born  blind. 

2.  The  Christian  Scriptures  set  forth,  on  the  whole,  such  a 
God  as  exists  already  in  human  thought — the  Creator  and  Pre- 
server of  all  things ;  infinite  in  wisdom,  power,  and  goodness ; 
the  source  of  moral  law ;  the  lover  of  men ;  the  hearer  and  an- 
swerer of  prayer.    They  inculcate  the  privilege  and  the  duty  of 
prayer  and  devotion ;  they  teach  the  reality  of  spiritual  exist- 
ence, and  promise  a  future  life. 

3.  At  the  same  time,  we  detect  some  of  the  stains  and  im- 
perfections of  humanity  transmitted  to  the  sacred  record ;  as 
the  color  of  the  glass  imparts  its  hues  to  the  light  which  it 


204  CLAIMS  OF  OUR  SC1UPTUKES. 

transmits.  The  Hebrew  people  had  not  attained  to  that  degree 
of  secular  knowledge,  and  intellectual  culture,  and  aesthetic  re- 
finement, which  enabled  their  inspired  writers  to  leave  a  record 
which,  in  all  its  details  of  style,  should  commend  itself  to  the 
highest  refinement  the  race  was  destined  to  attain.  Vastly  su- 
perior as  were  their  notions  of  Deity  to  any  entertained  by 
contemporaneous  peoples,  yet  they  were  unable  to  divest  them- 
selves, at  times,  of  those  very  anthropomorphic  conceptions 
which  disfigure  the  mythologies  of  the  Greeks  and  other  an- 
cient nations.  God  is  pictured  sometimes  as  having  human 
organs ;  as  walking  among  men ;  as  arguing  with  men,  indul- 
ging in  anger,  and  visiting  his  enemies  with  vengeance.  We 
must  have  the  sagacity,  however,  to  penetrate  beneath  the  an- 
thropomorphic garb  of  the  sacred  teachings,  and  discover  there 
the  spiritual  Being  of  purity  and  beneficence  whose  attributes, 
in  other  portions  of  our  Scriptures,  are  so  adequately  and  so 
eloquently  described.  These  blemishes,  which  indeed  play  a 
much  less  important  part  than  has  been  pretended,  have  been 
unwarrantably  magnified  and  misunderstood;  and  have  been 
made  the  pretext  for  rejecting  the  whole  body  of  written  rev- 
elation. We  shall  do  ourselves  injustice  not  to  judge  these 
Scriptures  candidly,  and  not  to  concede  to  them  all  that  truth- 
fulness and  authority  which  comport  with  the  antecedent  pre- 
sumptions which  we  have  established. 

4.  After  all  that  can  be  charged  against  the  tracery  of  hu- 
man imperfection  which  may  be  detected  in  the  style  of  certain 
portions  of  our  Scriptures,  we  must  not  only  acknowledge  them 
a  general  fulfillment  of  the  antecedent  presumptions,  but  we 
must  claim  for  them  a  wonderful  degree  of  consonance  with 
the  developments  of  truth  which  have  come  to  the  uninspired 
mind  of  man  in  the  progress  of  the  ages.  It  is  doubtful  wheth- 
er science  can  ever  successfully  impeach  any  important  state- 
ment of  our  Scriptures,  when  fairly  interpreted.  This  is  the 
result  which  we  had  grounds  to  expect.  This  circumstance 


INFERENTIAL  LESSONS.  205 

alone,  to  the  mind  of  one  who  has  not  examined  the  ground 
we  have  been  over,  ought  to  be  strong  evidence  of  their  super- 
human origin.  Written  ages  before  the  birth  of  the  modern 
sciences,  there  was  the  utmost  liability  for  mere  human  author- 
ship to  fall  into  the  most  egregious  misstatements  respecting 
the  phenomena  of  the  natural  world ;  but,  in  point  of  fact, 
some  of  the  statements  of  our  Scriptures  were  so  far  in  ad- 
vance even  of  the  science  of  the  nineteenth  century,  that  we 
are  only  just  beginning  to  understand  them.  Here  is  a  har- 
mony, at  least,  which  answers  to  all  the  antecedent  demands. 

V.    Our  Reasonable  Duty. 

As  pendants  to  the  grand  positions  which  we  have  establish- 
ed, some  most  important  lessons  ought  to  follow. 

1.  The  religious  consciousness  of  man  is  an  innate  part  of 
his  nature ;  it  inherits  as  high  a  nobility  as  the  intellect ;  and 
honesty,  and  self-respect,  and  mental  health,  and  reverence  for 
truth,  unite  their  demands  that  the  religious  nature  be  exer- 
cised and  cultured.     Devotion  toward  God  is  as  much  a  law  of 
our  being  as  attachment  to  a  child.     Prayer  is  as  natural  and 
efficient  an  utterance  of  the  human  soul  as  the  infant  plead- 
ings which  move  a  mother's  heart.     Faith  in  the  being  and 
providence  and  word  of  God  is  as  rational  as  faith  in  that 
primitive  intuition  which  leads  unresisting  assent,  through  all 
the  grades  of  thinkable  knowledge,  to  that  other  and  upper 
sphere  of  truth  which  faith  only  can  touch. 

2.  If  God  has  written  his  name  upon  every  human  heart, 
then  the  feeblest  and  most  inadequate  gropings  after  the  pres- 
ence of  God  should  command  our  respect ;  and  the  rude  dance 
and  ghastly  sacrifice  should  excite  our  pity  for  those  who,  like 
children  crying  in  the  night,  feel  that  a  comforter  exists,  though 
they  know  not  how  to  search.     And  though  we  can  neither 
bow  the  knee  at  mosque  of  Islam  or  shrine  of  Buddha,  let  it 
be  remembered  that  the  adherents  of  these  religious  systems 


206  UNION  OF  SCIENCE  AND  RELIGION. 

are  moved  by  the  self-same  spirit  of  devotion  as  leads  us  to 
the  temple  of  Christian  worship. 

3.  Cherish  a  veneration  for  our  Christian  Scriptures.     They 
embody  the  purest  written  revelation  which  God  has  ever  im- 
parted to  man,  and  afford  us  precious  lessons  which  can  never 
be  reached  by  unaided  efforts  of  the  intellect. 

4.  Betray  no  fear  that  any  word  of  truth  will  clash  with  any 
other.     Have  faith  in  truth ;  have  faith  in  all  truth.     Be  man 
enough  to  treat  truth  with  impartiality.     Be  as  hospitable  to  a 
moral  truth  as  to  an  intellectual.    Round  out  your  spiritual  nat- 
ure with  a  just  and  generous  nurture  of  all  its  faculties.    Hon- 
or God  by  honoring  every  department  of  the  human  nature 
which  he  has  constituted. 

5.  Be  men  of  science,  but  be  devout  men.     I  exhort  you  to 
this  in  no  professional  mood.     We  come  up  from  a  survey  of 
the  deep  and  eternal  foundations  of  truth,  and  proclaim  that 
on  one  basis  rest  the  systems  of  theology  and  the  systems  of 
science.     If  you  would  live  the  truth,  be  devout  in  being  wise 
— nay,  be  wise  in  being  devout.     Honor  philosophy,  but  do 
not  forget  that  this  includes  a  religious  philosophy.     Enrich 
the  soul  with  religious  emotions,  that  they  may  fertilize  and 
inspire  the  intellect.     Seize  upon  every  intellectual  discovery 
to  strengthen,  correct,  and  purify  the  religious  faith.     Labor 
for  the  union  of  science  and  religion  in  all  their  aims.     Thank 
God,  I  see  their  slow  approximation  begun.     They  begin  to  un- 
derstand each  other.    They  begin  to  respect  each  other.    They 
begin  to  extend  hands  for  a  cordial  greeting.     The  blessed  day 
of  their  wedding  will  come.     I  can  discern  the  roseate  dawn. 
With  prophetic  ear  I  catch  the  strains  of  the  rising  epithalami- 
um  that  shall  bring  rejoicing  to  the  hearts  of  all  the  nations, 
and  shall  be  caught  up  by  angels  and  archangels  dwelling  in 
the  sunlight  of  Eternal  Truth. 


VIII. 

THE  CONFLICTS  OF  FAITH. (') 

THIS  day  and  tins  occasion  are  consecrated  equally  to  the 
contemplation  of  those  truths  most  intimately  related  to  the 
religious  nature  of  man.  These  young  persons  whom  I  espe- 
cially address  are  on  the  eve  of  the  completion  of  a  long  and 
earnest  course  of  secular  study ;  and  yet  we  desire  to  freight 
our  latest  admonitions  with  thoughts  which  shall  fortify  those 
faiths  which  take  hold  on  the  things  unseen  and  unsecular. 
We  live  in  an  age  the  most  glorious  and  most  to  be  desired 
that  has  ever  dawned  in  the  history  of  man ;  and  yet,  in  this  ad- 
vanced and  progressive  age,  we  hear  a  strange  and  unexpected 
clangor  of  arms  in  the  world,  proceeding  from  what  at  first  ap- 
pears to  be  a  desperate  conflict  between  the  champions  of  re- 
ligious faith  and  the  champions  of  that  learning  which  makes 
our  age  so  glorious ;  and,  in  the  midst  of  this  din,  we  want  to 
ask  you  to  stop,  and  go  with  us  to  a  mount  of  observation  and 
contemplation,  where  we  may  dispassionately  view  the  whole 
field  of  the  facts,  and  discern,  if  possible,  the  meaning  of  the 
noisy  conflict  around  us. 

The  Battle-fields  of  Faith  have  been  many  and  bloody.  They 
are  scattered  along  the  whole  march  of  human  history.  No 
wonder  the  unphilosophic  have  deemed  the  conflict  mortal,  and 
more  than  once  declared  that  either  religion  or  science  must  go 
under ;  that  they  can  not  live  together  in  the  same  world  in 
peace.  No  wonder  that,  in  a  period  of  ecclesiastical  ascend- 

(J)  A  baccalaureate  address  to  the  graduating  class  of  1874,  in  the  Col- 
lege of  the  Liberal  Arts  of  the  Syracuse  University. 


208  HUMAN  POWERS  IN  THE  CONFLICT. 

ency,  science  has  been  clipped  of  her  plumes  and  chained  to  an 
effete  and  fungoid  carcass.  No  wonder,  again,  that,  in  an  in- 
terval of  strangulation  of  the  voice  of  religious  faith,  secularism 
should  have  trampled  religion  in  the  mud. 

But  religion  still  lives ;  and  science  still  marches  on.  What 
does  it  mean  ?  In  the  economy  of  existence,  may  it  not  be 
that  both  are  ordained  to  live  ?  And  may  it  not  be  that  both 
are  ordained  to  live  in  amity  and  mutual  respect  ?  Or  is  their 
incessant  conflict  an,  incident  of  the  law  of  progress  through 
antagonism  ?  As  affliction  mellows  the  soul  of  man,  and  ad- 
versity whets  its  powers,  perhaps  religion  and  science  are  ap- 
pointed to  be  mutually  whetstones  to  each  other,  and  their  col- 
lisions are  but  the  friction  which  sharpens  and  improves. 

If  we  gaze  for  a  moment  at  the  human  powers  which  prompt 
to  this  incessant  struggle,  what  do  we  see  ?  The  religious  phe- 
nomena of  the  race  are  as  universal  and  obtrusive  as  the  intel- 
lectual. The  religious  activities  are  equally  uniform  in  their  es- 
sential nature ;  the  dominion  of  the  religious  instincts  is  equal- 
ly controlling.  Notions  of  supernatural  creative  power,  of  mor- 
al government,  of  personal  responsibility,  are  as  universal  accom- 
paniments of  human  life  as  notions  of  reality,  of  causality,  of 
externality,  or  the  distinction  between  self  and  not-self.  The 
prompting  to  prayer  and  sacrifice,  and  the  confidence  in  their 
efficacy,  are  factors  of  humanity  as  positive  as  the  longing  and 
the  seeking  of  the  infant  for  its  food,  or  the  impulse  of  the 
understanding  to  inquire  after  causes  of  things.  The  religious 
sentiments,  it  may  be  rigorously  shown,  are  a  native  endow- 
ment of  human  nature.  The  promptings  to  prayer  and  wor- 
ship, and  the  sense  of  accountability,  by  all  the  reasoning  of 
Lubbock  and  Darwin,  and  Burton  and  Comte,  have  not  been 
proved  less  a  primordial  constituent  of  man  than  are  the  intel- 
lectual discernments  which  stand  correlated  to  another  sphere 
of  ideas. 

We  have,  then,  for  our  present  purpose,  two  groups  of  intui- 


PRIMITIVE  BELIEFS.  209 

tions  or  feelings — the  intellectual  and  the  moral.  Among  the 
latter,  let  it  be  distinctly  understood,  must  be  ranged  the  sen- 
timent of  Deity,  the  sentiment  of  accountability,  the  sentiment 
of  right  and  wrong,  the  sentiment  of  prayer,  the  sentiment  of 
piacular  offerings,  the  sentiment  of  future  life.  I  am  willing  to 
denominate  these  feelings  as  sentiments.  In  the  lowest  condi- 
tions of  the  human  mind,  I  confess  they  are  but  feeble  senti- 
ments ;  and  yet  I  desire  to  impress  the  psychological  fact,  that 
the  intuitions  belonging  to1  the  intellectual  group  are  also  but 
feelings  or  affections  of  the  mind.  I  desire  also,  by  way  of  a 
caution,  to  remark,  that  the  vague  sensus  numinis  which  I  here 
denominate  the  sentiment  of  the  supernatural  is  not  our  only 
avenue  to  the  cognition  of  Deity. 

Among  the  intuitions  of  the  intellect  must  be  ranked  such 
as  the  following :  A  thing  cannot  exist  and  not  exist  at  the 
same  time.  That  which  impresses  my  senses  is  external  to  me. 
It  is  also  a  reality.  Every  attribute  implies  substance ;  every 
effect,  a  cause.  The  whole  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  its  parts, 
and  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  prove  that  there  are  realities  corre- 
sponding to  the  primitive  beliefs  existing  in  the  human  soul. 
I  desire  merely  to  remind  you  —  and  that,  only  in  passing — 
that  we  have  the  same  ground  for  accepting  the  reality  of  the 
correlates  of  the  ethical  beliefs  as  of  the  intellectual  beliefs ; 
that  the  universal  and  ineradicable  beliefs  in  divinity,  right, 
and  duty  answer  to  verities  as  absolute  as  our  beliefs  in  the 
things  testified  by  perception  or  memory.  To  impeach  one 
witness  is  to  impeach  all.  To  deny  the  validity  of  our  primi- 
tive beliefs  is  to  plunge  us  into  the  fearful  abyss  of  nihilism, 
which  is  a  suicide  instigated  by  a  metaphysical  insanity. 

We  must  admit  that  these  two  groups  of  mental  powers  are 
absolutely  co-ordinate  in  legitimacy,  in  authority,  in  signifi- 
cance. This  proposition,  which  I  am  not  attempting  to-day  to 
prove,  can  not  be  too  profoundly  pondered.  The  religious  fac- 


210  ETHICAL  AND  INTELLECTUAL  POWERS. 

ulties  of  man  have  a  right  to  existence  and  activity.  No  apol- 
ogy is  needed  for  their  exercise — none  for  the  assertion  of  their 
rights — none  for  the  imperious  sway  which  they  exert,  and  al- 
ways have  exerted,  over  the  lives  of  men.  But,  though  equal 
and  like  in  a  certain  sense,  in  another  sense  they  are  unequal 
and  unlike.  Each  group  of  powers  has  its  sphere.  The  con- 
science discerns  the  fact  that  right,  and  wrong,  and  duty,  and 
accountability  exist,  and  prompts  unremittingly  to  some  line 
of  action  in  harmony  with  its  discernments.  But  it  does  not 
determine  what  line  of  action  this  shall  be.  The  intellect  must 
discern  the  act  most  conformable  to  the  law  of  right  and  duty. 
This  is  a  judgment.  The  ethical  nature  makes  discernments, 
and  feels  duty,  and  urges  to  right  action ;  but  these  states  all 
concern  the  abstract ;  the  intellect  supplies  the  concretes — the 
particular  things — between  which  the  discernments  are  to  be 
made,  by  which  the  feeling  of  duty  is  aroused,  or  toward  which 
action  is  to  be  urged.  Moral  discernments,  duty,  and  obliga- 
tion are  verities  of  one  class ;  particular  acts  or  particular  facts 
are  verities  of  another.  The  ethical  sentiments  are  a  heart 
yearning  for  a  consummation ;  the  intellect  is  the  eye  which 
discovers  the  way  to  it.  The  heart  of  man  cries  out  for  God ; 
it  feels  the  being  of  God ;  it  demands  to  be  shown  its  God. 
The  infant  intellect  opens  its  eye,  and,  behold !  the  glory  of  the 
sun  is  everywhere ;  the  sun  is  the  most  powerful  and  glorious 
object  within  reach  of  the  senses :  the  intellect  introduces  the 
sun  to  the  religious  consciousness  as  its  God.  The  religious 
nature  accepts  it,  and  pays  it  worship.  In  another  land,  the 
supreme  and  terrible  majesty  of  mountains  impresses  the  intel- 
lect as  the  grandest  manifestation  in  the  visible  world,  and  these 
become  the  gods  on  which  the  poor,  blind  heart  wastes  its 
adoration.  Again,  it  is  the  ocean,  or  the  sky,  or  the  storm  which 
the  soul  rests  upon  in  its  groping  for  the  felt  Deity.  But 

"  The  thoughts  of  men 
Are  widened  with  the  process  of  the  suns." 


HO  W  CONFLICT  ARISES.  211 

By-and-by,  the  intellect  perceives  that  it  does  not  belong  to 
material  objects  to  exert  the  attributes  of  divinity ;  and  then 
the  sun  and  moon  and  mountains  become  the  manifestations  or 
the  abodes  of  divinity.  The  mind  of  the  infant  race  could  only 
picture  Deity  as  a  human  form,  with  human  passions ;  and,  un- 
der such  guises,  it  represented  Deity  to  the  religious  nature. 
The  fancies  of  anthropomorphism  were  hardly  swept  from  the 
minds  of  the  Jewish  writers  —  or  else  they  were  permitted  to 
employ  anthropomorphic  language  to  suit  their  utterances  to 
the  mental  status  of  their  times. 

The  religious  nature  is  a  set  of  impulses  and  accompanying 
beliefs  in  the  reality  of  their  objects.  It  enacts  its  laws  and 
enforces  them  inexorably.  No  man  may  think  he  can  evade 
them.  The  intellectual  powers  take  cognizance  of  the  natural 
truth  which  furnishes  the  means  and  modes  of  gratification  of 
the  ethical  powers.  If  the  intellect  be  undeveloped,  the  relig- 
ious mandates  may  drive  mankind  to  fetichism,  to  idolatry,  to 
polytheism — to  juggernaut  or  the  funeral  pyre.  The  religious 
nature  must  act.  If  intellect  fail  to  open  a  rational  avenue 
for  its  exercise,  it  rushes  blindly  into  imbecilities,  superstition, 
bigotry,  dogmatism,  persecution.  But  it  has  a  right  to  act 
according  to  the  best  light  which  reason  affords;  and  when 
it  acts  thus,  it  acts  rightly,  it  acts  righteously.  Many  a  poor 
Buddhist  will  enjoy  a  higher  seat  in  heaven,  I  believe,  than  the 
enlightened  in  our  own  ranks  who  are  struggling  to  think  their 
religious  promptings  a  superstition. 

Hence  arise  the  conflicts.  The  soul  that  has  fixed  its  relig- 
ious affections  upon  the  sun  or  the  mountain  is  loath  to  remove 
them  when  assured  that  neither  sun  nor  mountain  can  possibly 
exert  divine  attributes.  The  intellect  utters  this  disparaging 
declaration,  and  the  religious  nature  revolts  at  such  profanity. 
Out  upon  that  knowledge  which  would  rob  us  of  our  gods! 
Such  unbridled  daring  must  be  restrained.  The  intellect  be- 
holds the  religious  nature  paying  its  devotions  to  a  senseless 


212  SELF-REGULATIVE  ANTAGONISM. 

object,  and  derides  its  credulity.  And  yet  the  religious  faith 
remains  subjectively  legitimate  and  rational.  It  is  only  the 
objective  exercise  of  it  which  assumes  an  absurd  form.  After 
a  protest  and  a  struggle,  religious  faith  may  settle  upon  an- 
other form  which,  for  the  time,  commends  itself  to  the  most 
enlightened  judgment  of  man ;  and  from  this,  in  the  further 
progress  of  thought,  it  may  also  be  driven.  Thus,  while  intel- 
lect is  ever  progressive,  faith,  like  love,  is  conservative.  Thus 
intellect  is  ever  pointing  in  derision  at  the  fogyism  of  faith ; 
and  faith  retaliates  with  scorn  at  the  irreverence  of  intellect. 
It  is  the  nature  of  religious  faith  to  recognize  sacredness.  That 
with  which  divinity  has  been  associated  in  our  minds  is  sacred ; 
and  faith  can  learn,  only  by  a  painful  effort,  to  count  it  oth- 
erwise. Intellect  cares  only  for  the  reality  of  things.  It  de- 
thrones the  idols  of  humanity  the  moment  it  discerns  there  is 
no  divinity  in  them.  It  takes  no  comfort  in  deceiving  itself ; 
it  has  no  patience  with  deception.  But  its  scope  is  finite  ;  its 
discernments  are  often  obscure,  and  its  judgments  erroneous. 
It  is  well  for  man  that  his  religious  faith  tends  to  immobility ; 
it  serves  as  ballast  to  a  ship  with  too  much  canvas. 

Thus  the  antagonism  is  self-regulative.  When  the  sway  of 
the  intellect  is  in  excess,  the  religious  nature  revolts ;  when  the 
religious  nature  runs  riot,  the  intellect  shames  it  back  to  sobri- 
ety and  reason.  Faith  has  always  been  prone  to  commit  the 
error  of  clothing  with  sanctity  things  merely  external  and  strict- 
ly secular.  Its  creeds  have  enumerated  too  many  particulars. 
They  have  attempted  to  embody  all  the  existing  beliefs,  and 
have  thus  subjected  themselves  to  many  an  unnecessary  shock, 
as  the  progress  of  intellect  has  disclosed  their  untenability. 
No  reproaches  are  to  be  cast  for  such  reasons.  Such  is  the. law 
of  human  progress.  Intellectual  and  ethical  rights  are  equipol- 
lent. Alternating  secularism  and  superstition  are  but  the  vibra- 
tions of  a  psychological  balance  caused  by  the  accidents  which 
transpire  in  human  affairs. 


ILL  USTRA  TIONS  FE  OM  HIST  OR  T.  213 

Such  general  views  crowd  themselves  upon  our  candid  atten- 
tion. It  does  not  remain  to  seek  the  illustrations,  for  they  lie 
before  our  minds  already.  We  follow  back  the  highway  of 
human  history,  and  see  the  altars  of  religion  smoking  in  an  un- 
broken series.  We  need  not  recede  farther  than  the  dawn  of 
Greek  philosophy  to  note  man's  jealousy  of  the  honor  of  his 
gods.  Oh,  how  sublime  have  been  the  intellectual  struggles  of 
humanity !  How  had  honest  thought  tugged  at  the  problems 
of  existence  before  yet  our  Saviour  had  appeared  to  shed  upon 
them  the  light  of  a  new  revelation !  The  ever-present  feeling 
and  the  ever-present  manifestation  of  divine  existence  and  cau- 
sation prompted  the  thoughtful  Greek  to  seek  for  a  closer 
knowledge  of  the  reality.  Most  of  the  Greek  philosophers  had 
no  doubt  of  the  existence  and  unity  of  the  ultimate  Cause,  but 
its  nature  remained  inscrutable.  Protagoras,  discouraged  with 
the  search,  proclaimed  that  truth  is  relative,  and  nothing  can 
be  affirmed  respecting  divine  existence.  Athenian  piety  was 
shocked.  Protagoras  was  accused  and  condemned  as  an  athe- 
ist ;  and  private  owners  of  copies  of  his  work  were  commanded 
to  give  them  up  to  be  burned  in  the  market-place. 

Aristarchus  of  Samos  had  the  fortune  to  disquiet  popular 
orthodoxy  by  asserting  that  the  earth  is  not  the  centre  of  the 
universe,  but  revolves  about  the  sun.  This  honest  and  correct 
opinion  earned  him  the  charge  of  impiety  from  Cleanthes  the 
Stoic.  It  is  not  needful  to  rehearse  the  story  of  "  Galileo  with 
his  woes"  to  remind  you  how  precisely  the  history  of  thought 
revolves  in  an  orbit.  Aristarchus  had  not  the  appliances  to 
demonstrate  the  truth  of  the  heliocentric  theory,  and  conserv- 
ative faith  continued  to  hug,  for  nineteen  hundred  years,  the 
dead  body  of  an  effete  astronomy. 

Socrates  is  not  generally  reputed  to  have  borne  a  character 
less  reverent  toward  divine  things  than  the  majority  of  his 
Athenian  countrymen.  In  fact,  according  to  the  pictures  which 
Plato  and  Xenophon  have  produced  of  their  master,  Socrates 


214  SOCRATES  AND  CHRIST  ACCUSED. 

struggled  surprisingly  near  to  the  spiritual  discernment,  purity, 
forbearance,  and  fortitude  which  have  characterized  sufferers 
for  the  Christian  faith.  His  very  divergence  from  the  preva- 
lent theism  of  Athens  —  his  very  approximation  toward  the 
Christian  stand-point — was  made  the  ground  of  the  accusation 
against  him,  and  he  died  a  noble  martyr  to  his  religious  opin- 
ions. It  is  instructive  to  note  the  language  of  the  indictment : 
"Socrates  is  a  public  offender  in  not  recognizing  the  gods 
which  the  State  recognizes,  introducing  other  and  new  divini- 
ties ;  he  is  also  an  offender  in  corrupting  the  youth."  He  was 
not  less  honest,  less  conscientious,  less  pure,  less  devout ;  but 
his  honesty,  conscience,  purity,  and  devotion  were  not  conform- 
ed to  the  dominant  type ;  and  he  reasoned  with  the  youth  of 
Athens  to  teach  them  his  purer  and  nobler  and  more  rational 
faith.  But  his  sublime  death  was  followed  by  a  revulsion  in 
public  sentiment.  His  prosecutors  were  themselves  punished, 
and  his  faith  was  nurtured  to  a  splendid  maturity  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  Plato. 

In  its  relation  to  our  theme,  the  persecution  and  martyrdom 
of  Christ,  viewed  only  as  a  witness  to  the  truth,  are  full  of  il- 
lustration. Teaching  a  purer  morality  and  a  loftier  and  more 
spiritual  devotion  than  his  nation  believed  in,  he  was  counted  a 
religious  offender — a  heretic — a  defamer  of  the  Mosaic  law ;  a 
prof aner  of  the  holy  temple ;  a  violator  of  the  Sabbath ;  a  tol- 
erator  of  evil-doers ;  a  usurper  of  divine  prerogatives ;  and  so 
the  conservatism  of  the  national  faith  must  vindicate  the  integ- 
rity of  the  Jewish  religion,  even  to  the  death  of  the  Author  of 
our  Christianity.  But,  as  Jesus'  teaching  was  the  mind  of  God — 
as  it  demonstrated  itself  true — it  must  prevail.  Innocent  blood 
was  again  the  nutriment  of  the  truth,  and  Christianity  was  des- 
tined to  reign  in  the  ascendant. 

The  struggles  of  religious  faith  have  not  always  been  with 
the  enemies  of  faith.  Indeed,  the  general  proposition  may 
be  enunciated,  that  blank  unbelief  has  seldom  lifted  its  hand 


HARD  DEATH  OF  OLD  FAITHS.  215 

against  religious  faith.  The  conflict  has  generally  been  be- 
tween two  factions  of  its  own  adherents.  Old  faiths  have  been 
antagonized  by  new  interpretations  either  of  nature  or  of  sa- 
cred Scripture.  Sometimes  one  of  the  combatants  has  profess- 
ed comparative  indifference  for  the  interests  of  religion ;  but, 
as  a  rule,  both  parties  have  floated  the  banner  of  religious 
belief. 

Old  faiths  die  hard.  Though  Judaism,  andj  still  more,  Chris- 
tianity, commended  themselves  to  the  ethical  and  intellectual 
natures  of  men,  the  popular  Greek  theology  retained  a  won- 
derful hold  upon  their  minds;  and  powerful  sects  devoted 
themselves  to  vain  efforts  to  harmonize  Greek  mythology  with 
the  purer  religions.  By  a  natural  revulsion,  the  excessive  spirit- 
uality of  Plato  had  been  succeeded  by  earnest  questionings,  and 
a  gradual  ascendency  of  theories  more  exclusively  intellectual. 
Thus  followed,  in  graduated  order,  the  Peripatetic  philosophy, 
the  Stoic,  the  Epicurean,  and  then  the  Skeptical.  It  was  now 
time  for  the  religious  nature  of  man  to  assert  itself  again.  Ju- 
daism had  assumed  a  prominent  position,  and  its  theocracy  af- 
forded a  welcome  relief  for  human  faith  oppressed  by  the  in- 
congruities of  the  old  Hellenic  myths.  Philo  accordingly  at- 
tempted to  co-adapt  the  two ;  and  now  for  a  period  waged  a 
conflict  between  Jewish-Alexandrian  theosophy,  on  one  hand, 
and  pure  Judaism  and  rising  Christianity,  on  the  other. 

Gnosticism,  in  its  various  sects,  marked  a  similar  conflict  of 
faiths.  In  general,  it  was  an  attempt  to  reduce  the  Christian 
system  to  a  philosophy ;  but  Judaism,  Hellenism,  and  Parsee- 
ism  were  powerfully  contending  factors.  At  length  the  decree 
of  Justinian  closed  the  schools  of  philosophy  at  Athens  (529 
A.D.)  ;  and  out  of  the  residual  conflict  between  Judaizing  Chris- 
tianity and  aristocratic  Gnosticism  came  forth,  at  Rome,  the 
Catholic  form  of  Christian  faith. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  present  a  history  of  the  conflicts 
which  religious  conservatism  has  waged  with  intellectual  radi- 

10 


216  DOGMATIC  AND  RATIONAL  TRUTHS. 

calism.  I  wish,  however,  to  impress  the  thought  already  an- 
nounced, that  those  conflicts  have  not  been  generally  between 
faith  and  skepticism,  but  between  forms  of  faith.  This  is  es- 
pecially exemplified  in  the  history  of  thought  during  the  ages 
of  ecclesiastical  supremacy  commonly  known  as  the  scholastic 
period.  So  firmly  had  the  Christian  system  become  established 
that  all  intellectual  efforts  were  directed  to  the  harmonizing 
with  it  of  all  science  and  philosophy.  Science  and  philosophy, 
for  twelve  hundred  years,  were  but  the  molders  and  welders  for 
a  stereotyped  form  of  religious  faith.  It  can  not  be  supposed 
that  during  this  reign  of  tradition  the  intellect  of  man  always 
wore  its  chains  with  composure.  On  the  one  hand  was  the  es- 
tablished body  of  beliefs — secular  as  well  as  religious — to  which 
the  Christian  world  had  assented  in  the  second  century  (about 
175  A.D.)  of  our  era.  On  the  other  hand  were  the  products  of 
continued  speculation  and  investigation.  Many  old  views  of 
nature  were  antagonized  by  the  progress  of  discovery.  If  the 
new  conclusions  were  tenable,  the  old  faith  must  give  way.  If 
the  old  faith  must  be  maintained,  the  new  views  must  be  sup- 
pressed. It  has  always  been  a  painful  dilemma.  Who  is  able 
to  act  as  umpire  between  the  high  authority  of  intellect  and 
the  imperious  power  of  faith  ?  You  well  know  the  history  of 
these  fearful  collisions — how,  for  a  millennium,  the  sceptre  was 
in  the  hand  of  the  Church,  and  intellect,  free-born,  crouched  a 
slave  at  her  feet.  Still,  the  utterances  of  intellect  could  never 
be  fully  stifled.  Her  sober  judgments  stared  every  man  in  the 
face.  The  Church  might  hold  to  the  flatness  of  the  earth,  but, 
somehow,  sailors  observed  a  distinct  convexity,  and  Columbus 
and  other  captains  proved  that  it  could  be  circumnavigated. 
The  Church  might  affirm  the  immaculate  character  of  the  sun's 
face ;  but  whoever  looked  through  the  instrument  of  Galileo 
must  see  the  spots.  The  Church  might  deny  the  habitability 
of  other  worlds ;  but  there  was  Mars  revealed  with  its  land  and 
waters,  like  our  own  globe,  and  the  presumption  of  habitability 


TWO  SPECIES  OF  TRUTH  RECOGNIZED.  217 

could  not  be  resisted.  How  could  these  things  be  ?  The  ques- 
tion must  have  presented  itself  to  many  minds  with  painful 
urgency.  Could  there  be  two  orders  of  truth  ?  The  old  views 
of  natural  things  seemed  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  accepted 
books  of  divine  revelation.  Could  it  be  that  the  testimonies 
of  the  senses  and  of  reason  are  in  discordance  with  these  infal- 
lible revelations?  Even  to  such  a  conclusion  did  the  mind's 
distress  impel  it.  Pomponatius  maintained  that  there  are  two 
orders  of  truth — the  philosophical  and  the  theological,  and  that, 
accepting  all  the  dicta  of  the  Church,  he  was  still  at  liberty,  in 
the  domain  of  reason,  to  subscribe  to  judgments  which  contra- 
dicted them.  The  Church,  however,  condemned  the  doctrine. 
It  is  analogous,  nevertheless,  to  such  tenets  as  those  of  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  and  Mansel  in  reference  to  the  Unconditioned 
and  the  Unknowable,  which  compel  them,  in  view  of  a  sup- 
posed impotency  of  the  reason,  to  attenuate  our  knowledge  of 
God  into  a  mere  faith,  which,  after  all,  philosophy  does  not 
deign  to  indorse. 

Against  this  mediaeval  slavery  of  the  intellect  the  great  ref- 
ormation of  the  sixteenth  century  was  a  rebellion.  The  men- 
tion of  this  reformation  recalls  the  fearful  shocks  of  a  commo- 
tion which  has  hardly  yet  subsided.  The  intellect  of  man  in- 
stinctively sided  with  the  reformers.  But  the  absolute  freedom 
of  thought ;  the  unity  of  truth ;  the  sacredness  of  natural  truth ; 
the  correct  view  of  the  relative  functions  and  prerogatives  of 
the  rational  and  the  religious  consciousness — these  were  attain- 
ments too  exalted  above  the  condition  to  which  the  mind  had 
been  consigned  for  a  thousand  years,  to  be  reached  by  the  ad- 
vances of  a  single  generation.  Even  Luther  thought  it  incum- 
bent upon  him  to  anathematize  the  "  reprehensible  doctrine  "  of 
the  Sorbonne,  that  "  whatever  is  demonstrated  true  in  philoso- 
phy must  also  be  accepted  as  true  in  theology ;"  while  of  Aris- 
totle he  declared,  "  If  he  had  not  been  of  the  flesh,  I  should 
not  hesitate  to  affirm  him  to  have  been  truly  a  devil."  It  is 


218  PSYCHIC  ACTION  AND  REACTION. 

due  to  Luther  to  state  that  he  afterward  modified  these  opin- 
ions to  a  large  extent.  Melanchthon,  his  co-reformer,  though 
better  disposed  toward  philosophy,  was  scarcely  better  prepared 
to  recognize  freedom  of  opinion;  for  he  applauded  the  exe- 
cution of  heretics,  and  pronounced  the  burning  of  Servetus  a 
"  pious  and  memorable  example  for  all  posterity." 

The  rebellion  against  intellectual  servitude  being  inaugurated, 
many  a  valiant  champion  ventured  to  draw  his  sword.  Bacon 
and  Hobbes — though  the  latter,  by  a  natural  revulsion,  went 
too  far — have  been  regarded  as  the  leaders  in  the  final  and  full 
emancipation  of  philosophy  from  its  subserviency  to  ecclesias- 
tical traditions.  Descartes  (1596-1650),  Spinoza  (1632-1677), 
Leibnitz  (1646-1716),  Berkeley  (1684-1 753),  Voltaire  (1694- 
1778),  Hume  (1711-1776),  Rousseau  (1712-1778),  and  Kant 
(1724-1804)  are  the  great  lights  of  what  is  generally  known  as 
rationalistic  religion — recognizing  the  fundamental  doctrines  of 
Christianity,  but  giving  a  free  rein  to  speculation  in  every  field, 
and  tending,  in  certain  cases,  toward  materialism ;  in  others,  to- 
ward some  form  of  pantheism. 

The  pendulum  of  thought  was  now  vibrating  toward  the  op- 
posite extreme.  Intoxicated  with  freedom,  the  intellect  began 
to  hate  its  former  master.  It  was  now,  in  turn,  the  effort  of 
philosophy  to  degrade  and  enslave  religion.  Hobbes  (1651) 
and  Lord  Herbert  (1624)  began  the  attempt,  and  it  was  eagerly 
followed  up  in  France  by  Bayle,  Diderot  (1713-1784),  D'Alem- 
bert  (1717-1783),  Von  Holbach  (1723-1789),  Volney  (1751- 
1820),  and  others;  and  a  bloody  revolution  having  thrown  po- 
litical power  into  the  hands  of  the  skeptics,  the  travesty  of 
government  reached  its  climax  in  the  enthronement  of  reason 
and  the  attempt  to  efface  every  record  of  religion. 

This  terror  was  more  than  the  religious  instincts  of  man 
could  bear  without  revolt.  They  arose  again  in  their  majesty, 
and  regained  an  acknowledgment  of  their  right  to  sway  the 
lives  of  men.  For  more  than  half  a  century  religion  and  phi- 


NEW  SCIENTIFIC  ADVANCE.  219 

losophy — which  had  become  now  more  exclusively  a  philoso- 
phy of  nature — observed  toward  each  other  outwardly  a  decent 
and  somewhat  cordial  respect.  Religious  faith  had  marched 
up  to  a  position  abreast  of  modern  science,  and  science  exer- 
cised its  full  freedom  to  conquer  new  realms  and  make  chaos  of 
old  theories.  But  it  was  plain  enough  that  the  peace  between 
the  two  was  not  a  complete  entente  cordiale;  it  was  only  an 
armistice.  Faith  watched  with  jealousy  the  manoeuvres  and 
proclamations  of  science,  and  science  made  the  existing  faith, 
at  times,  the  subject  of  contemptuous  remark.  Both  parties 
congratulated  themselves  on  the  evidences  of  progress.  Science 
took  just  pride  in  her  splendid  superstructures  of  astronomy, 
geology,  and  physics ;  and  religion  felt  relieved  to  have  shaken 
off  the  effete  appendages  and  crude  accessories  of  her  system, 
only  to  find  its  beauty  and  solidity  more  abundantly  revealed. 
But  the  reconciliation  of  science  and  religion  was  not  yet. 

During  the  last  three  decades,  the  human  intellect  has  made 
strides  which  have  set  the  world  agog.  It  is  really  amazed  at 
its  own  achievements.  It  has  become  self-complaisant,  if  not 
self-conceited.  It  shows  signs  of  overconfidence  and  usurpa- 
tion. I  speak  of  the  human  moods  of  some  of  the  representa- 
tives of  this  progress.  Scientific  positions  which  were  deemed 
impregnable  less  than  a  generation  ago  haye  been  swept  by  a 
storm  of  new  ideas.  Many  of  the  fogs  and  mists  which  have 
always  obscured  the  vision  of  the  race  have  been  dissolved,  and 
the  intellectual  atmosphere  immediately  around  us  has  been 
wonderfully  clarified.  True  it  is  that  still  beyond  are  banks  of 
cloud  darkly  bounding  the  horizon,  and  new  and  loftier  Alps 
of  thought  which  remain  to  be  scaled ;  and  these  revelations  of 
labors  yet  to  achieve  temper  the  mind's  elation  with  humili- 
ty ;  but  the  advances  of  thought  have  been  so  general  all  along 
the  front  line  of  the  sciences,  that  he  who  holds  wholly  to  the 
scientific  faiths  of  his  father  embraces  forms  as  dead  as  Egyp- 
tian mummies.  Every  system  of  belief — educational,  political, 


220  ESSENTIAL  AND  ADVENTITIOUS  FAITHS. 

religious — which  involved,  or  in  any  of  its  outposts  rested  on, 
the  interpretations  of  nature  which  were  current  a  third  of  a 
century  since,  must  fail  to-day  to  quadrate  perfectly  with  the 
existing  body  of  recognized  scientific  truth.  So  it  has  hap- 
pened that  science,  which,  for  the  time  being,  is  the  dominant 
phase  of  philosophy,  is  getting  into  a  quarrel  again  with  relig- 
ious faith. 

In  spite  of  all  the  lessons  of  history,  we  still  incline  to  em- 
brace non-essentials  in  our  creed.  It  is  the  law  of  religious 
faith  to  consecrate  and  cherish  all  which  the  intelligence  holds 
true.  Faith  is  a  doting  mother  who  lavishes  indiscriminate  af- 
fection upon  the  proper  members  of  her  family  and  those  who 
are  only  adventitious  comers ;  and  when  she  must  relinquish  the 
latter,  she  clasps  them  in  her  arms,  suffuses  them  with  tears, 
and  yields  only  when  the  last  entreaty  fails.  There  is  some- 
thing touching  in  faith's  fidelity  to  the  objects  it  has  loved. 
But  yet  it  seems  to  be  true  that  even  modern  Christianity,  as 
Christlieb  sagaciously  concedes,  has  been  willing,  sometimes,  to 
make  itself  responsible  for  positions  not  at  all  vital  to  its  inter- 
ests, and  the  holding  of  which  turns  with  to-morrow's  think- 
ing or  to-morrow's  experiment  in  the  laboratory.  Christianity 
may  be  likened  to  a  splendid  palace  which  the  great  Builder 
founded  on  a  rock,  digging  deep,  and  bolting  it  to  the  granite. 
When  he  had  gone,  those  who  were  sent  to  occupy  and  defend, 
built  wings  which  spread  themselves  upon  the  sand;  and  the 
floods  came,  and  the  sands  were  washed  away,  and  the  wings 
crumbled  into  a  ruin ;  but  the  body  of  the  palace  stood  un- 
moved  in  its  original  strength  and  majesty.  And  others  came 
to  occupy  the  palace,  and  they  too  built  extensions,  and  the 
tempest  came  and  moved  them  from  their  place,  and  left  them 
crushed,  chaotic  masses;  but  the  body  of  the  stately  palace 
stood,  for  it  was  anchored  to  the  rock. 

It  can  not  be  denied  that  the  world  is  witnessing  to-day  an- 
other ebb-tide  of  religious  sentiment.  The  reconciliation  of 


PERILS  OF  UNTHINKING  BELIEF.  221 

our  Scriptures  and  our  faiths  with  existing  knowledge  must,  in 
some  points,  be  effected  by  changed  methods.  It  is  sometimes 
painful  to  admit  it ;  but  it  is  always  manly ;  and  with  our 
antecedent  knowledge  of  both  the  imprescriptible  rights  and 
the  rational  defenses  of  religious  faith,  and  of  the  irrefragable 
authority  of  the  spirit  of  our  written  revelation,  there  is  no 
ground  for  apprehensions;  and  any  undue  reluctance  to  cor- 
rect or  prune  is  worse  than  a  refusal  to  look  through  Galileo's 
telescope  lest  we  witness  the  crescent  of  Venus :  it  is  a  denial 
of  the  crescent  after  having  it  demonstrated  to  our  eyes.  Such 
reluctance  will  tend  to  avert  the  respect  of  the  large  number 
whose  convictions  will  ever  be  controlled  by  the  data  of  secular 
thought,  and  whose  intelligence  and  respectability  will,  in  turn, 
control  a  large  proportion  of  the  unthinking  masses,  already 
predisposed  by  their  natures  and  indulgences  to  relieve  them- 
selves of  the  restraints  of  religion. 

I  have  aimed  to  float  your  thoughts  rapidly  over  the  succes- 
sive waves  of  religious  manifestation  which  have  diversified  the 
history  of  the  civilized  world.  I  have  desired  to  make  it  clear 
that  the  existing  collision  of  new  ideas  with  religious  faith  is 
but  a  natural  recurrence  of  the  same  phenomenon  which  the 
world  witnessed  in  the  latter  part  of  the  last  century,  culminat- 
ing in  the  bloody  revolution  of  France;  and,  earlier,  in  the 
great  reformation  under  Luther ;  and,  still  earlier,  in  the  strug- 
gle from  which  the  early  Catholic  Church  was  born,  and  in 
the  crucifixion  of  our  Lord,  and  in  the  Pyrrhonism  of  the  post- 
Socratic  age,  and  in  the  atomism  of  the  materialistic  Leucip- 
pus,  following  on  the  exalted  spiritual  philosophy  of  Anax- 
agoras.  I  desire  to  inspire  your  minds  with  a  confidence  that 
the  interests  of  religion  are  by  no  means  in  peril.  It  is  unman- 
ly to  be  found  quaking  with  fear.  Faith  is  to  experience  an- 
other renaissance.  It  may  not  be  easy,  it  may  not  now  be 
possible,  to  explain  how  all  discordances  are  to  be  reconciled ; 
but  I  entertain  the  strongest  confidence  that  all  the  conflicts  of 


222  THE  RECONCILIATION  DISCERNED. 

the  passing  hour  will  only  result  in  the  elimination  of  a  body 
of  truth — religious  and  secular — more  beautiful  and  lovely  than 
any  upon  which  human  thought  has  yet  been  fixed.  I  wish 
you  to  feel  brave.  I  wish  you  to  feel  strong.  I  wish  you  to 
feel  jubilant.  I  would  like  to  lift  my  arm  as  high  as  heaven 
to  signify  my  steadfast  faith  in  the  fortunes  of  our  Christiani- 
ty. I  would  like  to  speak  with  a  voice  which  all  the  terrified 
should  hear  and  take  heart  again.  I  would  like  to  raise  a  shout 
which  should  fill  the  world  at  the  joy  I  feel  over  the  coming 
reconciliation  of  the  contending  forces,  and  the  final  establish- 
ment of  the  harmony  and  sacredness  of  all  that  truth  which 
God  has  constituted  us  to  accept — for  which  philosophers  have 
thought,  or  poets  dreamed,  or  martyrs  bled. 

But  more  than  faith  sustains  me.  I  am  not  enveloped  in 
impenetrable  fog.  I  have  a  prophetic  discernment  of  the  meth- 
ods by  which  the  new  reconciliation  is  to  be  effected.  It  is  not 
a  new  faith  that  we  are  to  receive  ;  it  is  the  old,  old  faith  in  a 
bright  new  vesture.  Look,  I  pray  you,  at  the  tendencies  of  the 
conflicts  which  the  opposing  battalions  are  waging  to-day.  Is 
the  strife  between  Moses  and  geology  ?  To  my  mind  the  in- 
spired epic  of  Moses  presents  an  accordance  with  the  geological 
history  of  the  world  which  is  almost,  if  not  quite,  supernatural ; 
and  is  made  more  intelligible  and  more  wonderful  in  the  light 
which  science  has  thrown  upon  it.  Even  admitting  the  impos- 
sibility of  a  circumstantial  harmony,  all  conflict  has  forever  van- 
ished. 

Is  the  strife  waged  over  the  antiquity  of  the  human  race? 
Let  us  candidly  arrange  three  preliminaries:  1.  The  absolute 
age  of  Adam's  race  is  not  revealed,  and  has  only  been  deduced 
by  human  calculations  based  on  an  assumption  of  the  continui- 
ty of  the  genealogies  given  in  Scripture — an  assumption  which 
is  not  insisted  upon  by  all  Christian  theologians.  2.  The  Script- 
ural authority  bearing  on  this  question  may  have  exclusive  ref- 
erence to  the  Caucasian  race,  as  Dr.  M'Causland,  Dr.  Whedon, 


ELEMENTS  OF  GEE  AT  QUESTIONS.  223 

and  man}7  others  maintain ;  and  the  antiquity  of  this  race  may 
be  much  less  than  that  of  some  other  races,  though  there  be  a 
blood  affinity  between  them.  On  the  scientific  side,  the  fol- 
lowing propositions  may  be  maintained:  1.  All  science  testifies 
that  the  advent  of  our  species  is  comparatively  recent ;  more 
recent  than  any  of  the  great  revolutions  of  the  globe ;  more  re- 
cent than  the  advent  of  the  other  great  types  of  organic  life. 
2.  All  the  great  changes  which  the  Caucasian  race  have  wit- 
nessed may  have  transpired  within  a  few  thousand  years.  The 
final  disappearance  of  the  continental  glaciers;  the  extinction 
of  numerous  animal  and  vegetal  species ;  the  erosion  and  trans- 
position of  continental  shores,  and  the  desiccation  of  vast  seas 
and  lakes  —  these  are  all  phenomena  on  which  our  race  has 
probably  gazed ;  but  according  to  the  chronometry  of  changes 
transpiring  before  our  eyes,  they  do  not  imply  that  the  origin 
of  the  race  remounts  to  an  antiquity  exceeding  eight  to  twelve 
thousand  years.  But  suppose  twenty  thousand  years  appear 
more  probable,  what  forbids  ? 

Is  the  strife  over  the  destruction  of  men  by  a  great  deluge  ? 
I  discover,  first,  that  the  Bible  does  not  compel  me  to  believe 
it  speaks  of  a  deluge  covering  all  the  continents  simultaneous- 
ly ;  and,  secondly,  that  history,  tradition,  and  geology  preserve 
the  knowledge  of  post-Adamic  deluges  which  brought  destruc- 
tion over  all  the  world  known  to  the  sufferers. 

Is  the  strife  over  the  specific  unity  of  human  kind?  Then 
we  may  bear  in  mind  these  positions :  1.  There  is  much  reason 
to  believe,  with  M'Causland,  that  the  Mosaic  history  of  prime- 
val man  refers  only  to  the  Caucasian  race,  and  that,  consequent- 
ly, the  alleged  consanguinity  is  no  more  than  all  people  admit. 
2.  Even  if  this  be  true,  anatomical  and  physiological  science 
demonstrate  that  all  the  races  are  still  of  one  blood  and  one 
structure,  as  every  psychologist  admits  they  are  of  one  mental 
and  moral  constitution.  3.  If  we  hold  to  the  common  parent- 
age of  all  the  races,  we  assume  a  position  far  advanced  toward 

10* 


224  THEISM  OF  EVOLUTION. 

the  admission  that  still  lower  types  of  organization  are,  also, 
but  older  or  more  divergent  conditions  of  the  common  stock ; 
and  we  become  involuntary  defenders  of  a  doctrine  of  develop- 
ment. 4».-  If  any  theory  of  the  derivative  origin  of  species  ever 
becomes  established,  the  unity  of  human  kind  follows  as  a  cor- 
ollary. 

Is  the  existing  conflict  waged  over  the  origin  of  species  ?  I 
hold  it  to  be  exactly  like  a  fight  over  the  question  of  the  origin 
of  coal.  It  is  simply  a  question  of  fact.  The  truth  is  to  be 
found  out  by  searching,  and  to  be  revealed  to  the  understand- 
ing. Keligious  faith  has  no  more  to  do  with  it  than  with  the 
.contents  of  a  freight-car.  But  doesn't  the  Bible  teach  that  God 
created  man  and  other  forms  of  life  ?  Yes,  and  so  does  reason ; 
and  so,  I  believe,  does  science.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of 
organic  existence  except  as  the  result  of  supernatural  creative 
power.  But  is  it  not  the  miller  who  reduces  wheat  to  flour 
when  he  constructs  a  water-wheel,  and  causes  it  to  turn  the 
stone  which  pulverizes  the  grain?  And  is  it  not  God  who 
makes  man  when  he  arranges  a  line  of  genealogical  succession 
which  ends  in  man  ?  And  would  not  man  still  be  the  work  of 
Deity,  if  no  supernatural  power  were  interposed  between  the 
initial  act  and  the  human  result  ?  I  think  so ;  and  still  I  feel 
at  liberty  to  entertain  a  growing  conviction  that  even  if  species 
have  a  derivative  origin,  there  is  not  one  moment  between  the 
initial  act  and  the  final  result  when  the  impress  of  intelligent 
will  is  removed.  In  this  view,  not  only  is  every  species,  but 
also  every  individual,  the  result  of  direct  creation  ;  but  both  are 
creations  according  to  preordained  and  uniform  methods.  But, 
finally,  I  desire  to  say  for  myself  that  the  derivative  origin  of 
species  seems  not  to  be  proved ;  and  hence,  for  the  time  being, 
I  must  believe  that  each  organic  type  is  a  primordial,  and  not 
an  indirect,  creation. 

Is  the  conflict  to-day  over  the  origin  of  life  in  general  ?  Do 
Pouchet  and  Wyman  and  Bastian  assert — what  I  hold  is  not 


THEISM  OF  ARCHEGENESIS.  225 

yet  proved  by  observation  —  that  under  certain  circumstances 
living  animals  and  plants  come  into  being  without  the  inter- 
vention of  germs  ?  Well,  that  is  the  very  thing  for  which  we 
contend  in  asserting  that  the  first  representatives  of  all  organic 
types  were  not  generated,  but  created.  Do  you  assert  that  this 
so-called  spontaneous  origin  of  life  does  not  answer  to  the  the- 
ological idea  of  creation  ?  Then  I  would  ask  two  questions  in 
turn :  What  warrant  has  any  one  for  denominating  such  an 
origin  of  life  spontaneous  ?  And,  in  case  of  any  primordial 
creation  by  supernatural  agency,  what  set  of  circumstances  and 
appearances  would  you  expect  to  witness?  Would  you  look 
for  hands  molding  a  microscopic  animal  form  ?  Or  would  you 
not  rather  expect  such  form  to  be  molded  by  agencies  invisible 
and  immaterial?  That  is  what  the  doctrine  of  archegenesis 
asserts.  It  is  not  necessary  to  assume  that  forces  which  have 
no  basis  but  matter  elaborate  the  living  result.  Human  reason 
affirms  that  every  result  proceeds  from  intelligent  volition.  And 
so,  when  Dr.  Bastian  points  us  to  a  living  form  rising  into  be- 
ing from  a  germless  fluid,  I  wonld  cry  out,  Behold  the  "fact  of 
creation  !  Look  upon  the  very  presence  of  Deity ! 

Does  Maudsley,  Bain,  or  Carpenter — Biichner,  Vogt,  or  Bar- 
ker— assert  or  imply  that  mental  manifestations  are  so  far  de-  ^ 
termined  by  cerebral  conditions  that  we  are  prompted  to  re- ' 
gard  thought  a  mere  secretion  of  the  brain — mind  but  a  func- 
tion of  matter  ?  Then  I  rise  in  the  name  of  the  universal  con- 
sciousness to  denounce  the  absurdity.  If  it  is  only  nervous 
matter  which  thinks,  then  all  the  testimony  of  my  being  is  per- 
jury. Nature  itself  is  a  lie.  But  I  am  prepared  to  maintain 
from  the  platform  of  science  that  no  such  doctrine  as  the  uni- 
fication of  all  species  of  force  is  established,  short  of  an  ulti- 
mate synthesis  of  all  in  one  supreme  intelligent  Will.  In  the 
realm  of  inorganic  matter  we  discover,  besides  the  correlated 
physical  forces,  a  force  of  gravitation,  a  force  of  molecular  at- 
traction, and  a  force  of  molecular  repulsion.  In  the  world  of 


226  MUCH  « '  CONFLICT ' '  IMA  GIN  AS  Y. 

organization  we  have  revealed  a  force  of  vitality  and  a  force  of 
Will.  Now,  here  are  forms  of  energy  which  have  never  yet 
been  mutually  transformed.  To  say  that  a  man's  mental  man- 
ifestations are  conditioned  by  the  state  of  his  brain,  and  this 
by  the  food  which  he  consumes,  is  only  to  state  a  truism  which 
the  world  has  never  denied.  But  does  this  prove  that  mental- 
ity has  no  cause  but  brain  ?  The  movement  of  the  locomotive 
is  conditioned  by  the  switch;  but  does  this  fact  make  the 
switch  the  cause  of  the  locomotive's  motion?  Its  motion  is 
correlated  to  the  switch,  as  mentality  is  to  the  bias  which  brain 
gives  it ;  but  neither  motion  in  the  one  case,  nor  mentality  in 
the  other,  can  be  rationally  referred  to  any  influence  the  exer- 
cise of  which  implies  the  antecedent  and  independent  existence 
of  the  thing  influenced. 

Now,  to  be  candid,  I  am  not  aware  that  the  physicists  of  the 
day,  save  in  one  or  two  instances,  have  actually  avowed  a  dis- 
belief in  the  reality  of  spiritual  forces.  Some  of  them  have 
explicitly  avowed  the  contrary;  and  I  am  inclined  to  think 
most  of  them,  if  led  to  give  expression  on  the  subject  at  all, 
would  agree  in  substance  with  the  positions  I  have  assumed. 
But  that  dreadful  materialism  !  Where  does  it  come  from  ? 
Why,  it  is  the  joint  child  of  our  ignorance  and  our  fears. 
Come,  let  us  cease  whining,  and  stand  upon  the  prerogatives 
of  reason.  We  know  that  mind  is  a  factor  of  existence,  and 
so  does  everybody.  We  will  quit  setting  up  ghosts  to  fright- 
en ourselves  withal. 

Such  are  the  principal  fields  of  controversy  between  science 
and  religious  faith  at  the  present  day.  None  of  them  appear 
to  me  so  bloody  and  desperate  as  to  the  eyes  of  some  of  my 
friends.  With  an  antecedent  and  immovable  persuasion  of  the 
indestructibility  of  the  basis  of  our  Christian  faith,  I  contem- 
plate this  warfare  with  the  loftiest  and  most  serene  composure. 
Indifferent  as  to  what  may  be  proved  true,  I  am  only  anxious 
to  know  that  it  is  true,  and  embrace  it.  I  hold  devoutly  to 


RIGHTS  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  NATURE.  227 

the  utterance  of  the  Sorbonne,  that  whatever  can  be  proved 
true  in  philosophy  must  also  be  true  in  theology.  It  is  of  less 
interest  to  know  by  what  particular  means  the  doctrines  of  sci- 
ence can  be  harmonized  with  the  spirit  of  the  Bible,  than  to 
know  that  complete  harmony  reigns,  and  that  by  the  ordina- 
tion of  God. 

I  have  attempted  to  vindicate  the  religious  nature  of  man ; 
to  assert  its  right  to  activity ;  to  explain  and  illustrate  its  mode 
of  activity,  and  its  relations  to  the  intellect ;  to  commend  to 
you  a  profound  respect  for  every  form  of  religious  manifesta- 
tion ;  to  confirm  you  in  an  unalterable  faith  in  the  perpetuity 
of  our  religion ;  to  guard  you  against  superstition  and  bigotry, 
and  the  entanglement  of  your  faith  with  questions  of  human 
opinion ;  to  make  you  strong  Christians,  valiant  Christians,  ever 
ready  to  face  your  enemy  and  vindicate  your  faith ;  to  plant 
you  on  a  rock  whence  the  storms  of  hell  shall  be  unable  to 
move  you. 

If  history  and  philosophy  and  psychology  concur  in  proving 
that  man  is  not  man  without  religion,  then  it  follows  that  there 
is  no  human  relation  from  which  the  duties  and  observances  of 
religion  ought  to  be  excluded.  We  can  no  more  shake  off  our 
religion  than  our  skin ;  how,  then,  can  there  be  a  place  where 
it  is  proper  to  disown  it  ?  In  the  operations  of  business,  in  the 
halls  of  legislation,  in  the  organization  of  states,  in  the  universi- 
ty, in  the  high  school,  in  the  primary  school — everywhere,  ac- 
cording to  our  reasoning,  have  the  religious  instincts  the  right 
to  assert  themselves  and  qualify  our  determinations.  Man, 
however,  is  free  to  do  violence  to  these  instincts — even  to  be- 
lie and  deny  them ;  but  what  right  has  such  a  man  to  object 
to  my  compliance  with  the  law  of  my  being  and  the  law  of 
humanity  ?  What  right  has  he  to  interpose  an  unnatural  and 
monstrous  protest  against  the  recognition  of  the  religious  hem- 
isphere of  our  being  in  any  of  the  processes  or  stages  of  educa- 
tion ?  Education  must  be  secularized  ?  It  is  unnatural.  It  is 


228  RELIGION  IN  SCHOOLS. 

monstrous.  It  is  impracticable.  It  is  impossible.  Do  you  say 
that  in  a  free  country  we  should  not  impose  our  opinions  upon 
those  who  dissent  ?  Religion  is  not  an  opinion ;  it  is  a  law 
of  humanity,  like  respiration  and  hunger.  It  is  Heaven  that 
imposes  religion  upon  us  all — upon  the  objector  as  well  as  me. 
And  what  shall  we  say  of  the  man  of  religion  who  panders  to 
the  feigned  scruples  of  the  objector,  and  joins  with  him  in  vot- 
ing religion  out  of  school?  Whose  mind  does  his  vote  rep- 
resent in  committing  this  impiety?  Certainly  not  his  own. 
And  does  not  the  very  principle  of  equality  which  he  professes 
to  respect  dictate  that  he  give  himself  a  representation  instead 
of  affording  a  perverted  nature  a  double  one  ?  Oh,  sacrilege ! 
oh,  blindness !  Never  will  a  majority  of  sincere  objectors  ex- 
pel religion  from  its  rightful  place  in  any  of  the  affairs  of  men. 
If  it  is  ever  done,  it  will  be  through  the  weakness  and  ignorance 
of  religious  men. 

Religious  faith  is  an  ineradicable  constituent  of  human  char- 
acter. It  is  ordained  to  live  and  act  as  long  as  the  race  sur- 
vives. But  its  mode  of  action  is  receptive,  emotional,  propul- 
sive ;  that  of  the  intellect  is  cognitive,  discriminating,  directive. 
Faith  is  tender,  reverent,  conservative,  safe ;  intellect  is  blood- 
less, profane,  iconoclastic,  daring.  Superficially  viewed,  they 
have  almost  always  been  regarded  as  the  antitheses  of  each 
other.  The  true  view  'is,  that  they  mutually  antagonize  and 
qualify  each  other  to  produce  a  whole  which  constitutes  the  ex- 
cellence of  a  human  soul — as  molecular  attractions  and  repul- 
sions in  their  eternal  antagonism  marshal  quivering  atoms  into 
stable  masses ;  as  centrifugal  and  centripetal  forces  conspire, 
by  opposition,  to  create  and  maintain  the  circling  harmonies  of 
the  cosmos. 

They  are  unlike,  but  not  incompatible.  Though  each  has  its 
sphere,  it  can  never  be  admitted  that  faith  and  science  must  re- 
main apart.  "  The  mingling  of  science  with  religion,"  says  Ba- 
con, "  leads  to  unbelief ;  and  the  mingling  of  religion  with  science, 


THE  PEACE  OF  MUTUAL  RECOGNITION.  229 

to  extravagance."  To  all  tins  the  drift  of  my  arguments  is  op- 
posed. One  can  appreciate  the  force  of  the  aphorism  in  an 
age  when  a  set  of  arbitrary  dogmas  was  called  religion,  and 
fallible  interpretation  had  power  to  disfranchise  intellect ;  but 
strange  it  seems  that  men  should  still  maintain  that  no  neces- 
sary or  possible  correlation  can  subsist  between  the  thoughts 
embodied  in  God's  two  revelations ;  or  that  science  is  author- 
ized to  put  faith  in  a  test-tube,  or  theology  to  set  stakes  to 
science.  The  peace  to  be  established  between  the  two  is  not 
what  Bacon  intimates  —  a  sullen  non  -  intercourse.  It  is  the 
peace  of  mutual  recognition  and  mutual  understanding.  Re- 
ligion will  learn  that  whatever  is  true  is  hers,  and  must  be  in- 
corporated into  her  system.  Science  will  learn  that  many 
things  must  be  true  in  theology  which  can  not  be  gauged  by 
her  methods.  Philosophy  will  yet  convince  her,  when  the  ex- 
hilaration of  her  heyday  is  past,  that  underneath  the  isolated 
patch  of  ground  on  which  she  stands  stretches  the  broad  rock 
of  fundamental  truth,  that  bears  up,  in  equal  majesty  and  equal 
strength,  the  fabric  of  the  Christian  system.  Then  shall  she 
learn  that  the  most  imperious  demand  of  philosophy  is  to  ac- 
cept some  things  which  are  above  all  philosophy  and  all  science  ; 
that,  in  short,  faith  is  the  very  apotheosis  of  reason. 

There  is  a  story  told  by  Casalis,  the  African  traveler,  which 
I  have  read  and  reread,  and  seldom  without  tears.  It  illustrates 
and  proves,  better  than  all  argument,  how  inseparable  from  hu- 
manity is  the  feeling  of  religion ;  and  how  deep  and  mysteri- 
ous it  is,  even  in  the  breast  of  the  lowest  savages.  I  present 
you  the  account,  and  leave  you  to  ponder  its  meaning.  Ar- 
brousset,  the  missionary,  had  been  explaining  the  tidings  of  the 
Gospel  to  one  of  the  noblest  of  the  savage  Kaffirs,  when  he 
raised  himself  up  and  made  reply.  "  Your  tidings,"  said  he,  as 
reported  by  Arbrousset,  "  are  what  I  want ;  and  I  was  seeking 
before  I  knew  you,  as  you  shall  hear  and  judge  for  yourselves. 
Twelve  years  ago  I  went  to  feed  my  flocks.  The  weather  was 


230  THE  CRY  OF  INFANT  HUMANITY. 

hazy.  I  sat  down  upon  a  rock  and  asked  myself  sorrowful 
questions ;  yes,  sorrowful,  because  I  was  unable  to  answer  them. 
*  Who  has  touched  the  stars  with  his  hands  ?  On  what  pillars 
do  they  rest  ?'  I  asked  myself.  '  The  waters  are  never  weary ; 
they  know  no  other  law  than  to  flow,  without  ceasing,  from 
morning  till  night,  and  from  night  till  morning  ;  but  where  do 
they  stop?  And  who  makes  them  flow  thus?  The  clouds, 
also,  come  and  go,  and  burst  in  water  over  the  earth.  Whence 
come  they  ?  Who  sends  them  ?  The  diviners  certainly  do  not 
give  us  rain,  for  how  could  they  do  it  ?  And  why  do  I  not  see 
them,  with  my  own  eyes,  when  they  go  up  to  heaven  to  fetch 
it  ?  I  can  not  see  the  wind ;  but  what  is  it  ?  Who  brings  it, 
makes  it  blow  and  roar  and  terrify  us  ?  Do  I  know  how  the 
corn  sprouts?  Yesterday  there  was  not  a  blade  in  my  field; 
to-day  I  returned  to  the  field  and  found  some.  Who  can  have 
given  to  the  earth  the  wisdom  and  power  to  produce  it  ?'  Then 
I  buried  my  face  in  both  my  hands." 

This  is  the  cry  of  infant  humanity  in  the  dark.  This  is  the 
call  of  nature  for  its  God.  This  is  the  yearning  which  can 
only  be  eased  by  a  form  of  faith.  This  is  the  prayer  of  the 
soul  which  Deity  only  can  hush.  This  is  the  murmur  of  a 
spiritual  power  which  is  mightier  than  ocean  billows ;  which 
can  no  more  be  extirpated  from  existence  than  the  energies 
which  hurl  the  planets  in  their  circuits.  Oh,  let  us  be  calm  ! 
Oh,  let  ns  be  trustful,  and  confident,  and  brave — and  wait  rev- 
erently for  God  to  vindicate  his  own  everlasting  TRUTH  ! 


IX. 

THOUGHTS  ON  CAUSALITY,  WITH  REFERENCES  TO  PHASES 
OF  RECENT  SCIENCE. 

WHEN  I  was  in  London  last  July,  I  received  an  invitation  to 
participate  in  the  approaching  Belfast  meeting  of  the  British 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science.  Had  I  known 
that  the  occasion  was  to  be  signalized  by  some  of  the  most 
notable  utterances  of  the  century,  I  might  have  resisted  the 
strong  pressure  which  was  urging  me  to  the  Continent.  As  it 
was,  I  went  from  London  to  the  Alps,  while  Tyndall  proceed- 
ed from  the  Alps  to  London.  The  latter,  as  President  of  the 
British  Association,  delivered  an  address,  the  noise  of  which 
reached  me  at  Chamonix.  It  is  only  since  my  return  to  Amer- 
ica, however,  that  I  have  had  the  opportunity  to  learn  precise- 
ly what  the  great  physicist  uttered,  and  how  considerable  a 
commotion  it  occasioned  in  the  newspapers  of  this  country. 

The  gathering  to  which  I  refer  was  the  scene  of  other  nota- 
ble utterances  from  a  scientist  no  less  distinguished,  and  no 
less  worthy  of  distinction.  The  two  addresses  of  Tyndall  and 
Huxley  exemplify  well  a  characteristic  of  recent  science,  which, 
by  many,  has  been  deplored  as  a  tendency  to  positivism  and 
consequential  materialism.  To  these  two  productions  I  might 
add  two  recent  and  powerful  works  by  Haeckel,  of  Jena,  the 
latest  of  which  has  also  fallen  into  my  hands  since  my  return 
to  America.  I  refer  to  Haeckel's  "  Natural  History  of  Crea- 
tion,'^1)  and  his  "  Anthropogeny."(2) 

(*)  "Natiirliche  Schopfungsgeschichte,  4te.  verbesserte  Auflage,"  Ber- 
lin, 1873,  8vo,  pp.  688. 

(a)  "  Anthropogenic,  Entwickelungsgeschichte  des  Menschen,"  Leipzig, 
1874,  8vo,  pp.  732. 


232  TYNDALL  AT  BELFAST. 

In  studying  these  latest  emanations  from  the  evolutionist 
school  of  science,  I  have  been  deeply  impressed  by  four  obser- 
vations :  1.  The  great  learning  and  scientific  acumen  of  their 
authors.  2.  Their  strict  adherence  to  the  study  of  material  phe- 
nomena, and  their  customary  reticence  upon  questions  which 
receive  no  direct  light  from  physical  observations.  3.  The 
wide-spread  popular  misapprehension  of  these  men  in  respect 
to  the  subjects  of  their  reticence,  and  of  the  bearing  of  their 
scientific  opinions  upon  those  subjects.  4.  The  existence  of 
latent  fallacies  affecting  in  common,  to  a  certain  extent,  some 
of  their  fundamental  positions. 

With  the  view  of  eliciting  into  prominence  the  common  fun- 
damental principles  of  such  writers,  and  applying  to  them  what 
I  believe  to  be  true  philosophic  and  universal  criteria  of  correct 
thinking,  I  begin  by  presenting  the  line  of  reasoning  embodied 
in  the  address  of  Professor  Tyndall. 

This  address  is  a  panoramic  survey  of  the  history  of  thought 
and  speculation  on  the  origin  and  substratum  of  phenomena, 
and  concludes  that,  so  far  as  the  inquiries  of  science  are  con- 
cerned, there  has  always  been  manifest  a  tendency  in  leading 
minds  to  rest,  as  an  ultimate  datum,  upon  the  proposition  that 
atoms  and  molecules  are  ultimate  existences,  and  their  interac- 
tion is  the  cause  of  all  material  and  mental  phenomena.  Yet 
the  author  repeatedly  recognizes  the  necessity  of  admitting  the 
existence  of  some  inscrutable  energy  farther  back  than  the  re- 
motest cause  attainable  by  human  research. 

The  first  efforts  at  reasoning  traced  events  to  superhuman 
agency  exerted  by  numerous  beings  called  gods,  but  the  con- 
ception of  whom  was  strictly  anthropomorphic.  Science  was 
born  in  the  desire  to  find  fixed  and  orderly  energies  with  which 
to  replace  the  capricious  wills  of  the  primitive  gods.  While  yet 
in  its  cradle,  science  manifested  a  consciousness  of  its  mission, 
in  attacking  and  destroying  the  contemporary  religious  faiths 
and  pretensions.  In  seeking  from  below,  instead  of  above, 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHIC  SPECULATION.  233 

the  causes  of  phenomena,  ancient  Greek  speculation  struck 
into  the  fundamental  idea  that  atoms  and  molecules  are  the  ul- 
timate constituents  of  the  cosmos.  Democritus,  who  is  pro- 
nounced a  philosopher  superior  to  Plato  or  Aristotle,  first  gave 
precision  and  form  to  this  idea.  He  held  to  the  eternity  of 
the  atoms,  the  materiality  of  the  soul,  and  denied  chance.  He 
first  advanced  the  idea  of  vortices  in  the  genesis  of  worlds.  Em- 
pedocles  suggested  that  those  combinations  which  were  suited 
to  their  ends  maintain  themselves  from  their  very  nature,  and 
thus  launched  the  thought  which  has  taken  form,  in  our  own 
time,  as  the  doctrine  of  the  "  survival  of  the  fittest."  Epicurus, 
while  actuated  by  an  equal  desire  to  discover  law  and  order  in 
the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  and  thus  dispel  the  supersti- 
tions of  the  existing  religions,  did  not  reject  the  belief  in  di- 
vine existence ;  and  was  himself  a  worshiper  of  the  gods.  Lu- 
cretius, if  he  admitted  divine  existence,  maintained  that  the 
world  shows  no  proof  of  intelligent  design,  and  that  all  things 
have  been  caused  by  the  shock  of  the  atoms,  while  the  fittest 
combinations  have  persisted.  He  is  thought  to  have  suggest- 
ed the  nebular  hypothesis  to  Karit.  As  to  Socrates,  Plato,  and 
Aristotle,  they  imposed  a  yoke  on  the  human  mind  which  re- 
mains, to  some  extent,  unbroken  to  the  present  day. 

This  auspicious  inauguration  of  the  advance  of  science  was 
arrested  by  the  quickening  of  the  religious  feeling  through  the 
introduction  of  Christianity,  which  made  the  mistake  of  adopt- 
ing Biblical  interpretation  as  the  criterion  of  all  truth.  (*)  The 

(!)  In  the  Second  and  Third  lectures  of  the  present  work  I  have  given  a 
summary  of  the  facts  connected  with  the  relations  subsisting  between  the 
early  Christian  Church  and  contemporary  systems  of  thought.  I  have 
shown  that  it  was  only  through  the  abnormal  aggrandizement  of  the  eccle- 
siastical power  that  the  councils  of  tJie  Church  (not  Christianity,  except  so 
far  as  implicated  in  the  acts  of  those  who  professed  it)  attained  to  an  atti- 
tude where  they  were  enabled  to  dictate  terms  to  intellect ;  and  that,  in  do- 
ing this,  they  violated  not  more  the  rights  of  intellect  than  the  spirit  of 
primitive  Christianity. 


234  PROGRESS  OF  ATOMIC  THEORY. 

philosophy  of  Aristotle  sanctioned  and  aided  the  a  priori  meth- 
ods of  the  schoolmen ;  and,  though  science  made  positive  ad- 
vances in  Arabia,  the  bond  of  tradition  was  not  seriously 
wrenched  in  Europe  till  the  time  of  Copernicus  and  Bruno. 
Bacon  strengthened  the  incipient  bias  toward  inductive  meth- 
ods ;  and  Descartes,  though  setting  out  from  a  first  principle, 
unconsciously  abandoned  it,  to  present  the  cosmos  as  a  pure 
mechanism.  The  full  establishment  of  monotheism  was  favor- 
able to  the  conception  of  the  universe  which  presents  it  as  a 
system  of  physical  effects ;  and  Gassendi  signalized  the  possible 
compatibility  of  theology  with  a  revived  Epicureanism.  The 
doctrine  of  atoms,  which  started  with  Democritus,(8)  has  since 
grown  into  general  acceptance.  But  while  Democritus  con- 
ceived the  atoms  dead,  Gassendi,  and,  more  recently,  Clerk-Max- 
well, have  looked  upon  them  as  "prepared  materials,"  thus  sug- 
gesting either  the  postulate  or  the  inference  of  an  antecedent 
preparer.  Tyndall  agrees  with  Kant  in  denying  the  power  of 
reason  to  bridge  the  chasm  which  separates  the  atoms  from 
their  Maker. 

In  an  imaginary  discussion  between  Bishop  Butler  and  a  dis- 
ciple of  Lucretius,  the  close  correlation  between  states  of  mind 
and  conditions  of  the  brain  is  pointed  out ;  but  it  is  admitted 
that  the  impinging  of  dead  atoms  upon  dead  atoms  can  never 
result  in  sensation  or  any  other  phenomenon  of  consciousness. 
This  admission  does  not  appear  in  the  address  as  originally 
published,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  infer  that  the  author's  po- 
sition has  been  changed. 

Professor  Tyndall,  proceeding  to  the  phenomena  and  the 
problem  of  the  succession  of  organic  forms  in  geological  time, 
iterates  his  belief  in  the  genealogical  continuity  of  the  series, 
and  follows  with  a  sketch  of  the  origin  of  the  doctrine  of 

(2)  Democritus,  in  fact,  was  a  pupil  of  Leucippus,  a  disciple  of  the  Ele- 
atics.  Leucippus  seems  to  be  the  real  originator  of  the  atomic  philosophy 
(Ueberweg,  "Hist.  Phil.,"  vol.  i.,  p.  67). 


PROGRESS  OF  DEVELOPMENT  DOCTRINE.  235 

transmutation  or  derivation  of  species,  and  of  the  grounds  on 
which  the  Darwinian  phase  of  the  doctrine  reposes.  Mr.  Dar- 
win and  Professor  Huxley  receive  high  encomiums.  Kepeti- 
tions  here  would  be  irksome.  It  is  asserted  that  variations 
occur  under  domestication  and  in  a  state  of  nature;  that  in- 
finitesimal variations  transmitted  through  generations  become 
greatly  accumulated  and  augmented;  that  the  external  condi-, 
tions  which  are  concomitant  with  these  variations  are  "true 
causes ;"  that  Darwin  rejects  teleology,  even  while  bringing  for- 
ward some  of  the  most  striking  examples  of  apparent  design ; 
that  instincts  are  only  inherited  and  accumulated  experiences ; 
and,  finally,  that  Darwinism  has  become  firmly  rooted  in  the 
convictions  of  thinking  minds. 

In  the  recent  progress  of  scientific  research,  the  doctrine  of 
the  conservation  of  energy  has  become  established ;  and  this 
principle  is  held  to  embrace  organic  nature  as  truly  as  inorgan- 
ic. Next,  the  origin  of  mind  itself  has  come  specially  under 
review ;  and  Spencer  is  maintained  to  have  established  for  it  a 
developmental  history  parallel  with. that  established  by  Darwin 
for  the  physical  organism.  Eyes  and  other  organs  of  the  senses 
are  but  portions  of  a  primitively  homogeneous  mass  differen- 
tiated by  the  influence  of  light  and  other  external  agents.  The 
tactual  sense  is  observed  to  possess  a  development  correlative 
with  the  intelligence  of  animals ;  and  the  inference  is  that  it 
determines  such  intelligence.  Instincts  and  intuitions  are  but 
the  accumulated  experience  of  races,  transmitted  from  genera- 
tion to  generation.  Space  and  time  are  "  elements  of  thought," 
or,  as  Kant  phrases  it,  "  forms  of  intuition,"  instead  of  object- 
ive realities.(J) 

(')  The  phrase  "  elements  of  thought "  as  here  used  is  too  loose  for  phi- 
losophy. Space  and  time  are  not  the  "  elements,"  but  the  concomitants, 
and  probably  the  conditions,  of  thought.  "Forms  of  intuition"  is  more 
exact ;  but  still,  "  conditions  of  intuition,"  or  "  conditions  of  the  possibility 
of  intuition  and  thought,"  would  be  better. 


236  "MATERIALISTIC"  INDICATIONS. 

The  author  now  approaches  the  critical  point  of  his  discus- 
sion. Having  admitted  that  the  scientist  often  feels  himself 
impelled  to  pass  beyond  the  field  of  physical  phenomena,  and 
from  phenomena  to  induce  an  abstract  generalization  under 
which  an  entire  category  of  phenomena  may  be  ranged — as  in 
the  case  of  the  force  of  gravitation — it  is  not  strange  that  Lu- 
cretius should  have  reached  the  generalization  that  his  atoms 
were  endowed  with  life ;  or  that  Darwin  should  have  permitted 
himself  to  be  understood  as  abstracting  creative  power,  exer- 
cised in  a  limited  number  of  initial  cases,  as  the  antecedent  and 
cause  of  the  series  of  organized  beings.  Darwin,  our  author 
thinks,  should  speak  with  clearness  at  this  juncture,  and  assume 
the  responsibility  of  carrying  derivative  development  back,  not 
only  to  one  primitive  stock,  but  to  unorganized  matter  itself. 
At  the  same  time,  he  admits  that  the  doctrine  of  spontaneous 
generation  is  not  yet  proved,  though  he  seems  to  regard  that 
achievement  as  not  very  remote. 

We  stand  now  in  the  presence  of  that  matter  so  uniformly 
defined  as  dead.  We  have  traced  life  from  its  highest  mani- 
festations, through  all  its  gradations,  to  granulated,  vivified  pro- 
toplasm. Life  is  everywhere  associated  with  matter.  We  know 
nothing  of  life  save  as  associated  with  matter.  Is  there  any 
terrestrial  life  which  does  not  depend  for  its  maintenance  and 
its  origin  upon  matter  ?  "  Here  the  vision  of  the  mind  author- 
itatively supplements  the  vision  of  the  eye.  By  an  intellectual 
necessity,"  he  says,  "  I  cross  the  boundary  of  the  experimental 
evidence,  and  discern  in  that  matter  which  we,  in  our  ignorance 
of  its  latent  powers,  and  notwithstanding  our  professed  rever- 
ence for  its  creator,  have  hitherto  covered  with  opprobrium — 
the  promise  and  potency  of  all  terrestrial  life." 

Here,  then,  he  reaches  the  goal  toward  which  recent  theories 
in  science  seemed  to  impel  him.  This,  indeed,  is  a  sort  of  ma- 
terialism ;  but  we  must  have  the  candor  to  permit  the  distin- 
guished physicist  to  explain  the  sense  in  w^ich  he  embraces 


DEEPER  FORCES  RECOGNIZED.  237 

materialism.  In  harmony  with  Spencer,  and  in  opposition  to 
Mill,  Fichte,  Berkeley,  and  Hume,  Professor  Tyndall  entertains 
no  question  as  to  the  existence  of  an  external  world;  though 
we  have  no  evidence  that  it  is  as  it  seems  to  be.  "Our  states 
of  consciousness,"  he  says,  "are  symbols  of  an  outside  entity 
which  produces  them  and  determines  the  order  of  their  suc- 
cession, but  the  real  nature  of  which  we  can  never  know.  In 
fact,  the  whole  process  of  evolution  is  the  manifestation  of 
a  power  absolutely  inscrutable  to  the  intellect  of  man.*  *  * 
Considered  fundamentally,  then,  it  is  by  the  operation  of  an 
insoluble  mystery  that  life  on  earth  is  evolved,  species  differ- 
entiated, and  mind  unfolded,  from  their  prepotent  elements  in 
the  immeasurable  past"  (p.  91). 

The  facts  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  man  are  repeat- 
edly recognized.  "  The  facts  of  religious  feeling  are  to  me 
as  certain  as. the  facts  of  consciousness"  (p.  24,  Appleton  & 
Co.'s  ed.).  "Physical  science  can  not  cover  all  the  demands 
of  man's  nature  "  (p.  42).  Speaking  of  facts  of  consciousness 
which  have  prescriptive  rights  quite  as  strong  as  those  of  the 
understanding,  he  says,  "There  is  also  that  deep -set  feeling, 
which,  since  the  earliest  dawn  of  history,  and  probably  for  ages 
prior  to  all  history,  incorporated  itself  in  the  religions  of  the 
world.  You  who  have  escaped  from  these  religions  into  the 
high  and  dry  light  of  the  intellect  may  deride  them ;  but  in 
so  doing,  you  deride  accidents  of  form  merely,  and  fail  to 
touch  the  immovable  basis  of  the  religious  sentiment  in  the 
nature  of  man.  To  yield  this  sentiment  reasonable  satisfaction 
is  the  problem  of  problems  at  the  present  hour"  (p.  93).  It 
will  be  noticed  that  he  relegates  religion  to  the  realm  of  emo- 
tion. This  force  is  something  "capable  of  being  guided  to 
noble  issues  in  the  region  of  emotion,  which  is  its  proper  and 
elevated  sphere'^1)  (p.  93).  Finally,  while  claiming  for  sci- 

.  (')  On  this  subject,  see  the  present  writer's  views  expressed  in  the  First 
Lecture,  p.  22-25. 


238  NATURE  OF  TYNDALVS  MATERIALISM. 

ence  a  rightful  and  complete  exemption  from  the  restraints  of 
all  religious  theories,  schemes,  or  systems,  he  asserts  an  equal 
right  of  the  ethical  nature  to  free  exercise.  "The  advance  of 
man's  understanding  in  the  path  of  knowledge,  and  those  un- 
quenchable claims  of  his  moral  and  emotional  nature  which  the 
understanding  can  never  satisfy,  are  here  equally  set  forth  "  (p. 
97).  In  an  address  delivered  two  months  subsequently  to  his 
Belfast  manifesto,  Professor  Tyndall,  raising  the  question  wheth- 
er there  are  not  in  nature  manifestations,  of  knowledge  and  skill 
superior  to  man's,  replies,  "  My  friends,  the  profession  of  that 
atheism  with  which  I  am  sometimes  so  lightly  charged  would, 
in  my  case,  be  an  impossible  answer  to  this  question"  (p.  102). 
The  ethical  bearing  of  scientific  materialism  is  found  further 
set  forth  in  an  address  delivered  by  the  same  speaker  in  1868. 
After  explaining  the  invariable  relation  of  physics  to  conscious- 
ness, and  alleging  that,  "given  the  state  of  the  brain,  the  cor- 
responding thought  or  feeling  might  be  inferred ;  or  given  the 
thought  or  feeling,  the  corresponding  state  of  the  brain  might 
be  inferred,  he  asks,  "  How  inferred  ?  It  would  be  at  the 
bottom  not  a  case  of  logical  inference  at  all,  but  of  empirical 
association.*  *  *  The  passage  from  the  physics  of  the  brain 
to  the  corresponding  facts  of  consciousness  is  unthinkable  (p. 
117).*  *  *  In  affirming  that  the  growth  of  the  body  is  me- 
chanical, and  that  thought  as  exercised  by  us  has  its  correlative 
in  the  physics  of  the  brain,  I  think  the  position  of  the  mate- 
rialist is  stated  as  far  as  that  position  is  a  tenable  one.  I  think 
the  materialist  will  be  able,  finally,  to  maintain  this  position 
against  all  attacks ;  but  I  do  not  think,  in  the  present  condi- 
tion of  the  human  mind,  that  he  can  pass  beyond  this  position. 
I  do  not  think  he  is  entitled  to  say  that  his  molecular  group- 
ings and  his  molecular  motions  explain  every  thing.  In  real- 
ity, they  explain  nothing.  The  utmost  he  can  affirm  is  the  as- 
sociation of  two  classes  of  phenomena,  of  whose  real  bond  of 
union  he  is  in  absolute  ignorance"  (p.  118). 


TYNDALL  NEITHER  ATHEIST  NOR  PANTHEIST.       239 

The  foregoing  digest  indicates  that  the  celebrated  Belfast 
address  is  an  attempt  to  show  that  the  most  penetrating  minds 
of  all  ages  have  felt  themselves  borne  toward  the  conviction 
that  the  ultimate  datum  of  scientific,  and,  perhaps,  of  philo- 
sophic, investigation  must  be  matter.  It  asserts  that  this  is  the 
general,  or  at  least  the  forming,  conviction  of  men  of  science 
at  the  present  day ;  that  all  activities  in  the  realm  of  life  and 
mind,  as  well  as  in  that  of  organization,  are  intimately  connect- 
ed sequents  or  concomitants  of  the  interactions  of  the  atoms, 
and  that  back  of  this  basis  of  phenomena,  whatever  we  may 
feel  impelled  to  believe,  there  is  nothing  which  can  be  reached 
by  real  knowledge;  though  we  are  compelled  to  recognize  a 
profound  and  mysterious  reality  to  which  our  ethical  feelings 
are  co-ordinated.  It  is  unfair  to  hurl  at  Professor  Tyndall  the 
charge  of  atheism  in  the  philosophic  sense.  He  distinctly  re- 
pels the  imputation.  It  is  uncandid,  after  his  careful  qualifi- 
cations, to  charge  him  with  materialism  in  that  ordinary  sense 
which  excludes  the  notion  of  Deity  back  of  matter.  When  he 
avows  materialism,  he  means  that  within  the  region  of  the 
data  of  science  he  discovers  every  thing  originating  from  ante- 
cedents under  the  recognized  laws  of  matter  and  force.  There 
certainly  is  something,  he  says,  behind  matter  and  force ;  but 
he  follows  Spencer  in  refusing  to  subscribe  to  any  predicates 
respecting  it.  He  is  hardly  a  material  pantheist,  for  he  dis- 
tinctly declares  that  sensation  and  thought  can  not  come  from 
dead  matter ;  and  implies  that  though  existence  emerges  from 
matter,  its  ground  is  farther  back.  He  certainly  belongs  to 
the  nescience  school  of  theists,  in  which  Hamilton  and  Mansel 
are  older  masters  than  Spencer ;  and  there  seems  little  propri- 
ety and  less  occasion  for  his  assuming  the  burden  of  a  confes- 
sion so  opprobrious  as  materialism. 

I  desire  to  make  the  analysis  of  this  address  the  occasion  for 
shaping  a  statement  of  fundamental  principles  which  ought  to 

11 


240  SOME  FIRST  PRINCIPLES. 

regulate  the  procedures  of  scientist,  philosopher,  and  theologian 
alike.  We  are  all  equally  attempting  to  cleave  through  the 
dense  darkness  which  environs  us,  to  reach  the  truth  of  things. 
That  we  live  in  a  universe  of  phenomena  is  generally  admitted. 
We  are  therefore  realities,  and  we  all  act  on  the  assumption 
that  there  are  other  realities  shadowed  forth  in  the  realm  of 
appearances.  No  reasoning,  nevertheless,  can  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world;  and  the  history  of  thought  shows 
that  it  is  possible,  in  individual  cases,  to  stifle  the  universal  be- 
lief that  it  exists.  But  if  these  phenomena  represent  realities, 
we  are  still  uncertain  that  they  represent  realities  as  they  are. 
Universal  belief  again  affirms  that  'they  do ;  and  yet  there  is 
room  for  doubt. 

If  we  trust  the  indications  of  the  shifting  phenomena,  the 
world  of  realities  is  the  theatre  of  perpetual  movement,  change, 
and  transformation.  We  find  rooted  in  universal  belief  a  con- 
viction that  all  these  changes  are  severally  the  results  of  appro- 
priate causes ;  and  that  the  realities  themselves  are  equally  ef- 
fects of  adequate  causation.  It  is  a  law  of  mind  to  look  upon 
every  phenomenon  as  an  effect,  and  to  couple  effect  with  cause. 
It  is  the  province  of  science  to  catalogue  phenomena,  to  classi- 
fy them,  to  note  their  relations  of  antecedence  and  sequence 
and  formulate  laws;  and,  from  observed  uniformities  of  se- 
quence, to  lift  the  veil  from  the  future  and  the  past.  It  is  the 
province  of  philosophy  to  pass  beyond  the  phenomenon  and 
inquire,  not  what  is  its  antecedent,  but  what  is  its  cause ;  to 
pass  from  immediate  and  accessible  causes  to  remote  ones,  and 
from  these  to  ultimate,  efficient  causation.  Philosophy,  when 
it  has  attained  this  limit,  becomes  theology.  Theology  is  the 
granary  in  which  the  fruitage  of  science  and  philosophy  is 
garnered.  Religion  is  the  activity  of  that  department  of  our 
nature  which  feels  its  ground  and  sanction  in  the  supreme  Re- 
ality in  which  the  successes  of  science,  philosophy,  and  theolo- 
gy converge. 


RELATIONS  OF  TRUTH- SEEKERS.  241 

Though  searchers  after  truth  may  be  ranged  as  scientists, 
philosophers,  and  theologians,  it  is  seldom  the  case  that  either 
shuts  himself  closely  in  his  own  field.  The  scientist  from  phe- 
nomena induces  laws ;  and  from  the  postulates  of  his  own  mind 
deduces  causes,  such  as  gravitation,  affinity,  electricity.  The 
modern  philosopher  combines  the  data  furnished  in  reason 
with  the  conclusions  yielded  by  science;  and  the  theologian 
pursues  all  paths  and  all  methods  which  seem  to  tend  toward 
a  last  solution  of  the  mystery  of  being  and  events. 

It  is  a  misfortune,  as  it  seems  to  me,  for  either  to  restrict 
his  investigations  to  a  single  field.  The  practice  begets  in- 
difference to  certain  classes  of  data,  and  ends  in  bigotry,  mis- 
understanding, and  hostility.  Our  common  nature  covers,  in 
each  individual,  the  whole  ground,  and  it  seems  to  me  narrow 
and  pernicious  for  the  truth-seeker  to  tie  himself  up  to  a  single 
method. 

Science,  in  its  modern  acceptation,  does  not  lead  to  causes 
— still  less,  to  primordial  cause.  The  search  for  these  is  the 
legitimate  object  of  philosophy.  Science,  strictly  speaking, 
knows  only  phenomena  with  their  groupings  and  orders  of  se- 
quence. It  talks  much  of  forces,  but  these  are  only  hypothe- 
ses, verbal  symbols  of  unknown  quantities  which  may  be  one 
thing  or  another.  Moreover,  when  the  scientist  steps  into  the 
realm  of  abstract  realities,  he  is  playing  the  r6le  of  philoso- 
pher.(') 
•  I  have  said  the  bond  between  effect  and  cause  is  a  universal 

(')  So  natural  and  legitimate  is  philosophizing  that  the  most  emphasized 
scientist  finds  himself  continually  tempted  beyond  the  limits  of  science. 
The  earnest  hunt  for  truth  renders  the  mind  oblivious  of  the  boundary- 
lines  between  the  territories  of  science  and  philosophy.  "£y  an  intellect- 
ual necessity,"  as  Professor  Tyndall  truthfully  admits,  "  it  crosses  the  bound- 
ary of  the  experimental  evidence"  and  demands  of  philosophy  the  extradi- 
tion of  truth  which  had  eluded  pursuit  in  the  realm  of  positive  science. 
See  further  on  this  subject  in  the  Fifth  Lecture. 


242  CHANCE  DISCRIMINATED. 

datum  of  reason.  I  think  no  modern  philosopher  will  main- 
tain that  existence  or  phenomenon  can  be  the  product  of 
chance.  In  ruling  chance,  however,  from  the  throne  of  the 
universe,  it  may  be  well  to  offer  an  explanation  and  a  discrim- 
ination. We  must  recognize  such  a  thing  as  chance ;  and  we 
ought  to  understand  what  it  is  and  what  it  is  not.  If  I  throw 
down  a  couple  of  dice,  it  is  impossible  to  calculate  what  will 
turn  up.  We  say  the  result  is  wholly  a  matter  of  chance.  I 
may  chance  to  turn  up  one  ace ;  it  may  be  two.  But  the  con- 
tingency of  the  result  is  not  the  cause  of  it.  The  two  aces  con- 
cur by  chance;  but  chance  did  not  put  forth  the  efficiency 
which  moved  each  dice  precisely  so  far  and  no  farther.  The 
movement  of  the  dice  is  as  absolutely  the  effect  of  the  forces 
exerted  by  my  hand,  by  gravity,  and  by  elasticity,  as  if  I  had 
deliberately  laid  each  one  down  with  the  ace  up.  I  have  not 
the  ability  so  to  measure  and  adjust  the  force  and  direction  of 
my  muscular  effort  as  to  produce  a  preappointed  movement 
and  lodgment  of  the  dice ;  and  there  is,  consequently,  some 
range  of  possible  movement  and  possible  place  of  rest  for  the 
dice.  But  whatever  movement  transpires,  and  whatever  may 
result  in  the  position  of  the  dice,  ordinary  physical  forces  were 
the  cause — the  proximate  cause — of  all.  Chance,  in  this  case, 
is  simply  a  field  of  possibility.  It  is  a  range  of  values  of  an 
unknown  quantity,  within  certain  limits.  It  is  a  name  for  our 
inability  to  gauge  precisely  the  forces  which  act — our  ignorance 
of  the  precise  result  which  they  will  produce. 

The  case  is  not  fundamentally  altered  when,  for  the  dice,  we 
substitute  the  atoms  of  a  universe.  The  field  of  possible  re- 
sults is  inconceivably  enlarged ;  but  we  must  feel  equally  cer- 
tain that,  whatever  adjustment  the  atoms  assume,  there  has  been 
some  adequate  cause  or  set  of  causes  to  move  them  to  their 
places.  We  say  that  any  particular  adjustment  is  the  result  of 
chance ;  but  it  is  absolutely  certain  that,  whatever  the  adjust- 
ment, there  were  forces  moving  the  atoms  in  such  directions 


CHANCE  NOT  CAUSAL.  243 

and  with  such  velocities  as  to  produce  precisely  that  adjust- 
ment. The  chance  of  which  we  speak  is  no  more  a  cause  in 
this  case  than  in  that  of  the  dice. 

Chance  is  essentially  a  negation  of  cause.  The  moment  I 
assert  that  a  result  is  caused,  the  idea  of  chance  is  necessarily 
excluded.  Were  there  no  cause  but  chance  in  the  universe — 
even  supposing  the  atoms  of  matter  to  exist  —  every  thing 
would  rest  in  a  state  of  immobility,  stagnation.  There  would 
be  no  further  effect  than  the  birth  of  matter. 

But  suppose  the  existence  of  matter  and  orderly  acting  forces 
to  be  granted,  there  is  much  more  in  the  collocations  of  the 
atoms  of  the  universe  than  can  be  attributed  to  causes  acting 
without  discernment.  We  are  not  authorized  to  assert  that  the 
disposition  of  the  atoms  is  the  result  even  of  blind  attractions 
and  repulsions ;  since,  as  can  be  shown,  there  are  numberless 
adjustments  in  which  harmony,  beauty,  fitness,  and  utility  have 
been  the  directive  or  conditioning  force ;  and  these  are  qual- 
ities sustaining  relations  only  to  intelligence. 

Whatever  character,  then,  philosophy  may  authorize  chance 
to  assume,  she  can  not  concede  to  it  the  character  of  cause. 
Existence  can  not  be  the  result  of  chance.  No  mode  of  exist- 
ence can  be  the  result  of  chance.^) 

It  is  one  of  the  results  of  science  to  prove  that  that  which 
had  been  regarded  as  a  cause  is  only  an  effect.  The  more  we 
know,  the  longer  the  chain  of  intermediate  causation  seems  to 
be.  Primitive  man  recognizes  no  interval  between  cause  and 
first  cause.  Every  event  in  the  natural  world  is  looked  upon 
as  the  direct  product  of  supernatural  causation.  This  is  not  a 
theoretical  opinion,  but  a  historical  fact,  which  I  have  ascer- 
tained after  abundant  research.  The  relics  of  this  habit  perpet- 


(!)  On  chance  and  probabilities,  the  reader  may  consult  De  Morgan, 
"Probability,"  p.  23;  Mill,  "Logic,"  book  iii.,  chap.  xvii. ;  M'Cosh,  "Typ- 
ical Forms,"  pp.  40,  41,  etc. ;  Venn,  "  Logic  of  Chance,"  1876. 


244  PROGRESS  OF  CAUSAL  RESEARCH. 

uated  themselves  among  the  Greeks  until  the  dawn  of  Greek 
philosophy ;  and  we  are  assured  by  Draper  and  Tyndall,  and 
the  professions  of  the  philosophers  themselves,  that  the  aim  of 
philosophy,  in  which,  in  ancient  times,  all  science  was  merged, 
was,  to  demonstrate  that  events  do  not  transpire  through  the 
direct  intervention  of  the  gods,  but  according  to  the  orderly 
methods  of  physical  law.  With  such  gods  as  ruled  in  the 
Greek  pantheon,  there  must  have  been  much  to  stimulate  phi- 
losophy and  forward  its  aims. 

Advancing  from  the  lowest  stage  of  barbarism,  the  first  step 
in  reflection  discloses  the  law  of  invariable  antecedence  and  se- 
quence among  physical  phenomena;  and  the  mind  attaches  its 
ineradicable  notion  of  cause  to  the  invariable  antecedent.  Here 
arises  the  notion  of  physical  causation.  But  the  invariable  an- 
tecedent is  now  regarded  the  effect  of  first  cause,  acting  in  the 
guise  of  a  supernatural  power.  Here  is  one  term  interposed 
between  first  cause  and  ultimate  phenomenon. 

The  next  step  in  reflection  discloses  the  same  fact  in  regard 
to  the  observed  physical  cause  as  had  been  noted  at  first  in  re- 
gard to  the  last  phenomenon.  This  is  also  the  effect  of  a  phys- 
ical cause ;  and  the  mind  now  finds  two  terms  of  intermediate 
causation  interposed  between  assumed  first  cause  and  ultimate 
phenomenon.  The  opportunity  presents  itself,  at  this  stage, 
for  another  observation  which,  in  the  development  of  science, 
becomes  extremely  significant.  The  recognized  intermediate 
causes  of  two  separate  phenomena  appear,  in  many  cases,  as 
the  effects  of  the  same  cause.  The  number  of  assumed  first 
causes  is  therefore  much  less  than  the  number  of  intermediate 
causes  in  the  first  order  of  remove  from  phenomenon. 

With  the  further  advance  of  reflection,  it  is  ascertained  that 
the  assumed  first  cause  is  again  the  effect  of  remoter  causation ; 
and  so  its  aspect  changes  to  that  of  an  intermediate  cause,  and 
we  find  three  terms  interposed  between  phenomenon  and  newly 
assumed  first  cause.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  observed  that,  in 


HUMANITY'S  FAITH  IN  FIRST  CAUSE.  245 

many  cases,  two  of  the  previously  assumed  first  causes  are,  in 
common,  the  effect  of  one  first  cause  thus  removed  by  three 
terms  from  phenomenon. 

Thus  continues,  through  the  instrumentality  of  researches  of 
the  scientific  kind,  the  process  of  interpolating  new  terms  of 
intermediate  or  secondary  causation ;  and  parallel  with  the  re- 
treat of  primary  causation  into  the  ever-dimmer  distance  is  a 
diminution  in  the  number  of  assumed  first  causes.  The  tend- 
ency of  lines  of  causation  or  series  of  effects  to  converge  has 
been  noted  by  every  thinker.  This  zone  of  secondary  causes 
is  the  peculiar  field  of  science. 

Before  proceeding  further,  one  suggestive  fact  should  be  con- 
spicuously held  up  to  view.  The  human  mind  all  along  holds 
fast  to  its  notion  of  primary  causation.  Disappointed  and  de- 
ceived a  hundred  times,  its  faith  in  the  reality  is  not  one  whit 
abated.  Reluctantly  and  sorrowfully  driven  from  post  to  post, 
it  moves  on  into  the  unexplored  darkness,  full  of  confidence 
that  the  object  of  its  trust  will  be  found  at  last.  Look,  further, 
at  the  notion  which  it  always  frames  of  the  character  of  its 
primary  cause.  True  it  is  that  the  hue  of  humanity  is  reflect- 
ed over  it.  The  first  cause  does  assume  human  attributes.  In 
the  rude  conditions  of  society,  they  are  bodily  as  well  as  spirit- 
ual ;  but  afterward  purely  spiritual.  Man  is  conscious  of  the 
exercise  of  a  power  of  causation  on  his  own  part,  and  he  knows 
nothing  of  any  other  mode  of  essential  causation.  As  long  as 
all  that  he  sees  and  investigates  in  the  universe  is  found  co- 
ordinated to  the  powers  and  methods  of  his  own  intellect,  it 
would  be  an  impossible  philosophy  to  assume  that  primary 
cause,  when  discovered,  should  not  exert  its  efficiency  in  a  man- 
ner harmonious  with  the  indications  of  all  the  rest  of  the  uni- 
verse. The  mind  of  humanity,  therefore,  invests  its  primary 
cause  with  volition  and  intelligence.  It  may  be  said  that  hu- 
manity's conceptions  in  this  and  many  other  things  are  desti- 
tute of  demonstrable  foundation.  I  do  not  wish  to  meet  the 


246  INFLUENCE  OF  MONOTHEISM. 

objection  now,  but  would  suggest  that  sound  reasoning  de- 
mands that  we  proceed  from  grounds  which  are  strongly  prob- 
able, rather  than  from  the  total  negation  of  them  because  not 
demonstrated.  The  fallacy  of  asserting  that  a  given  position 
can  not  be  demonstrated  true,  and  then  proceeding  to  reason  as 
if  it  were  demonstrated  untrue,  is  a  somewhat  fashionable  one, 
and  has  served  as  the  basis  of  a  great  deal  of  bulky  and  osten- 
tatious, if  not  very  substantial,  philosophizing. 

Another  observation  to  be  made  at  this  point  has  reference 
to  the  relative  influence  of  polytheistic  and  monotheistic  con- 
ceptions upon  the  body  and  the  march  of  science.  It  is  the 
characteristic  of  polytheism  to  stand  ready  to  recognize  an  in- 
definite number  of  first  causes ;  thus  necessarily  retarding,  in- 
stead of  stimulating,  the  search  for  intermediate  causes.  Mono- 
theism, while  recognizing  but  one  absolutely  first  cause,  must 
either  favor  the  tendency  of  lines  of  causation  to  converge  at  a 
point,  by  the  continual  interpolation  of  secondary  causes,  or 
else  must  yield  to  the  anthropopathic  instinct  of  uncultured 
mind,  in  assuming  an  indefinite  number  of  points  of  applica- 
tion of  causal  efficiency.  This  latter  alternative  would  evident- 
ly be  the  resort  of  a  monotheism  not  yet  sufficiently  exalted  in 
scientific  knowledge  to  be  able  to  appreciate  the  full  meaning 
of  that  convergence  toward  a  unity  which  is  disclosed  in  the 
genealogical  lines  of  phenomena.  To  the  first  alternative  it 
would  be  driven  by  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  significance 
of  the  history  of  opinion ;  and  when  once  fully  intrenched  in 
that  position,  it  would  contemplate  with  satisfaction,  rather 
than  alarm,  the  progress  of  science  in  breaking  through  the  un- 
explored barriers  which  separate  the  last  found  causes  from  the 
One  Universal  Cause. 

We  turn  back  now  to  scrutinize  the  field  of  secondary  cau- 
sation in  which  physical  science  occupies  itself.  It  is  purely 
a  phenomenal  world.  The  data  of  physical  science,  strictly 
speaking,  do  not  consist  of  causes  made  manifest  in  sensible 


CAUSES  NOT  COGNIZED  BY  SCIENCE.  247 

phenomena,  but  of  sensible  phenomena  themselves,  certain^  ones 
of  which  sustain  to  each  other  the  relation  of  invariable  ante- 
cedence and  sequence.^)  The  body  of  positive  science  is  re- 
stricted to  these.  When,  in  obedience  to  a  law  of  our  minds, 
we  connect  the  necessary  notion  of  causation  with  a  given  inva- 
riable antecedence,  we  perform  a  legitimate  act  of  philosophic 
thinking ;  but  we  neither  know  the  modus  operandi  of  the  cau- 
sation, nor  whether  the  causation  inheres  in  the  antecedent  or 
acts  through  it,  nor  whether  such  causation  is  primary,  or  sep- 
arated by  an  indefinite  number  of  terms  from  primary  cause. 
It  is  only  an  accommodated  and  symbolical  form  of  expression 
when  I  say,  for  instance,  that  friction  causes  electrical  phenom- 
ena. I  only  know  that  electrical  phenomena  follow  friction. 
Friction  may  be  the  cause  proximate,  or  it  may  not  be.  That 
it  is  the  first  cause  no  one  will  pretend;  but  how  many  re- 
moves separate  it  from  first  cause  no  one  can  conjecture. 

Physical  science  may  conveniently  and  harmlessly  assume 
that  causation  inheres  in  the  antecedent;  but  the  habit  of  so 
doing  must  not  generate  a  belief  that  the  assumption  represents 
a  verity.  Science  may  forbear  to  inquire  —  nay,  in  its  own 
character,  it  can  not  inquire — whether  efficient  causation  inhere 
in  the  material  substance  back  of  the  phenomenon  which  stands 
as  invariable  antecedent ;  or  whether  the  remotest  phenomenal 


(J)  Certain  language  which  Professor  Morris  has  published  since  this 
paper  was  written  (and  published)  is  singularly  coincident  with  some  of 
our  expressions.  It  is  a  pleasure  to  learn  that  he  has  independently 
thought  the  same  thoughts,  and  to  call  attention  to  the  acute  analysis  by 
which  he  eliminates  the  principle  of  final  cause  as  a  necessary  principle  of 
cognition  and  of  the  contemplation  of  nature.  "  The  laws,"  he  says,  "  of 
such  [mechanical]  action  are  laws  of  phenomenal  sequence,  and  not  of 
causation.  So-called  mechanical  causes  are  not  true  causes  "  ("  The  Final 
Cause  as  Principle  of  Cognition  and  Principle  in  Nature,"  in  Jour.  Phil. 
Soc.  of  Great  Britain,  1875).  For  further  references,  see  the  foot-note  on 
page  96  of  the  present  work. 

11* 


248  REAL  CAUSATION -MET APHEN OMEN AL. 

antecedent  reached  by  science  represents  substantial  first  cause. 
Should  the  scientist  refrain  from  instituting  such  inquiries,  he 
should  neither  be  reproached,  on  the  one  hand,  with  the  charge 
of  apathy  touching  questions  of  primary  causation,  nor  himself 
commit  the  mistake,  on  the  other,  of  assuming  that  inquiries 
in  his  actual  field  have  led  him  to  real  causes.  Still  less  should 
he  dogmatically  deny  that  real  causation  is  posited  outside  of 
the  phenomenal  world  in  which  his  labors  are  conducted — be- 
yond the  last  term  which  he  has  discovered  with  his  microscope, 
or  dissolved  in  his  alembic,  or  discerned  with  the  Vorstellungs- 
Jcraft  of  his  imagination. 

The  method  of  science,  I  repeat,  is  chiefly  inductive ;  that 
of  philosophy,  chiefly  deductive.  The  science  of  antiquity  and 
of  the  Middle  Ages  was  essentially  a  body  of  conclusions  de- 
rived deductively ;  and  the  inevitable  and  glaring  absurdities 
of  the  method  and  its  results,  contrasted  with  the  brilliant  suc- 
cesses of  the  inductive  method  of  modern  times,  have  caused 
many  scientists  to  look  upon  deductive  processes  with  an  un- 
merited degree  of  distrust,  or  even  disdain.  This  has  led  them, 
since  scientific  induction  can  not  be  carried  into  the  field  of 
first  principles,  to  reject  as  unsafe  and  unworthy  of  considera- 
tion the  results  of  a  priori  reasoning.  Hence  has  sprung  up 
the  miscalled  "  positive  philosophy."  This  tendency  has  gone 
too  far,  and  it  is  quite  time  to  return  to  the  natural  method, 
which  appreciates  and  weighs  with  impartiality  the  evidence 
afforded  both  by  reason  and  the  senses ;  and  does  not  refuse  to 
search  for  causes  in  the  realm  of  immaterial  things,  because 
there  they  would  elude  the  verification  of  the  crucible  and  the 
balance.  Deduction,  dealing  with  necessary  truths  and  admit- 
ted principles,  is  a  permissible  and  safe  procedure,  and  so  natural 
and  available,  that  not  unfrequently  the  scientist  himself  falls 
into  the  use  of  it,  at  the  same  time  that  he  professes  to  observe 
rigorously  the  canons  of  scientific  induction. 

The  test  of  a  physical  truth — that  it  must  be  capable  of  men- 


INEFFICIENCY  OF  "LAW."  249 

tal  presentation — is  legitimate ;  but  a  moment's  reflection  will 
convince  any  one  that  it  is  an  "impossible  test  in  the  whole  field 
of  abstract  ideas.  By  what  sort  of  process,  for  instance,  would 
Professor  Tyndall  bring  before  his  mind's  eye  a  Vorstellung  of 
cheapness,  or  ambition,  or  despair,  or  even  the  generalization 
induced  from  a  body  of  phenomena  ? 

In  this  phenomenal  world  science  disposes  its  data  accord- 
ing to  their  resemblances,  concomitancies,  and  sequences.  An 
observed  invariable  sequence  is  styled  a  law.  In  the  general- 
ized faith  that  a  certain  sequence  will  remain  invariable,  science 
forecasts  terms  which  lie  in  the  future ;  and,  in  a  similar  faith 
that  it  has  always  been  invariable,  science  retraces  the  pathway 
of  phenomena  into  the  inaccessible  past.  But  it  is  of  the  ut- 
most importance  to  refrain  from  endowing  the  word  law  with 
the  notion  of  efficiency.  We  say  loosely  that  the  law  of  chem- 
ical affinities  causes  the  disengagement  of  carbonic  acid  when 
chalk  and  sulphuric  acid  are  brought  together ;  that  it  is  a  law 
of  life  that  the  stomach  should  not  be  dissolved  by  its  own 
juices ;  that  it  is  the  law  of  the  "  survival  of  the  fittest"  which 
causes  the  progressive  improvement  (either  assumed  or  proved) 
in  the  successive  generations  of  a  species  in  the  state  of  nature. 
We  are  apt  to  think  that  when  we  have  ranged  a  phenomenon 
under  its  appropriate  order  of  sequence,  we  have  pointed  out 
its  cause;  whereas,  laws  are  only  uniformities  of  juxtaposition 
of  phenomena.  There  is  no  efficacy  in  law.  It  is  not  a  force, 
but  only  the  method  of  activity  of  force  or  the  order  of  its  ef- 
fects. The  law  which  expresses  the  relations  subsisting  be- 
tween the  intensity  of  gravity  and  the  masses  and  distances  of 
bodies,  when  applied  to  a  certain  assemblage  of  phenomena, 
renders  them  intelligible  in  a  certain  sense ;  it  discloses  the 
consummate  harmony  subsisting  among  them,  and  reveals  cor- 
relations which  seem  to  be  the  work  of  intelligence ;  but  we  de- 
ceive ourselves  when  we  imagine  that  the  law  produces  a  single 
result.  The  law  itself  is  a  result — an  induction  from  the  order 


250  "  CONDITIONS  "  NOT  CA  USAL. 

of  the  phenomena  which  a  mistaken  science  summons  it  to  ex- 
plain. If  a  progressive  improvement  of  race  is  an  outcome  of 
the  continuous  "  survival  of  the  fittest,"  then  this  order  of  se- 
quence is  a  law ;  and  in  accordance  with  it,  we  shall  expect 
every  race  left  to  itself  to  undergo  a  gradual  improvement; 
but  such  order  of  sequence  is  no  more  a  cause  in  this  case 
than  in  any  other.  The  immediate  causes  of  this  result  are 
the  agencies  which  destroy  the  individuals  not  "  fittest  to  sur- 
vive," or,  more  accurately,  the  forces  concerned  in  the  contin- 
uance of  the  species,  under  the  conditions  (extermination  of  the 
weakest),  through  the  surviving  individuals. 

Still  employing  the  term  cause  in  the  symbolical  sense  cus- 
tomary with  science,  there  is  another  set  of  circumstances 
which  ought  not  to  escape  notice  in  scrutinizing  the  principles 
of  causality.  I  refer  to  conditions  of  causation  —  sometimes 
called  conditioning  causes.  There  are  conditions  indeed  to  the 
efficiency  of  every  cause  —  conditions  of  its  operativeness  in 
any  degree ;  and  there  are  others  which  merely  modify  its  op- 
eration ;  and,  not  unfrequently,  the  two  characters  are  united 
in  one  condition.  There  is  danger  of  confounding  conditions 
with  causes.  I  agree  to  write  a  book,  for  instance,  on  the  con- 
dition that  my  publishers  will  put  it  in  print.  It  will  not  be 
written  with  that  condition  left  out.  But  the  publisher  does 
not  thereby  become  the  author  of  my  book.  The  dilute  acid  in 
the  battery  will  attack  the  zinc  only  on  condition  that  you  con- 
nect the  zinc  and  platinum  externally  by  means  of  a  conductor ; 
but  this  does  not  render  the  conductor  the  agent  which  dis- 
solves the  zinc.  I  build  a  wall  behind  my  grape-trellis,  and  I 
find  the  ripening  of  the  fruit  accelerated  ;  but  it  is  not  the  wall 
which  does  the  work:  it  is  still,  as  before,  the  sun.  The 
amount  of  light  emitted  by  my  lamp  is  determined,  within  cer- 
tain limits, by  the  height  of  the  wick;  but  this  does  not  ren- 
der the  wick  the  cause  of  the  light.  The  varying  wick  is  only 
a  varying  condition  of  a  varying  result  (oxidation)  of  a  vary- 


< '  CONDITIONS  "  NOT  CA  VSAL.  251 

ing  activity  of  a  constant  physical  cause — chemical  affinity  be- 
tween oil  and  oxygen.  Similarly,  the  amount  of  thought  which 
I  can  evolve  is  conditioned  by  all  the  various  affections  and 
conditions  of  the  brain.  My  poetry  and  my  philosophy  are 
indeed  correlated  to  brain  and  blood  and  oxygen  and  beef- 
steak, but  only  in  the  same  way  that  my  boots  are  correlated 
to  calf-skin  and  tan-bark  and  black-wax.  These  condition  the 
exercise  of  the  boot-maker's  skill ;  beefsteak  conditions  the  ex- 
ercise of  mine.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  activity  in  both  cases 
has  other  conditions ;  but  it  is  also  true  that  none  of  the  con- 
ditions can  be  elevated  to  the  dignity  of  causes.  The  physical 
scientist  is  sometimes  hoodwinked  by  the  exact  graduation  of 
mental  activity  to  the  condition  of  the  brain,  and  commits  the 
mistake  of  clothing  condition  with  the  character  of  cause.  As 
well  assert  that  the  wick  secretes  the  light. 

A  similar  departure  from  correct  reasoning  is  the  assignment 
of  the  "  environment "  as  the  cause  of  organic  modifications. 
I  shall  not  deny  that  organic  modifications  are  generally  corre- 
lated to  the  environment,  and  vary  with  the  environment,  and 
as  a  sequence  of  its  variations.  Though  I  have  observed  that 
organism  bears  no  fixed,  and  therefore  necessary,  relation  to  en- 
vironment, and  even  sometimes  ignores  it,  I  will  assume  that 
the  correspondence  is  always  as  uniform  as  a  certain  school  of 
derivationists  pictures  it.  What  then  ?  This  is,  after  all,  but 
a  conditioning  cause.  It  seems  to  me  to  imply  a  lack  of  close 
discrimination  to  assert,  for  instance,  that  increased  cold  causes 
an  animal's  fur  to  grow  longer.  If  it  grow  longer  with  in- 
crease of  cold,  and  as  a  sequence  of  it,  the  immediate  cause  is 
evidently  the  increased  amount  of  assimilation  at  the  growing 
points  of  the  hairs.  That  cold  is  the  cause  of  this,  there  is  no 
ground  for  asserting.  But  if  it  were  the  cause,  cold  itself  is 
the  effect  of  a  remoter  cause — the  diminution  of  heat-vibra- 
tions ;  and  this  is  the  result  of  a  decrease  of  energy  in  the  cause 
of  heat-vibrations,  whatever  that  may  be.  When  the  common 


Of  TBS 


252  CONSECUTIVENESS  AND  CAUSAL  NEXUS. 

potato  is  grown  in  a  dry  and  sterile  soil,  it  deteriorates  in  size 
and  quality ;  and  the  Darwinist  would  assert  that  these  changes 
are  caused  by  the  change  in  the  environment ;  while,  in  fact, 
they  are  only  conditioned  by  it.  The  change  in  the  soil  is  the 
condition  of  the  assimilation  of  less  material ;  it  is  the  condi- 
tion of  the  less  energetic  action  of  the  vital  forces.  Whatever 
result  ensues,  it  is  these  forces  which  cause  it.  The  crane's 
long  legs  and  the  duck's  broad  bill  are  co-ordinated  to  their  en- 
vironment, and  have  been  fashioned  as  they  are  by  some  cause. 
It  is  evident  that  the  environment  has  been  the  condition  with 
reference  to  which  the  conformation  was  produced.  But  there 
is  no  particle  of  proof  that  the  environment  produced  them. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  contemplate  Professor  Tyndall  in 
the  effort  to  represent  to  his  mind's  eye  the  process  by  which 
pond  water  wove  the  web  of  a  duck's  foot ;  or  that  by  which 
the  consumption  of  clover-heads  fashioned  a  persistent  pulp  in 
the  molar  of  the  rabbit,  while  forest  fruits  determined  a  limit- 
ed growth  in  the  molar  of  its  fellow-rodent,  the  squirrel.  The 
whole  doctrine  of  organic  transformations,  or  formations, 
through  the  influence  of  external  conditions,  is  infected  with 
this  fallacy  of  reasoning.  I  am  not  denying  the  co-ordinations 
alleged,  but  I  choose  to  trace  them  to  intelligible  and  real 
causes. 

The  scientist,  in  pronouncing  upon  causal  relations  among 
his  phenomena,  is  in  danger  of  committing  the  logical  error  of 
post  hoc,  propter  hoc.  The  fundamental  conception  of  the  doc- 
trine of  the  derivation  of  species,  under  any  of  its  aspects,  is  a 
case  of  post  hoc,  propter  hoc.  While  there  is  not  an  undoubted 
instance  of  the  derivation  of  a  genuine  species,  its  possibility  is 
a  mere  hypothesis  ;(')  and  the  assertion  that  all  species  are  de- 

(J)  The  author  would  be  sorry  to  indulge  in  dogmatism  on  this  question. 
Recent  observations  have  shown  the  possibility  of  structural  changes  of 
great  significance,  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  which  is  cited  from 
the  Zeitschrift  fur  Wissenschaftliche  Zoologie,  which  represents  a  minute 


RECENT  FACTS  FAVORING  DERIVATION.  253 

rivative  is  a  somewhat  hazardous  assumption.     The  direct  ob- 
servations which  we  have  been  able  to  make  on  the  serial  rela- 


crustacean  varying,  with  increase  of  the  saltness  of  the  water,  from  a  spe- 
cific form  known  as  Artemia  salina  to  another  specific  form  known  as  Ar- 
temia  Milhauseni,  and  with  decrease  in  the  saltness  of  the  water  varying 
inversely  (Popular  Science  Monthly,  vol.  ix.,  p.  122).  Even  this  is  less 
striking  than  the  transformation  of  Siredon  liclienoides  (observed  by  Pro- 
fessor Marsh)  induced,  under  change  of  habitat,  by  which  a  transition  was 
effected  not  only  from  one  supposed  species  to  another,  but  from  one  rec- 
ognized genus  to  another,  and  even  from  a  group  (Perennibranchiata)  com- 
monly regarded  as  of  ordinal  value,  to  another  group  (Caducibranchiata) 
often  regarded  as  a  distinct  order.  Obviously,  however,  such  examples 
remain,  for  the  present,  open  to  the  explanation  that  naturalists  have  over- 
estimated or  underestimated  the  relative  value  of  different  categories  of 
characters  (mistaking  certain  ones  for  specific  which  are  only  varietal),  or 
have  assumed  as  adult  and  ultimate  states  those  which  are  merely  devel- 
opmental ;  as  in  the  remarkable  instances  of  Medusae,  where,  as  an  illus- 
tration, the  embryonic  stages  of  a  single  individual  were  described  as  four 
genera,  Scyphistoma,  Strobila,  Ephyra,  and  Aurelia  (Packard,  "  Life  Histo- 
ries of  Animals,"  p.  68 ;  Clark,  "  Mind  in  Nature,"  p.  67-72). 


Since  the  foregoing  note  was  penned,  the  researches  of  American  zoolo- 
gists have  made  it  appear  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  recognized  spe- 
cies of  birds,  mammals,  and  fresh-water  mollusks  of  our  country  are  no 
more  than  geographical  varieties,  having,  of  course,  common  origins.  Yet 
we  have  been  no  less  positive  about  the  fixity  of  these  supposed  specific 
types  than,  on  the  same  grounds,  we  might  continue  to  be,  in  respect  to 
specific  types  still  recognized.  If  we  must  admit  that  so  many  "  good  spe- 
cies "  have  had  common  origins,  we  may  as  well  admit  that  all  good  spe- 
cies have  been  probably  derived  from  common  origins,  and  thus  the  bar- 
rier to  acceptance  of  the  derivative  hypothesis  would  be  completely  broken 
down.  In  the  judgment  of  the  writer,  the  evidence  for  derivation  has  been 
continually  accumulating,  and,  part  passu,  the  difficulties  encountered  by 
it  have  disappeared.  This  admission,  however,  concerns  the  theory  only 
as  a  mode  of  succession  of  pJienomena  and  as  an  explanation  of  the  material 
conditions  and  physiological  instrumentalities  under  which  and  through  which 
the  succession  is  effectuated  by  some  cause  existing  without  the  province 
of  science.  It  is  made,  also,  in  view  of  the  entire  range  of  evidence — geo- 


2  54        "  ORGANIC  ALL  T  REMEMBERED  "  EXPERIENCES. 

tions  of  species  disclose  the  existence  of  obstacles  which,  so 
far  as  we  know,  have  never  been  surmounted.  The  fossil  treas- 
ures of  our  continent  furnish  us,  in  successive  ages,  a  series  of 
equine  quadrupeds  with  a  progressively  diminishing  develop- 
ment of  toes,  ending  with  the  solidungulate  horse.  Derivation 
assumes  that  these  belong  to  one  genealogical  line ;  while  it  is 
perfectly  obvious  that  this  set  of  facts,  taken  by  itself,  is  en- 
tirely consistent  with  the  creation  hypothesis.  The  gigantic 
basal  inconsequence  of  a  theory  which  deduces  material  conti- 
nuity from  a  simple  succession  of  terms  is,  nevertheless,  great- 
ly palliated  by  its  harmony  and  parallelism  with  the  phenom- 
ena of  embryonic  development,  and  with  recently  established 
facts  of  variability  of  species ;  and  I  do  not  think  any  man 
authorized  to  deny  dogmatically  that  specific  derivation  is  the 
method  of  nature. 

Equally  unfounded  in  reason  or  science  is  Mr.  Spencer's  as- 
sumption that  instincts  are  inherited  and  accumulated  experi- 
ences "  registered  in  the  organism,"  and  that  our  intuitive  ideas 
are  "  organically  remembered  "  experiences.  No  glimmer  of  ev- 
idence exists  of  any  such  connection  between  instinct  or  in- 
tuition and  ancestry ;  while  all  attainable  evidence  shows  that, 
besides  the  absolute  lack  of  qualitative  resemblance  between  in- 
stinct or  intuition  and  its  alleged  cause,  the  instincts  and  intu- 


logical,  zoological,  embryological,  and  morphological — and  not  on  the  na- 
ked evidence  of  a  few  nicely  graduated  successions  of  forms. 

On  the  geographical  variations  of  American  species,  see,  for  Birds, 
Baird,  "  The  Distribution  and  Migration  of  North  American  Birds,"  in 
Amer.  Jour.  Sci.  and  Arts,  vol.  xli.,  Jan.  and  March,  1866 ;  Allen,  Proc.  Bos- 
ton Soc.  Nat.  Hist.,  vol.  xv. ;  Kidgway,  Amer.  Jour.  Sci.  (3),  iv.,  Dec.,  1872, 
and  vol.  v. ;  for  Mammals,  Baird,  "  Pacific  R.  R.  Reports,"  vol.  viii. ;  Allen, 
Proc.  Boston  Soc.  Nat.  Hist.,  1874,  vol.  xv. ;  for  Birds  and  Mammals,  Yar- 
row, "Wheeler  Survey,"  vol.  v.,  chap,  i.,  1876;  Morse,  Popular  Science 
Monthly,  Nov.  and  Dec.,  1876  ;  for  Mollusks,  Cooper,  Proc.  Cal.  Acad.  Nat. 
Sci.,  vol.  v.,  p.  128 ;  Weatherby,  Proc.  Cincinnati  Soc.  Nat.  Sci.,  June,  1876. 


CONCOMITANCE  AND  CAUSAL  NEXUS.  255 

itions  are  the  most  absolutely  fixed  and  secularly  invariable  ele- 
ments in  the  system  of  life,  and  are  as  distinctly  operative  in 
the  brute  as  in  man. 

Not  unfrequently  the  phenomena  which  challenge  our  inves- 
tigation sustain  relations  of  simple  concomitancy  or  parallel- 
ism ;  and  when  such  relations  appear  tolerably  uniform,  it  is 
natural  to  suspect  some  intercausal  connection  between  them, 
while  in  truth  nothing  of  the  kind  may  exist ;  and  their  par- 
allelism may  result  from  a  common  relation  to  some  higher 
cause.  The  improvement  of  the  tactual  sense  in  the  ascending 
series  of  animal  forms  proceeds  pari  passu,  with  improving 
intelligence;  and  Mr.  Spencer  has  assumed,  accordingly,  that 
intelligence  is  developed  by  improved  tactual  organs.  Now, 
there  is  much  better  reason  for  affirming  that  improved  intel- 
ligence causes  improved  organs ;  for  it  is  obvious,  from  con- 
siderations already  presented,  that  external  conditions  are  not 
causes  at  all,  but,  at  best,  only  conditions ;  and  still  less  could 
they  become  the  cause  of  a  result  qualitatively  diverse ;  while 
intelligence,  as  we  are  conscious,  is  gifted  with  the  power  of 
causation.  But  in  truth  neither  is  the  cause  of  the  other; 
though  superior  intelligence  is  the  condition  of  improved  co- 
ordinate faculties  in  the  organism  which  is  its  instrument. 
The  whole  catalogue  of  needs  and  accompanying  instruments 
for  their  gratification  belongs  to  this  category ;  as  well  as  the 
parallel  phenomena  of  mind  and  brain,  from  which  Dr.  Carpen- 
ter has  illogically  generalized  his  strange  doctrine  of  "  uncon- 
scious cerebration,"  while  others  have  been  led  to  conceive  of 
thought  as  a  "  secretion  of  the  brain." 

The  assignment  of  an  uncertified  antecedent  for  cause  is  but 
one  degree  worse  than  the  assignment  of  an  inadequate  cause. 
As  no  stream  can  flow  higher  than  its  source,  so  no  cause  can 
produce  an  effect  greater  than  itself.  This  recognized  necessi- 
ty of  things  is  disregarded  in  that  phase  of  the  derivative  the- 
ory which  contemplates  organic  traits  ^augmented  by  inherit- 


256  LAWS  AND  FORCES. 

ance.  Inheritance  transmits  what  it  receives — no  more.  If,  in 
the  course  of  generations,  a  character  become  more  and  more 
developed,  we  discover  the  action  of  a  constant  force  loading 
more  and  more  into  the  vehicle  of  inheritance. 

We  must  now  endeavor  to  approach  more  closely  to  the  real 
objective  ground  of  phenomena.  We  have  assumed  that  an 
external  world  is  a  reality.  We  all  know  that  its  phenomena 
have  been  investigated  by  Science  until  the  chain  of  causation 
has  been  traced  back  to  portions  of  matter  which  elude  obser- 
vation ;  and,  by  a  leap,  she  has  concluded  that  divisibility  ex- 
tends to  those  inconceivably  smaller  portions  called  molecules 
and  atoms.  These  supposed  atoms  are,  then,  the  ultimate  real- 
ities of  science ;  and  all  other  forms  and  conditions  of  material 
substance  result  from  their  mutual  interactions.  The  interac- 
tions of  atoms  and  their  resulting  aggregates  are  admitted  to 
be  the  effects  of  causes.  The  universal  and  individual  reason 
would  rebel  against  the  converse  hypothesis.  Now,  those  causes 
lying  out  upon  the  utmost  verge  of  intellectual  exploration 
have  been  designated  forces.  Their  modes  of  activity  are  their 
"  laws,"  and  produce,  severally,  those  correlate  orders  of  phe- 
nomenal sequence  called  the  "  laws "  of  phenomena.  •  Now, 
force,  it  must  be  perceived,  is  the  name  of  an  entity  unknown 
to  science.  It  is  another  symbolical  term  employed  for  con- 
venience, the  symbolism  of  which,  as  in  other  cases,  long  usage 
is  liable  to  disguise.  We  are  absolutely  certain,  nevertheless, 
that  the  cause  called  force  is  a  reality. 

Where,  now,  does  this  reality  reside  ?  I  do  not  inquire  where 
it  acts,  but  where,  in  reference  to  matter,  is  its  own  subjective 
essence  ?  Here  opinion  bifurcates.  A  few  maintain  that  mat- 
ter itself  is  the  subjective  ground  of  force,  while  others  believe 
that  force  is  external  to  matter.  Suppose  we  assume  matter 
itself  to  be  the  author  of  energy.  The  supposition  involves  the 
absurdity  of  confounding  subject  and  object.  Moreover,  as 
matter  must  be  either  -intelligent  or  unintelligent,  we  may  sup- 


RELATION  OF  FORCE  TO  MATTER.  257 

pose,  at  first,  that  it  is  unintelligent.  If  unintelligent,  then  the 
interaction  of  dead  atoms  gives  rise  to  a  universe  of  phenome- 
na among  which  are  life,  volition,  and  thought.  I  am  willing 
to  consider  as  final  the  admissions  of  Tyndall  and  Dubois-Rey- 
mond  on  this  point,  both  of  whom  explicitly  assert  the  impos- 
sibility of  eliciting  intellectual  fire  from  the  collision  of  dead 
atoms.  (')  If  the  force -atom  is  not  unintelligent,  it  is  intelli- 
gent, and  we  have  a  universe  with  an  infinitude  of  atomic  in- 
telligences, acting,  nevertheless,  in  infinite  and  eternal  harmony 
among  themselves ;  or  else  the  universe  as  a  whole  is  one  in- 
telligence, and  objectivity  in  respect  to  it  is  totally  annihilated. 
Every  thing  which  is,  is  not  a  manifestation  of  the  Supreme, 
but  a  part  of  it.  Of  these  two  alternatives,  the  first  is  a  more 
startling  hypothesis  than  that  of  the  living  monads  of  Leibnitz ; 
since  these  were  not  the  seat  of  ultimate  cause,  but  subsisted 
under  it.  It  may  be  pronounced  infinitely  improbable,  and  dis- 
missed from  consideration.  The  second  alternative,  which  iden- 
tifies nature  with  one  supreme  intelligence,  is  pantheism,  the 
credibility  of  which  I  have  no  space,  at  present,  to  discuss,  be- 
yond the  suggestion  already  laid  down.(2) 

The  other  supposition  which  may  be  made  in  reference  to 
the  ultimate  seat  of  energy  views  it  as  external  to  matter — 
that  is,  an  entity  of  which  matter  is  neither  a  part  nor  the 
whole.  This  entity  may  be  considered  as  intelligent  or  unin- 
telligent. If  unintelligent,  we  have  no  cause  for  life,  volition, 
and  intelligence  more  promising  than  when  we  sought  it  from 
unintelligent  atoms.  If  we  suppose  the  ultimate  ground  of 
force  to  be  intelligent,  we  have  an  adequate  explanation  of  vi- 

(')  Tyndall,  "Belfast  Address,"  pp.  68,  87;  Dubois  -  Reymond,  "Ueber 
die  Grenzen  des  Naturerkennens,"  pp.  20,  29. 

(3)  Helmholtz  considers  matter  resting  and  inactive  in  itself,  but  yet,  in 
some  strange  way,  as  animated  with  varying  forces.  The  definition  im- 
plies that  the  ultimate  cause — that  is,  the  cause  of  the  atomic  forces  with 
which  matter  is  endowed — is  something  external  to  matter. 


258  INTELLIGENT  PRIMORDIAL  FORCE. 

tal  and  mental  phenomena  in  the  world,  and  an  immediate  and 
all-sufficient  explanation  of  the  rational  method  which  knits 
creation  into  a  web  of  relationships. 

This  conception  of  supreme,  intelligent  power,  enthroned  at 
the  fountain  head  of  phenomena,  and  displaying  its  activity  in 
force  acting  upon  atoms  and  aggregates  of  matter,  does  not 
differ,  so  far  as  this  qualification  goes,  from  the  conceptions  set 
forth  by  Spencer.  Huxley,  Tyndall,  and  Dubois-Reymond.  Or- 
ganization, like  crystallization,  flows  from  an  impulse  imparted 
to  material  atoms. 

Now,  let  us  look  at  the  significance  of  this  position.  The 
whole  range  of  molecular  activities  proceeds  from  the  exertion 
of  intelligent  activity  from  without.  That  is,  wherever  and 
whenever  those  activities  exist,  there  such  energy  is  exerted. 
If  molecular  attraction  and  repulsion,  which  number  organi- 
zation among  their  results,  are  but  force  exerted  from  with- 
out by  supreme  intelligent  cause,  then  such  cause  has  been  act- 
ive, not  alone  at  the  beginning  of  existence,  but  through  the 
whole  history  of  molecular  activities  since  the  world  began ; 
and  continues  to  act  in  the  myriad  phenomena  of  daily  obser- 
vation. The  only  alternative  to  this  sweeping  conclusion  is  that 
which  contemplates  supreme  cause  as  exerting  only  an  initial 
energy,  the  currents  of  which  sweep  through  infinite  years  and 
infinite  existence.  This  would  imply  that  the  molecular  forces 
of  the  present  are  either  exerted  by  dead  matter,  or  are  not 
original,  but  simply  transmitted,  forces.  The  first  supposition 
is  contrary  to  the  premise.  The  second  is  the  view  commonly 
entertained ;  and  it  resolves  the  universe  into  a  dead  mechan- 
ism. There  are  grave  difficulties  which  oppose  it.  First,  the 
molecular  activities  of  to-day  are  universally  believed  to  be 
identical  in  nature  with  those  which  have  always  been  manifest 
in  matter,  and  hence,  if  the  first  motions  were  imparted  by  in- 
telligent being,  all  are.  Secondly,  we  have  no  knowledge  or 
room  to  conjecture  that  molecular  force  has  undergone  any 


DETHRONED  DIVINITY  ENTHRONED.  259 

change  since  the  morning  of  material  existence.  Thirdly,  it  is 
out  of  harmony  with  the  facts  of  the  moral  consciousness  to 
posit  supreme  causation  at  a  point  so  remote  from  the  present. 
Fourthly,  the  molecular  forces  are  .probably  one :  this  is  the 
demand  of  philosophy  and  the  foreshadowed  verdict  of  science. 
The  atoms  also,  by  the  general  admission  of  physicists,  are  of 
one  kind.  Now,  it  is  unreasonable  to  affirm  that  one  identical,, 
unintelligent,  involuntary  force  or  impulse,  acting  upon  one  un- 
intelligent, involuntary  set  of  atoms,  can  give  rise  to  the  varied 
classes  of  material  phenomena.  It  seems  to  me  a  far  more  ra- 
tional resort  to  abandon  the  hypothesis  of  blind  impulse  run- 
ning on  in  pursuance  of  an  initial  energy,  and  recognize,  as  Sir 
William  Thompson  has  himself  suggested,  the  immediate  pres- 
ence of  first  cause  in  all  the  passing  activities  of  the  material 
world. 

This,  of  course,  is  a  restoration  of  the  very  power  which, 
according  to  Tyndall,  antiquity  invoked  science  to  overthrow. 
But  science  herself  has  brought  us  to  a  situation  which  sug- 
gests and  commends  this  alternative.  It  does  not  follow,  how- 
ever, that  the  universe  must  be  again  subjected  to  the  domin- 
ion of  capricious  will.  It  is  demonstrable  that  the  universe  is 
not  so  ruled ;  and,  in  view  of  the  conclusion  reached,  it  appears 
that  supreme  spontaneity  wills  to  act  according  to  fixed  meth- 
ods. It  is  surely  as  easy  to  refer  the  regularity  of  phenomena 
to  discerning  mind  as  to  blind  mechanism. 

It  is  a  common  phraseology  of  science  to  speak  of  heat, 
light,  and  other  forms  of  energy  as  "  modes  of  motion."  This 
form  of  expression  is  inexact,  and  opens  the  way  to  logical  sub- 
reptions and  other  fallacious  procedures.  A  mode  of  motion 
is  some  kind  of  motion,  and,  as  such,  implies  a  thing  moved 
and  a  mover.  The  thing  moved  is  an  atom  or  molecule ;  the 
mover  is  the  real  energy  to  which  thought  is  habitually  directed 
when  we  speak  of  molecular  force.  Motion,  instead  of  being 
an  ultimate  physical  cause,  is  merely  an  effect.  Now,  it  is  true 


260  INTELLIGENCE  THE  GROUND  OF  FORCE. 

that  the  real  cause  may  produce — does  produce,  various  modes 
of  motion,  one  of  which  may  be  styled  heat ;  another,  light ; 
and  so  on ;  and  these  motions,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
"  continuity  of  motion,"  or."  persistence  of  force,"  may  be  prop- 
agated indefinitely  along  the  lines  which  characterize  respect- 
ively the  several  species  of  energy  so  named.  Used  in  this 
sense,  however,  heat  and  light  are  no  longer  energies ;  and  ex- 
act science  should  desist  from  discoursing  about  them  as  such. 

Now,  it  seems  to  me  that,  by  a  defensible  process  of  reason- 
ing, the  conclusion  has  been  reached  that  the  ultimate  ground 
of  physical  force  is  voluntary  intelligence.  This  ground  may 
be  reached  from  another  datum.  The  only  mode  of  causation 
of  which  we  have  any  knowledge  is  that  of  which  we  are  con- 
scious— the  exercise  of  free-will  suggested  by  motive,  prompt- 
ed by  desire,  and  directed  by  intelligence.  By  a  compulsion  of 
the  reason,  we  feel  ourselves  under  the  necessity,  when  thinking 
of  cause,  to  think  of  it  as  we  know  it.  This  mandate  of  the 
universal  reason  possesses  the  same  authority  as  any  other ;  and, 
if  we  recognize  at  all  the  validity  of  our  necessary  intuitions, 
or  the  authority  of  the  common  consent  of  humanity,  we  are 
bound  to  recognize  the  truth  of  this  indication  of  the  nature 
of  causation. 

Again,  it  is  a  datum  of  the  universal  consciousness  that  re- 
lations of  order,  fitness,  adaptation,  utility,  imply  intelligence. 
Now,  the  universe  abounds  in  relations  which,  within  the 
sphere  of  human  affairs,  would  be  pronounced  such  relations ; 
and  hence,  by  a  necessary  law  of  reason,  we  affirm  that  the 
cause  of  the  universe  is  intelligent ;  and  this  attribute,  by  the 
necessary  law  of  substance,  we  posit  in  real  being.(]) 

(*)  It  may  be  observed  that  Kant's  opinion  of  the  insufficiency  of  the 
cosmological  and  teleological  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  is  deter- 
mined by  his  neglect  of  the  "  law  of  substance,"  or  the  ontological  intui- 
tion which  carries  the  reason  across  the  chasm  which  separates  the  world 
of  phenomena  from  the  realm  of  real  being. 


DIFFERENT  SPECIES  OF  FORCE.  261 

If,  then,  a  voluntary  intelligence  is  the  ultimate  ground  of 
all  causation,  and  this  intelligence  chooses  to  act  according  to 
methods  so  uniform  that,  as  in  the  movements  of  a  piece  of 
mechanism,  sequences  can  be  predicated  on  given  relations  of 
things,  it  only  remains  to  make  two  further  important  points. 
The  first  is,  that  we  discern  more  than  a  single  mode  of  activ- 
ity ;  in  other  words,  the  forces  of  nature  are  not  all  mutually 
convertible.  Some  of  the  molecular  forces  seem  to  be  so. 
Heat  may  perhaps  be  transformed  into  electricity ;  electricity 
into  heat,  and  so  on.  And  yet  even  among  these  we  note  a 
want  of  similarity.  Magnetism  and  electricity  are  polar  forces ; 
but  it  is  not  probable  that  heat,  light,  and  affinity  are  such. 
Though  light  and  heat  are  both  molecular  vibrations,  and  hence 
congeneric,  they  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  conspecific,  equiva- 
lent, and  intertransmutable,  since  they  are  vibrations  of  differ- 
ent intensities.  Electricity,  magnetism,  chemical  and  cohesive 
attractions,  though  sustaining  undoubted  correlations  with  heat 
and  light,  are  not  known  to  be  vibrations  or  modes  of  motion ; 
and  it  seems  like  a  stretch  of  evidence  to  pronounce  them  con- 
specific  with  phenomena  which  are  such.  Repulsion,  more- 
over, is  a  molecular  force  looming  distinctly  above  the  horizon 
of  discovery ;  and  there  are  indications  that  its  intensity  is  in- 
versely as  the  fifth  power  of  the  distance,  while  chemical  affin- 
ity varies  inversely  as  the  cube  of  the  distance.  Gravity  is  a 
force  varying  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance ;  and  it  is, 
moreover,  a  force  which  has  never,  to  our  knowledge,  resulted 
from  the  transformation  of  any  other  force ;  nor  does  it  sustain 
quantitative  or  any  other  correlations  with  any  other  force — 
seeming  to  be  entirely  unique,  and  the  most  mysterious  of  the 
catalogue  of  forces.  Here,  then,  in  the  field  of  inorganic  nat- 
ure, we  find  forces  producing  three  classes  of  phenomena — 
attractions,  repulsions,  and  vibrations.  Of  the  attractions,  cer- 
tain ones  affect  aggregates,  and  others  atoms  and  molecules ; 
the  former  are  again  differentiated  into  non-polar  (gravitation) 


262  PHYSICAL  AND  VITAL  FORCES. 

and  polar  (magnetism  and  electricity),  while  the  latter  embrace 
cohesion  and  affinity.  The  vibrations,  moreover,  are  different 
intensities,  as  before  stated.  We  have,  therefore,  three  dif- 
ferent genera  of  inorganic  force,  and  at  least  five  species.  (') 
Within  a  few  years  we  confidently  expected  to  find  their  re- 
spective lines  of  sequence  converging  at  the  farther  limit  of 
the  phenomenal  world;  but  here  we  are  at  that  limit,  and  we 
find  five  separate  threads  of  causation  emerging  from  the  realm 
beyond  that  boundary. 

In  addition  to  this,  we  have  the  phenomena  of  life,  back 
of  which  we  discern  a  force  which,  so  far  as  we  know,  is  not  a 
transformation  of  any  other  form  of  force.  True  it  is,  that 
the  vehicle,  and  instrument,  and  sensible  expression  of  life  is  a 
material  organism,  whose  building  up  is  chiefly  the  work  of 
molecular  forces.  True  it  is,  that  the  mode  of  expression  and 
manifestation  of  life  is  and  must  be  co-ordinated  to  this  sole 
and  material  medium  of  expression.  But  that  which  we  call 
life  plays  the  part  of  a  force  which  conditions  the  activity  of 
the  molecular  forces ;  has  never  been  produced  by  the  transmu- 
tation of  any  of  them ;  can  not  be  approached  by  any  of  the 
methods  of  physics,  nor  brought,  like  a  physical  force,  within 
the  grasp  of  numerical  formulation. 

The  other  point  to  be  noted  is,  that  the  supreme,  intelligent 
Spontaneity,  as  we  are  thus  led  by  science  and  reason  to  think 
it,  is  revealed  to  us  in  our  own  mental  constitution,  whose  laws 

f  Non-polar (inverse  square) . . Gravitation. 

( Aggregates. <  .  In  magnets Magnetism. 

(i )  Attractions  I  •  •  j  In  electrics Electricity. 

between     j  Atoms    and  j  Atoms,  and  like  molecules Cohesion. 

I  Molecules,  j  Unlike  molecules (inverse  cube) . .  .Affinity. 

Repulsions (inverse  fifth  power).  Repulsion. 

(  Low  intensity Heat. 

Vlbratl°nSOf  I  High  intensity Light. 

Mechanical  force  and  motion,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  are  always  effects  of 
one  or  more  of  the  above  forms  of  force,  or  of  animal  volition,  or  of  vital 
force. 


ELEMENTS  OF  CAUSAL  CONCEPT.  263 

afford  us  the  only  attainable  ground  of  certainty ;  whose  dele- 
gated spontaneity  is  a  picture  of  the  absolute  Will ;  whose  in- 
telligence takes  hold  on  the  thoughts  expressed  in  the  cosmos, 
and  finds  them  comprehensible,  admirable,  and  satisfying ;  and 
whose  conscience,  while  it  finds  among  men  the  fitting  theatre 
for  its  activities,  discovers,  in  the  supreme  entity  which  we  have 
disclosed,  the  sufficient  ground  for  its  authority  and  basis  for 
its  hopes. 

Let  me  now  attempt,  in  a  concise  manner,  by  way  of  reca- 
pitulation, to  draw  out  in  historical  order  the  steps  and  circum- 
stances in  the  genesis  and  constitution  of  our  notion  of  causa- 
tion in  the  existing  universe. 

1.  I  dismiss  the  consideration  of  all  secondary  causation. 
The  phrase  is  a  misnomer.     There  is  no  real  cause  which  can 
be  disclosed  as  an  effect ;  first  cause  is  only  cause.     That  must 
be  an  intelligent  spontaneity,  and  must  act  without  intermedia- 
tion or  "  instrumental  causation." 

2.  The  notion  of  causation  implies  correlative  subjectivity 
and  objectivity  —  a  thing  acting  and  a  thing  acted  upon  —  a 
causative  spontaneity  and  a  possibility  of  its  action  otherwise 
than  in  and  upon  itself.     In  all  causation,  except  a  primordial 
creative  act,  objectivity  is  a  reality— in  primordial  creation  it  is 
a  potentiality.     This  dual  necessity  of  subjective  agent  and  ob- 
jective possibility  of  effect  implies,  in  every  case  of  actual  caus- 
ative effort,  a  differentiation  of  active  and  passive  existence; 
and  hence  renders  irrational  the  theory  of  "  monism  "  and  its 
corollary  "  pantheism  "  under  all  its  aspects. 

3.  The  subject  must  be  self-conscious  —  conscious  of  its  own 
existence  and  power  of  determination.     This  necessity  is  the 
ground  of  "  personality ;"  and  it  implies  that  the  subject  is  a 
"  free  agent." 

4.  The  subject  must  form  a  concept  of  an  effect — a  thing  not 
yet  existing,  or  an  event  not  yet  enacted. 

5.  The  subject  must  be  conscious  of  the  relation  between  effect 

12 


264  ELEMENTS  OF  CAUSAL  CONCEPT. 

and  cause  —  the  intuition  of  causality  must  arise  in  the  con- 
sciousness. This  intuition  certainly  embraces  the  notion  of  ef- 
ficiency and  adequacy ;  and,  in  all  cases  of  intermediate  cau- 
sation, it  implies,  also,  that  the  effect  must  be  congeneric  with 
its  cause.  In  intermediate  causation  we  have  merely  a  given 
energy  transmitted — no  new  energy  put  forth.  This  must  re- 
tain through  an  indefinite  series  of  terms  the  same  quality  and 
quantity  as  belonged  to  the  initial  and  only  logically  causative 
act.  Original  causation,  on  the  contrary,  is  not  bound  by  any 
qualitative  relation  between  cause  and  effect — though,  in  the 
finite  sphere,  subject  to  other  conditions  which  may  variously 
restrict  the  field  of  effects. 

6.  The  subject  must  be  conscious  of  motive  prompting  to 
produce  the  effect  conceived.    There  must  always  be  a  reason  why 
an  intelligence  acts  one  way  rather  than  another.     This  neces- 
sary "  reason  why  "  is  often  styled  the  "  final  cause." 

7.  The  subject  may  cognize  a  contingency  existing — that  is, 
a  fact  constant  or  varying  which  sustains  some  established  rela- 
tion to  the  effect  contemplated.     Such  fact,  if  it  exist,  becomes 
a  "condition"  or  "conditioning  cause." 

8.  The  subject  must  become  conscious  of  the  influence  of  the 
contingency  (if  it  exist)  upon  the  conscious  motive — adding  to 
or  taking  from  it. 

9.  The  subject  must  next  be  conscious  of  a  desire  to  produce 
the  effect  conceived.     This  desire  would  be  modified  in  a  manner 
co-ordinated  with  the  contingently  modified  motive. 

10.  The  subject  must  next  be  conscious  of  a  formed  in- 
tention to  produce  the  effect.     "  Intentionality,"  whose  genesis 
arises  at  this  point,  incloses  all  the  mental  acts  which  precede — 
self -consciousness,  intuition  of  causal  relation,  motivity,  percep- 
tion of  conditionality  (if  existing),  and  desire  (conditionally 
modified). 

11.  The  subject  must  finally  will  the  effect — modified  by  the 
contingent  fact,  if  it  exist. 


FINITE  CAUSATION.  265 

This  is  the  whole  process  of  original  causation  as  represent- 
ed in  individual  consciousness,  which,  unless  the  harmonies  of 
the  universe  be  fatally  misleading,  is  the  finite  reflection  of  the 
method  of  infinite  causation. 

In  the  case,  however,  of  finite  causality,  as  in  the  human 
will,  every  effect  external  to  the  mind  itself  must  be  reached 
through  instrumentalities.  In  most  cases,  the  final  determina- 
tion does  not  reach  immediately  the  external  result  toward 
which  volition  is  ultimately  directed.  It  reaches,  nevertheless, 
another  result  which,  however  it  may  escape  observation,  is  the 
effect  which  figures  in  the  foregoing  account.  This  effect  is  a 
muscular  movement  adapted  to  serve  as  the  first  term  in  the 
series  of  intermediate  causes.  After  this,  the  whole  history  of 
causal  efficiency,  as  above  laid  down,  must  necessarily  be  repeat- 
ed for  each  separate  term  in  the  series  of  intermediate  causes. 
In  the  mean  time,  complications  arise.  The  instruments  em- 
ployed become  effective  on  condition  that  the  forces  of  nature 
prove  regularly  operative ;  and  thus  supreme  causation  may  be 
summoned  to  conspire  with  human  volition  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  most  trivial  result. 


X. 

IS  GOD  COGNIZABLE  BY  REASON  ?(') 

"  Knowledge,  accordingly,  is  characterized  by  faith ;  and  faith,  by  a  kind 
of  divine,  mutual,  and  reciprocal  correspondence,  becomes  characterized  by 
knowledge." — CLEMENS  ALEX.,  Stromata,  book  ii.,  chap.  iv. 

"  THE  existence  of  God,"  writes  one  of  the  most  original  of 
the  scholastic  fathers,  who  is  said  to  have  rescued  Aristotle 
from  atheism  and  secured  him  for  orthodoxy,  "can  be  known 
by  natural  reason,  as  is  said  in  the  first  of  Romans ;  and  this 
and  other  truths  of  the  same  kind  are  not  properly  so  much 
articles  of  faith  as  preambles  to  these  articles,  our  faith  pre- 
supposing natural  knowledge,  as  grace  presupposes  nature."(2) 
This  thought  is  the  theme  of  the  volume  before  us. 

We  have  here  a  contribution  to  religious  philosophy  which 
is  an  honor  to  American  letters.  The  treatment  is  worthy  of 
the  theme,  and  the  theme  is  worthy  of  philosophy.  It  is  an 
essay  at  the  old  problem  so  profoundly  pondered  by  Socrates 
and  Plato,  Anselm  and  Leibnitz,  Descartes  and  Newton,  Bar- 
row and  Butler — the  attempt  to  construct  a  formal  proof  of  an 
affirmation  which  rises  spontaneously  in  the  human  soul,  and 
around  which  cluster  the  profoundest  emotions  and  the  high- 
est hopes  of  humanity. 

The  lapse  of  twenty-five  centuries  has  not  diminished  the  in- 
terest of  the  human  mind  in  the  legitimate  grounds  of  its  irre- 

(J)  "Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy;  or,  the  Relations  between 
Spontaneous  and  Reflective  Thought  in  Greece  and  the  Positive  Teaching 
of  Christ  and  his  Apostles."  By  B.  F.  Cocker,  D.D.,  Professor  of  Moral 
and  Mental  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Michigan.  New  York,  1870. 

(a)  Aquinas,  "Suinma  Theologize,"  art.  Hi.,  Quaest.  2. 


IRREVERENCE  OF  MODERN  THOUGHT.  267 

sistible  theistic  faith.  The  keenness  of  the  search  has  indeed 
been  sharpened.  Every  new  unfolding  of  truth  in  the  realm 
of  science  or  the  empyrean  of  speculation  is  promptly  ques- 
tioned as  to  the  testimony  which  it  has  to  render  respecting 
the  supreme  ground  of  all  truth.  Modern  thought  holds  no 
system  too  sacred  for  its  scrutiny.  Decayed  timbers  must  be 
hewed  out ;  and,  if  the  fabric  fall  in  the  excision,  the  remorse- 
less axe  must  do  its  work. 

It  is  a  questioning,  relentless,  irreverent  spirit.  It  strikes  many 
a  blow  heedlessly,  recklessly,  malignantly.  Commissioned  to 
cut  out  the  effete  and  the  false,  its  appetite  seems  whetted  for 
mere  destruction.  Christianity  appears  before  its  bar  to  show 
cause  why  it  should  not  be  expunged  as  a  superstition;  and 
even  the  ancient  religion  of  humanity  is  challenged  again  and 
again  to  uncover  its  granite  foundations,  and  demonstrate  its 
right  to  stand. 

It  is  not  an  age  in  which  Christian  believers  can  rest  secure- 
ly upon  their  traditions.  If  Christian  faith  survives,  it  will  not 
be  through  the  grace  of  its  enemies,  but  the  vigor  of  its  de- 
fenders. In  the  midst  of  the  conflict,  it  does  not  need  even 
the  weapon  of  an  enemy  to  inflict  a  wound.  Christian  believ- 
ers must  arm  themselves  with  the  alertness  and  learning  of 
their  times ;  and  it  must  ever  be  remembered  that  the  antique 
armor  which  once  served  for  adequate  defense  is  not  a  muni- 
ment against  the  implements  of  modern  warfare.  No,  the  in- 
tellectual activity  of  the  age  must  pervade  the  ranks  of  Chris- 
tianity. The  Christian  system,  being  grounded  in  reason,  rests 
securely  beneath  the  a3gis  of  reason.  Its  field  is  as  wide  as  the 
realm  of  reason.  All  philosophy  and  all  science  are  its  legal 
inheritance. 

Christianity  must  recognize  its  alliance  with  all  truth.  It  is 
not,  indeed,  peculiarly  a  system  of  philosophy,  but  it  is  a  fun- 
damental tone  to  which  all  science  and  philosophy  must  be  at- 
tuned ;  not  because  Christianity  is  our  faith,  but  because  under- 


268  METHOD  OF  CHRISTIAN  DEFENSE. 

neath  Christianity  lie  the  eternal  foundations  on  which  reposes 
all  that  is  true ;  and  any  system  resting  on  other  foundation 
floats  in  air.  Because  Christianity  is  co-ordinated  with  all  real 
truth,  it  is  concerned  in  every  discovery  of  truth,  and  stands 
foremost  in  welcoming  and  assimilating  results,  and  stimulating 
original  thought.  For  the  same  reason,  the  teacher  or  defend- 
er of  Christianity  must  place  himself  in  relations  with  the 
whole  field  of  thought  before  he  can  discern  the  system  in  its 
symmetry,  or  know  what  is  alien  to  it,  and  what  is  its  own. 
The  defense  of  Christianity,  in  our  times,  is  a  conflict  located 
upon  the  field  reached  in  the  march  of  modern  thought. 
Thunders,  ex  cathedra,  are  no  longer  heard  in  the  camp  of  the 
enemy.  They  are  like  the  sounding  of  gongs  over  the  heads 
of  the  sappers  attacking  the  deep  foundations  of  the  fortress, 
or  the  scolding  of  cowards  frightened  to  the  covert  of  their 
caves.  Go  out,  strike  the  Philistines  at  Gath,  and  the  God  of 
David  will  strengthen  your  arm. 

The  work  of  Dr.  Cocker  is,  in  effect,  a  brave  defense  of  the 
fundamental  truths  of  Christianity.  It  is  a  grammar  of  relig- 
ious thought,  illustrated  by  citations  from  Grecian  thinkers. 
It  is  an  attempt  to  introduce  to  personal  consciousness  the  ax- 
ioms of  religious  philosophy,  and  familiarize  it  with  their  char- 
acteristics and  implications.  But  the  method  is  not  alone  ab- 
stract. The  necessary  laws  and  tendencies  of  human  thought 
are  illustrated  by  the  history  of  Greek  philosophy;  and  the 
necessary  relation  of  all  correct  thinking  to  a  correct  conception 
of  the  Christian  system  is  also  exemplified  in  the  gradual  prepa- 
ration of  the  philosophic  mind  of  Greece  for  the  reception  of 
ideas  peculiarly  Christian. 

The  work  consists  essentially  of  three  parts:  1.  The  funda- 
mental ideas  of  religious  philosophy.  2.  Illustration  of  these  in 
the  results  of  Grecian  speculation.  3.  Christian  revelation  a 
final  disclosure  divinely  correlated  to  the  religious  instincts  of 
man  and  the  previous  education  of  the  race.  Such,  at  least,  if 


PHYSICAL  INFLUENCES  ON  MIND.  269 

not  the  strict  arrangement  of  the  work,  is  a  classification  of  its 
ideas,  of  which  we  now  proceed  to  give  a  condensed  statement. 

In  the  preliminary  chapter,  the  author  passes  in  review  the 
city  and  the  men  of  Athens,  and  the  physical  features  of  the 
Grecian  peninsula  in  general.  In  commenting  upon  the  con- 
nection between  national  character  and  physical  surroundings, 
he  takes  occasion  to  remark  that  the  latter  are  merely  modify- 
ing forces ;  while  human  spontaneity — reason  and  will — in  con- 
nection with  a  superintending  Providence,  are  the  fundamental 
forces  which  give  direction  to  national  development.  Human 
will  impresses  even  the  face  of  nature  ;(')  and,  although  great 
men  are  generally  mere  mouth-pieces  of  their  generation,  they 
seem  sometimes  appointed  by  Divine  Providence  to  antagonize 
the  spirit  of  their  age,  and  achieve  moral  revolutions.  Still, 
physical  surroundings  impart  individuality  to  national  charac- 
ter; and  this  is  well  exemplified  in  the  Hellenic  traits.  The 
central  position  of  Greece  in  the  civilized  world  led  to  a  com- 
mercial development,  and  this  was  favored  by  a  maritime  cli- 
mate. The  configuration  of  the  surface  and  the  shore-line  con- 
tributed to  individuality;  its  scenery  impressed  the  aesthetic 
character.  The  Athenians  were  ardent,  vivacious,  and  of  inde- 
pendent spirit.  Their  intellect  tended  to  observation  and 
thought,  and  their  language  was  adapted  to  be  the  vehicle  of 
the  highest  philosophy,  and  the  medium  of  the  loftiest  civiliza- 
tion attainable  without  Christianity. 

Before  proceeding  to  discuss  the  religion  of  the  Athenians, 
our  author  furnishes  a  condensed  and  masterly  exhibit  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion  in  general.  Defining  religion  as  "  a  form 
of  thought,  feeling,  and  action  which  has  the  Divine  for  its  ob- 

(')  On  the  "  Power  of  Mind  over  Nature,"  see  Cocker,  in  Methodist  Quar- 
terly Review,  January  and  April,  1870;  and  Marsh,  "Man  and  Nature;" 
and,  on  human  will  as  an  original  spontaneous  cause,  see  "Whedon  on 
the  Will,"  p.  42,  and  elsewhere ;  also  Cocker,  in  Methodist  Quarterly  fie- 
view,  October,  1864. 


270  COMTE,  HEGEL,  JAG  OBI. 

ject,  basis,  and  end,"  and  enunciating  the  fact  of  history  and 
ethnology  that  "  religious  ideas  and  sentiments  have  prevailed 
among  all  nations,"  he  runs  his  scalpel  through  the  joints  of 
the  various  theories  of  religious  phenomena  which  do  not  recog- 
nize their  germs  in  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  This 
chapter,  by  itself,  is  a  neat,  clean-cut  monograph,  and  might 
well  be  made  a  tract  for  more  general  reading.  The  Comtean 
theory,  that  religious  phenomena  have  arisen  from  the  fear  of 
unseen  powers,  falls  with  the  overthrow  of  Comte's  theory  of 
the  "  law  of  the  three  states  "  in  human  development — the  the- 
ological, the  metaphysical,  and  the  positive.^)  The  Hegelian 
theory,  that  religion  is  a  part  of  an  evolution  of  the  Absolute, 
attaining  its  fullest  self -consciousness  in  philosophy,  next  re- 
ceives an  exposition  (if  exposition  be  possible)  and  an  expos- 
ure^)— for  propositions  which  categorically  contradict  the  ax- 
ioms of  reason (3)  admit  only  of  exposure,  and  not  of  refuta- 
tion. The  theory  of  Jacobi  and  Schleiermacher,  that  religion 
has  its  foundation  in  feeling,  is  indefensible,  since  feeling  can 
not  be  the  source  of  ideas ;  and,  farther,  any  cognition  of  Deity 
alleged  as  correlated  to  the  feeling  of  the  Divine  must  be  log- 
ically preceded  by  ideas  of  reason.^)  The  theory  of  Cousin, 

(*)  P.  57-65.  See,  also,  a  sharp  criticism  of  this  fundamental  position 
in  Huxley's  "Lay  Sermons,  Addresses,  and  Reviews,"  p.  156-164;  and 
for  a  consummate  dissection  of  the  "  Philosophic  Positive,"  see  Martineau's 
"Essays,"  vol.  i.,  p.  1-62. 

(2)  P.  65-69. 

(3)  Like  this:  "Being  and  nothing  are  identical."    The  fundamental 
principle  of  Hegelianism  is  the  paradox  that  "  contraries  are  identical." 
But,  since  the  time  of  Aristotle,  the  "  law  of  non-contradiction  "  has  been 
accepted  by  all  logicians  as  a  fundamental  law  of  thought. 

(4)  P.  70-77.     Is  not  this  criticism  based  on  a  misconception  of  the 
sense  in  which  Jacobi  employs  the  term  "  feeling  ?"    All  mental  states 
may  be  regarded  as  "  feeling."     Brown  uses  "  feeling  "  for  consciousness 
("Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,"  §  xi.).     All  cognition  involves  a  kind 
of  intellectual  feeling — the  subjective  factor  of  consciousness.     J.  S.  Mill 


COUSIN,  COCKER.  271 

that  religion  has  its  outbirth  in  the  spontaneous  apperceptions  of 
the  reason,  is  stated  and  substantiated  as  a  rational  account  of 
the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  God,  but  found  defective  as  a  philos- 
ophy of  the  phenomena  of  religion  (p.  78-86).  Finally,  the 
theory  that  religious  phenomena  had  their  origin  in  external 
revelation,  is  shown  to  be  unsatisfactory,  (x)  because,  1.  It  is 
improbable  that  truths  so  important  should  have  been  intrust- 
ed to  tradition  alone ;  2.  The  theory  does  not  account  for  the 
universality  of  religious  beliefs  and  practices ;  3.  Verbal  reve- 
lation could  convey  no  ideas  to  a  being  destitute  of  antecedent 
notions  of  divine  things  (p.  86-95). 

As  the  result  of  this  survey,  our  author  concludes  with  the 
following  proposition :  "  The  universal  phenomenon  of  religion 
has  originated  in  the  a  priori  apperceptions  of  reason,  and  the 
natural,  instinctive  feelings  of  the  heart,  which,  from  age  to 
age,  have  been  vitalized,  unfolded,  and  perfected  by  supernatu- 
ral communications  and  testamentary  revelations  (p.  97).  It 
thus  contains  an  element  of  KEASON,  an  element  of  FEELING, 
and  an  element  of  REVELATION. 

The  way  is  now  opened  for  a  statement  of  the  higher  char- 
acteristics of  the  religion  of  the  Athenians.  Numerous  evi- 
dences, presented  to  the  eyes  of  St.  Paul  as  he  entered  their 
city,  convinced  him  that  they  were  "  every  way  more  than  or- 


uses  the  term  in  this  sense,  "  Every  thing  is  a  feeling  of  which  the  mind 
is  conscious  "  ("  System  of  Logic,"  American  edit.,  p.  34).  The  sensus  mi- 
minis  evidently  is  not  supposed  to  be  a  distinct  definable  cognition,  but 
only  the  analogue  of  the  sensus  vagus,  or  vital  sense,  in  the  field  of  sensa- 
tions. Jacobi  calls  it  "  Glaube"  and  compares  it  with  our  "  faith  "  in  the 
intuitions  of  sense  ;  and,  finally,  in  a  later  work  ("  Ueber  das  Unterneh- 
men  des  Kriticismus,  die  Vernunft  zu  Verstande  zu  bringen,"  1802),  the 
faculty  which  he  had  before  called  "Faith"  he  now  names  "Reason" — 
Vernunft.  This  would  make  the  corresponding  "feeling"  something  more 
specific  than  the  sensus  vagus — a  real  intuition  of  God. 

O  On  this,  see  Cocker,  in  Mellwdist  Quarterly  Review,  April,  1862. 


272  ATHENIAN  RELIGION. 

dinarily  religious.'^1)  This  character  the  apostle  had  reason  to 
ascribe  to  them  in  a  sense  entirely  strict  and  legitimate.  Re- 
ligion, in  its  essential  character,  being  something  more  than  a 
system  of  dogmatic  teaching,  and  consisting  in  "a  mode  of 
thought,  feeling,  and  action  determined  by  our  consciousness  of 
dependence  on  a  Supreme  Being"  (p.  107),  the  numberless  tem- 
ples and  shrines  of  Athens  testified  to  their  excessive  "  careful- 
ness about  religion."  Leaving  their  idolatries  and  superstitions 
for  the  moment  in  the  background,  certain  noble  and  normal 
outcrops  of  the  religious  nature  were  clearly  discernible  in  the 
religious  philosophy  of  the  Athenians.  They  had  some  faith 
in  the  being  and  providence  of  God  (p.  107-109).  They  felt 
a  consciousness  of  dependence  upon  God  (p.  110-117).  One 
of  their  own  poets  (Aratus)  had  said : 

"  Jove's  presence  fills  all  space,  upholds  this  ball ; 
All  need  his  aid ;  his  power  sustains  us  all, 
For  we  his  offspring  are."(2) 

The  same  sentiment  had  been  hymned  in  the  same  city  by 
Cleanthes.  This  feeling  of  dependence  and  sense  of  obligation 
lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  religion.  The  Athenians  also  pos- 
sessed the  religious  emotions  flowing  from  the  feeling  of  depend- 
ence— fear  of  offending  the  divinity  which  they  felt  over  them, 
and  an  instinctive  yearning  after  the  Invisible.  Finally,  they 
felt  a  consciousness  of  sin,  and  made  piacular  sacrifices. 

But,  turning  to  contemplate  the  dark  side  of  the  Athenian 
religion,  we  are  confronted  by  the  shocking  realities  of  poly- 
theism and  idolatry.  Modern  inquiry,  however,  in  penetrating 
beneath  the  exterior  of  these  religious  monstrosities,  finds  them 

(')  This  is  Cudworth's  rendering  of  Kara  iravra  UQ  Sei(ri3aifiovtospovg 
(Acts  xvii.,  22),  and  with  this  exegetical  writers  substantially  agree.  The 
first  chapter  on  the  religion  of  the  Athenians  appeared  in  the  Methodist 
Quarterly  Review  for  April,  1869. 

(2)  Aratus,  "  The  Phenomena,"  book  v.,  5. 


GREEK  POLYTHEISM.  2*73 

to  be  mere  excrescences  upon  a  purer  and  simpler  faith  —  a  de- 
generacy from  a  state  of  primitive  monotheism  which  seems  to 
underlie  the  religion  of  humanity.^)  And  even  during  the 
reign  of  these  abominations,  the  elite  in  the  realm  of  thought 
looked  upon  them  with  horror,  and  denounced  them  with  a 
boldness  tempered  only  by  an  instinctive  respect  for  popular 
opinions.  The  genesis  and  significance  of  the  Greek  mythology 
are  discussed  in  this  connection  in  words  which  ought  to  be 
made  the  preamble  to  every  Christian  text-book  of  the  classical 
authors  (p.  128-160).  We  commend  the  discussion  earnestly 
to  the  attention  of  those  bees  in  the  world  of  thought  who  love 
to  extract  the  honey  even  of  poisonous  flowers.  Our  author 
regards  the  Grecian  mythology  as  a  grand  symbolic  represen- 
tation of  the  Divine  as  manifested  in  nature  and  Providence 


We  reach  here  the  heart  of  the  discussion  :  Is  God  cogniza- 
ble by  Reason  ?  If  a  religious  nature  and  destination  appertain 
to  man  ;  if  certain  fundamental  principles  are  found  underlying 
the  Grecian  and  all  other  religions  ;  if  it  be  a  clear  presump- 
tion that  the  reason  of  man  is  furnished  with  necessary  ideas 
or  laws  of  thought  correlated  to  the  instinct  and  emotion  of 
worship,  let  us  see  whether  it  be  possible  to  give  these  ideas  an 
articulate  expression,  and  reproduce  the  spontaneous  and  in- 
stantaneous deduction  by  which  reason  bridges  the  gulf  which 


(')  This  position  is  earnestly  controverted  by  certain  writers,  who  hold 
that  mankind  has  undergone  a  continuous  and  uniform  development,  re- 
ligiously, from  a  state  of  fetichism,  and  that  fetichism  is  incompatible  with 
a  sense  of  theistic  unity.  Having  given  this  subject,  however,  an  inde- 
pendent study,  we  have  been  surprised  at  the  copiousness  of  the  proof  that 
Dr.  Cocker's  position  is  a  valid  one. 

(2)  He  draws  largely  from  the  learned  dissertation  on  this  subject  by 
Cudworth,  "  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe,"  especially  chap.  iv.  The 
reader  will  fall  upon  a  coincident  line  of  thought  in  Miiller,  "  Chips  from 
a  German  Workshop,"  vol.  ii.,p.  142-169. 


274  SPONTANEOUS  COGNITION  OF  DEITY. 

separate  the  changeful  and  finite  from  the  permanent,  infinite, 
and  eternal. 

I.  The  idea  of  God  is  a  common  phenomenon  of  the  uni- 
versal intelligence.     The  proofs  of  this  (pp.  89,  90)  are  found 
in  common  observation,  in  the  voice  of  history,  and  in  the  con- 
current testimony  of  travelers  among  savage  tribes. 

II.  The  idea  of  God,  in  its  completeness,  is  not  held  to  be  a 
simple,  direct,  and  immediate  intuition  of  the  reason  alone,  in- 
dependently of  all  experience  and  all  knowledge  of  the  exter- 
nal world.     It  is  a  complex  idea — a  logical  deduction  from  self- 
evident  truths  given  in  sense,  conscience,  and  reason.    The  log- 
ical evolution  of  the  theistic  concept  begins  with  the  disengage- 
ment of  certain  ideas  formulating  themselves  in  primitive  judg- 
ments which  the  mind  intuitively  perceives  to  be  true  necessa- 
rily and  universally.     Such  are  "  Every  event  implies  a  cause ;" 
"  Every  attribute  implies  a  substance."     These  a  priori  judg- 
ments constitute  the  major  premise  of  the  theistic  syllogism. 
The  minor  premise  is  furnished  by  the  facts  of  experience  and 
observation.     From  these  facts,  the  a  priori  laws  of  reason  ne- 
cessitate, as  a  conclusion,  the  affirmation  of  a  God  as  the  only 
valid  explanation  of  the  phenomena.     Historically,  or  actually, 
the  process  is  reversed.     The  phenomena  of  experience  first 
come  before  the  mind,  and,  in  their  presence,  the  latent  laws  of 
thought  or  primitive  ideas  of  the  reason  are  roused  into  effi- 
ciency, and  the  judgment,  by  a  natural  and  spontaneous  logic, 
free  from  all  reflection,  and,  consequently,  from  all  possibility 
of  error,  affirms  a  necessary  relation  between  the  facts  of  expe- 
rience and  the  a  priori  ideas  of  the  reason.^)     The  demonstra- 
tion consists  necessarily  of  a  priori  as  well  as  a  posteriori  ele- 
ments.    It  is  of  no  use  to  point  to  the  events  and  changes  of 
the  material  universe  as  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  First  Cause, 


(')  For  a  lucid  treatment  of  this  subject,  see  Cocker,  Methodist  Quarter- 
ly fieview,  April,  1862. 


POSITIVISM  INVOLVES  TRANSCENDENTALISM.        275 

unless  we  take  account  of  the  universal  and  necessary  truth 
that  "  every  change  refers  itself  to  an  adequate  cause."  There 
is  no  logical  conclusiveness  in  the  assertion  of  Paley,  that  "  ex- 
perience teaches  us  that  a  designer  must  be  a  person,"  because, 
as  Hume  justly  remarks,  our  "  experience  "  is  narrowed  down  to 
a  mere  point,  and  "  can  not  be  a  rule  for  a  universe ;  but  there 
is  an  infinitude  of  force  in  that  dictum  of  reason  that  "  intelli- 
gence, self-consciousness,  and  self-determination  necessarily  con- 
stitute personality." 

III.  The  universe  demands  a  God  as  its  adequate  expla- 
nation. The  attempts  of  Positivism  are  futile  and  absurd. 
Mankind  can  not  be  prevented  from  striving  to  pass  beyond 
phenomena.  Positivism  is  possible  only  through  transcend- 
ental ideas.  We  can  not  even  have  a  cognition  of  phenomena 
without  the  play  of  the  regulative  ideas  of  the  reason.  No 
notion  of  realities  underlying  phenomena  can  be  given  by  the 
phenomena  themselves.  It  is  given  by  reason  in  the  presence 
of  phenomena.  These  a  posteriori  and  a  priori  data  mutually 
condition  each  other.  The  relation  between  them  is  a  law  of 
thought  and  a  law  of  things.  It  is  a  universal  and  necessary 
correlation  which  impels  us  to  affirm  that  a  living  power  is  the 
correlative  of  the  changing  phases  of  the  sensible  world ;  and 
intelligence  the  correlative  of  the  order  which  we  discover  in 
them.  The  author  has  given  us  an  exhaustive  table  of  the 
facts  of  the  universe,  material  and  mental,  which  may  be  re- 
garded as  "  hints  and  adumbration  of  the  ultimate  ground,  and 
reason,  and  cause  of  the  universe"  (p.  175-177). 

It  thus  appears  that  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  can  not 
be  explained  on  the  basis  of  Positivism ;  and  this,  though  we 
admit,  as  Descartes,  Pascal,  Leibnitz,  Saisset,  Mahan,  and  others 
have  mistakenly  and  fatally  done,  that  the  universe  is  infinite. 
Its  infinity  is  only  a  mathematical  infinity,  which  might  more 
correctly  be  styled  indefinity.  Infinity  is  not  predicable  of 
quantity.  This  principle  solves  the  problem  of  Kant's  "Anti- 


276  ABSOLUTE  IDEAS. 

nomies,"  and  constitutes  a  complete  refutation  of  Hume  on  the 
eternity  of  the  universe. (J) 

IV.  In  the  field  of  consciousness  are  discovered  elements 
or  principles  which,  in  their  regular  and  normal  development, 
transcend  the  limits  of  consciousness,  and  attain  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  Absolute  Being,  Absolute  Reason,  Absolute  Good — that 
is,  God.  The  mind  is  in  possession  of  universal,  necessary,  ab- 
solute ideas,  as  the  idea  of  space,  the  idea  of  cause.  Reason, 
distinct  from  sense,  is  the  organ  or  faculty  for  the  cognition  of 
these  ideas.  Their  elimination  from  the  mass  of  mixed  knowl- 
edge in  the  mind  is  a  work  which  has  engaged  the  attention 
of  Plato,  Aristotle,  Kant,  Cousin,  and  others,  but  it  is  yet  in- 
complete. Our  author  presents  a  neat,  compact,  and  symmet- 
rical table  of  the  principal  ideas  of  this  class.  Here,  in  two 
pages,  is  the  quintessence  of  the  speculative  thought  of  two 
chiliads  of  years. 

Our  author  next  passes  in  review,  through  two  chapters, 
those  philosophic  theories  which  lead  to  the  denial  that  God  is 
cognizable  by  reason.  Our  appropriate  limits  do  not  permit  a 
reproduction  of  even  the  gist  of  the  discussion.  J.  S.  Mill  and 
the  Idealists,  Comte  and  the  Materialists,  Hamilton  and  the 
Nescientists,  Watson  and  the  Dogmatists,  are  taken  in  hand  by 
turns,  and  in  a  few  incisive  sentences,  each  of  which  reaches  to 
the  marrow  of  the  subject,  each  school  is  shown  to  be  doing 
violence  to  the  inexorable  laws  of  thought.  Positivism  infracts 
the  principle  of  causality  in  denying  that  we  can  proceed  be- 
yond a  knowledge  of  phenomena  and  their  laws.  It  dishonors 
the  principle  of  intention ality  in  affirming  that  we  can  only 
know  what  is,  and  never  why  it  is.(a) 

(')  P.  178-184.  This  principle  has  been  presented  and  applied  with 
masterly  analysis  and  force  by  a  writer  in  the  North  American  Review, 
No.  CCV.,  art.  iii.,  1864. 

(a)  In  this  connection  our  author  rather  discredits  the  "  nebular  hypoth- 
esis," fortifying  himself  with  an  array  of  authorities.  It  might  be  said, 


DENIAL   OF  DIVINE  COQNOSCIBILITY.  277 

The  Hamiltonian  philosophy  of  the  unconditioned  is  shown 
to  involve  a  discrediting  of  one  portion  of  the  testimony  of 
consciousness,  and  thus  a  conflict  with  the  fundamental  princi- 
ple of  the  natural-realistic  school.  The  further  examination  of 
this  subject  is  especially  able.  The  Dogmatic  theologians  are 
shown  to  attack  the  principle  of  causality  in  affirming  that 
philosophy  can  only  attain  to  the  idea  of  an  "eternal  succes- 
sion "  of  phenomena.  They  attack  the  principle  of  the  uncon- 
ditioned in  denying  that  human  reason  passes  spontaneously 
from  the  finite  to  the  notion  of  the  infinite.  They  invalidate, 
also,  the  principle  of  unity  and  the  evidence  of  the  moral  in- 
tuitions, and  fail  to  discern  the  real  meaning  of  certain  passages 
of  Scripture.^) 

The  next  six  chapters  are  devoted  to  an  examination  of  the 
historical  development  of  Greek  philosophy.  This  may  be  re- 
garded as  another  form  of  proof  of  the  proposition  that  God 
is  cognizable  by  reason.  An  inductive  generalization  from  the 
facts  of  Greek  speculation  leads  to  the  affirmation  of  the  prop- 
osition. More  strictly  speaking,  however,  this  part  of  the  work 

however,  that  the  first  cited — Sir  William  Herschel — was  the  real  origina- 
tor of  the  hypothesis  (Sir  William  Herschel  in  "Philosophical  Transac- 
tions" for  1811).  If  this  theory  is  to  be  decided  by  a  vote,  we  may  cite 
in  the  affirmative  Arago,  Dana,  Dawson,  Helmholz,  Hunt  (T.  S.),  Huggins, 
Lockyer,  Meunier,  Mill  ( J.  S.),  Newcomb,  Nichol,  Saemann,  Schellen,  Thom- 
son (Sir  William),  Tyndall,  Young,  and  the  generality  of  geologists  and  as- 
tronomers of  the  present  day.  Objectors  and  objections  which  date  back 
twenty-five  years  have  lost  all  weight,  in  consequence  of  the  new  data  (es- 
pecially spectroscopic)  furnished  by  recent  science.  The  reader  may  con- 
sult further  the  present  writer's  articles  on  the  "  Unity  of  the  Physical 
World,"  in  the  Metfwdist  Quarterly  Review  for  April,  1873,  and  Jan.,  1874. 
[It  appears  that  the  author  himself  (of  the  work  under  review)  is  inclined 
to  yield  at  the  present  time  to  the  weight  of  authority  in  support  of  the 
"nebular  hypothesis."  See  "Theistic  Conception  of  the  World,"  pp.  104, 
105, 143,  etc.] 
(J)  For  instance,  Acts  xvii.,  27 ;  Romans  i.,  19-21,  32. 


278  DIGEST  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY. 

may  be  viewed  as  a  citation  of  illustrations  or  confirmations  of 
the  main  thesis. 

Following  Zeller  in  the  grouping  of  the  schools  of  Greece, 
we  find  that  the  Pre-Socratic  were  physical  in  the  point  of  view 
from  which  they  contemplated  the  problems  of  speculative  phi- 
losophy ;  the  Socratic  were  psychological,  and  the  Post-Socratic 
were  ethical.  The  first  make  the  world  the  great  centre  of  in- 
quiry; the  second,  the  "ideas"  of  things — truth  and  being; 
the  third  fall  back  upon  the  practical  conduct  of  life  as  the 
chief  interest  in  philosophy.  We  can  not  follow  the  author 
through  his  compact  but  lucid  digest  of  the  opinions  of  these 
noble  pioneers  of  thought.  The  six  chapters  form  a  neat  and 
concise  compend  of  the  history  of  Greek  philosophy;  not  a 
mere  chronological  table  of  facts,  but  a  body  of  facts  imbed- 
ded in  a  matrix  of  thought — such  an  exposition  as  discloses  the 
spinal  marrow — the  common  subjective,  animating  principle  of 
those  three  centuries  qf  manly  mental  struggle.  We  can  only 
make  disconnected  reference  to  some  of  the  prominent  conclu- 
sions from  this  survey. 

The  bifurcation  of  speculative  thought  began  in  the  Pre-So- 
cratic age.  The  Ionian  school,  from  their  stand-point,  tended 
toward  Sensationalism ;  and  the  Italian,  from  theirs,  toward 
Idealism.  The  issue,  theologically,  was  material  pantheism,  on 
one  hand,  and  ideal  pantheism,  on  the  other.  These  divergent 
streams  of  thought  had  their  common  source  in  one  fundament- 
al principle  or  law  of  the  human  mind — the  intuition  of  unity, 
or  "  the  desire  to  comprehend  all  the  facts  of  the  universe  in  a 
single  formula,  and  consummate  all  conditional  knowledge  in 
the  unity  of  unconditioned  existence."  The  radical  error  of 
Sensationalism  is  the  denial  of  the  validity  of  the  testimony  of 
consciousness  in  reference  to  suprasensuous  phenomena ;  while 
the  fatal  fault  of  Idealism  is  a  similar  denial  in  reference  to 
sensuous  phenomena.  Both  alike,  by  discrediting  conscious- 
ness in  one  affirmation,  virtually  discredit  it  in  all,  and  set  us 


SOCRATIC  SCHOOL.  279 

afloat  in  an  atmosphere  of  phantoms.  From  such  philosophy 
no  theistic  result  is  possible,  save  universal  skepticism.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  Sophists  signalize  the  completion  of  the  first 
cycle  of  philosophic  thought. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  another  evidence  that,  even  in  ab- 
stract thinking,  "  there  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun."  Hege- 
lianism  existed  two  thousand  years  before  Hegel.  Parmenides 
of  Elea  held  that  all  phenomenal  existences  are  but  modes  of 
the  Absolute,  and  seems  to  have  been  the  inventor  of  the  aph- 
orisms, "All  is  one,  "  "Thought  and  being  are  identical."  We 
might  add,  however,  that  Heraclitus  had  previously  asserted 
that  contradictory  propositions  may  be  consistent.^) 

Socrates,  by  the  inductive  use  of  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness, was  a  patron  of  the  inductive  method — a  method 
which  Francis  Bacon  no  more  originated  than  he  did  the  oth- 
er laws  of  thought.  Plato  enunciated  the  "  law  of  sufficient 
reason" — universally  attributed  to  Leibnitz — in  these  words: 
"  Whatever  is  generated  is  necessarily  generated  from  a  certain 
atriav  " — ground,  reason,  cause — "  for  it  is  wholly  impossible 
that  any  thing  should  be  generated  without  a  cause."  The 
Ontology  of  Plato,  after  having  served  as  a  starting-point  for 
other  philosophers  for  a  period  of  twenty  centuries,  remains 
to-day  nearly  the  most  perfect  system  extant.  The  Aristote- 
lian Organon  has  equally  survived. the  criticisms  of  the  entire 
course  of  philosophy.  Aristotle  proposed  three  forms  of  the- 
istic proof:  1.  The  Ontological,  based  on  our  necessary  idea 
of  an  eternal  and  immutable  substance.  2.  The  Cosmological, 
based  on  our  necessary  idea  of  causality  as  the  correlative  of 
effect,  and  intelligence  as  the  correlative  of  harmony  and  con- 
trivance.^) 3.  The  Moral. proof. 

(!)  Aristotle,  "Ethic.  Nic.,"  lib.  viii.,  1. 

(a)  Cosmological,  as  here  used  = JEteological,  Cocker  +  Cosmological, 
Cocker  +  Teleological,  Cocker = Cosmological,  Kant  +  Physio  -  Theological, 
Kant.  See  sequel  of  this  article. 


280  AIMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

• 

Pyrrhonism  marks  the  transition  from  the  Socratic  to  the 
Post-Socratic  schools.  In  the  latter,  Epicureanism  manifests  a 
decline  of  the  spirit  of  ontological  speculation,  and  Stoicism  sig- 
nalizes its  almost  complete  supersedure  by  the  ethical  spirit. 

For  us,  however,  the  most  important  aspects  of  Greek  phi- 
losophy are  its  theological  results.  These  are  gathered  to- 
gether in  the  last  two  chapters  of  the  work  under  review.  No 
thoughtful  person  can  glance  over  this  summary  without  being 
convinced  that  Greek  philosophy  had  an  important  propaedeu- 
tic office  to  perform  for  Christianity.  '  The  object  of  all  philos- 
ophy is  to  systematize  the  results  of  thought,  and  attain  to  a 
basis  of  certainty.  Its  especial  aim  is  the  disclosure  of  the  Su- 
preme Reality  which  underlies  the  phenomenal  world.  The 
correlation  of  the  human  mind  to  the  Divine  renders  this  a 
hopeful  effort.  Again,  the  Author  of  nature  is  the  Author  of 
revelation.  The  "true  light  which  lighteth  every  man  that 
cometh  into  the  world "  "  shone  on  the  mind  of  Anaxagoras, 
and  Socrates,  and  Plato,  as  well  as  on  the  mind  of  Kahab,  Cor- 
nelius, and  the  Syrophenician  woman,  and  in  a  higher  form, 
and  with  a  clearer  and  richer  effulgence,  on  the  minds  of  Moses, 
Isaiah,  Paul,  and  John."  No  wonder,  then,  that  in  the  teach- 
ings of  Socrates  and  Plato  we  find  a  striking  harmony  of  senti- 
ment, and  even  form  of  expression,  with  some  parts  of  the 
Christian  revelation ;  and  in  the  speculations  of  Plato  "  catch 
glimpses  of  a  world  of  ideas  not  unlike  that  which  Christianity 
discloses,  and  hear  words  not  unfamiliar  to  those  who  spake  as 
they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost "  (p.  459). 

Christianity,  if  its  enunciations  would  not  be  nugatory,  must 
sustain  some  relations  to  human  reason,  and  to  the  progressive 
developments  of  human  thought  in  the  ages  before  Christ. 
"  Christianity  did  not  break  suddenly  upon  the  world  as  a  new 
commandment,  altogether  unconnected  with  the  past,  and  want- 
ing in  all  points  of  sympathy  and  contact  with  the  then  pres- 
ent. It  proceeded  along  lines  of  thought  which  had  been  laid 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  PROPAEDEUTIC.  281 

throngli  ages  of  preparation ;  it  clothed  itself  in  forms  of  speech 
which  had  been  molded  by  centuries  of  education ;  and  it  ap- 
propriated to  itself  a  moral  and  intellectual  culture  which  had 
been  effected  by  long  periods  of  severest  discipline.  It  was,  in 
fact,  the  consummation  of  the  whole  moral  and  religious  histo- 
ry of  the  world"  (pp.  461,  462).  Greek  civilization  sustained 
direct  preparatory  relations  to  the  Christian  system.  It  was 
the  most  perfect  civilization  which  the  world  had  yet  witnessed, 
and  the  highest  attainable  by  human  nature  without  the  specif- 
ic reinforcement  of  moral  and  religious  ideas  and  demonstra- 
tions which  was  now  impending  in  Christianity.  This  civiliza- 
tion the  conquests  of  Alexander  propagated  from  Antioch  and 
Alexandria.  The  Greek  language,  enriched  by  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, was  not  only  the  most  copious  and  perfect  of  all  tongues, 
but  was  also  the  most  perfectly  adapted  to  serve  as  the  vehicle 
of  moral  and  religious,  and  even  Christian,  ideas.  Greek  phi- 
losophy, too,  had  gradually  educated  the  human  mind  to  the 
contemplation  of  that  purity,  holiness,  justice,  and  spirituality 
which  were  to  characterize  pre-eminently  the  Christian  teach- 
ing. But  philosophy  had  done  its  utmost,  and  mankind  had 
not  yet  attained  to  a  full  and  impressive  sense  of  the  majesty 
and  holiness  and  presence  of  God.  It  was  a  moment  of  de- 
spair. It  was  the  grand  climacteric  in  the  life  of  humanity. 
Paul  appeared  and  preached  Christ,  and  the  heart  of  the  Greek 
bounded  responsively. 

Let  us  see  a  little  more  specifically  what  service  Greek  phi- 
losophy rendered  to  Christianity.  We  have  said  it  served  as 
an  education  of  the  intellect  of  the  race,  as  Judaism  served  for 
the  discipline  of  the  religious  nature.  But  all  logical  training 
of  the  intellect  leads  it  toward  the  same  Supreme  Reality  which 
Hebrew  revelation  discloses  directly.  The  growth  of  philoso- 
phy is  a  reverent  approximation  toward  God.  Mankind,  like 
children,  first  accepted  God  with  a  spontaneous  faith.  Then, 
like  the  youth,  they  plunged  into  misguided  speculations,  fruit- 


282  RELEASE  FROM  POLYTHEISTIC  NOTIONS. 

less  sophisms,  and  distressing  doubts.  Lastly,  like  the  man  of 
matured  wisdom,  they  attained  an  age  of  reflective  conscious- 
ness, and  glimpsed  with  clearer  vision  the  God  who  had  been 
at  first  simply  an  object  of  blind  faith.  In  the  history  of 
Greece,  the  Homeric  age  was  the  national  childhood ;  the  Pre- 
Socratic  the  transitional,  and  the  Post-Socratic  the  philosophic, 
age.  In  these  facts  of  intellectual  and  religious  history  we  dis- 
cern a  true  development  and  a  progressive  preparation.  It  is 
discernible — 

I.  In  the  field  of  theistic  conceptions.  In  this  field  its  tend- 
ency was  to  dethrone  the  false  gods  and  enthrone  the  true  one. 
This  is  seen — 

1.  In  the  release  of  the  popular  mind  from  polytheistic  no- 
tions, and  the  purifying  and  spiritualizing  of  the  theistic  idea. 
The  idea  of  a  Supreme  Power  is  not  the  product  of  philoso- 
phy. It  is  the  immanent,  spontaneous  thought  of  humanity. 
Without  tuition,  or  suggestion,  man  sees  God  in  the  impressive 
phenomena  of  nature  transpiring  around  him.  He  translates 
her  mysterious  manifestations  in  the  light  of  the  feeling  of  the 
divine  which  bathes  his  soul.  The  sun,  the  mountain,  and  the 
storm  command  his  veneration  as  the  manifestations  of  the  felt 
Deity.  Then,  in  the  lapse  of  time,  he  forgets  their  symbolical 
character  and  worships  them  as  gods,  or  as  the  dwelling-places 
of  gods.  He  becomes  a  polytheist ;  and,  in  attempting  to  em- 
body his  necessarily  anthropomorphic  conceptions  of  his  gods, 
he  is  led  into  idolatry.  But  now,  when  the  era  of  reflection 
and  inquiry  arrives,  he  discovers  the  absurdity  of  many  of  his 
theistic  notions,  and  the  stubborn  inscrutableness  of  the  divine 
nature,  and  he  begins  to  fear  he  has  been  wholly  deluded.  He 
doubts.  He  surrenders  himself  to  speculation ;  he  seeks  for 
that  which  must  be  the  first  principle  of  all  things.  He  fan- 
cies it  discovered  in  "  water,"  or  "  air,"  or  "fire."  Unsatisfied, 
he  seeks  it  in  "  numbers  "  or  in  purely  abstract  "  ideas,"  or  it 
may  be  an  Anaxagoras  glimpses  it  in  "  mind."  But  the  human 


PHILOSOPHY  BECOME  MONOTHEISTIC.  283 

soul  still  longs  for  a  personal  God.  "  The  heart  of  man  cries 
out  for  the  living  God."  These  abstractions  are  unsatisfying, 
and  humanity  is  again  skeptical  and  restless.  Now,  Socrates 
and  Plato  introvert  the  mental  gaze,  and,  in  the  analysis  of 
thought,  discover  elements  which  at  once  announce  themselves 
to  consciousness  as  out  of  necessary  relation  to  the  things  of 
time  and  sense — ideas,  truths  which  are  seen  to  be  necessary, 
universal,  and  eternal — truths  which  would  beam  in  the  firma- 
ment of  mind  though  the  worlds  cease  to  exist.  These  are  rays 
from  the  eternal  source  of  truth.  Here,  in  this  world  of  ideas, 
is  the  only  solid  ground  on  which  faith  and  reason  may  em- 
brace each  other.  In  this  eternal  reality  is  the  absolute  ground 
of  all  causality,  all  thought,  all  beauty,  all  goodness. 

Such  was  the  progress  of  theistic  speculation  in  Greece.  The 
inevitable  tendency  toward  a  unity  served  to  gradually  under- 
mine the  popular  polytheistic  faith  which  had  usurped  the  sim- 
ple theism  of  the  earlier  ages.  The  Eleatics  rejected  the  gross 
anthropomorphism  of  the  Homeric  theology.  Socrates  held 
that  the  Supreme  Being  is  the  immaterial,  infinite  Governor 
of  all;  that  the  world  bears  the  stamp  of  his  intelligence,  and 
that  he  is  the  author  and  vindicator  of  all  moral  laws.  Plato 
earnestly  inveighs  against  the  anthropomorphism  and  polythe- 
ism of  the  Greek  mythology ;  and  having  himself  risen  to  purer 
conceptions  of  the  Deity,  he  insists  that  he  ought  to  be  repre- 
sented as  he  is — without  imperfections,  the  author  of  all  good, 
and  the  punisher  of  sin.  "  There  is  no  imperfection,"  says  Pla- 
to, "in  the  beauty  or  goodness  of  God;"  "he  is  a  God  of  truth, 
and  can  not  lie ;"  "  he  is  a  being  of  perfect  simplicity  and  truth 
in  deed  and  word."(J)  Aristotle,  though  less  spiritual,  enun- 
ciates views  entirely  incompatible  with  the  popular  mythology 
of  the  Greeks.  Thus,  the  popular  notions  of  divine  existence 
which  had  been  current  from  the  time  of  Orpheus  and  Homer, 

(')  Plato,  "Republic,"  book  ii.,  §  18-21. 


284  THEISTIG  ARGUMENTS. 

were  gradually  dissipated,  and  the  way  was  cleared  for  Christian 
theism. 

The  preparatory  office  of  Greek  philosophy,  in  the  region  of 
speculative  thought,  is  seen — 

2.  In  the  development  of  the  theistic  argument  in  a  logical 
form.  The  growth  of  Greek  philosophy  evolved  in  due  succes- 
sion every  form  of  argument  employed  by  modern  writers  in 
proof  of  the  being  of  God.  Our  author  inclines  to  except  the 
"moral  argument;"  but  we  believe  that  Plato's  ontological 
proof  of  the  existence  of  the  Supreme  Good  ought  to  be  re- 
garded as  involving  the  moral  argument.  This,  as  we  shall  at- 
tempt to  show,  is  but  a  single  aspect  or  branch  of  the  ontolog- 
ical. We  might  add  the  statement  more  distinctly  than  Dr. 
Cocker  has  presented  it,  that  the  argument  from  "  Common 
Consent "  is  as  old  as  Socrates^1)  Universal  beliefs  were  made 
by  the  Stoics  an  argument  for  the  existence  of  God;  and  before 
the  Stoics,  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias  ascribed  great  authority 
to  widely  prevalent  beliefs,  "  since,"  he  asserts,  "  mankind  gen- 
erally do  not  greatly  err  from  the  truth.  "(3)  Cicero  declares 
that  "  in  any  matter  whatever  the  consent  of  all  nations  is  to 
be  reckoned  a  law  of  nature  ;"(3)  and  such  opinions  have  re- 
ceived the  sanction  of  modern  philosophy. (4) 

The  four  arguments  most  conspicuously  embodied  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  ancients  are  thus  formulated  by  Dr.  Cocker  (p. 
487-494) : 

(1.)  The  ^3£tiological(6)  proof,  or  the  argument  based  on  the 

(>)  Plato,  "Apology,"  §32. 

(2)  "  De  Fato,"  ii. ;  Ritter,  "  History  of  Ancient  Philosophy,"  vol.  iv.,  p. 
242. 

(3)  Cicero,  "  Tuscul.,"  L,  13. 

(4)  Grotius,  "De  Jure  Belli  et  Pacis,"  ii.;  Butler,  "Analogy"  (Introduc- 
tion); Quatrefages,  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  1860-1861;  Saisset,  "Essay 
on  Religious  Philosophy"  (Edinburgh  translation),  i.,  33,  note. 

(5)  This  is  the  Cosmological  proof  of  Kant. 


jETIOLOGICAL  AND  COSMOLOGICAL.  285 

principle  of  causality,  which  may  be  presented  in  the  following 
form: 

"  All  genesis,  or  becoming,  supposes  a  permanent  and  un- 
caused Being,  adequate  to  the  production  of  all  phe- 
nomena : 

"  The  sensible  universe  is  a  perpetual  genesis,  a  succession 
of  appearances ;  it  is  always  becoming,  and  never  really 
is: 

"  Therefore,  it  must  have  its  cause  and  origin  in  a  perma- 
nent and  unoriginated  Being  adequate  to  its  produc- 
tion." 

This  argument  is  enunciated  more  or  less  articulately  by 
most  of  the  Greek  philosophers,  especially  Pythagoras,  Xenoph- 
anes,  Zeno  of  Elea,  Anaxagoras,  Empedocles,  Plato,  and  Aris- 
totle. 

(2.)  The  Cosmological^)  proof,  or  the  argument  based  on 
the  principle  of  order,  and  thus  presented : 

"Order,  proportion,  harmony,  are  the  product  and  expres- 
sion of  mind : 

"  The  created  universe  reveals  order,  proportion,  and  har- 
mony: 

"  Therefore,  the  created  universe  is  the  product  of  mind." 
The  fundamental  law  of  thought  which  underlies  this  mode 
of  proof  was  clearly  recognized  by  Pythagoras,  and  is  also  elab- 
orated by  Plato  in  his  Philosophy  of  Beauty. 

(3.)  The  Teleological(*)  proof,  or  the  argument  based  on  the 

(*)  This  is  embraced  under  the  Physico-theological  of  Kant.  The  pres- 
ent, however,  is  a  more  legitimate  use  of  the  word  than  Kant  has  made 
of  it,  since  the  primary  (and,  with  the  Greeks,  the  usual)  signification  of 
KofffnoQ  is  "  order."  Moreover,  as  Pythagoras,  who  first  applied  KOO^OQ  to 
the  universe,  designed  especially  to  express  its  (numerical)  order,  Kant 
has  clearly  violated  the  rule  of  preoccupancy  in  the  attempt  to  divert  the 
word  to  another  use. 

(2)  Embraced  under  the  Physico-theological  argument  of  Kant. 


286  TELEOLOGIGAL  AND  IDEOLOGICAL. 

principle  of  intentionality  or  final  cause,  and  is  presented  in  the 
following  form : 

"  The  choice  and  adaptation  of  means  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  special  ends  suppose  an  intelligent  purpose,  a 
designing  mind : 
"In  the  universe  we  see  such  choice  and  adaptation  of 

means  to  ends : 
"  Therefore,  the  universe  is  the  product  of  an  intelligent, 

personal  cause." 

This  is  especially  the  Socratic  proof;  but  it  was  also  em- 
ployed by  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

(4.)  The  Ontological  or  Ideological  proof,  or  the  argument 
grounded  on  necessary  and  absolute  ideas,  which  may  be  thrown 
into  the  following  syllogism : 

"  Every  attribute  or  quality  implies  a  subject,  and  absolute 

modes  necessarily  suppose  absolute  being : 
"  Necessary  and  absolute  truths  or  ideas  are  revealed  in 

human  reason  as  absolute  modes : 

"Therefore,  universal,  necessary,  and  absolute  ideas  are 
modes  of  the  absolute  subject — that  is,  God,  the  foun- 
dation and  source  of  all  truth." 
This  is  especially  the  Platonic  mode  of  proof. 
The  preparatory  office  of  Greek  philosophy  is  seen — 
II.  In  the  department  of  ethical  ideas  and  principles. 
1.  In  the  awakening  and  enthronement  of  conscience  as  a 
law  of  duty,  and  the  elevation  and  purification  of  the  moral 
idea.     Here  we  find  an  order  of  succession  in  the  evolution  of 
moral  ideas  corresponding  with  that  observed  in  the  field  of 
speculative  thought.     These  stages  are  traceable  equally  in  the 
individual  and  the  national  mind.     We  recognize  (1)  in  the 
age  of  Homer,  Hesiod,  and  the  Gnomic  poets,  and  the  Seven 
Wise  Men,  a  period  of  "  popular  and  unconscious  morality ;" 
(2)  in  the  following  age,  beginning  with  Protagoras,  a  "  tran- 
sitional, skeptical,  or  sophistical  period ;"  and  (3)  in  the  So- 


GREEK  PHILOSOPHY  AND  ETHICS.  287 

cratic  age  "  the  philosophic  or  conscious  "  period  of  morality. 
We  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  pages  of  our  author  (p.  495- 
505)  for  the  illustrations  and  proofs. 

2.  In  the  fact  that,  by  an  experiment  conducted  on  the 
largest  scale,  it  demonstrated  the  insufficiency  of  reason  to  elab- 
orate a  perfect  ideal  of  moral  excellence,  and  develop  the  moral 
forces  necessary  to  secure  its  realization.  The  moral  idea  in 
Socrates,  Plato,  Epictetus,  Marcus  Aurelius,  and  Seneca  rose  to 
a  sublime  height,  and  developed  a  noble  and  heroic  character. 
Yet  the  cardinal  virtues  of  the  ancient  ethical  systems  are  pru- 
dence, justice,  temperance,  and  courage.  The  gentler  virtues — 
humility,  meekness,  forgiveness  of  injuries,  love  of  enemies, 
universal  benevolence  ("  graces  which  give  beauty  to  character 
and  bless  society  ") — are  scarcely  known.  The  inculcation  of 
humility,  forbearance,  and  forgiveness  by  Epictetus  and  Seneca 
is  not  clearly  an  attainment  of  philosophy  unillumined  by  the 
spirit  of  contemporary  Christianity.  Socrates,  "  the  noblest 
of  all  the  Grecians,"  had  no  world-wide  sympathies  which  con- 
cerned themselves  with  interests  beyond  the  limits  of  his  na- 
tionality. "  Plato,  in  his  solicitude  to  reduce  his  ideal  state  to 
a  harmonious  whole  answering  to  his  idea  of  justice,  sacrificed 
the  individual.  He  superseded  private  property,  broke  up  the 
relations  of  family  and  home,  degraded  woman,  and  tolerated 
slavery  "  (p.  507).  Plato  himself  asserted  the  inadequacy  of 
human  teaching  and  effort,  and  announced  that  "  virtue  is  the 
gift  of  God."(') 

III.  In  the  department  of  religious  feeling  and  sentiment,  the 
propa3deutic  office  of  Greek  philosophy  is  further  seen. 

1.  "It  awakened  in  man  the  sense  of  distance  and  estrange- 
ment from  God,  and  the  need  of  a  mediator — '  a  daysman  be- 
twixt us  that  might  lay  his  hand  upon  us  both.' "  The  first 

(')  On  the  insufficiency  of  philosophy,  see  the  concluding  portion  of 
Farrar's  "Seekers  after  God,"  p.  318-836. 

13 


288  ANTICIPATIONS  OF  A  REDEEMER. 

stage  of  human  history  recognized  the  divine  as  near.  Nature 
was  the  supernatural.  The  second,  or  reflective,  stage  removed 
God  to  the  region  of  the  unseen.  It  made  him  abstract  and 
difficult  to  discern.  Man  now  longed  for  an  approachable  Fa- 
ther, Counselor,  Friend.  Humanity  was  thus  prepared  for  the 
announcement  of  an  incarnation. 

2.  It  deepened  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  and  awakened  a 
desire  for  redemption.  In  the  Homeric  period  the  idea  of 
wrong-doing  was  certainly  present,  but  it  was  vague  and  gross. 
The  sentiment  uppermost  in  the  great  tragedians  is  the  invinci- 
bility of  the  moral  law.  "  The  sinner  must  suffer  for  his  sins." 
"But  after  the  law  comes  the  gospel.  First  the  controversy, 
then  the  reconciliation.  A  dim  consciousness  of  sin  and  retri- 
bution as  a  fact,  and  of  reconciliation  as  a  want,  seems  to  have 
revealed  itself  even  in  the  darkest  periods  of  human  history. 
This  consciousness  underlies  not  a  few  of  the  Greek  tragedies  " 
(p.  516).  Offended  justice  is  appeased  by  divine  interpositions. 
The  office  assigned  to  Jove's  son,  Apollo,  in  the  "  Prometheus 
Unbound,"  is  certainly  suggestive  of  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
reconciliation.  Plato  more  than  once  betrays  his  longing  for  a 
divine  helper.  The  obstacles  to  virtue,  as  he  says,  are  great, 
and  insurmountable  to  feeble  man.  Plato  admits  it  with  a 
spirit  of  sadness,  and  says  it  is  the  work  of  God  to  restore  fall- 
en humanity.  He  lets  fall  obscure  hints  of  a  coming  Conquer- 
or of  sin,  an  Assuager  of  pain,  an  Averter  of  evil ;  but  he  in- 
dulges rather  in  desires  than  in  hopes.  (J)  The  experience  of 

(J)  Socrates,  in  express  words,  prophesies  the  future  advent  of  some 
heaven-sent  Guide  (Xenophon,  "  Memorabilia,"  I.,  iv.,  14 ;  Plato,  "Alcib.," 
ii.).  In  the  "  Republic  "  Plato  employs  these  singularly  suggestive  words : 
"  Thus  he  who  is  constituted  just  shall  be  scourged,  shall  be  stretched  on 
the  rack,  shall  be  bound,  have  his  eyes  put  out ;  and  at  last,  having  suffer- 
ed all  evils,  shall  be  crucified  "  (cited  from  Clem.  Alex.,  Strom.,  book  v., 
chap,  xiv.,  where  other  foreshadowings  of  the  Redeemer  are  referred  to). 
The  expectation  of  a  Redeemer  seems  to  have  been  very  wide-spread.  Dr. 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  REVELATION  HARMONIOUS.       289 

Plato  found  its  counterpart  in  the  experience  of  Paul  prior  to 
his  conversion.  "What  I  do,  I  approve  not;  for  I  do  not 
what  I  would,  but  what  I  hate."  "  Oh,  wretched  man  that  I 
am !  who  shall  deliver  me  from  the  body  of  this  death  ?"  But 
Paul,  conscious  of  deliverance,  was  enabled  to  say,  u  I  thank 
God,  through  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord ;"  while  Plato  could  only 
desire  and  hope  and  wait  for  the  coming  Deliverer. 

The  history  of  religions  and  philosophies  is  thus  the  confir- 
mation of  Christianity. (')  We  may,  indeed,  regard  the  revela- 
tion of  God  in  the  human  soul  to  be  as  genuine  and  authentic, 
though  not  as  clear  and  influential,  as  the  revelation  in  the  per- 
son and  teaching  of  Christ.  These  two  revelations  are  harmo- 
nious, and  must  be  so.  Greek  philosophy  had  made  the  calcu- 
lation, from  the  data  of  human  consciousness,  that  a  Saviour 
was  needed — that  a  Saviour  must  be  predicated.  Paul  came 
to  Athens,  and  pointed  out  the  Saviour  whose  want  had  been 

Curry  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  idea  of  vicarious  suffering  is  in- 
tuitive (lecture  before  the  students  of  Drew  Theol.  Sem.,  Feb.  4th,  1874). 
However  this  may  be,  Dr.  J.  P.  Newman  cites  it  from  the  Japanese  (see 
letter  on  "  Religion  in  Japan,"  in  Christian  Advocate,  N.  Y.,  Oct.,  1873), 
and  from  the  Chinese  (see  letter  on  "  Tauism  in  China,"  ibid.,  Feb.  19th, 
1874) ;  and  it  is  notorious  that  the  expectation  of  a  deliverer  was  found  ex- 
isting among  the  Pueblos,  Navajoes,  Aztecs,  and  others  ( Whipple,  "  Pacific 
Railroad  Reports,"  vol.  iii.,  part  iii.,  chap,  iii.,  p.  46  ;  ibid.,  p.  42 ;  Pres- 
cott's  "Conquest  of  Mexico,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  60,  312).  On  this  subject  com- 
pare, also,  M'Cosh,  "  Method  of  the  Divine  Government,"  book  iv.,  chap.  ii. 
(*)  "  Philosophy,"  says  Clement,  "  was  a  school-master  to  bring  men  to 
Christ "  (Clem.  Alex.,  Strom.,  i.,  §  28).  "  Philosophy,  before  the  coming 
of  the  Lord,  was  necessary  to  the  Greeks  for  righteousness,  and  now  it 
proves  useful  for  godliness,  being  in  some  sort  a  preliminary  discipline — 
TrpoTraiSfia  TIQ  ovaa — for  those  who  reap  the  fruits  of  the  faith  through 
demonstration"  (ibid.,  i.,  5,  §  28).  "Philosophy  was  given  as  a  peculiar 
testament — SiaOijKrjv — to  the  Greeks  as  forming  the  basis  of  the  Christian 
philosophy"  (ibid.,  Strom.,  vi.,  8,  §  67 ;  -see,  also,  "  Cohortatio,"  chap.  vi.). 
Similar  testimony  has  been  abundantly  rendered  by  Augustine,  Origen,  Lac- 
tantius,  and  Justin  Martyr. 


290  DR.  COCKER'S  STYLE. 

felt — giving  sight  to  the  blind  instinct  that  had  been  feeling 
after  God,  and  preaching  a  Gospel  which  fulfilled  the  prophetic 
longings  of  the  struggling  ages  of  Greek  philosophy. 

Such  is  the  line  of  argument  pursued  by  the  author  of  "  Chris- 
tianity and  Greek  Philosophy."  We  must  refer  the  reader  to 
the  work  itself  for  an  idea  of  the  fullness  and  symmetry  with 
which  the  discussion  is  evolved.  We  may  yet  state  that  it  em- 
braces in  its  compass  neat  monographic  treatments  of  a  num- 
ber of  subsidiary  theses.  Often,  nevertheless,  the  full  discus- 
sion of  a  topic  must  be  gathered  from  widely  separated  pages ; 
and  this,  perhaps,  is  a  defect  in  the  arrangement  of  the  work. 

The  work  shows  the  signs  of  study  and  erudition  upon  every 
page.  But  it  is  not  simply  a  learned  treatise,  for  the  author 
possesses  a  remarkably  keen  and  penetrating  insight  into  sub- 
jects of  speculative  inquiry,  and  hews  out,  with  trenchant  blade, 
and  in  rapid  succession,  clean-cut  blocks  of  thought  to  fit  into 
the  beautiful  structure  of  his  growing  argument.  His  mind's 
eye  sees  with  the  clearness  of  noonday  in  realms  which  are 
thick  darkness  to  ordinary  vision.  He  revels,  with  playful  un- 
consciousness of  effort,  among  the  ponderous  problems  of  met- 
aphysical research,  shedding  upon  each  the  light  of  a  brilliant 
intellect,  transmitted  through  a  style  as  pellucid  as  crystal.  His 
pages  resound  from  beginning  to  end  with  the  changes  rung 
upon  his  favorite  ontological  conceptions.  Indeed,  the  only 
fault  of  the  book  seems  to  arise  from  the  circumstance  that  the 
author  is  so  completely  possessed  by  his  favorite  thought  that 
it  is  always  present  in  his  mind,  whatever  subsidiary  theme  he 
handles,  and,  like  a  ruling  passion,  always  finds  some  avenue  to 
utterance.  This  leads  sometimes  to  a  premature  broaching  of 
the  heart  of  an  impending  discussion,  and,  by  a  division  of 
forces,  somewhat  weakens,  in  some  cases,  the  effect  of  the  pres- 
entation. Thus,  in  treating  Plato,  he  lets  fall  something  of 
Plato's  ontology  on  almost  every  page.  Quite  a  full  statement 
is  presented  three  times :  first,  in  treating  of  Plato's  Psycholo- 


PREMATURE  DENOUEMENTS.  291 

gy ;  second,  under  the  head  of  Dialectic ;  and,  finally,  under  On- 
tology proper.  That  the  author's  positive  theistic  system,  ul- 
timately argued  out  so  lucidly  in  its  various  aspects,  is  consid- 
erably scattered  in  presentation,  will  be  apparent  from  the  at- 
tempt to  make  all  the  references  on  any  leading  topic — as  phi- 
losophies of  religious  phenomena  (p.  55-95, 172-176, 203-223) ; 
the  materialistic  philosophy  of  religion  (p.  55-65, 172-176,  203 
-223,  293,  311) ;  the  Platonistic  philosophy,  and  its  relations  to 
Christianity  (p.  328-387,  492-493,  502-504,  507-509,  517- 
519);  the  doctrine  of  "Final  Causes"  (p.  211-223,  320-324, 
405,  413,  489-491).  Still,  these  peculiarities  proceed  from  the 
influence  of  a  strongly  dominant  idea,  and  the  tendency  is  to 
make  it  a  dominant  idea  in  the  reader's  mind.  In  perpetual- 
ly turning  the  subject  over,  he  always  exposes  some  new  side. 
Every  presentation  is  in  fresh  phrase,  and  is  brought  forward 
from  a  different  direction.  If  the  shadows  of  coming  conclu- 
sions are  sometimes  cast  before,  they  at  least  serve,  like  "  pro- 
phetic types"  in  geological  history,  to  proclaim  a  unity  of 
thought  in  the  progress  of  the  evolution.  The  style  is  digni- 
fied, enriched  with  a  copious  vocabulary,  forcible,  sometimes 
sententious,  and  always  remarkably  transparent.  It  is  some- 
what freighted  with  brief  quotations  and  foreign  words ;  but 
these  almost  always  add  some  meaning  to  the  text.  The  com- 
prehensibility  of  the  work  would  be  improved  if  its  skeletal 
structure  were  a  little  less  disguised ;  though,  in  the  subordi- 
nate parts,  the  method  is  as  noticeable  as  it  is  admirable.  A 
detailed  analysis,  showing  the  subordination  of  parts,  would 
very  much  aid  the  student  and  the  general  reader.  This  sug- 
gestion is  made  under  the  conviction  that  it  is  a  treatise  which 
might  be  studied  with  great  profit  by  all  intelligent  clergymen 
and  candidates  for  the  ministry.  Indeed,  as  before  stated,  the 
subjects  treated  and  the  views  presented  can  not,  in  the  pres- 
ent age,  be  safely  passed  by  without  earnest  study  by  the  "  de- 
fenders of  the  faith." 


292  ARGUMENT  FROM  COMMON  CONSENT. 

In  reviewing  the  work  of  Dr.  Cocker  we  had  purposed  to 
avoid  any  general  discussion  of  the  question  of  the  knowability 
of  God  through  the  powers  of  reason.  Our  estimate  of  this 
work  is  so  high  that  we  thought  it  would  prove  a  better  serv- 
ice to  the  reader  to  present  simply  a  miniature  portrait  of  its 
method  than  to  attempt  an  original  discussion.  We  conclude, 
therefore,  by  making  a  mere  memorandum — partly  by  way  of 
resume — of  the  various  forms  of  theistic  proof,  showing  that 
every  proof  inevitably  hinges  on  the  validity  of  a  primitive  be- 
lief or  intuition  of  reason. 

I.  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  COMMON  CONSENT. — We  find  re- 
ligious impressions,  faiths,  and  practices  a  universal  fact  of 
humanity,  (l)  They  existed,  if  we  rightly  interpret  the  in- 
dications, even  in  the  Stone  Age  of  the  life  of  humanity.  (') 

(2)  They  are  abundantly  exemplified  in  the  existence  and  prev- 
alence of  great  religious  systems  among  those  portions  of  the 
human  family  that  have  risen  above  the  stage  of  savageism.(2) 

(3)  They  characterize  the  life  of  the  lowest  savages.     We  are 
aware  of  contradictory  statements.  (8)     Formerly,  missionaries 
denied  the  lowest  savages  a  spark  of  religious  fire,  through 
zeal  for  the  importance  of  written  revelation.     Recently,  their 
theological  antipodes  have  made  the  same  denial,  for  the  pur- 

(')  Quatrefages,  "Rapport  sur  le  Progres  de  1'Anthropologie,"  1868; 
Duke  of  Argyll,  "Primeval  Man;"  Figuier,  "Primitive  Man;"  and  many 
other  authorities.  This  position  is  questioned  (we  think  through  the  influ- 
ence of  preconceived  opinions)  by  Lubbock,  "Prehistoric  Times,"  and  " Or- 
igin of  Civilization ;"  and  Vogt,  "  Lectures  on  Prehistoric  Man." 

(2)  See,  for  condensed  and  accessible  accounts  of  these,  (in  addition  to 
the  work  of  Dr.  Cocker),  Clark,  "  The  Ten  Great  Religions  "  (to  these  ten 
we  would  add  Lao-tseism  and  the  systems  of  the  Aztecs  and  Peruvians) ; 
Moffat,  "  A  Comparative  History  of  Religions ;"  Miiller,  "  Chips  from  a  Ger- 
man Workshop,"  vols.  i.,  ii.,  iii. ;  and  "  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Religion, 
with  Papers  on  Buddhism." 

(3)  Sir  John  Lubbock's  works,  cited  above ;  Burton,  "  Abeokuta,"  vol.  i., 
p.  179 ;  Darwin,  "  Descent  of  Man,"  etc. 


ARGUMENTS  FROM  COMMON  CONSENT.  293 

pose  of  undermining  the  foundations  of  Christianity.  We 
have  examined  the  specifications  and  charges  in  detail,  and  our 
judgment  is,  that  the  charges  are  "not  proved."  However 
gratifying  it  would  be  to  spread  the  facts  before  our  readers, 
we  must  forbear.  (J)  (4)  The  fact  has  impressed  itself  upon 
the  minds  of  thoughtful  writers  in  all  ages.  We  could  quote 
Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  Socrates,  Plato,  Zeno  of  Cittium, 
Cicero,  St.  Paul,  Augustine,  Galen,  Anselm,  Descartes,  Leibnitz, 
Barrow,  Butler,  Herder,  Ritter,  Ad.  Pictet,  Carpenter,  Calder- 
wood,  M'Cosh,  Spencer,  and  many  others,  to  prove  that  if  the- 
istic  ideas  do  not  exist  fully  formed  in  the  minds  of  lowest 
savages,  they  manifest,  at  least,  a  religious  susceptibility  and 
predisposition  which  could  not  exist  without  a  connatural 
foundation. 

But  it  is  not  necessary  that  these  ideas,  or  even  predisposi- 
tions, should  be  established  in  every  case.  There  are  whole 
tribes,  as  there  are  single  individuals,  which  can  not  reasonably 
be  taken  as  tests  and  standards  of  normal  humanity.  We  may 
throw  them  out  if  we  choose. 

Could  we  go  no  farther,  we  have  in  these  universal  phenom- 
ena the  data  for  a  "  philosophy  of  religion."  Why  this  com- 
mon consent  ?  We  have  listened  to  the  solution  of  Comte ;  we 
have  strained  our  mental  vision  till  we  feel  symptoms  of  stra- 
bismus in  endeavoring  to  reconcile  the  paradoxes  of  Hegel; 
but  we  remain  unsatisfied.  The  religious  consciousness  is  a 
characteristic  of  humanity,  and  we  demand  the  sanction  of  its 
affirmations.  We  feel  borne  toward  the  conclusion  that  the 
voice  of  humanity  is  the  voice  of  truth.  This  is  the  verdict  of 
the  ages.  Ilavrwv  fierpov  6  avOpwiroc; — vox  populi  vox  Dei — 
the  sentiment  of  humanity  is  the  utterance  of  God. 

(*)  A  summary  of  the  results  of  a  study  of  the  religious  nature  of  sav- 
ages has  been  more  recently  given  by  the  present  writer  in  the  Methodist 
Quarterly  Review  for  January  and  July,  1875. 


294  ARGUMENT  FROM  "REVELATION." 

But  is  such  an  argument  a  demonstration  ?  It  is,  if  the  voice 
of  humanity  is  the  voice  of  truth.  The  conclusion  hinges  on 
the  validity-of  a  primitive  necessary  belief.  Is  that  which  man- 
kind necessarily  believes  to  be  taken  as  a  presentation  of  the 
reality  of  things  ? 

Let  us  see  if  it  be  possible  to  rise  to  a  knowledge  of  God  by 
any  chain  of  thought  which  does  not  involve  this  link. 

II.  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  DIRECT  "REVELATION."  —  Here, 
it  seems  at  first,  is  an  unimpeachable  demonstration.     But  sup- 
pose ourselves  in  a  position  to  witness  the  immediate  manifes- 
tations of  the  Divine  presence,  and  to  listen  to  the  audible 
voice  of  God,  what  proof  have  we  that  the  phenomenon  is  not 
an  illusion  of  our  senses  ?  or  that  any  of  our  sensations  are  not 
illusory?    We  receive  an  impression  upon  our  sensorium,  and 
believe  because  we  must;  but  that  is  all.     What  sanction  has 
our  belief?     Next,  suppose  we  had  the  best  of  grounds  for  as- 
suming the  reality  of  something  making  the  outward  manifes- 
tation, how  could  we  know  that  reality  to  be  such  as  mankind 
conceives  the  nature  of  God  to  be?    Without  an  antecedent 
notion  of  God,  the  sensible  manifestation  could  only  announce 
itself  as  a  finite  phenomenon.     Whence  the  notions  of  intelli- 
gence, goodness,  infinity,  rising  up  in  the  soul  in  presence  of  a 
finite  phenomenon?    This  "revelation,"  instead  of  imparting  a 
primordial  knowledge  of  God,  simply  awakens  into  conscious- 
ness a  pre-existing  knowledge.     With  us  who  no  longer  wit- 
ness such  sensible  revelations  of  God,  but  receive  them  only  by 
tradition,  it  is  obvious  that  the  demonstration  must  be  weak- 
ened rather  than  strengthened.     Revelation,  therefore,  can  not 
possibly  be  a  revelation  of  God's  existence  and  attributes ;  and, 
in  order  that  it  may  become  efficient  at  all,  as  a  divine  revela- 
tion, there  must  be  an  antecedent  concept  of  the  Being  reveal- 
ed.   We  come  round,  then,  to  the  point  from  which  we  started 
— Whence  this  concept,  and  what  is  its  meaning  ? 

III.  THE  ARGUMENT  FROM  IMMEDIATE  INTUITION.  —  As  all 


INTUITIONAL  AND  ^TIOLOQICAL  ARGUMENTS.      295 

men  seem  to  themselves  to  know  of  the  Divine,  and  are  uncon- 
scious of  any  process  or  effort  by  which  they  have  attained  to 
this  knowledge,  have  we  not  here  a  clear  case  of  immediate  in- 
tuition ?  To  this  question  Jacobi  and  Schleiermacher  and  many 
others  respond  affirmatively.  This  is  probably  the  meaning 
of  the  theism  of  Hamilton  and  Mansel ;  and  no  other  theism 
was  possible  to  Kant  without  virtual  self-contradiction.  We 
refer  to  the  pages  of  Dr.  Cocker  for  an  exposition  and  criticism 
of  this  philosophy ;  but  for  ourselves,  we  feel  like  confessing  a 
leaning  toward  it.  We  can  not  here  argue  the  point ;  nor  do 
we  wish  to  intimate  that  there  is  not  another  avenue  of  ap- 
proach to  the  theistic  concept.  We  believe  there  is.  But  here 
we  are  confronted  still  by  the  old  question.  Consciousness  re- 
ports directly  (in  this  view)  the  reality  of  the  Divine,  and  we 
irresistibly  believe  the  report.  Now,  what  authority  has  con- 
sciousness to  report  thus  ?  Does  the  presence  of  this  necessary 
belief  imply  a  reality  ?  We  must  make  a  further  effort  to  flank 
this  difficulty. 

IV.  THE  ^ETIOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. — We  turn  here  into  the 
domain  of  necessary  ideas.  We  place  our  feet  on  the  princi- 
ple of  universal  causality,  and  rise  from  the  observation  of  con- 
tingent causes  to  the  concept  of  primordial  causation.  This 
concept  is  a  revelation  of  causation  adequate  to  the  formation 
of  the  world  and  all  the  visible  or  conceivable  universe.  But 
as  nothing,  quantitatively  considered,  can  be  infinite,  but  only 
indefinite,  this  principle  does  not  lift  us  to  infinite  causation. 
The  power  is  not  that  of  an  absolute  cause,  but  only  a  world- 
maker,  a  demiurge,  and  this  does  not  answer  to  the  human  con- 
ception of  Deity.  But,  further,  the  argument  only  bears  us  to 
the  necessary  idea  of  primary  causality ;  and  though  we  do,  in- 
deed, discover  beyond  this  the  necessary  idea,  of  absolute  cause 
— self-existence — it  furnishes  us  no  means  to  bridge  the  gulf 
between  necessary  ideas  and  necessary  realities.  True,  the  rea- 
son supplies  us  with  the  means  of  passing  from  mode  to  sub- 


296  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. 

ject,  but  this  is  extraneous  to  the  purlieus  of  the  present  ar- 
gument. This  method,  therefore,  of  itself  breaks  oS  before 
reaching  our  objective  point ;  and,  moreover,  it  will  be  noted 
that,  whatever  the  uses  to  which  it  may  be  put,  its  validity  rests, 
again,  on  the  trustworthiness  of  that  judgment  which  affirms 
that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause.  What  sanction  has  reason 
for  affirming  this  judgment  ?  What  validity  appertains  to  our 
belief  in  the  principle  of  causality  ?  Let  us  make  another  tack. 

Y.  THE  TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT.  —  Restricting  this  to 
cases  of  the  mechanical  sort,  we  affirm  that  the  contrivances 
discoverable  in  nature  proclaim  intelligence  operative  in  nature. 
Here  we  are  met  at  the  threshold  by  the  objection  that  we 
know  nothing  about  designs  in  nature ;(')  and  the  only  reply 
we  can  make  is,  that  we  feel  fully  persuaded  that,  contrivance 
implies  intention,  and  therefore  intelligence,  and  tfiat  we  feel 
this  necessity  to  be  the  same  in  the  domain  of  nature  as  in 
that  of  humanity.  Still,  it  is  only  a  primitive  belief.  But 
there  is  further  difficulty.  The  evidence  carries  us,  at  best, 
only  to  the  idea  of  necessary  intelligence  as  the  adequate  expla- 
nation of  the  mechanism  of  the  universe.  This,  again,  apart 
from  any  other  proof,  is  not  infinite  intelligence,  but  only  intel- 
ligence indefinite  in  degree — such  intelligence  as  is  demanded 
by  the  system  of  nature — and,  in  addition,  it  is  only  intelligence, 
and  nothing  more.  The  argument  does  not  lead  us  to  the  idea 
of  being  and  personality ;  and  so,  like  the  preceding  argument, 
it  leaves  faith  dangling  in  mid-heaven,  and  groping  around  des- 
perately for  a  firm  support.  We  hasten  to  the  next  alternative. 

VI.  THE  HoMOLOGicAL(2)  ARGUMENT.  —  As  this  phrase  is 

(')  This  "  conclusion  [that  design  is  revealed  in  nature]  could  not  bear, 
perhaps,  the  strictest  transcendental  critique  "  (Kant,  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,"  English  translation,  p.  435).  This  objection  is  echoed  and  re- 
echoed in  the  pages  of  Hamilton,  Spencer,  and  others. 

(2)  This  is  the  Cosmological  argument  of  Cocker,  or  a  branch  of  the 
Physico-theological  of  Kant. 


HOMOLOGICAL  AND  ONTOLOOIGAL  ARGUMENT.      297 

a  stranger  in  the  category  of  theistic  arguments,  we  explain  the 
meaning  to  be,  an  argument  based  on  proofs  of  intelligence 
drawn  from  the  existence  of  intelligible  methods  —  plans  in 
nature.  We  need  not  amplify  the  explanation  or  the  argu- 
ment. It  is  at  once  apparent  that,  however  convincing  the 
proofs  of  intelligence,  the  argument  lands  us  exactly  where  the 
teleological  does,  and  faith  still  feels  itself  afloat  without  an 
anchorage. 

VII.  THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT. — Here  we  deal  with  es- 
sential realities — the  ground  and  source  of  all  cognizable  modes 
and  attributes,  whether  contingent  or  uncontingent.  We  find 
in  our  minds  the  necessary  idea  of  existence — reality — and  feel 
impelled  to  predicate  a  necessary  something  distinct  from  the 
world,  and  which  constitutes  the  ground  and  reason  of  its  ex- 
istence. This  is  the  only  argument  furnished  by  reason  which 
attains  to  real  being.  There  are  three  orders  of  cognizable 
manifestations,  giving  rise  to  three  corresponding  orders  of  on- 
tological  concepts : 

1.  Phenomena  of  the  Objectivity  (extension,  form,  color,  etc.). 
— Ontological  principles,  applied  to  these  phenomena,  supply  a 
form  of  real  being  which  is  contingent,  finite,  and  MATERIAL. 

2.  Phenomena  of  the  Subjectivity  (the  mental  states). — Onto- 
logical principles,  applied  to  these  phenomena,  supply  a  form 
of  real  being  which  is  self-conscious,  free,  intelligent,  moral,  and 
IMMATERIAL,  but  still  finite  and  conditioned. 

3.  Necessary  Ideas. — These  are  not  properly  phenomena  of 
mind.     The  consciousness  of  their  presence  is  such.     No  phe- 
nomena of  the  finite  can  claim  a  necessary  existence.     Some 
of  the  necessary  ideas  which  reason  discovers  in  its  domain 
are  the  following:  The  ideas  of  (l)  Substance  or  Reality;  (2) 
Causality,  with  its  derivatives,  Will,  Liberty,  Motivity,  Intelli- 
gence, Unity,  and  Personality;  (3)  Intelligence;  (4)  Liberty; 
(5)  Ethicality — the  idea  of  right  and  wrong ;  (6)  Duty ;  (7) 
Personality ;  (8)  Unity ;  (9)  Infinity ;  (10)  Absolutivity.    (Per- 


298  NECESSARY  IDEAS. 

haps  the  10th  is  also  derivable  from  the  idea  of  causality.  It 
will  be  observed  that  while  certain  of  our  necessary  ideas  seem 
to  be  primitive  and  intuitive,  they  may  also  arise  through  a 
brief,  spontaneous  process  of  deductive  derivation.  Kant  says 
Liberty  is  not  directly  cognized,  but  only  a  deduction  from  the 
concept  of  Duty ;  but  in  this  he  contradicts  himself  and  the 
verdict  of  common  consciousness.  To  us  it  seems,  however, 
that  while  the  idea  of  Liberty  is  simple  and  spontaneous,  it  is 
also  summoned  into  the  field  of  consciousness  as  a  correlative 
of  the  idea  of  causality  —  coupled,  or  not,  with  the  idea  of 
Duty.) 

Ontological  principles,  applied  to  the  existence  of  necessary 
ideas,  present  them  as  modes  of  the  absolute,  proclaiming  nec- 
essary, infinite,  and  unconditioned  Being  as  their  subject.  There- 
fore, the  ontological  argument  shows  that  if  necessary  ideas  ex- 
ist, there  is  a  necessary  subject  to  which  they  must  be  referred 
as  their  adequate  cause  and  ground.  We  repeat,  then,  that 
necessary  ideas  exist — 

(1.)  Arising  spontaneously  in  our  own  minds  in  presence  of 
the  phenomena  of  the  external  world,  but  transcending  all  which 
we  can  conceive  of  the  extent,  duration,  or  degrees  of  contin- 
gent existence,  and  clothing  themselves  with  the  attribute  of 
absolutivity.  Such  are  our  transcendental  ideas  of  substantivi- 
ty,  causality,  intelligence,  etc. 

(2.)  Further  illustrated  and  emphasized  by  a  thoughtful  con- 
templation of  the  cosmos.  For  instance : 

Intelligence  is  exemplified  in  (a)  Relations  of  contrivance 
(the  Teleological  proof) ;  (6)  Relations  of  plan  (the  Homolog- 
ical  proof) ; 

Primordial  causality  and  its  derivatives  :  "| 

Unity,  are  exemplified  in  relations  of 

Motivity,  ^  >     cause  and  effect  (the  JEtio- 

Self-determination,  V  =  Personality;         logical  proof). 
Self-consciousness,  J  J 


EQUIVALENCIES  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS.  299 

These  three  and  other(!)  similar  modes  of  argumentation 
thus  contribute  predicates,  which  the  Ontological  argument 
affirms  of  real  being.  These  predicates,  together  with  those 
supplied  directly  and  spontaneously  by  the  mind,  make  up  the 
whole  possible  conception  of  Perfect  Being,  or  DEITY. 

We  desire,  in  passing,  to  offer  a  few  words  in  reference  to 
Kant's  criticism  of  the  theistic  proofs  from  speculative  reason, 
lie  is  commonly  represented  as  having  visited  them  with  a 
Waterloo  overthrow.  He  enumerates  three  arguments :  (l)  The 
Physico- theological  (=Teleological,  Cocker  -f-  Cosmological, 
Cocker  =  Socratic  =  Argument  from  "Final  Causes  ") ;  (2)  The 
Cosmological  (—  ^Etiological,  Cocker  =  Peripatetic  or  Aristote- 
lian =  Leibnitzian,  in  part) ;  (3)  The  Ontological  (=  Ontologic- 
al, Cocker  =  Platonic  or  Ideological,  or  argument  from  absolute 
modes  +Anselmian,  or  argument  from  Perfect  Being  =  New- 
tonian [as  far  as  it  goes],  founded  on  space  and  time,  viewed 
[erroneously]  as  attributes  of  Deity  and  symbols  of  infinity = 
Leibnitzian,  founded  on  the  principle  of  "sufficient  reason"). 
"  More  than  these  [proofs]  there  are  not,  and  more,  even,  there 
can  not  be."(2)  His  criticisms  of  the  first  two  are  just ;  and,  it 
ought  to  be  added,  his  praise  of  the  first  is  generous,  though 
reserved.  His  strictures  of  the  Ontological  argument  are  keen, 
but,  it  seems  to  us,  contradictory  to  reason,  and  even  to  some 
of  his  own  later  Ontological  propositions.  He  asserts  that  the 
Ontological  argument  proves  the  necessity  of  something  as  the 

(!)  Similarly  we  might  frame  an  ethical  argument,  based  on  the  princi- 
ple of  ethicality  as  major,  and  the  demonstrations  of  justice  in  the  world 
as  minor,  premise ;  also  an  agathological  argument,  based  on  the  idea  of 
goodness  and  its  manifestations  in  nature.  But  these  arguments,  guided 
by  nature,  reach  only  to  indefinite  intelligence,  causality,  justice,  and  good- 
ness, when  we  are  obliged  to  turn  to  the  reason  to  furnish  the  concepts  of 
absolute  attributes ;  and  still  another  effort  of  reason  is  demanded  to  view 
these  absolutes  as  modes  of  being. 

(2)  Kant,  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  Haywood's  translation, p.  411. 


300  PREDICATES  OF  NECESSARY  BEING. 

ground  of  the  necessary  idea,  but  it  renders  demonstrable  no 
predicate  of  that  necessary  something.  Is  it  substance,  reali- 
ty, necessity  ?  In  his  "  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  "  he  admits, 
similarly,  the  concept  of  Duty,  and  then  asserts  that  it  has  an 
objective,  real  existence.  But,  on  the  contrary,  he  holds  that 
Necessary  Being  remains  only  an  idea.  We  can  not  pass  from 
the  idea  of  Necessary  Being  to  the  qualitative,  objective  actu- 
ality. This  is  simply,  so  far  as  we  understand  it,  a  confession 
of  the  impotency  of  reason  in  all  attempts  to  comprehend  Nec- 
essary Being.  We  reach  here  the  idea  of  the  undefinable,  in- 
comprehensible ("unknowable," Spencer,  Hamilton,  etc.)  "some- 
thing" which  we  can  not  render  to  our  intelligence,  except  as 
to  its  real  and  necessary  existence ;  and  this  impotency  is  sim- 
ply the  confession  of  all  the  theistic  ages. 

We  pause  to  inquire  whether  it  is  essential  that  we  be  able 
to  go  farther.  Of  this  Necessary  Being  all  predicates  are  pos- 
sible which  are  not  contradictory  to  reason ;  and  even  if  no 
predicate  were  demonstrable,  we  should  be  precluded  from  the 
possibility  of  speculative  atheism,  or  the  possibility  of  disproof 
of  any  of  the  Christian  predicates  of  Deity ;  while  the  hypothe- 
sis of  a  self-existent  Creator  and  Father  would  remain  the  only 
rational  explanation  of  the  world,  and  we  should  be  bound  to 
accept  it  as  an  inductive  generalization  of  the  highest  possible 
degree  of  probability. 

But  we  hold  that  there  are  predicates  of  the  (so-styled)  un- 
definable which  must  be  affirmed  if  we  would  not  dishonor  our 
intuitions.  If  the  world  logically  refer  itself,  through  reason, 
to  Necessary  Being,  then  the  intelligence  which  Kant  cheerfully 
acknowledges  revealed  in  the  world  so  refers  itself;  and  intel- 
ligence is  a  necessary  predicate  of  Necessary  Being. 

But  the  great  transcendental  philosopher  raises  a  difficulty 
deeper  than  this,  which  strikes  the  axe  into  the  very  roots  of 
the  Ontological  argument.  That  which  appears  necessary  to 
our  reason  may  not  be  necessary  absolutely.  The  necessity  of 


THEISM  OF  KANT.  301 

our  judgments  must  be  distinguished  from  the  necessity  of 
things^1)  "  The  principle  of  causality  has  no  meaning  at  all, 
and  no  sign  of  its  use,  excepting  only  in  the  sensible  world." (2) 
"  The  statement  that  a  triangle  must  have  three  angles  is  only 
a  necessary  judgment,  and  not  a  necessity  of  things.  (3)  From 
this  premise,  it  follows  that  we  can  not  logically  trace  the  chain 
of  causation  beyond  the  limits  of  the  existing  world,  and  affirm 
absolute  primordial  causality.  We  can  affirm  only  causation 
as  a  prefix  of  the  existing  order.  Now,  if  this  were  all,  it  ap- 
pears that  the  principle  of  causality  possesses  the  same  validity 
and  the  same  extent  of  dominion  as  the  ideas  of  geometry. 
That  is,  the  theistic  proposition,  on  the  showing  of  Kant,  is 
just  as  demonstrable  as  a  theorem  in  mathematics,  though  both 
are  propositions  limited  to  the  existing  order  of  things,  and  not 
depending  as  absolutes  upon  the  necessity  of  things  in  totis 
possibilibus. 

This  is  certainly  pushing  a  firm  foot-hold  for  reasoning  as  far 
as  most  minds  would  ask  to  carry  it.  If  transcendental  phi- 
losophy goes  to  the  limit  of  affirming  an  intelligent  Creator  of 
the  existing  order  of  things,  we  may  breathe  freely ;  that  is  as 
far  as  any  of  our  arguments  have  pretended  to  go ;  and  we  set 
down  Kant  as  a  speculative  theist  in  the  same  sense  as  Butler 
and  Paley.  His  exceptions  to  the  transcendental  argument  (for 
the  three  or  four  so  called  are  finally  but  one)  lie  entirely  be- 
yond any  thing  thought  of  by  ordinary  theists.  Besides,  most 

(J)  Thus  also,  Hamilton:  "It  is  not  competent  to  argue  that  what  can 
not  be  comprehended  as  possible  by  us  is  impossible  in  reality  "  ("  Meta- 
physics," p.  552).  And  Professor  Stephen  Alexander :  "  The  relations  of 
things  are  matters  of  constitution  and  arrangement.  *  *  *  One  part  of 
space  is  not  diverse  from  another,  nor  does  one  day  of  the  week  of  course 
succeed  another  because  we  may  choose  to  think  so,  but  because  the  Creator 
has  formed  (or  conformed)  them  so "  (Amer.  Jour,  of  Science)  [2],  vii., 
p.  180). 

(2)  Kant,  op.  tit.,  p.  413.  (3)  Ibid.,  p.  424. 


302  LEIBNITZIAN  ARG  UMENT. 

thinkers  will  affirm  the  truths  of  mathematics  to  be  a  "  necessity 
of  things,"  and  the  properties  of  a  triangle  to  hold  good  under 
any  possible  (not  to  say  conceivable)  constitution;  and  hence, 
also,  the  principle  of  causality  and  the  principle  of  intelligence 
grow  out  of  the  necessity  of  things,  and  not  the  existing  con- 
stitution of  things ;  and  hence,  finally,  the  proof  of  an  intelli- 
gent Creator  is  the  proof  of  Absolute  Being. 

After  all,  we  are  inclined  to  think,  with  Leibnitz,  that  there 
exists  a  more  direct  road  to  the  Absolute  Intelligence,  and  that 
it  may  be  directly  predicated  on  transcendental  grounds.^)  As 
the  existing  order  of  things  is  not  the  only  order  conceivable 
as  a  possibility,  and  as  the  relations  of  different  possible  orders 
must  be  intelligent  relations,  there  must  be  an  Understanding 
which  lies  back,  not  only  of  the  existing  intelligible  world,  but 
of  every  possible  constitution  of  things ;  and  this  Understand- 
ing must  be  the  predicate  of  a  real  Being — a  Being  thus  un- 
conditioned by  any  possible  law  Out  of  itself. 

Finally,  we  desire  to  direct  attention  to  the  fact  that  on  what- 
ever ultimate  the  last  predicate  of  reason  rests,  we  are  obliged  to 
accept  it — though  we  do  it  cheerfully  and  necessarily — simply 
because  the  denial  of  it  appears  absurd.  Simple,  primitive  be- 
lief, therefore,  is  the  very  root  of  the  highest  certainty  attainable. 

(*)  Leibnitz,  "  Essais  de  Theodice,"  ad  initium.  The  Leibnitzian  argu- 
ment, reduced  to  distinct  propositions,  is  as  follows :  1.  "  There  must  be  a 
first  Reason  of  things  (^Etiological) ;  2.  The  reason  must  be  out  of  the 
world,  and  a  necessary  self -existence  (^Etiological) ;  3.  It  must  also  be  in- 
telligent. Proof:  To  understand  the  relation  of  all  possible  worlds  and 
the  grounds  of  choice  of  this  world  (Cosmological,  Cocker) ;  4.  It  must 
have  self-determination  to  make  the  choice  (^Etiological) ;  5.  It  must  have 
power  to  render  the  choice  efficient  (^Etiological) ;  6.  Power  belongs  to 
substance — it  tends  to  Being  (Ontological) ;  7.  Wisdom  or  understanding 
tends  to  truth  [reality]  (Ontological) ;  8.  Will  tends  to  goodness  [the  Per- 
fect Good]  (Ontological) ;  9.  This  Intelligent  Cause  tends  to  all  that  is  pos- 
sible— therefore  infinite  every  way  (^Etiological) ;  10.  There  is  only  room 
for  ONE,  as  all  is  linked  together  (Ontological). 


VALIDITY  OF  PRIMITIVE  BELIEFS.  303 

Must  we,  then,  confess  that  all  our  knowledge  rests  on  a  ba- 
sis which  admits  of  doubt  ?  Never  was  a  more  important  ques- 
tion raised  in  the  whole  annals  of  humanity.  It  is  of  supreme 
importance  to  discern  the  absolute  and  irrecusable  validity  of 
the  primitive  beliefs.  They  are  the  molecules  of  philosophy. 
In  the  last  analysis  of  our  knowledge,  we  find  an  element  which 
we  hesitate  to  pronounce  knowledge,  because  it  is  only  belief ; 
and  we  are  not  satisfied  to  pronounce  it  belief,  because  we  feel 
that  it  is  knowledge.  All  our  knowledge  resolves  itself  into 
primitive  judgments  which  we  affirm,  because  we  intuit  the 
reality.  Intuitive  knowledge  is  identical  with  primitive  belief, 
and  philosophy  is  a  deduction  from  intuitive  knowledge. 

It  was  not  our  purpose  to  attempt  to  enforce  the  authority 
of  the  primitive  beliefs,  but  merely  to  point  them  out  as  the 
key-stones  of  human  knowledge,  and  to  remind  the  reader  that 
the  impeachment  of  one  is  the  dethronement  of  all.  To  attack 
the  authority  of  the  belief  in  efficient  causality  is  not  only  to 
launch  us  upon  a  universe  of  chance,  but  to  surround  us,  as 
Fichte  confessed,  by  a  phantasmagoria  of  unrealities  and  illu- 
sions. To  dishonor  our  belief  in  Absolute  Being  as  the  ground 
of  our  necessary  idea  of  Absolute  Being  is,  by  a  fell  touch, 
to  break  the  electric  communication  which  unites  the  world  of 
finite  existence  with  the  realm  of  eternal  Realities,  and  plunge 
the  unhappy  soul  into  the  abyss  of  nihilism.  On  the  contrary, 
to  assert  the  authority  of  our  belief  in  the  reality  either  of  the 
external  world  or  of  the  world  within  ourselves,  is,  by  implica- 
tion, to  announce  the  authority  of  that  universal  faith  of  hu- 
manity which  affirms  Supreme  Divinity ;  it  is  to  recognize  in- 
telligence, power,  goodness,  justice,  in  the  ordinations  of  the 
visible  universe,  and  to  make  these  attributes  the  predicates  of 
the  Absolute  and  Perfect  Being  revealed  in  the  inmost  cham- 
ber of  human  reason. 


XL 

GOD  IN  THE  WORLD.(') 

"  I  am  not  oblivious  of  what  is  babbled  by  some,  who  in  their  ignorance 
are  frightened  at  every  noise,  and  say  that  we  ought  to  occupy  ourselves 
with  what  is  most  necessary,  and  which  contains  the  faith ;  and  that  we 
should  pass  over  what  is  beyond  and  superfluous,  which  wears  out  and 
detains  us  to  no  purpose  in  things  which  conduce  nothing  to  the  great 
end." — CLEMENT  OP  ALEXANDRIA,  Stromata,  book  i.,  chap.  1. 

PEOPLE  still  live  who  sincerely  believe  that  Mr.  Moody's 
method  is  the  only  one  requisite  to  convince  the  world  of  re- 
ligious truth.  They  have  heard  of  the  loudly  proclaimed 
"conflict  between  Science  and  Religion,"  but  they  maintain 
that  the  only  way  to  a  pacification  is  through  "evangelical 
teaching."  They  have  seen  the  young,  in  the  formative  stage 
of  opinion,  yielding  with  an  irresistible  deference  to  the  ev- 
idences which  science  arrays  before  the  human  understand- 
ing ;  but  they  still  proclaim  that  well-established  science,  in  cer- 
tain of  its  forms,  is  false,  and  must  not  be  trusted.  "  Tynclall, 
Huxley,  Spencer,  and  Darwin"  must  be  put  down;  and  the 
way  to  do  it  is  to  "  preach  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ."  These  are 
literal  and  recent  quotations  from  the  lips  and  pens  of  excel- 
lent Christian  divines,  and  are  not  made  in  any  spirit  of  levity 
or  disparagement. (2)  Nevertheless,  we  do  not  think  it  neces- 

(1)  "The  Theistic  Conception  of  the  World:  an  Essay  in  Opposition  to 
Certain  Tendencies  of  Modern  Thought;"  by  B.F.  Cocker,  D.D., LL.D., Pro- 
fessor of  Moral  and  Mental  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Michigan,  au- 
thor of  "  Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy,"  New  York,  Harper  &  Broth- 
ers, 1875. 

(2)  While  we  write,  a  Doctor  of  Divinity  is  advertised  as  about  to  pub- 


MISTAKEN  THEOLOGIANS.  305 

sary  to  support  our  statements  by  giving  names  and  places ; 
while  we  have  no  right  to  attach  names  to  opinions  privately 
expressed.  We  wish  only  to  define  a  position  which  we  think 
wholly  mistaken  and  indefensible.  We  shall  be  the  last  to  ut- 
ter a  word  of  depreciation  of  evangelical  efforts.  By  all  means, 
let  them  be  assiduously  promoted.  We  sincerely  honor  Mr. 
Moody  and  his  fellow-evangelists.  We  only  maintain  that  a 
large  and  increasing  class  of  persons  exists  who  can  not  be 
reached  by  such  efforts,  as  long  as  certain  antecedent  and  fun- 

lish  "  a  series  of  masterly  discourses  *  *  *  in  opposition  to  the  celebrated 
doctrines  and  theories  of  all  the  celebrated  materialists."  *  *  *  "  He  will 
expose  and  refute  the  theories  of  Tyndall,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Darwin,  and 
others  of  that  school."  If  this  divine  undertake  so  broad  a  task,  we  fear 
he  will  bring  religion  into  renewed  and  unmerited  disrespect.  He  is  emi- 
nently able  to  serve  the  cause  of  religious  truth  by  "  preaching  the  Lord 
Jesus  Christ,"  and  convincing  such  as  are  accessible  to  his  presentations; 
but  he  will  sorely  disparage — not  science,  but  Christianity,  by  convincing 
his  auditors  that  an  inherent  alienation  exists  between  the  two.  Should 
he  penetrate  under  standingly  the  subject-matter  taught  by  "  that  school," 
the  "  scales  would  fall  from  his  eyes,"  and  he  would  feel  less  eager  to  pa- 
rade the  assumed  "materialism"  of  "Tyndall,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Darwin, 
and  others."  We  do  not  say  that  these  scientists  are  exemplars  of  fer- 
vent piety ;  we  do  not  affirm  that  they  are  "  evangelical ;"  but  we  do  main- 
tain that  they  are  not  amenable  to  the  charges  of  which  multitudes  think 
them  guilty.  Our  meaning  will  become  obvious  as  we  proceed,  setting 
forth,  in  our  progress,  the  matured  estimate  of  modern  science  which  is 
embodied  in  the  work  under  review. 

In  similar  error  was  another  Doctor  of  Divinity  whom  we  call  to  mind, 
and  who,  during  a  meeting  of  the  American  Association  for  the  Advance- 
ment of  Science,  announced  a  Sunday  sermon  on  the  Warfare  of  Science 
against  Religion — or  something  to  that  effect.  At  the  same  moment  an 
eminent  scientist  was  advertised  to  speak  on  the  harmony  between  science 
and  religion.  Such  harmony  has  been  set  forth  time  and  again  by  mem- 
bers of  the  Association  on  the  Sunday  occurring  during  the  session ;  and 
scarcely  a  presidential  address  has  been  delivered  during  the  existence  of 
the  Association  which  did  not,  more  or  less  at  length,  affirm  the  friendship 
of  science  for  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  the  Christian  faith. 


306  DIFFERENT  GROUNDS  OF  BELIEF. 

damental  questions  of  evidence  remain  unsettled  in  their  minds. 
We  will  briefly  explain  our  position. 

The  work  of  Dr.  Cocker  assumes  that  a  conviction  of  -relig- 
ious truth  may  be  legitimately  grounded  on  data  disclosed  as 
the  ultimate  results  of  analytical  inquiry.  The  existence  of  the 
work  implies  that  though  the  belief  of  the  multitude  may  be 
prompted  by  their  feelings — reverence  for  teachers,  hope  of 
future  happiness,  devotional  susceptibilities  —  there  is  a  con- 
siderable number  who  demand  the  proofs  of  the  realities  which 
must  stand  as  correlates  to  the  religious  feelings. 

Belief  is  a  conviction  of  the  truth  of  some  proposition. 
Conviction  always  rests  on  some  ground ;  there  is  some  reason 
why  we  believe.  Sometimes  its  ground  is  testimony  to  a  fact 
observed.  Sometimes  it  is  simply  authority.  A  entertains  a 
certain  belief,  and  B,  presuming  A's  belief  to  represent  truth, 
adopts  it,  and  can  give  no  other  reason  for  his  faith.  Some- 
times belief — sincere  belief — is  generated  or  biased  by  our  in- 
terests ;  intellectual  discernment  becomes  perverted,  and  the 
grounds  of  belief  are  not  revealed  to  us  in  their  true  light. 
Sometimes  belief  is  based  on  the  results  of  a  personal  scrutiny 
of  evidence.  George  Smith,  who  has  seen  and  deciphered  the 
Chaldean  inscriptions,  may  feel  a  confidence  in  the  veracity  of 
our  ancient  Scriptures  no  stronger — perhaps  even  less  unre- 
served— than  that  of  the  servant-girl  who  acquires  it  from  her 
faithful  pastor ;  but  his  belief  rests  on  a  basis  not  traditiona- 
ry. We  who  have  not  deciphered  these  inscriptions  may  still 
accept,  without  reserve,  the  testimony  of  the  antiquary,  and, 
with  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  evidence,  may  build  a 
faith  as  firm  and  as  logical  as  that  of  the  original  decipherer. 
Similarly,  the  chemist  notes  the  transformations  which  take 
place  in  the  test-tube,  and  acquires  an  original  belief  in  the 
principle  of  chemical  affinities.  He  measures  and  weighs  the 
products  of  these  reactions,  and,  finding  that  the  compounds 
present  him  with  definite  multiples  of  the  simples,  he  attains 


PHILOSOPHIC  BELIEF.  307 

to  a  belief  in  the  doctrine  of  "  chemical  equivalents,"  and  the 
doctrine  of  the  atomic  constitution  of  matter.  The  philoso- 
pher, introverting  his  scrutiny,  notes  the  facts  of  consciousness, 
and  grounds  on  direct  observation  his  belief  in  the  reality  of 
his  conscious  states.  Here  belief  becomes  knowledge ;  there  is 
no  normal  contingency  which  can  invalidate  or  qualify  this  in- 
tuitive knowledge  that  he  thinks  and  feels.  He  finds  existent, 
also,  a  belief  that  the  something  to  which  consciousness  refers 
its  states  is  a  reality,  and  such  a  reality  as  is  represented  in  this 
reference.  This  belief  respecting  the  existence  of  an  objective 
reality,  and  its  nature,  is  accepted  by  all  men  as  knowledge.  It 
is  knowledge  exalted  above  all  contingency.  These  ultimate 
data  disclose  an  absolute  identification  of  knowledge  and  belief. 
Once  more,  the  philosopher  discerns  reflected  in  consciousness 
certain  other  primary  truths  which  exclude  the  possibility  of 
all  conditionality— such  as  the  principle  of  causality,  the  prin- 
ciple of  substance,  and  the  principle  of  intentionality.  These 
he  feels  to  be  more  indestructible  even  than  matter  itself.  All 
knowledge,  all  science,  is  but  a  superstructure  built  up  of  these 
ultimate  atoms  of  truth.  The  ground  of  a  primary  belief  is 
neither  testimony,  nor  authority,  nor  sensuous  observation,  nor 
inductive  inference,  nor  deductive  consequence.  It  is  a  ground 
more  unassailable  than  any  of  these.  It  is  a  directness  and  a 
singleness  of  intuition  of  one  transcendental  and  eternal  truth. 
A  religious  belief  is  not  secure  from  the  attacks  of  doubt  till, 
by  a  process  of  reflection,  it  has  been  resolved  into  these  ulti- 
mate and  adamantine  elements. 

Now,  a  moment's  reflection  suffices  to  show  that  men's  be- 
liefs possess  various  degrees  of  validity.  Nor  is  the  ardor  of 
belief  graduated  to  its  validity — unless  it  be  in  an  inverse  ratio. 
One  man  rests  belief  on  grounds  which  would  not  be  satisfac- 
tory to  another.  Some  persons,  like  children,  willingly  adopt 
beliefs ;  while  others  must  themselves  bring  the  grounds  of  be- 
lief under  the  careful  inspection,  of  the  intellect.  Some  per- 


308  STRENGTH  OF  RELIGIOUS  FEELINGS. 

sons  with  warm  feelings  may  be  easily  prepossessed  by  beliefs 
which,  in  others  of  cooler  natures,  must  be  built  on  evidence 
comprehended  and  weighed;  and  in  persons  of  similar  emo- 
tional characteristics,  proneness  to  take  advice  of  the  feelings 
is  inversely  as  the  control  of  intellect. 

The  religious  feelings  hold  the  first  place  in  respect  to  in- 
fluence over  the  lives  of  men.  They  are  not  the  product  of 
occasional  concurrences  of  circumstances;  their  existence  does 
not  depend  on  conditions  of  poverty  or  wealth,  power  or  sub- 
jection, sickness  or  health,  age  or  sex :  they  sway  the  actions 
of  men  through  the  presentation  of  interests  which  range  not 
alone  over  the  entire  period  of  mortal  existence,  but  through 
the  dimly  glimpsed  vistas  of  an  eternal  life.  All  other  interests, 
all  other  motives,  are  limited  by  circumstances,  and  transitory 
in  duration,  save  as  they  condition  the  religious  feelings  which, 
like  the  dome  of  the  sky,  cover  and  embrace  all  that  there  is  in 
human  life. 

Yet  men  differ  no  less  in  the  intensity  and  dominance  of 
religious  feeling  than  in  intellect,  or  amiability,  or  physique. 
Differences  which  exist  absolutely  may  be  counteracted  or  ex- 
aggerated by  the  other  differences  which  exist — differences  in 
intellect,  in  education,  in  fortune,  in  personal  associations.  The 
final  resultant  of  all  the  forces  which  influence  human  actions 
may  be,  in  one  case,  an  irrepressible  religious  predisposition; 
in  another,  an  emotionless,  questioning,  religious  circumspec- 
tion. The  first  individual  will  possess  an  exuberance  of  relig- 
ious faith,  though  he  may  be  unable  to  give  a  reason  for  it ; 
but  will  remain  legitimately  cheerful  and  happy.  The  second 
may  deny  all  religion,  though  equally  unable  to  give  a  reason 
for  his  denial;  but  remain  unsettled  and  anxious.  Tertulli- 
an  could  believe  even  because  belief  was  impossible ;(')  Pyrrho 

(*)  Tertullian  seems  to  have  been  fond  of  paradoxes.  Besides  his  Credo 
quid  impossible,  which  Sir  Thomas  Brown  says  he  learned  out  of  Tertul- 


CONVICTION  THROUGH  THE  EMOTIONS.  309 

would  not  believe  even  when  doubt  became  absurd.  Between 
Tertullian  and  Pyrrho  stand  all  gradations. 

There  is  a  class  of  individuals  richly  gifted  with  religious 
susceptibilities,  but  yet  subject  to  the  strong  influence  of  hab- 
its of  intellectual  inquiry.  In  their  ordinary  moods,  belief  can 
only  exist  under  the  previous  sanction  of  intellect;  but  in  a 
roused  condition  of  the  religious  nature,  belief  bursts  into  be- 
ing at  the  bidding  of  the  higher  intuitions ;  and  ratiocinative 
intellect  comes  afterward  merely  to  sanction  its  existence. 

The  intelligent  reader  can  not  hesitate  to  give  indorsement 
to  these  propositions.  Can  there  be  any  difficulty  in  apply- 
ing them  to  the  work  of  convincing  men  of  religious  truth? 
The.  religious  predisposition  exists  in  all  men;  in  most  men 
it  is  strong.  The  great  mass  of  people,  then,  need  no  argu- 
ments; they  need  only  persuasion;  they  need  arrested  atten- 
tion, aroused  religious  emotions,  quickened  religious  perceptions. 
To  accomplish  this  must  be  always  the  chief  work  of  the  relig- 
ious teacher.  It  is  legitimate ;  for  we  maintain  not  only  that 
the  essential  propositions  of  the  religion  of  Jesus  are  capable 
of  authentication  by  the  most  rigorous  logic,  but  that  there  is 
a  higher  apperception  of  their  truth  which  is  glimpsed  most 
clearly  by  those  who  attain  to  the  sublimest  conditions  of  re- 
ligious exaltation.  To  convince  through  the  emotions — emo- 
tions profound  and  pervading  enough  to  be  calm  and  clear — 
is  to  open  the  intuitional  eye,  and  anticipate  the  affirmation  of 
reflective  intellect. 

True  it  is  that  the  religious  teacher  whose  own  belief  rests 
on  authority  or  religious  predisposition,  may  throw  the  sanc- 
tity of  religion  over  tenets  which  are  purely  secular  or  even 

lian,  as  an  easy  solution  of  knotty  problems,  the  worthy  father  has  left  us 
the  following  :  Non  pudet,  quia  pudendum  est ;  Prorsus  credibile  est,  quia 
ineptum  est ;  Cerium  est,  quia  impossible  ("  De  Cam.,  Christ.,"  v.) ;  Merita 
damnantur  licet  damnent ;  Ad  Icnoncm  damnanda  Christianum  potius  ad 
leonem. 


310  THE  COLD  THINKERS. 

baseless ;  and  lie  may  thus  become  the  propagator  of  a  volume 
of  crude,  if  not  false  and  damaging,  "  theology."  How  sadly 
is  this  danger  illustrated  in  the  history  of  even  the  modern 
church!  True  it  is,  too,  that  the  subject  of  religious  exaltation 
is  sometimes  simultaneously  the  subject  of  a  nervous  exaltation 
which  quickens  the  imagination  and  the  whole  range  of  sensi- 
bilities ;  and  in  consequence  of  this,  the  religious  intuition  be- 
comes fogged,  or  even  confounded  with  imaginative  and  physi- 
ological impulses.  These  extravagances  of  both  religious  teach- 
er and  religious  pupil  are  to  be  diligently  corrected  by  invok- 
ing the  calm  influences  of  intellect. 

But  a  different  phenomenon  and  a  different  demand  are  pre- 
sented by  that  respectable  minority  of  persons  in  whom  the 
religious  predisposition  can  not  be  evoked.  Though  they  do 
not,  by  any  means,  embrace  all  the  thinkers,  they  constitute, 
on  the  whole,  a  thinking  class.  The  ideas  which  elevate  our 
civilization,  and  the  enterprises  which  advance  the  happiness  of 
the  race,  originate  with  them.  They  unite  with  strong  motive, 
executive  power.  They  are  accessible  to  argument  as  well  as 
persuasion.  Their  attitude  toward  the  tenets  and  institutions 
of  Christianity  will  be  determined  by  the  claims  and  pretensions 
of  professing  Christians ;  by  the  results  of  a  study  of  Christian 
evidences ;  by  the  awakening  power  which  is  brought  to  bear 
upon  them ;  by  education,  example,  friendships,  or  other  acci- 
dents. 

Among  the  influences  which  will  determine  the  attitude  of 
this  class  will  be  the  allegations  of  conflict  between  the  sys- 
tem of  religion  and  the  system  of  knowledge.  Science  is  at 
work  in  dusky  basement,  and  high  tower,  and  scented  field; 
and  now  and  then  a  new-fledged  thought  flies  forth,  like  an- 
other dove,  to  typify  the  mind  of  the  All-Father.  Then  some 
representative  of  the  first  class,  from  his  lofty  attitude  of  re- 
ligious enthusiasm,  and  pellucid  faith,  and  beautiful  com- 
munion, proclaims  that  the  idea  is  out  of  harmony  with  the 


HO  W  THEOL  OGY  ALIEN  A  TES  INTELLECT.  311 

system  which  his  faith  has  consecrated;  it  is  a  false  idea; 
it  must  be  put  down.  Accordingly,  he  begins  to  denounce 
" unsanctified "  learning,  and  to  preach  "faith  and  repentance" 
more  earnestly  than  ever.(l)  Meantime  the  thoughtful  minor- 
ity examine  the  claims  of  this  new  announcement  from  the 
laboratory  or  observatory.  It  seems  sustained  by  evidence  ;  our 
preacher  has  said  nothing  germane  to  this  evidence  ;  if  the  sys- 
tem which  faith  indorses  is  inconsistent  with  this,  it  must  be  in- 
consistent with  truth.  We  must  consider  the  system  more  de- 
liberately. We  feel  predisposed*  toward  it ;  but  if  its  apostles 
affirm  its  incompatibility  with  what  seems  to  us  good  reason, 
we  must  hold  aloof ;  for  reason,  as  one  of  the  fathers  has  said, 
is  our  only  means  of  judging  of  the  truth  of  any  matter  what- 
ever, even  of  revelation  itself.  So  argue  the  conservative  mi- 
nority. Do  we  not  see  half  our  young  men  standing  in  this 
attitude  ?  The  spirit  of  God  may  reach  them  ;  but  the  heart's 
door  may  even  be  bolted  against  the  spirit  of  God. 

Now,  turning  toward  the  author  and  propagator  of  this  ter- 
rible new  teaching  in  science,  tBey  may,  quite  possibly,  find  a 
man  completely  antipodal  to  him  of  exalted  religious  intuitions. 
Whether  from  deficiency  of  religious  endowment,  or  as  the  re- 
sult of  some  mental  revulsion  caused  by  religious  delinquen- 
cies or  extravagances  in  others,  he  may  be  seen  preserving  the 
most  inviolable  reticence  respecting  his  own  faith  and  the  bear- 
ing of  his  new  science  upon  the  current  faith  of  his  neighbors. 
Here  is  ground  for  painful  apprehension.  Our  friend  in  the 
minority — the  young  man  in  college,  the  man  shadowing  forth 

(J)  "  Some  who  think  themselves  naturally  gifted  do  not  wish  to  touch 
either  philosophy  or  logic ;  nay,  more,  they  do  not  wish  to  learn  natural 
science.  They  demand  bare  faith  alone  ".(Clemens  Alex.,  Strom.,  book  i., 
chap.  ix.).  "But,  as  they  say  that  a  man  can  be  a  believer  without  learn- 
ing, so,  also,  we  assert  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  man  without  learning  to 
comprehend  the  things  which  are  declared  in  the  faith"  (ibid.,  book  i., 
chap.  vi.). 

14 


312         EELIQIOUS  FAITH  vs.  RATIONAL  EVIDENCE. 

a  creed  to  shape  his  life — will  certainly  prolong  his  hesitance ; 
his  questionings  will  become  bolder;  he  will  recede  visibly 
from  alliance  with  religion.  But  should  the  man  of  science 
happen  to  be  a  doubting  Xeniades  or  D'Alembert,  or  a  scoffing 
Von  Holbach,  or  misanthropic  Rousseau,  he  may  even  corrobo- 
rate the  fatal  charge  of  the  pure  religionist,  and  leave  our  seek- 
er after  truth  to  ponder  over  the  problem,  What  must  be  the 
result  when  immovable  religious  faith  is  impinged  upon  by  the 
irresistible  force  of  rational  evidence  ? 

Here  is  a  dilemma  more  painful  than  can  be  described,  and 
it  seems  to  us  that  he  who  contributes  to  rescue  the  victim 
from  between  the  millstones  of  doubt  performs  a  religious 
service  for  his  fellow-man.  The  verdict  which  comes  from  the 
lofty  elevation  of  a  faith  which  ignores  the  grounds  of  doubt 
is  false.  The  verdict  which  comes  from  the  sullen  depths  of 
a  doubt  which  ignores  the  grounds  of  faith  is  also  false.  The 
conflict,  friend,  is  imaginary.  Heavenly  faith  will  receive  from 
imperial  science  the  kiss  of  reconciliation. 

It  is  the  effort  to  show  that  Christian  faith  sounds  no  dis- 
sonance with  the  universal  scheme  of  truth  which  occupies  the 
author  of  the  work  before  us.  He  does  not  look  unmoved 
upon  the  wide  paralysis  of  faith  and  hope  caused  by  the  perni- 
cious influence  of  this  uneducated  crusade  against  science,  and 
this  soulless  contempt  for  religion.  He  presents  us  a  concep- 
tion of  the  world,  as  framed  and  sustained  by  profoundest  sci- 
entific investigation,  and  shows  us  that  it  implies  God.  Here 
is  the  text -book  for  the  wavering,  and  for  those  who  would 
counsel  the  wavering.  Here  is  the  resolvent  for  their  scientific 
doubts — doubts  which  can  not  be  dissipated  by  the  fervor  of  a 
hymn,  nor  exorcised  by  the  authority  of  a  sermon — the  most 
stubborn  and  invincible  of  all  the  obstacles  to  religious  life. 

Let  us  examine  this  work.  It  is  not  a  theory  framed  by  the 
author.  It  shows  a  thorough  familiarity  with  all  recent  author- 
ities in  physical  science ;  and  its  copious  array  of  citations,  con- 


USE  OF  COPIOUS  CITATIONS.  313 

catenated  together,  would  almost  constitute  a  manual  of  science 
in  the  words  of  the  masters  themselves.  Indeed,  we  feel  moved 
to  express  our  wonder,  in  limine,  that  an  author  so  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  questions  discussed  should  feel  it  necessary 
to  fortify  his  statements  by  quoting  so  largely  the  dicta  of 
scientists  and  philosophers.  Dr.  Cocker,  philosopher  as  he  is, 
is  also  a  scientist,  and  he  possesses  the  prerogative  of  speaking 
by  authority,  yet  he  seems  reluctant  to  rest  his  own  logical 
convictions  on  their  merits.  One  feels  sometimes  disappointed 
that  he  does  not  leave  a  well-reasoned  and  well-put  truth  to 
rest  without  the  bolster  of  authority.  One  is  led  to  suspect  he 
may  be  deficient  in  the  dogmatic  spirit.  He  seems  distrustful, 
at  times,  of  his  judgments  in  matters  of  physical  science ;  but 
no  person  can  read  the  work  without  feeling  that  the  author's 
information  and  clearness  of.  head  make  him  the  equal  of  those 
whom  he  cites  for  confirmation ;  and  this  all  the  more  when 
it  is  remembered  that  the  disputed  points  in  physical  science 
lie  rather  within  the  territory  of  philosophy  than  of  physics. 
The  explanation  of  this  exuberance  of  literature  is  undoubtedly 
to  be  found  in  the  author's  purpose  to  put  the  representatives 
of  science  themselves  upon  the  stand,  to  testify  in  their  own 
words,  and  thus  forestall  all  charges  of  misinterpretation.  This 
purpose  is  judicious,  and  hastens  the  finality  of  the  existing 
controversy.  But,  aside  from  such  object,  the  reader  will  thank 
the  author  for  opening  so  many  avenues  of  collateral  reading 
and  study. 

Viewed  as  a  whole  —  in  its  conception,  method,  and  argu- 
ment—  the  work  is  a  finished  product  of  broad  philosophical 
reflection,  and  sheds  a  genuine  lustre  upon  American  authorship. 
It  is  a  pure  and  lofty  cosmic  philosophy.  It  supplies  the  co- 
hemisphere  of  his  former  work,^)  and  rounds  out  with  com- 
pleteness a  sphere  of  cosmo-theistic  reflection.  He  has  given 

(l)  "  Christianity  and  Greek  Philosophy." 


314  THE  FIRST  PRINCIPLE  OF  THINGS. 

us  the  relations  of  Christianity  to  ancient  thought,  and  the  re- 
lations of  Christianity  to  modern  thought.  In  the  former,  he 
has  not  developed  as  great  detail  as  Cudworth  in  the  "Intel- 
lectual System  of  the  Universe ;"  in  the  latter,  his  details  of 
science  occupy  the  physical  rather  than  the  organic  field,  as 
in  M'Cosh's  "Typical  Forms  and  Special  Ends  in  Creation." 
Cudworth  and  M'Cosh  have  diverged  to  great  distances  in  cer- 
tain directions  —  and  so,  indeed,  have  Paley,  and  Butler,  and 
Chalmers,  and  the  "Bridgewater  Treatises;"  but  Dr.  Cocker 
has  described  a  complete  circumference  by  keeping  himself 
constantly  near  the  central  and  fundamental  position.  He  has 
given  a  great  range  of  proof ;  others  have  adduced  a  greater 
variety  of  illustrations.  Spencer(1)  and  Fisk,(2)  as  far  as  com- 
parisons may  be  made,  have  furnished  each  an  admirable  and 
masterly  organon,  and  Mahan(3)  has  given  a  more  ostentatious 
metaphysic ;  but  we  think  the  reader  of  these  authors  has  need 
to  exercise  a  degree  of  discrimination  between  sound  and  un- 
sound which  is  not  required  in  the  study  of  Dr.  Cocker. 

Starting  with  the  fundamental  inquiries  which  have  exercised 
the  thinking  world  in  all  ages,  the  author  leads  us  by  steps  of 
reasoning,  as  lucid  as  logical,  through  the  realms  of  philosophy, 
science,  and  revelation,  to  the  necessary  and  vivid  conception 
of  a  personal,  Intelligent  Will,  as  the  originator,  conservator, 
and  governor  of  the  world. 

Four  answers,  he  tells  us,  have  been  given  to  the  question, 
What  is  the  First  Principle  of  all  things  ?  "  In  the  beginning 
was  MATTER  ;"  "  In  the  beginning  was  FORCE  ;"  "  In  the  be- 
ginning was  THOUGHT  ;"  "  In  the  beginning  was  WILL."  The 
first  and  second  answers  coalesce  with  Atheism ;  the  third,  with 
Pantheism ;  the  fourth  is  the  creed  of  Theism ;  and  this  is  the 
answer  which  is  rendered  alike  by  our  Sacred  Scriptures  and 
by  the  testimony  of  recent  science. 

(')  "  A  System  of  Philosophy."  (2)  "  Cosmic  Philosophy." 

(8)  "Natural  Theology." 


CAUSE  AND  METHOD  OF  THE  WORLD.  315 

The  idea  of  God  is  a  common  phenomenon  of  the  universal 
intelligence  of  our  race.  An  inquiry  into  the  essential  nature 
of  the  divine  originative  existence  thus  revealed  discloses  it  as 
"an  unconditioned  will,  or  self-directive  power  seeing  its  own 
way,  and  having  the  reason  and  law  of  its  action  in  itself  alone." 
Will  is  conceived  as  implying  reason,  affection,  and  efficiency. 
This  determination  of  the  nature  of  the  first  principle  is  sanc- 
tioned by  both  philosophy  and  science.  Grove,  Sir  John  Her- 
schel,  Carpenter,  Wallace,  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  Laycock,  Mur- 
phy, Challis,  and  even  Comte,  unite  in  affirming  that  intelli- 
gent will  is  the  only  rational  explanation  of  the  existence  and 
order  of  the  universe.  All  our  acquired  conceptions  of  God 
fall  into  harmony  with  this  idea.  Whether  contemplated  un- 
der the  category  of  being,  attribute,  or  relation  ;  whether  in  the 
light  of  reason  or  of  revelation ;  our  total  conception  of  the  Su- 
preme Cause  finds  its  synthetic  expression  in  WILL. 

In  discussing  the  question,  What  conception  are  we  to  form 
of  the  nature  and  mode  of  the  first  origination?  the  author 
first  considers  it  in  its  hermeneutical  and  metaphysical  aspects, 
arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  it  is  the  purpose  of  Scripture  to 
teach  the  absolute  origination  of  all  existence  by  the  Power  of 
God,  and  that  the  same  conclusion  is  the  outcome  of  the  most 
defensible  line  of  philosophic  reasoning  in  respect  to  the  exist- 
ence of  space  and  time,  matter  and  force.  The  absolute  ideas 
of  immensity  and  eternity  he  finds  imbedded  in  the  depths  of 
consciousness ;  and  he  is  led,  by  a  subtle  process  of  reason- 
ing, to  regard  immensity  and  eternity  as  attributes  of  God ; 
while  space  and  time  are  relations  between  co-existing  things 
and  successive  events,  and,  apart  from  things  and  events,  have 
no  reality.  Matter,  also,  derives  its  existence  from  the  divine 
will — produced,  not  out  of  nothing,  but  out  of  the  eternal 
potentialities  of  the  divine  nature.  The  establishment  of  the 
conditionality  of  the  existence  of  time,  space,  and  matter  re- 
lieves natural  theology  of  those  fatal  embarrassments  involved 


316  NATURE  OF  SPACE  AND  TIME. 

in  the  admissions  of  Chalmers,  Martineau,  Mahan,  and  others. 
"The  creative  act  was  not  conditioned  by  time,  or  space,  or 
matter." 

The  conclusion  we  freely  indorse;  but  it  seems  to  us  the 
discussion  of  the  question  respecting  the  nature  of  space  and 
time  is  not  yet  closed.  The  affirmation  that  space  and  time 
have  no  reality  apart  from  things  and  events  is  not  thorough- 
ly satisfying.  It  is  difficult  to  apprehend  how  the  existence  of 
body  (we  use  the  term  for  any  entity  possessing  extension)  can 
condition  the  existence  of  space.  If  space,  as  we  all  agree,  is 
the  condition  of  the  existence  of  body,  then  the  existence  of 
space  is  the  logical  antecedent  of  the  existence  of  body,  and  it 
must  be  possible  to  contemplate  spatial  existence  abstracted 
from  bodily  existence  —  that  is,  with  body  non-existent.  Let 
the  attempt  be  made ;  think  all  material  existence  annihilated 
except  two  atoms  of  matter.  Space,  as  our  author  admits,  still 
exists.  The~  space  once  occupied  by  matter  annihilated,  it 
seems  to  us,  also  exists  as  before.  Now  think  the  last  two 
atoms  annihilated,  and  space,  our  author  says,  exists  no  longer ; 
nothing  but  the  immensity  of  God  remains,  as  before  creation 
began.  But  for  us  the  space  still  exists.  The  fallacy  in  Dr. 
Cocker's  reasoning,  if  we  may  venture  the  opinion,  is  a  fallacy 
of  definition;  it  consists  in  adopting  an  arbitrary  definition, 
and  one  which  does  not  answer  to  the  universal  idea  of  space. 
Space,  he  says,  "  is  the  relation  of  co-existing  material  things — 
that  is,  the  relation  of  position,  distance,  direction,  hereness, 
thereness."  Accordingly  he  says,  "  Let  one  atom  of  matter  be 
created,  and  we  have  extension."  That  we  grant,  for  extension 
is  an  essential  property  of  matter.  "Let  a  second  atom  be 
created,  and  there  is  now  a  relation  of  distance,  position,  direc- 
tion— that  is,  there  is  space"  The  existence  of  the  relations 
alleged  is  obvious,  but  we  appeal  to  the  common  consciousness 
for  the  verdict  that  such  relations  are  not  space.  Having  as- 
signed such  a  definition  to  space,  the  conclusion  is  self-evident 


SPACE  AND  TIME  CREATED.  317 

that  space  was  created  in  the  creation  of  matter,  for  the  con- 
clusion is  embraced  in  the  definition  ;  and  (as  similar  reasoning 
may  be  employed  in  reference  to  time)  that  time  was  created 
in  the  creation  of  matter ;  and  that,  as  a  corollary,  space  and 
time  have  no  eternal  and  necessary  existence;  and  creative  ef- 
ficiency was  in  no  way  conditioned  by  them.  These  proposi- 
tions are  all  but  different  forms  of  the  definition.  The  last  is 
a  most  important  conclusion  for  natural  theology;  nay,  we 
agree  with  the  author,  that  a  system  of  natural  theology  is 
baseless  which  does  not  rest  on  this  corner-stone.  But  we  feel 
fully  persuaded  of  our  title  to  this  corner-stone,  even  if  not  de- 
rived from  the  authority  alleged:  we  possess  a  more  valid  title 
than  one  resting  on  an  erroneous  definition. 

What  is  that  title  ?  it  will  be  asked.  Our  first  and  highest 
title  is  based  on  the  necessary  intuition  of  First  Cause.  The 
universal  intelligence  entertains  the  idea  of  First  Cause;  ac- 
cepts its  reality ;  can  not  be  driven  from  a  belief  in  it.  There 
must  be  one  cause  which  does  not  exist  as  an  effect.  No  ex- 
istence can  be  prior  to  that  which  has  the  sole  capacity  to  con- 
fer existence.  Neither  space,  time,  matter,  nor  material  force 
can  assert  possession  of  that  capacity.  It  is  only  when  we  at- 
tempt to  reconcile  this  spontaneous  concept  of  the  necessary  lim- 
itation of  the  existence  of  space,  time,  matter,  and  force  with 
the  formulated  processes  and  products  of  reflective  thought, 
that  difficulty  is  discovered  and  doubt  arises.  But  suppose  the 
method  of  this  harmony  undiscoverable ;  we  are  not  bound  to 
point  it  out.  Our  difficulty  is  disclosed  in  a  deductive  infer- 
ence several  removes,  perhaps,  from  the  first  truths  from  which 
we  argue.  Every  step  opens  a  possibility  of  fallacy.  Our  be- 
lief in  absolute  creation  is  primary;  it  possesses  higher  author- 
ity than  any  deduction — still  more,  a  deduction  which  conflicts 
with  it. 

But  we  may  endeavor  to  deduce  conclusions  which  shall 
quadrate  with  the  highest  law  of  belief.  The  existence  of 


318  SPACE  AND  TIME  DISCUSSED. 

body  implies  the  existence  of  space ;  for  there  can  be  no  ex- 
tension— not  even  an  atom's  extension — without  space.  It  also 
implies  the  existence  of  time ;  for  we  can  not  separate  exist- 
ence from  duration :  a  thing  whose  existence  has  no  duration 
has  no  actual  existence.  Space  and  time,  then,  are  concapaci- 
ties  of  body — the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  body.  Time 
is  the  sole  capacity  of  unextended  being.  But  time  and  space 
have  no  dependence  on  body  or  succession.  Time  exists  logic- 
ally before  succession,  and  space  before  body ;  and  we  are  able 
to  think  them  as  so  actually  existing.  Neither  time  nor  space 
is  the  capacity  or  condition  of  absolute  existence.  As  to  abso- 
lute being,  we  can  not  affirm  that  it  exists  in  time  or  space — 
in  eternity  or  immensity.  God  exists.  Here  and  there,  prior 
and  subsequent,  have  no  meaning  in  relation  to  the  Absolute. 
Space  and  time,  immensity  and  eternity,  are  not  needed  for 
the  existence  of  God ;  nor  are  they  attributes  of  God :  they 
are  created  to  serve  as  the  capacities  of  other  existence,  or  the 
conditions  of  the  potentialities  of  other  existence.  Of  the. non- 
existence  of  space  and  time  we  can,  indeed,  form  no  conception 
or  idea ;  our  reason  knows  no  denomination  in  which  to  for- 
mulate that  negation ;  we  are  part  of  the  same  system  as  space 
and  time,  and  our  intelligence  is  made  the  measure  of  the  sys- 
tem to  which  we  belong,  and  not  another  unimaginable  system 
which  may  be  possible  with  God.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  form 
the  concept  of  divine  existence  manifest,  cognizable  in  all  space 
and  all  time  past  and  future,  and  yet  characterized  by  activity 
not  transitive  through  time  and  space.  There  are  few  things 
which  may  be  confidently  predicated  of  the  Absolute  by  finite 
intelligence;  and  we  may  be  certain  that  of  the  legitimate 
predicates  of  the  Absolute,  nearly  all  must  transcend  the  grasp 
of  human  reason  to  the  same  extent  as  his  causality  existing 
out  of  relation  to  time  and  space. 

We  proceed,  now,  with  our  resume.     A  survey  of  the  pass- 
ing phenomena  of  the  actual  world  soon  transports  thought 


FINITENESS  OF  THE  EXISTING  ORDER.  319 

backward  to  a  beginning.  That  the  existing  order  had  a  be- 
ginning, is  a  thesis  less  debatable  than  the  creation  of  matter. 
The  leading  representatives  of  science  accord  with  each  other 
and  with  the  showing  of  Sacred  Scripture  on  this  point.  Lit- 
tle less  contrariety  of  conviction  now  obtains  in  reference  to 
the  limitation  of  cosmical  existence  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Science  and  revelation  with  one  voice  prophesy  an  end.  If 
science  conduct  us  backward  to  a  condition  of  matter  which, 
for  her,  must  be  regarded  as  a  beginning,  what  has  she  to  testi- 
fy in  reference  to  the  nature  of  matter,  and  thence,  by  inference, 
in  reference  to  the  origin  of  matter  ?  This  question  affords  the 
author  the  opportunity  to  bring  science  to  the  witness-box ;  and 
the  verdict  made  up  from  its  testimony  is  alternative :  Either 
matter  is  simply  a  phenomenon  of  force,  and  therefore  refera- 
ble to  an  original  creative  entity  as  its  ground,  or  else  it  is  to 
be  regarded,  in  each  of  its  atoms,  as  "  a  manufactured  article 
and  a  subordinate  agent,"  "precluding  the  idea  of  its  being 
eternal  and  self-existent."  This,  let  it  be  remembered,  is  the 
verdict  of  recent  science.  Here  let  the  person  troubled  about 
the  atheistical  tendencies  of  modern  science  take  hope  again, 
and  trust  to  the  voice  of  God  which  he  hears,  as  Socrates  heard 
it,(')  perpetually  uttered  in  his  own  consciousness.  Science — 
physical  science — affirms  that  all  its  data — its  ultimate  data — 
are  things  created. 

Holding,  then,  to  the  creation  of  time,  space,  and  matter, 
and  to  the  finiteness  of  the  existing  order,  what  was  the  method 
of  its  beginning?  That  some  motive  or  sufficient  reason  for 
creating  was  necessary  to  condition  the  divine  will  to  activity, 
is  maintained  both  on  purely  metaphysical  grounds  and  on  the 
admission  of  philosophers  and  scientists.  The  doctrine  of 


(J)  "  I  am  attended  by  a  supernatural  intimation  which  has  been  assigned 
me  from  a  child,  by  Divine  appointment.  This  is  a  voice  which,  when  it 
comes,  prevents  what  I  am  about  to  do  "  (Plato,  "  Theages,"  xi.). 

14* 


320  SUPREME  TELEOLOQICAL  LAW. 

final  cause,  then,  instead  of  being  exploded,  is  acquiring  new 
strength  under  the  sanction  of  such  names  as  Laycock,  Sir 
William  Thomson,  Bacon,  Miiller,  and  even  J.  S.  Mill.  "  The 
highest  law  of  the  universe,"  concludes  our  author,  "  must  be  a 
teleological  idea  to  which  all  nature-forces  and  all  causal  con- 
nections are  subordinated.  This  ultimate  purpose  forms,  as  it 
were,  a  complete  net -work  of  higher  teleological  connections 
above  the  web  of  mere  aiteological  connections  which  pervades 
the  universe."  As  to  the  nature  of  the  supreme  teleological 
law  of  the  universe,  finite  intellect  may  judge  inadequately  or 
erroneously;  but  our  Christian  Scripture  reveals  its  character 
as  a  purpose  to  "  communicate  of  the  divine  blessedness  to  in- 
telligent personal  being."  Reasoning  from  this  fundamental 
principle,  it  must  be  inferred  that  the  self-manifestation  of  God 
in  creation  would  be  gradual,  cumulative,  conservative,  and  har- 
monious. A  critical  examination  of  the  sacred  narrative,  in 
reference  to  its  general  purpose  and  its  literary  character, 
shows  that  this  a  priori  inference  is  sustained ;  and  an  inqui- 
sition of  the  facts  and  conclusions  of  science  demonstrates  a 
complete  consonance  with  the  meaning  educed  from  the  sacred 
text. 

In  drawing  out  the  parallel  chronologies  of  Genesis  and  ge- 
ology, we  notice  but  one  point  which  is  open  to  our  adverse 
criticism.  With  Lange  and  many  others,  Dr.  Cocker  recog- 
nizes only  the  first  verse  of  Genesis  as  belonging  to  the  "  exor- 
dium "  or  "  proemium ;"  we  feel  quite  confident  the  real  exor- 
dium embraces  the  first  and  second  verses.  What  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  statement  in  the  opening  of  the  second  verse  ?  The 
EARTH.  "And  the  earth  was  formless  and  empty."  Now,  ac- 
cording to  the  author,  this  was  before  the  creation  of  "  light " 
— the  luminosity  of  the  matter  out  of  which  the  earth  was 
to  be  fashioned.  Is  such  an  interpretation  reasonable  ?  Next, 
the  succeeding  clauses  depict  events  in  relation  to  the  earth. 
11  And  darkness  was  upon  the  face  of  the  abyss ;  and  the  spirit 


PROEMIUM  IN  BIBLICAL  COSMOGONY.  321 

of  God  brooded  upon  the  face  of  the  waters.'^1)  Now,  this 
was  an  "abyss"  revealed  in  the  condition  of  the  earth,  just 
mentioned ;  and  these  "  waters  "  belonged  to  the  earth,  and  not 
to  outer  space.  It  is  only  in  the  third  verse  that  the  primeval 
fact  in  creation  is  enunciated ;  this  is  the  beginning  of  the  nar- 
rative. The  statements  of  the  second  verse  are  to  be  regarded 
as  detached  glimpses — foreshado wings — of  some  of  the  mighty 
events  which  are  to  pass  before  us  in  the  hymn ;  as  when,  in 
the  proemial  passage  of  the  "  Paradise  Lost,"  Milton  sings, 

"  Of  man's  first  disobedience,  and  the  fruit 
Of  that  forbidden  tree  whose  mortal  taste 
Brought  death  into  the  world,  and  all  our  woes, 
With  loss  of  Eden,"  etc. 

Here,  as  is  universal  with  the  epic  poets,  some  salient  facts  of 
the  narrative  are  pre-announced.  We  always  picture  the  sa- 
cred writer  as  gazing  upon  an  inspired  vision.  The  first  and 
highest  fact  of  all  is  the  disclosure  of  God  as  absolute  origina- 
tor. Next,  as  the  panorama  of  creation  passes  rapidly  before 
him,  his  attention  is  particularly  arrested,  1.  By  the  formless 
and  empty  condition  of  the  arid,  scorching  surface  of  the 
primeval  crust ;  2.  By  the  chaos — the  disorder  of,  and  the  ab- 
sence of  correlations  in,  the  features  of  that  surface  and  the 
promiscuity  of  the  aerial  envelope ;  3.  The  darkness  which  hid 
the  earth  when  the  gathered  mantle  of  aqueous  vapors  excluded 
the  ancient  sunlight ;  4.  The  ocean  precipitated,  and  myriad 

(*)  Our  author  says  "  vapors,"  and  quotes  Lange :  "  The  *  waters '  of 
verse  2  is  quite  another  thing  than  the  water  proper  of  the  third  creative 
day;  it  is  the  fluid  (or  gaseous)  form  of  the  earth  in  its  first  condition." 
Now,  its  first  condition  was  not  liquid — if  that  is  what  is  meant  by  "  fluid  " 
— and  an  incandescent  gaseous  fluid  would  be  a  singular  condition  of  mat- 
ter to  which  to  apply  a  term  immediately  afterward  applied  to  waters. 
This  is  a  virtual  arraignment  of  the  good  discrimination,  and,  so  far,  the 
authority,  of  the  narrative. 


322  MODE  OF  CONSERVATION  OF  THE  WORLD. 

forms  of  life  hatching  from  the  waters  vivified  by  the  "  brood- 
ing "  "  spirit  of  God."  Of  these  conspicuous  features  of  the 
divine  work  he  makes  a  memorandum ;  and  then  returns  to 
the  beginning  to  recount  the  series  of  events  in  its  complete- 
ness and  order.  And  thus  he  begins :  "  God  said,  '  Let  light 
be ;'  and  light  was." 

No  difficulty  arises  from  the  use  of  the  word  "  evening,"  on 
the  theory  that  the  first  "  day  "  began  with  the  creation  of  light. 
"Evening"  and  "morning"  are  not  here  equivalent  to  dark- 
ness and  light ;  they  are  poetically  expressive  of  the  "  begin- 
ning "  and  "  end  "  of  a  demiurgic  day.  If  the  "  evening  "  of 
the  first  day  means  the  darkness  which  preceded  the  creation 
of  light,  what  means  the  evening  of  the  second  day,  which  fol- 
lowed the  creation  of  light  ?  We  think  the  interpretation  here 
suggested  to  be  demanded  equally  by  critical  exegesis  and  by 
science. 

The  next  question  which  arises  concerns  the  present  relation 
of  the  Creator  to  the  creation.  The  key-note  of  the  discussion 
respecting  the  conservation  of  the  world  is  struck  in  the  copi- 
ous citations  from  Sacred  Scripture,  and  the  authorities  of  the 
Church,  which  represent  God  as  continuously  exerting  a  con- 
serving efficiency,  without  which  creation  would  sink  immedi- 
ately into  non-existence.  Divergent  from  such  a  recognition 
of  divine  power  are  the  views  of  certain  "  advanced  thinkers," 
which  our  author  now  proceeds  to  examine.  The  first  school, 
represented  by  such  writers  as  Professor  Tyndall,  Dr.  H.  Bence 
Jones,  and  Dr.  Bastian,  hold  to  "  the  absolute  inseparability  of 
matter  and  force."  While  subscribing  to  the  doctrine  of  pri- 
mordial creation,  they  maintain  that  the  phenomena  of  the  uni- 
verse are  perpetuated  through  the  inherent  and  unwasted  ener- 
gy imparted  to  matter  in  the  beginning.  The  second  school, 
represented  by  such  men  as  Professors  Owen,  Huxley,  and  Ba- 
den Powell,  "  deny  the  ultimate  distinction  between  matter  and 
force,  and  regard  both  as  phenomenal  manifestations  of  some 


RELATION  OF  GOD   TO  THE  WOULD.  323 

*  unknown  substratum ' — a  supramaterial  PHYSIS  (0v<ne),  which 
is  identical  with  the  divine  substance."  This  is  a  phase  of 
thought  which  verges  toward  Pantheism.  "A  third  and  inter- 
mediate school  assumes  the  existence  of  a  plastic  nature  (vis 
formativa)  intermediate  between  the  Creator  and  his  work,  by 
which  the  phenomena  of  nature  are  produced."  This  hypoth- 
esis was  propounded  by  Cudworth,  and  probably  possesses  a 
close  affinity  with  the  old  theory  of  the  anima  mundi ;  but  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  the  "animating  principle"  of  Harvey, 
the  materice  vita  of  Hunter,  or  the  "  organic  force "  of  Miiller, 
or  "  plastic  force  "  of  the  Schoolmen,  is  similarly  intended  to 
imply  the  existence  of  any  separate  intelligence.  The  theory 
has  been  lately  reproduced  by  Dr.  Laycock  and  Mr.  Murphy, 
under  the  name  of  "  unconscious  organizing  intelligence."  To 
what,  it  may  be  asked,  does  this  intelligence  pertain?  If  to 
matter,  the  theory  means  Atheism ;  if  to  spirit,  it  means  Pan- 
theism. 

Now,  every  conception  of  the  world  which  makes  it  self- 
supporting,  self-evolving,  with  Deity  standing  merely  as  a  re- 
mote, unapproachable  prefix,  however  sanctioned  by  any  theol- 
ogy styling  itself  orthodox,  is  essentially  atheistic  and  in  con- 
flict with  Scripture ;  but,  iiappily,  also,  a  conception  which  is 
incompatible  with  the  deductions  which  we  are  compelled  to 
draw  from  the  data  of  reason  and  science.  In  the  defense  of 
this  thesis,  our  author  displays  an  admirable  familiarity  with 
the  theories  and  speculations  of  physical  science,  and  gives,  we 
think,  the  two  most  charming  chapters  of  his  work.  Our  lim- 
its do  not  permit  even  an  abstract  of  his  method ;  and  we  can 
only  commend  this  masterly  discussion  to  the  studious  atten- 
tion of  those  who  desire  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  real 
positions  of  the  scientists  named,  and  the  relations  which  their 
science  sustains  to  the  Biblical  doctrine  of  immanent  divine 
efficiency. 

The  forms  under  which  Dr.  Cocker  discusses  the  leading 


324  DIVINE  IMMANENCE  DEDUCED. 

theories  which  he  opposes  are:  1.  The  hypothesis  of  natural 
law.  2.  The  hypothesis  of  active  force  communicated  to  mat- 
ter at  its  creation.  3.  The  hypothesis  of  a  plastic  nature.  His 
own  views  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  1.  Matter  is  not  a 
mere  phenomenon  of  force,  but  is  an  entity  of  a  purely  passive 
character,  serving  as  the  recipient  and  vehicle  of  force.  2.  It 
consists  of  ultimate  continuous  atoms  or  molecules.  3.  Force 
can  not  be  a  property  of  matter.  It  is  an  attribute  of  mind 
or  spirit  alone;  and  spirit  force  is  the  only  force  in  the  uni- 
verse. 4.  All  the  forms  of  energy  manifested  in  the  universe 
are  only  transformations^)  of  the  one  omnipresent  force  issu- 
ing from  the  one  fountain-head  of  power — the  Divine  Will. 
5.  All  the  phenomena  of  molecular  life  (bioplasmic  phenomena) 
are  the  result  of  the  immediate  presence  and  direct  agency  of 
God. 

Thus  the  final  conclusion  is,  that  "God  is  not  simply  the 
transitive,  but  the  immanent,  cause  of  the  universe.  *  *  *  His 
ceaseless  energy  produces  all  the  phenomena  of  nature."  Is 
not  this  identification  of  the  dynamical  life  of  the  universe 
with  God,  Pantheism?  To  this  question  he  replies:  "The 
theory  which  represents  the  Deity  as  the  transitive  cause  of  the 
universe — a  Arj/jnovpyos  mechanically  fashioning  the  materials 
supplied  to  his  hands,  and  then  leaving  it  to  the  working  of  its 
own  inherent  forces  —  is  rank  Deism.  The  hypothesis  which 
regards  the  Deity  as  no  more  than  the  dynamical  life  of  the 
universe  —  an  informing  and  organizing  soul  associated  with 
matter — is  naked  Hylozoism.  The  theory  that  reduces  all  ex- 
istence, material  and  mental,  to  phenomenal  manifestations  of 
one  eternal,  self-existent  substance,  which  evolves  itself  accord- 
ing to  an  inward  law  of  necessity,  and  which  is  elusively  called 


(!)  On  the  theory  of  immanent  divine  agency  the  "  different  forms  of 
energy  "  are  not  "  transformations  "  of  one  divine  will-force ;  they  are  the 
divine  Avill-force  in  its  varied  self-imposed  modes  of  activity. 


DIVINE  GOVERNMENT  OF  HUMANITY.  325 

God,  is  Pantheism.  But  the  doctrine  which  embraces  the  two 
conceptions  of  transcendence  and  immanence,  and  while  it  teach- 
es the  immanence  of  God  in  matter,  proclaims  the  infinite  dis- 
tinctness in  essence  between  matter  and  God,  and  the  infinite 
omnipresence  of  a  personal  God  above  and  beyond  the  limita- 
tions of  matter,  is  Christian  Theism." 

If  we  recognize  the  world  as  created  and  sustained  by  divine 
power,  and  accept  the  testimony  of  revelation  that  the  free  and 
loving  impartation  of  happiness  to  other  conscious  beings  was 
the  final  cause  of  creation,  we  reach  the  inquiry,  What  has 
been  the  method  of  God  in  the  treatment  of  his  rational  creat- 
ures? What  are  the  phenomena  and  laws  of  the  providence 
of  God  in  human  history  ?  The  conclusion  developed  from 
the  discussion  of  this  question  sets  man  as  an  objective  point 
in  the  geological  transformations  of  the  earth  and  its  succes- 
sive faunas  and  floras,  and  in  the  final  configuration  of  the  ter- 
restrial surface ;  and  establishes  a  parallelism  between  the  edu- 
cational development  of  the  race  and  that  of  the  individual ; 
transferring  the  work  of  human  education,  in  each  successive 
stage,  to  a  new  theatre,  until  at  length,  the  stages  of  Oriental, 
Hebrew,  Greek,  and  Roman  civilization  being  passed,  the  Chris- 
tian civilization  seems  destined  to  be  fully  unfolded  and  per- 
fected upon  a  continent  presenting,  physically  and  politically, 
the  freest  scope  for  the  activity  of  the  appointed  agencies  of 
human  perfection  and  happiness. 

Descending  to  a  discussion  of  the  question  of  providence 
and'  prayer,  the  author  strikes  what  he  announces  as  "  the  most 
sharply  defined  issue  between  Science  and  Religion  —  in  fact, 
the  only  real  issue  at  the  present  time."  We  are  inclined  to 
think  this  statement  quite  correct.  The  old  issues  of  atheism, 
materialism,  and  pantheism  have  vanished  in  smoke,  since  we 
discover  it  to  be  impossible  to  settle  upon  any  well-accepted 
doctrine  of  science  from  which  a  simple  deductive  inference 
does  not  usher  us  into  the  presence  of  a  personal  and  adorable 


326  DEFINITION  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

Divinity.  We  shall  continue  to  hear  the  old  accusations  hurled 
against  the  citadel  of  science,  but  we  may  rest  assured  that 
they  proceed  from  combatants  who  live  in  the  past.  The  dis- 
cussion of  prayer  considered  from  the  stand-point  of  science  is 
conducted  with  characteristic  learning  and  conclusiveness ;  and 
we  think  any  clergyman  placed  under  the  necessity  of  vindica- 
ting prayer  from  the  aspersions  of  Professor  Tyndall  may  find 
here  a  mine  of  pertinent  suggestions.  "  In  prayer,"  concludes 
the  author,  "  the  intelligent  believer  does  not  invoke  a  different 
Power  from  that  which  is  manifested  in  all  the  forms  of  phys- 
ical energy  which  are  manifested  in  nature;  he  does  but  in- 
voke the  same  Power,  and  the  only  Power  which  is  the  source 
of  all  causation,  and  produces  all  the  processions  of  phenom- 
ena." 

The  last  two  chapters  are  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the 
moral  government  of  the  world — its  ground,  its  nature,  con- 
ditions, method,  and  end.  The  first  subjective  condition  of 
moral  government  is  intelligence.  In  discussing  this  condition 
the  author  is  led  to  place  a  definition  upon  conscience.  He 
does  not  view  it  as  a  distinct  faculty  of  the  mind,  but  rather  as 
the  "common  field  in  which  is  revealed  the  operation  of  all 
our  faculties  in  their  especial  relation  to  moral  law."  It  is  thus : 
(1)  "The  reason  intuitively  apprehending  universal  moral  ideas 
and  laws."  *  *  *  (2)  The  understanding  apprehending  the  re- 
lations in  which  we  stand  to  God,  to  our  fellow-beings,  and  to 
self  as  a  moral  personality  endowed  with  reason  and  freedom. 
(3)  The  judgment  comparing  the  acts  of  a  voluntary  agent 
*  *  *  with  the  immutable  ideas  and  laws  of  the  reason,  and  af- 
firming this  is  right,  and  worthy  of  praise  and  reward,  or  that 
is  wrong,  and  deserving  of  blame  and  punishment.  (4)  A  par- 
ticular state  of  the  sensibility — the  painful  or  pleasurable  emo- 
tions which  spontaneously  arise  in  the  presence  of  right  or 
wrong  in  our  actions  or  in  the  actions  of  our  fellow-men." 

In  reference  to  this  analysis,  we  can  not  avoid  raising  the 


CRITICISM  AND  REDEFINITION.  327 

query,  In  what  do  the  intelligential  elements  differ  from  reason, 
understanding,  and  judgment,  in  their  exercise  upon  non-ethical 
data  ?  Is  there  any  adequate  ground  for  dissociating  the  moral 
intuitions  of  the  reason  from  intuitions  concerning  modality  or 
quantity — except  with  the  view  to  a  classification  of  the  intu- 
itions ?  And  does  the  understanding,  in  seizing  upon  relations 
which  may  constitute  the  data  of  an  ethical  decision,  become  a 
different  faculty  from  that  exercised  upon  relations  of  utility, 
efficiency,  or  congruity?  Or  does  judgment,  in  rendering  its 
decisions?  In  every  case,  we  respond  negatively.  There  is 
only  a  difference  in  the  subjects  upon  which  these  faculties  are 
exercised.  In  the  analysis  of  the  author,  the  sensibility  is  the 
only  power  which  is  sui-generis,  and  this  he  does  not  view  as 
subjectively  distinct  from  the  general  sensibility.  His  concep- 
tion of  conscience  is  neat  and  intelligible ;  and  we  quite  agree 
with  him  that  such  a  conscience  is  not  a  separate  faculty  of  the 
soul ;  it  is  only  a  certain  co-ordination  of  activities  upon  ethical 
data;  it  is  a  dethronement  of  conscience  as  an  autonomy,  and 
a  diluting  and  weakening  of  it  to  a  mere  complex  of  functions. 
In  all  this  the  theory  is  a  violation  of  the  universal  convictions 
on  this  subject.  We  think,  in  respectful  disagreement  with 
him,  that  the  composite  activity  which  he  views  as  a  conven- 
tional conscience,  does  involve  an  element  which  constitutes  the 
natural  conscience,  and  one  for  which  we  have  no  name  unless 
we  call  it  conscience.  There  is  no  sensibility  but  this  ethic- 
al element  which  constitutes  the  feeling  that  "  I  ought,"  or 
"  ought  not ;"  and  this  becomes  pleasurable  or  painful  accord- 
ing as  act  agrees  or  disagrees  with  that  which  judgment  has 
pronounce^  right.  Conscience  proper,  we  think,  is  not  a  dis- 
cerning faculty,  and  pronounces  no  judgments  ;  but  when  once 
the  discernments  have  been  made  and  the  judgments  pro- 
nounced by  the  intellect,  conscience,  as  a  feeling(1)  of  a  pecul- 

x-  • 

(*)  Religion  may  be  defined   as  the  feeling  of  the  existence  of  the  All- 


328  FREEDOM  OF  WILL. 

iar  kind,  prompts  to  actions  conformable  to  the  judgments  pro- 
nounced, and  accompanies  the  contemplation  of  an  act  with 
pleasure  or  pain  according  to  its  conformity  or  non-conformity 
•with  the  prompting. 

The  second  subjective  condition  of  moral  government  leads 
to  a  discussion  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  the  outcome  of  which 
(would  that  space  permitted  a  complete  outline  of  these  two 
chapters !)  is  as  follows :  Will  is  original,  uncaused  cause ;  it  is 
not  caused  by  motive ;  "  motives  may  be  reason  for  action,  con- 
ditions under  which  it  acts,  but  they  are  not  causes  of  action ;" 
or,  in  the  language  of  Dr.  Whedon,  "  for  its  own  effect,  will  or 
the  willing  agent  is  a  complete  cause;  as  complete  a  cause 
as  any  cause  whatever ;  and  every  complete  cause  produces  its 
effect  uncausedly"  These  enunciations,  it  seems  to  us,  cut  to 
the  marrow  of  the  subject,  and  harmonize  the  fact  of  universal 
motivity  with  the  fact  of  conscious  freedom. 

One  can  not  complete  the  thoughtful  perusal  of  this  work 
without  a  feeling  of  high  admiration  and  profound  satisfaction. 
There  has  passed  before  his  mind  a  vision  of  heavenly  beauty. 
The  grand  conclusion  shines  in  upon  him  like  a  divine  illumi- 
nation, and  he  feels  absorbed  in  an  atmosphere  of  supernal  ra- 
diance and  tender  love.  It  is  a  vision  of  God,  of  his  own  free- 

Cause,  and  of  his  inevitable  grasp  upon  us,  and  paternal  interest  in  us.  The 
feeling  is  primarily  intuitive  knowledge ;  it  is  strengthened  and  sanctioned 
by  ratiocinative  knowledge.  The  grasp  felt  inspires  reverence,  awe,  fear, 
desire  to  please,  supplication.  The  paternal  interest  prompts  to  gratitude, 
love,  praise,  and  prayer.  The  fear  of  God,  in  the  ethnic  religious  scale, 
must  necessarily  precede  the  love  of  God.  The  latter  is  based  on  a  knowl- 
edge of  what  God  has  done,  and  purposes  to  do  for  us.  Hence  the  lowest 
savages  know  only  a  malevolent  deity.  All  the  powers  of  the  soul  are 
made  ministers  to  the  demands  of  the  religious  feeling.  Hence  religious 
systems,  rites,  creeds,  institutions,  enterprises — all  inspired  by  the  unvary- 
ing religious  feeling,  but  all  reasoned  out  and  executed  by  finite  and  erring 
intelligence. 


GOD  IN  THE  WOULD,  329 

will  resolving  to  create  a  world,  and  populate  it  with  beings 
physically  adapted  to  it,  but  yet  in  his  own  spiritual  image — 
beings  to  be  made  happy ;  a  vision  of  God  in  the  world,  main- 
taining it,  communing  with  it,  admitting  himself  into  the  con- 
sciousness of  his  beloved  intelligences ;  speaking  to  them  in 
the  voiceless  whisperings  of  reason,  in  the  radiant  beauties  of 
the  field  and  the  sky,  or  in  the  awful  voices  of  the  storm  and 
the  earthquake  and  the  collapse  of  planetary  systems;  God 
with  us  —  Immanuel  —  strengthening  and  cheering,  lifting  us 
up  and  pitying  us  in  our  distresses,  watching  for  the  whispered 
prayer,  responsive  to  the  hymn  of  adoration,  infolding  us  with 
his  love  through  all  the  journey  of  mortal  life,  and  then,  when 
the  light  of  the  cerulean  heaven  fades  in  our  glazing  eyes,  re- 
vealing us  to  ourselves  in  the  midst  of  a  light  which  mortal 
eyes  can  not  behold,  and  which  floods  with  ineffable  glories  that 
other  world  from  which  we  are  now  shut — not  by  distance,  bat 
by  life. 

An  author  who  can  bequeath  his  readers  an  impression  like 
this  has  earned  a  title  to  gratitude,  to  fame,  to  an  eternal  re- 
ward. 


GLIMPSES  OF  THE  EVIDENCE,  A  POSTERIORI. 


XII. 

GOD  AND  RELIGION  IN  NATURE. 

ILLUSTRATIONS    OF    INTENTIONALITY    AND    OF    OTHER    BIBLICAL 
TEACHING. 

I.  Manifestations  of  Power  in  Creation. 

WE  propose  to  look  out  upon  Nature,  and  see  what  there  is 
to  suggest  the  idea  of  God  and  religion.  If  there  be  any  thing 
in  the  universe  to  prove  or  illustrate  the  being  and  attributes 
of  God,  and  to  confirm  our  faith  in  the  authority  of  the  Sa- 
cred Scriptures,  let  us  endeavor  to  ascertain  clearly  what  it  is, 
and  what  it  teaches. 

The  most  impressive  and  most  comprehensible  phenomena 
of  the  Universe  are  manifestations  of  POWER.  Those  which 
most  readily  excite  our  wonder  and  astonishment,  when  we 
pause  to  consider  them,  are  manifestations  of  physical  power. 
Among  the  works  of  human  hands,  we  gaze  with  amazement 
on  the  ponderous  bulk  of  the  Pyramids,  and  the  majesty  of  St. 
Peter's  at  Rome,  and  that  marvel  of  modern  engineering  which 
lifts  a  massive  brick  block  of  Chicago  stores  and  moves  it  bod- 
ily to  a  new  location.  But  what  are  Pyramids  to  the  Alps, 
which  have  been  lifted  by  some  power  to  an  altitude  thirty- 
three  times  the  height  of  the  largest  Pyramid?  And  yet  the 
Alps  are  little  more  than  half  the  height  of  the  Andes,  and  not 
more  than  the  hundredth  part  of  their  mass.  These  ponderous 
mountain  chains  have  been  upheaved  bodily,  tearing  their  way 
through  masses  of  solid  rock  miles  in  thickness,  uplifting, 
crushing,  tilting,  and  dislocating  the  solid  floor  of  half  a  conti- 
nent. We  must  not  forget  that  this  is  the  work  of  physical 


334  DISPLAYS  OF  PHYSICAL  POWER. 

power.  These  are  physical  masses,  moved  by  physical  agencies, 
and  give  expression  to  the  efforts  of  physical  power  as  really 
as  the  conscious  labors  of  human  hands. 

What,  again,  is  the  power  of  man  in  upheaving  bodily  a 
massive,  stone -built  structure?  No  strain  that  man  has  ever 
applied  has  compressed  or  stretched  to  a  perceptible  extent  a 
block  of  building-stone  above  an  inch  or  two  in  diameter.  The 
builder  makes  no  allowance  for  compression  of  the  stones  which 
lie  at  the  very  base  of  the  most  ponderous  edifices.  Yet  such 
are  the  strains  which  nature  exerts  upon  the  rocky  slabs  built 
into  the  hill-sides  that  they  yield  like  india-rubber  to  the  press- 
ure ;  and  when,  by  quarrying,  the  strain  is  relieved,  the  crush- 
ed rocks,  with  a  groan,  ease  themselves  back  to  their  original 
dimensions.  Here  is  power  which  may  well  amaze  us.  We 
must  not  forget,  in  our  habit  of  thinking  that  these  are  the 
phenomena  of  nature,  that  they  are  none  the  less  the  results  of 
pOwer — such  power  precisely  as  man  exerts  in  raising  a  pillar 
or  kneading  a  lump  of  clay. 

But  these,  after  all,  are  some  of  the  feeblest  of  nature's 
efforts.  Look  beyond  the  phenomena  of  uplifted  mountain- 
masses,  deep-scooped  ocean  basins,  forest-laying  tempests,  and 
land-consuming  waves.  Look  out  into  limitless  space !  There 
hang  worlds  of  ponderous  bulk,  fashioned  by  some  plastic  hand, 
upheld  by  some  mighty  agency,  moved  onward  in  their  majes- 
tic courses  by  some  mysterious  power.  If  we  would  know  how 
great  the  power  which  handles  these  spheres,  think  of  the  to- 
tal bulk  of  our  own  world,  and  of  the  crash  of  matter  which  its 
fall  would  occasion.  There  is  the  sun,  the  ancient  mother  of 
the  planets,  but  still  fervid  in  the  heat  of  youth,  whose  bulk  is 
so  great  that  if  its  centre  were  placed  where  the  earth's  centre 
is,  the  body  of  the  sun  would  extend  in  every  direction  as  far 
as  the  moon— nay,  would  extend  beyond  the  moon  a  distance 
equal  to  eight  times  the  circumference  of  the  earth.  And 
yet,  so  vast  a  globe  of  matter  as  this  has  been  shaped  by  the 


POWER  AN  ATTRIBUTE  OF  BEING.  335 

Power  which  operates  in  creation,  and  rolls  the  planets  in  their 
yearly  courses.  Do  not  let  the  phraseology  of  science  mislead 
us.  Science  affirms  that  the  spherical  form  is  "  natural "  to 
matter — that  its  particles,  gravitating  equally  toward  the  cen- 
tre of  gravity,  spontaneously  produce  the  sphere.  But  think 
again.  Is  not  the  shaping  of  this  tremendous  mass  a  real 
work  ?  Is  not  the  force  there  which  moves  the  particles,  molds 
the  mass,  enspheres  the  planet  and  the  sun  ?  Is  it  less  a  stu- 
pendous physical  force  because  displayed  in  the  field  of  nature  ? 
And  then,  again,  what  is  this  force?  Is  it  matter  acting  for 
itself? — shaping  itself?  Or  is  the  origin  of  force  outside  of 
matter  ?  Science  says  "  gravity  "  does  these  mighty  deeds.  If 
nothing  more  could  be  said,  its  deeds  are  sufficiently  amazing 
to  excite  our  attention  and  set  us  to  thinking.  But  what  is 
"  gravity  ?"  Whence  proceeds  that  energy  which  science  calls 
by  this  name?  Gravity  is  not  a  being  to  manifest  the  attribute 
of  force ;  nor  is  it  an  attribute  of  the  masses  moved.  These 
masses  are  the  objects  acted  upon  by  the  source  of  power 
which  imparts  a  gravitating  tendency.  There  must  be  some 
being  in  whom  the  energy  resides.  And  when  we  come  to 
think  more  closely,  we  find  the  conviction  existing  in  our 
minds  that  the  fountain  of  all  power  is  WILL.  In  human  af- 
fairs we  witness  no  result  which  we  do  not  necessarily  assume 
to  have  been  produced  by  some  human  agency,  prompted  by 
volition.  And  so,  in  the  field  of  nature,  every  phenomenon 
and  event  must  rest  back,  for  its  ultimate  cause,  on  some  In- 
telligent Will.  This  is  a  law  of  our  minds.  We  recognize  in 
nature  the  same  matter,  the  same  forces,  the  same  modes  of  ac- 
tivity, the  same  reflections  of  intelligence,  motive,  and  will,  as 
are  disclosed  in  the  finite  field  of  the  human  body  and  human 
activities.  It  is  this  which  renders  nature  comprehensible  to 
any  extent,  and  authorizes  us  to  interpret  nature  as  the  expres- 
sion of  thought  and  volition. 

Think,  again,  of  the  magnitude  of  the  power  exemplified  in 
15 


336  VASTNESS  OF  NATURE'S  FORCES. 

nature.  Over  what  an  inconceivable  sweep  of  space  it  stretch- 
es !  The  dimensions  of  the  great  sun  overpower  us ;  but  the 
attempt  to  take  in  his  distance  is  almost  paralyzing  to  the  mind. 
Ninety-two  millions  of  miles !  This  is  a  small  thing  in  words ; 
but  try  to  realize  its  meaning.  A  railway  train  moves  thirty 
miles  an  hour ;  but  yet,  if  a  railroad  stretched  from  the  earth 
to  the  sun,  a  train  would  require  three  hundred  and  fifty  years 
to  pass  over  it.  Had  the  pilgrims  from  the  Mayflower  stepped 
immediately  aboard  that  train,  their  descendants  this  year  would 
not  have  reached  the  farther  terminus  of  the  road.  Nay,  the 
distance  remaining  would  be  so  vast  that  the  great-great-grand- 
children of  the  children  of  to-day  would  be  the  first  to  reach 
that  distant  sun.  As  our  thoughts  stretch  along  over  that  line 
of  road,  dimmer  and  dimmer  and  dimmer  in  the  uncompassa- 
ble  distance,  how  the  idea  of  its  vastness  oppresses  us !  And 
yet  there  is  a  power  which  stretches  from  the  sun  to  the  earth. 
It  bends  the  whole  mass  of  the  world  from  its  straight  course, 
and  compels  it  to  career  around  the  sun  like  a  colt  held  by  a 
halter.  It  lifts  the  ocean  into  a  broad  tidal  swell,  and  whips 
the  rocky  shores  with  the  stormy  lash  of  the  waves,  before 
whose  power  oaken  ships  are  as  straw,  and  granite  cliffs  but 
lumps  of  chalk.  How  vast  the  power  which  reaches  so  far 
and  works  such  tremendous  results ! 

But  this,  too,  is  one  of  the  least  of  the  powers  which  busy 
themselves  in  the  universe  stretched  out  before  us.  The  whole 
distance  which  separates  the  sun  from  the  earth  is  so  inconsid- 
erable in  the  field  of  nature  that  light  travels  over  it  in  eight 
and  a  half  minutes.  The  light  by  which  the  reader  peruses 
these  lines  started  from  the  sun  about  the  time  when  he  read 
the  title  of  this  article.  Think  now  of  a  space  so  vast  that 
the  same  light  must  travel  a  hundred,  a  thousand,  ten  thousand 
years,  before  it  reaches  its  destination.  The  attempt  to  com- 
pass with  thought  an  interval  like  this  is  literally  like  the  at- 
tempt to  comprehend  God  himself.  And  yet  we  must  assert 


POWER  AND  INTELLIGENCE.  337 

that  light  is  flying  over  all  these  mighty  intervals  of  space. 
Some  of  the  starlight  which  falls  upon  our  eyes  any  night  has 
just  arrived  from  a  journey  of  a  thousand  years.  The  same 
powers,  also,  which  work  at  mountain -building  on  our  earth, 
and  reach  forth  from  the  sun  to  all  the  planets,  stretch  even  to 
the  remotest  star,  shaping  it,  rolling  it,  hurling  it,  as  if  it  were 
the  veriest  plaything  of  a  child.  Nay,  it  is  a  power  so  vast 
as  to  seize  the  whole  frame-work  of  stars  and  systems  in  one 
infinite  embrace  and  send  it  whirling  and  wheeling  onward 
through  the  depths  of  boundless  space,  like  a  handful  of  peb- 
bles thrown  through  the  air. 

Do  we  need  to  carry  our  imaginations  farther  to  be  con- 
vinced that  the  power  working  in  nature  has  no  measure,  no 
limits  ?  It  is,  indeed,  infinite.  Here,  in  nature,  is  at  least  a 
demonstration  of  Infinite  Power. 

II.  Manifestations  of  Intelligence  in  Creation. 

Every  person  distinguishes  between  results  produced  without 
intention,  and  results  produced  for  a  visible  purpose.  The 
wild  wind  scatters  the  autumn  leaves  about  the  yard,  or  hurries 
them  along  the  street  with  restless  haste,  till  they  reach  some 
lodgment  in  a  nook  or  corner,  and  there  they  lie.  And  what 
is  accomplished  by  all  this  ?  One  gust  whisks  them  across  the 
street,  and  another  whirls  them  back  again.  Their  final  resting- 
place  depends  entirely  on  the  accident  of  the  wind.  It  makes 
no  difference  where  the  fitful  gust  may  leave  the  brown  foliage 
to  decay.  The  place  where  a  particular  leaf  shall  lie,  or  even 
a  pile  of  leaves,  is  all  a  matter  of  chance ;  and  it  is  all  a  mat- 
ter of  complete  indifference  to  every  body.  So,  at  least,  do 
people  think. 

But  I  walk  out  into  my  friend's  garden,  and  there  I  see  a 
pile  of  leaves  lying  upon  his  bed  of  early  flowering  bulbs. 
Upon  the  leaves,  also,  are  a  few  bits  of  boards,  which  keep 
the  wind  from  blowing  them  away.  Now,  it  occurs  to  me 


338  ADAPTATION  HUMAN  AND  DIVINE. 

that  this  is  a  useful  covering  for  the  bulbs  in  the  soil.  It  will 
keep  the  frost  out  of  the  ground,  and  the  bulbs  will  remain 
uninjured,  and  secure  an  early  start  in  the  spring.  This  ar- 
rangement was  not  the  result  of  accident.  This  covering  was 
probably  placed  here  by  my  friend,  and  he  did  it  because  he 
understood  that  it  would  protect  his  bulbs.  In  fact,  it  was  his 
good  sense,  his  intelligence,  which  prompted  him  to  do  it.  I 
can  understand  this  act,  and  perceive  why  it  was  performed.  I 
feel  very  certain  that  it  illustrates  my  friend's  intelligence. 

A  man  walks  along  the  street  in  the  rain  with  an  umbrella 
over  his  head,  and  I  feel  sure  that  somebody  contrived  that 
umbrella  with  an  understanding  of  its  use.  It  is  intended  for 
rainy  weather.  It  is  adapted  or  correlated  to  rainy  weather. 
The  key  which  unlocks  my  door  sustains  an  intelligible  correla- 
tion to  the  lock,  and  all  the  countless  contrivances  which  make 
up  the  admirable  improvements  of  civilized  life  are  so  many 
manifestations  of  the  intelligence  of  their  contrivers.  We  can 
not  look  upon  the  simplest  invention  or  coadaptation  of  one 
thing  to  another,  without  feeling  compelled  to  regard  it  as  the 
product  of  intelligence. 

The  world  is  full  of  contrivances  which  were  not  made  by 
human  hands  nor  invented  by  human  brains.  My  hand,  for 
instance,  with  which  I  write  these  words,  is  a  more  admirable 
machine  than  human  ingenuity  has  ever  devised.  What  is  a 
"  walking  doll "  compared  with  the  varied  movements  of  which 
the  hand  is  capable?  Think  of  all  the  pincers,  pliers,  forceps, 
or  tongs  which  man  has  invented,  and  answer  whether  one  of 
them  could  seize  and  move  a  pen  as  my  fingers  do  it.  I  say 
nothing  of  the  mind  which  guides  the  fingers;  I  speak  only 
of  the  mechanism.  If  it  requires  intelligence  to  fashion  the 
pen,  does  it  not  require  more  intelligence  to  fashion  the  hand 
which  wields  it  ?  Look  at  the  joints  of  the  fingers,  and  see 
how  admirably  they  close  down  upon  an  object.  See  how  the 
thumb  stands  opposed  to  the  fingers.  See  the  marvelous  rapid- 


ORDERING  MIND  IN  NATURE.  339 

ity  with  which  these  fingers  may  be  made  to  glide  over  the  keys 
of  a  piano,  and  the  astonishing  accuracy  with  which  they  elicit 
a  predetermined  succession  of  sounds.  Think  of  the  number- 
less varieties  of  activity  to  which  they  may  be  put.  Is  there 
any  human  contrivance  more  exquisitely  fitted  for  the  work 
intended  to  be  performed  ?  Certainly  there  is  none  which  can 
perform  such  a  variety  of  work. 

Now,  I  think  every  one  is  ready  to  admit  that  the  hand  is 
as  much  a  work  of  intelligence  as  a  pair  of  tongs.  This,  at 
least,  is  the  natural,  instinctive  admission.  True,  we  have  nev- 
er seen  the  Author  of  nature  engaged  in  making  hands  by  any 
such  process  as  men  employ ;  but  does  that  really  make  any 
difference?  Is  it  of  any  consequence  to  know  by  what  in- 
struments or  means  a  device  is  carried  into  execution  ?  Is  it  of 
any  consequence  to  know  whether  a  contrivance  is  the  result 
of  human  or  divine  agency  ?  If  we  can  detect  contrivance,  do 
we  not  irresistibly  say,  Here  is  mind  ? 

If  mind  was  really  concerned  in  the  formation  of  the  hand, 
how  consummate  a  mind  it  was  !  Look  into  the  internal  struct- 
ure of  bone  and  nourishing  marrow,  joints,  ligaments,  sheaths, 
juices,  veins,  arteries,  lymphatics,  nerves,  muscular  fibres,  blood, 
blood-corpuscles,  skin,  fat — all,  and  more,  entering  into  the  con- 
stitution of  this  little  instrument ;  all,  and  more,  kept  continu- 
ally at  work,  each  in  its  own  way,  to  maintain  this  wonderful 
hand  in  a  state  of  perfect  repair.  Look  deeper.  This  very 
skin  is  composed  of  several  layers ;  the  deeper  layers,  of  count- 
less little  cells,  visible  only  with  the  microscope ;  underneath 
are  innumerable  loops  of  nerve-fibres  to  give  it  sensibility,  while 
the  whole  integument  is  perforated  by  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  minute  apertures  for  the  escape  of  vapor,  and  for  other  uses ; 
and  every  part,  to  the  central  bone,  possesses  a  minute  structure 
revealed  only  to  the  microscope,  which  is  just  as  elaborate,  just 
as  perfect,  just  as  carefully  and  complicately  finished  at  the  far- 
ther limits  of  our  powers  of  scrutiny  as  in  the  larger  and  more 


340  MECHANISM  IN  ANIMAL  STRUCTURES. 

visible  parts.  Down  toward  the  infinitely  small,  these  struct- 
ural details  may  be  traced ;  and  we  have  every  reason  to  believe 
that  far  beyond  the  powers  of  our  vision  are  parts  and  coadap- 
tations  and  activities  as  wonderful  as  those  witnessed  in  the 
larger  movements  of  the  fingers.  Where  is  the  human  contriv- 
ance displaying  a  thousandth  part  of  this  elaborateness?  In- 
deed, there  is  nothing  to  compare  with  it.  The  detail  is  bound- 
less ;  and  the  intelligence  that  could  provide  for  all  so  far  trans- 
cends our  human  powers  that  to  us  it  is  infinite. 

This  is  one  way  in  which  intelligence  is  manifested  in  nat- 
ure. The  end  for  which  a  contrivance  is  produced  we  style  the 
"  final  cause ;"  and  we  deem  it  perfectly  legitimate  to  argue  in- 
telligence from  final  causes  in  nature,  because  our  minds  are  so 
constituted  that  we  are  necessarily  impelled  to  attribute  a  use- 
ful collocation  of  parts  to  intelligent  purpose.  But  intelligence 
is  also  manifested  in  nature  in  quite  another  way.  All  the 
work  of  nature  is  performed  according  to  fixed  methods ;  and 
the  very  idea  of  method  implies  systematic,  thought-elaborated, 
and  intelligible  order,  according  to  which  events  are  made  to 
transpire. 

We  were  speaking  of  hands.  Has  not  the  reader  remarked 
the  striking  resemblance  between  the  human  hand  and  that  of 
the  monkey  ?  Each  is  used  nearly  in  the  same  way  ;  but  what 
is  most  decisive,  each  is  composed  of  exactly  the  same  number 
of  bones  and  joints,  similarly  connected  together,  and  all  the 
internal  fabric  is  almost  identical  in  the  two.  In  short,  the 
plan  of  the  two  hands  is  the  same,  and  no  one  can  fail  to  per- 
ceive it.  They  are  as  much  alike  as  a  shovel  and  a  spade. 

But  place,  now,  the  monkey's  hand  by  the  side  of  the  squir- 
rel's. The  squirrel  is  a  vastly  less  knowing  animal ;  but  he 
uses  his  hand  in  a  similar  way,  and  it  is  easy  to  show  that  its 
structure  is  substantially  identical.  The  hands  of  the  squirrel 
and  the  monkey  are  built  upon  one  plan. 

But  how  does  the  hand  of  the  cat  differ  from  that  of  the 


PLANS  IN  ANIMAL  STRUCTURES.  341 

squirrel?  True,  the  squirrel  can  handle  a  nut  more  skillfully 
than  a  cat ;  but  examination  shows  that  the  bones  of  the  two 
hands  are  identical  in  number,  form,  and  arrangement.  No 
one,  again,  would  feel  disposed  to  allege  that  the  plan  of  the 
cat's  paw  is  materially  different  from  that  of  the  dog  or  the 
bear.  In  fact,  we  feel  compelled  to  admit  that  the  fore-feet  of 
all  these  quadrupeds  are  constructed  on  the  same  plan  as  the 
human  hand.  Now,  extending  our  comparisons,  we  even  find 
the  alligator  and  lizard  and  frog  possessed  of  the  same  kind  of 
anterior  extremity.  The  seal  and  the  otter,  to  adapt  them  to 
swimming,  have  the  fingers  webbed;  and  the  whale  exhibits 
even  a  further  shaping  of  the  hand  into  the  form  of  a  fin, 
which,  lastly,  in  the  fish,  exhibits  the  lowest  modification  of  a 
plan  which,  in  its  highest  development,  is  the  admirable  human 
hand.  The  fin  of  a  fish,  the  flipper  of  a  whale,  the  paw  of  a 
cat,  the  hand  of  a  man,  are  only  modifications  of  one  set  of 
bones — varied  manifestations  of  one  idea. 

This  is  not  all.  Though  we  can  not  here  employ  the  argu- 
ment, nor  appropriate  the  space  to  prove  it,  we  may  assert  that 
this  identity  of  plan  includes  also  the  hoofed  quadrupeds — lit- 
tle as  the  horse's  foot  resembles  the  hand  which  flits  over  the 
keys  of  a  piano-forte.  But  even  this  is  but  the  beginning  of 
these  wonderful  resemblances.  The  entire  arm  of  man  is  iden- 
tical in  plan  with  the  anterior  extremity  of  all  other  verte- 
brates. The  wing  of  a  bird  is  only  a  human  arm  shaped  and 
consolidated  to  support  an  array  of  quills.  The  hinder  extrem- 
ities, also,  of  all  back  -  boned  animals  are  similarly  related  to 
each  other ;  and  every  one  must  have  observed  how  closely  they 
resemble  the  anterior  extremities. 

Thus  we  arrive  at  this  remarkable  conclusion,  that  all  the 
limbs  of  all  quadrupeds,  birds,  reptiles,  and  fishes  are  but  mod- 
ifications of  one  plan,  which  in  man  we  see  adapted  to  the  pur- 
pose of  seizing  a  pen,  greeting  a  friend,  or  enforcing  an  idea  by 
means  of  a  gesture. 


342  INFINITE  MIND  IN  NATURE. 

It  is  impossible  that  all  these  limbs  should  be  thus  connected 
together  by  identity  of  plan  unless  intelligence  had  conceived 
the  connection  and  employed  the  means  to  realize  it  in  these 
various  forms.  Now,  when  we  think  of  the  countless  tribes 
and  species  of  vertebrate  animals,  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  in- 
habiting land,  sea,  and  air,  burrowing  in  the  ground,  sauntering 
along  the  river-shore,  climbing  trees,  and  occupying  every  im- 
aginable situation,  we  perceive  that  the  mind  which  has  planned 
and  executed  all  these  adaptations  according  to  one  ideal  con- 
ception, must  transcend  inconceivably  all  the  powers  of  human 
intelligence.  And  when  we  know  that  these  numberless  adap- 
tations have  been  perpetuated  in  existence  for  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  years  before  the  creation  of  man,  we  feel  that  the  intelli- 
gence displayed  in  nature  is  practically,  if  not  absolutely,  infinite. 

These  are  single  examples.  Could  we  speak  of  all,  how 
would  our  thoughts  swell  with  the  intelligible  manifestations  of 
the  omnipresence  of  infinite  mind  in  nature ! 

III.  Manifestations  of  Ecneficence  in  Creation. 

Sitting  before  my  bright  coal-fire  this  winter  evening,  I  fell 
into  a  kind  of  reverie,  which,  since  it  has  a  moral,  I  may  be 
pardoned  for  repeating.  How  comfortable  is  this  warmth,  I 
mused  with  myself,  and  to  what  inconveniences  we  should  be 
subjected  were  we  not  provided  with  this  anthracite !  Oak  and 
hickory  wood,  it  is  true,  make  admirable  fires,  but  how  rapidly 
is  the  country  undergoing  exhaustion !  It  is  only  on  the  front- 
iers that  we  can  now  obtain  cord-wood  at  a  cheaper  rate  than 
coal ;  and,  in  the  densely  settled  districts,  the  price  of  wood  is 
far  above  that  of  coal,  and  is  rapidly  increasing.  Beyond  all 
question,  the  supply  of  wood  is  melting  away ;  and,  unless  we 
had  these  stores  of  coal  to  draw  upon,  a  pound  of  fuel  would 
soon  command  more  money  than  a  pound  of  wheat.  And  what 
enormous  quantities  of  this  coal  are  consumed !  Look  into  those 
coal -yards  in  any  of  our  great  cities;  there  are  mountains  of 


ANTICIPATIONS  OF  MAN  IN  COAL.  343 

anthracite  and  bituminous  coals  piled  up  for  the  winter's  con- 
sumption. It  is  not  alone  in  domestic  fires  that  this  substance 
is  made  to  yield  us  such  supplies  of  heat.  There  are  thousands 
of  steam-engines  all  over  the  country,  sawing  lumber,  weaving 
cloth,  spinning  cotton,  making  pins  and  buttons,  propelling 
locomotives  and  steamboats,  and  performing  countless  other 
kinds  of  work ;  and,  if  the  supply  of  coal  should  fail,  half  of 
these  engines  must  cease  from  their  labors.  Yes,  indeed,  this 
black  and  smutty  article  lies  at  the  very  foundation  of  domestic 
comfort  and  modern  civilization. 

But  what  is  it?  I  asked  myself.  And  then  my  thoughts 
ran  over  the  series  of  steps  by  which  the  man  of  science  has 
attained  to  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  this  prod- 
uct of  the  rocks.  Why,  this  black,  hard  substance  is,  after  all, 
nothing  but  real  wood.  It  is  the  vegetable  growth  of  other 
long-past  ages.  There  was  no  man  upon  the  earth  to  fell  the 
trees  and  utilize  the  forests,  and  so  they  were  laid  by  and  pet- 
rified, and  preserved  till  there  should  be  a  man  to  use  them. 
The  forests  of  the  human  time,  then  far  in  the  future,  would 
not  suffice  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  coming  man,  and  so  it 
seems  nature  began  to  store  away  the  material  of  the  forests 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  years  before  the  world  had  reached 
such  a  condition  that  man  could  subsist  upon  it.  This  coal 
could  not  have  been  packed  down  for  any  other  being  than 
man.  The  beasts — of  what  use  was  coal  to  them?  As  to 
spiritual  intelligences  which  may  inhabit  the  earth  —  of  what 
use  is  coal  to  them  ? — unless  to  demonstrate  to  them,  as  it  does 
to  us,  that  the  Power  which  made  the  world  had  the  intelli- 
gence to  know  that  man  was  coming,  and  the  goodness  to  pro- 
vide for  his  wants.  Yes,  I  can  not  see  it  otherwise.  As  we 
can  not  conceive  of  any  thing  done  without  an  adequate  mo- 
tive, and  we  can  discern  no  other  reason  why  some  of  the 
rocks  were  made  combustible,  it  must  have  been  so  ordained 
for  the  comfort  and  uses  of  man. 


344  GLIMPSE  OF  COAL-MAKING  TIMES. 

But  if  this  was  really  so,  what  an  amazing  amount  of  work 
has  been  done  in  nature  for  no  other  object  than  human  uses ! 
To  grow  millions  of  acres  of  forests  and  lay  them  down  in  beds 
of  coal  was  but  a  single  one  of  the  steps  by  which  man  has 
been  placed  in  possession  of  this  fuel.  All  my  reading  and 
study  on  this  subject  comes  up  to  mind.  I  seem  to  sink  back 
into  the  twilight  of  the  world's  long  history.  The  ocean  is 
here,  and  the  land — or,  at  least,  a  large  part  of  it — and  the  sea 
is  full  of  fishes  and  mollusks,  and  various  other  creatures.  But 
the  land  is  desolate  and  tenantless.  The  work  of  creation  has 
come  to  a  standstill.  To  this  time  the  march  of  improvement 
has  been  continuous ;  but  now  no  higher  creature  can  be  sum- 
moned into  being,  because  the  air  is  irrespirable.  It  is  filled 
with  carbonic  acid  gas,  which  is  immediately  fatal  to  every 
animal  which  respires  it.  Will  Infinite  Power  annihilate  this 
poison,  and  then  call  air-breathers  into  being  ?  Infinite  Power 
could  have  done  both ;  but  Infinite  Beneficence  chose  to  wait. 
All  the  Northern  States  except  New  England  and  New  York 
had  just  been  lifted  above  the  level  of  the  sea;  and  all  over 
this  area  luxuriant  forms  of  strange  vegetation  sprung  into  ex- 
istence, fed  on  this  atmospheric  poison,  fixed  it  in  the  form  of 
stem  and  leaf,  and  fell  down  at  maturity,  accumulating  enor- 
mous beds  of  peat.  Now  those  regions  subsided,  and  ocean 
returned,  and  layers  of  mud  and  sand  were  strewed  over  the 
beds  of  peat.  Then  another  uplift  poured  off  the  ocean's  wa- 
ters, another  growth  of  strange  forests  accumulated  other  peat- 
beds,  and  another  subsidence  resulted  in  their  burial.  These 
vicissitudes  were  continued  many  ages.  At  length,  with  one 
grand  throe,  the  Alleghany  Mountains  were  brought  up,  and 
the  wide  expanse  of  the  Northern  States  lay  spread  out,  a  per- 
manent home  for  future  races  of  animals.  But  this  was  not 
till  the  atmosphere  had  become  purified.  And  now  could  be 
ushered  into  being  those  advancing  forms  of  animal  life  which 
must  breathe  air.  The  end  was  secured,  and  the  work  of 


THE  WORLD  SHAPED  TO  HUMAN  WANTS.  345 

creation  could  continue.  Yea,  a  greater  end  was  secured, 
which  looked  ages  into  the  future,  and  provided  for  the  wants 
of  human  creatures  in  the  nineteenth  century  of  the  Christian 
era.  And  while  the  ages  were  rolling  on,  earthquake  visita- 
tions passed  over  the  land,  the  deep  rocky  sheets  were  tilted, 
and  in  places  folded  together,  and  the  deep -hidden  beds  of 
coal  were  exposed  at  the  surface,  lest  man  should  fail  to  dis- 
cover his  store-house  of  fuel. 

The  ages  still  rolled  on,  and  the  lands  became  wasted  for  the 
uses  of  the  many  tribes  of  animals  which  were  marched  across 
the  stage  of  being,  before  the  advent  of  their  master.  Then, 
again,  Beneficence  put  forth  its  hand,  summoned  a  continent- 
wide  glacier  to  plane  it  down,  washed  it  once  again  in  the  sea, 
and  here  was  a  bright,  new,  soil-covered  surface  for  man's  ex- 
clusive use. 

Now  the  promise  of  the  ages  was  fulfilled.  When  man  came 
upon  the  earth,  what  more  could  have  been  devised  to  render 
his  home  abundant  in  comforts  ?  Every  element  ministered  to 
his  wants  and  enjoyments.  Here  were  fruits  and  grains  and 
game  to  appease  his  hunger,  and  the  very  activities  put  forth 
to  secure  them  were  pleasurable  and  healthful.  Every  func- 
tion of  his  being  brought  delight.  He  looked  forth  upon  the 
green  field,  and  its  color  pleased  his  eye.  The  evening  cloud, 
the  tinted  rainbow,  the  swaying  bough,  the  painted  violet's  cup, 
awakened  responses  in  his  soul  which  made  him  happy ;  while 
the  awful  precipice  and  the  thunder-voiced  tempest  found  an- 
swering emotions  which  swelled  his  soul  in  the  presence  of 
their  sublimities.  Even  his  questioning  intelligence  was  re- 
warded with  answers  in  the  revelations  of  truth  which  beamed 
from  the  objects  around  him.  Was  he  capable  of  reason — here 
were  objects  to  be  reasoned  upon  and  to  yield  him  the  fruits 
of  thought.  Nature  had  her  secrets,  but  she  was  ready  to  re- 
veal them  when  intelligently  and  persistently  asked.  And  so 
man  worked  out  the  story  of  the  earth  and  was  delighted.  He 


340      RESPONSES  TO  INTELLECTUAL   QUESTIONINGS. 

lost  no  great  fact  of  its  wonderful  history  by  being  delayed  in 
his  coming  till  countless  ages  of  revolutions  had  passed.  Cu- 
rious— with  insatiate  curiosity,  he  could  gratify  it  by  peering 
into  and  through  those  long,  dark  ages  lapsed,  and  glimpsing 
the  tremendous  march  of  terrestrial  events  on  a  forming  world. 
What  beneficence  was  here!  With  a  yearning  thirst  for  a 
knowledge  of  the  world  and  himself,  how  miserable  would  have 
been  his  situation  if  no  idea  could  have  entered  his  mind !  but 
how  blessed,  when  the  world  was  found  stored  with  stimuli  to 
curiosity  and  the  materials  of  thought!  Of  what  avail  were 
suggestions  to  thought  while  the  world  was  the  home  only  of 
brutes  ?  Of  what  need  were  they  to  incorporeal  intelligences 
who  read  directly  the  idea  symbolized  in  the  material  form, 
and  have  no  relations  of  dependence  upon  matter?  It  was  to 
human  intelligence,  materially  embodied,  that  all  these  things 
were  accommodated.  These  sources  of  enjoyment,  these  ma- 
terial symbols  of  thought,  these  records  of  the  ideas  of  God, 
these  intelligible  relics  of  the  long  past,  these  myriad  translat- 
able signs  of  creative  power  and  beneficence,  which  render  the 
world  all  luminous  with  the  halo  of  divine  thought — these  all 
sustain  no  relations  as  material  forms  and  objects  to  any  other 
being  than  man.  They  were  provided  for  man  countless  ages 
before  the  birth  of  our  race.  They  were  ordained  to  augment 
human  happiness,  and  to  lift  the  thoughts  to  the  unseen  reali- 
ties which  underlie  phenomena,  and  to  lead  them,  by  no  uncer- 
tain path,  to  that  Supreme  Reality  in  whom  all  being  finally 
centres. 

Nor  was  this  the  end  of  my  reveries;  for  thought  floated 
on  over  the  circle  of  social  relations  as  sources  of  happiness  to 
man — over  the  religious  sentiments  and  hopes,  and  the  mate- 
rials in  nature  for  their  activity  and  gratification — the  yearning 
of  the  soul  over  the  profound  problems  of  the  past  and  future 
of  its  existence,  and  the  data  in  our  possession  for  the  solution 
of  these  great  problems ;  but  everywhere  rose  up  reminders  of 


VNIVERSAL  GRAVITATION.  347 

the  Beneficence  which  has  exerted  so  controlling  an  influence 
in  the  ordinations  of  the  world  of  which  man  forms  a  part. 

So  the  very  light  which  beams  from  my  comfortable  fire  re- 
veals the  record  of  long-continuod  preparations  for  the  comfort 
of  man ;  and  this  is  but  the  title-page  of  a  volume  filled  with 
recitals  of  the  Beneficence  which  shines  in  nature. 

IV.   The  Unity  of  Creation. 

How  vast  is  the  empire  of  gravitation !  The  acorn  falls  to 
the  ground  in  the  forest,  drawn  by  the  same  force  which  bends 
the  courses  of  the  planets.  A  drop  of  water  in  the  air  assumes 
the  form  of  a  little  sphere,  and  so  does  the  molten  lead  de- 
scending from  the  summit  of  the  shot-tower.  How  few  of  us 
have  realized  that  the  great  planet  is  only  a  larger  sphere  hurled 
into  space  to  assume  its  form  under  the  same  law  as  a  drop  of 
rain ! 

The  spherical  form  is  natural,  we  say.  Right.  It  only 
amounts  to  the  same  thing  to  say  that  it  is  the  result  of  grav- 
itation—  that  force,  whatever  it  may  be,  which  draws  all  the 
parts  equally  toward  the  centre,  and  which  draws  all  matter  to- 
ward all  other  matter.  We  say  it  is  &  property  of  matter  to  do 
this ;  but  really,  we  can  only  be  certain  that  it  is  the  method 
according  to  which  matter  is  moved.  We  do  not  know  wheth- 
er it  is  a  property  of  matter  to  move  itself  according  to  this 
method,  or  a  property  of  something  else  to  move  matter.  Now, 
I  think  we  know  nothing  about  matter  as  itself  acting ;  nor 
about  force  as  itself  acting  in  matter ;  and  all  we  can  say  is, 
that  force  is  exerted  by  living  will.  I  am  inclined  to  think 
the  only  reasonable  account  we  can  give  of  that  gravitating 
force  which  causes  the  fall  of  an  acorn  is  this:  that  some  liv- 
ing will  is  exerted  upon  it,  and  that  it  is  a  self-imposed  method 
of  this  will  to  act  always  in  the  same  way  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances. This  uniform  method  is  its  law ;  it  is  what  we 
call  a  natural  law. 


348  UNITY  OF  THE  SOLAR  SYSTEM. 

Now,  I  would  like  to  direct  attention  to  the  vastness  of  the 
intervals  of  space  and  time  through  which  this  WILL  has  exert- 
ed itself,  and  is  exerting  itself.  We  thought  the  distance  of 
the  sun  amazingly  vast  when  we  calculated  that  a  train  of  cars 
would  require  three  hundred  and  fifty  years  to  travel  across 
the  interval ;  but  the  distance  of  Neptune  from  the  sun  is  such 
that  more  than  ten  thousand  years  would  be  required.  And 
yet  Neptune — the  farthest  planet — is  not  so  remote  from  the 
sun  but  he  feels  the  sun's  attraction,  and  is  held,  as  it  .were,  by 
a  halter,  careering  around  the  controlling  centre  always  at  about 
the  same  distance  from  it.  This  central  attraction  is  the  same' 
which  keeps  all  the  planets  from  flying  off  in  straight  lines ; 
and  it  is  the  same  force  which  causes  the  fall  of  an  apple  in 
the  orchard.  How  vast  the  presence  of  a  Being  who  can  thus 
exert  his  will  in  the  orchard,  and  in  the  sun,  and  in  the  remotest 
planet !  There  are  a  hundred  and  sixty  planets  revolving  about 
the  sun,  all  moved  forward  by  a  single  impulse,  and  all  bent 
out  of  right  lines  and  into  regular  orbits  by  the  sun's  attrac- 
tion. There  are  little  Jess  than  twenty  satellites  or  moons  re- 
volving similarly  about  these  planets.  What  further  excites  our 
wonder  is  this:  that  all  these  bodies  revolve  in  orbits  which 
are  a  little  longer  than  broad  (ellipses),  and  all  lie  nearly  in  the 
same  plane;  that  these  bodies  all  move  in  the  same  direction, 
from  west  to  east ;  that  they  all  rotate  on  their  axes  from  west 
to  east ;  that  they  are  all  a  little  flattened  at  the  poles ;  that 
such  of  them  as  we  have  been  able  to  examine  indicate  a  suc- 
cession of  seasons  like  our  own  ;  and  that  they  have  land  and 
water,  and  clouds  and  storms,  and  sunrise  and  sunset.  In  short, 
this  little  spot  which  we  call  our  earth  is,  as  it  were,  but  one 
nook  in  a  vast  farm,  while  all  around  is  the  same  system  of 
fields  and  fences  and  crops  and  cultivation  as  we  witness  with- 
in the  bounds  of  our  little  nook. 

But,  after  all,  this  is  hardly  the  beginning  of  the  vastness 
of  the  empire  over  which  gravitation  exercises  dominion.     The 


UNITY  OF  THE  STELLAR  FIRMAMENT.  349 

power  of  gravitation  is  felt  in  the  stars.  They,  also,  arc  in  mo- 
tion. Hundreds  of  them  are  also  revolving  in  orbits — in  ellip- 
tical orbits — such  motions  as  can  only  be  explained  as  we  ex- 
plain the  fall  of  an  acorn  on  the  earth.  The  same  power  is 
there — the  same  WILL  is  there.  The  very  nearest  of  those  stars 
is  so  remote  that  if  we  were  to  represent  the  distance  of  Nept- 
une by  ten  inches,  that  star  would  be  one  mile  away.  And  yet 
other  stars  are  two  thousand  times  as  remote  as  the  nearest. 

We  should  be  still  at  home  could  we  fly  to  those  remotest 
stars — still  in  the  house  of  our  God.  And  could  we  take  the 
wings  of  light,  we  might  travel  over  such  intervals  as  we  now 
travel  to  San  Francisco  or  Calcutta — with  this  difference,  that 
while  by  cars  we  go  but  fifty  feet  a  second,  by  light  we  should 
go  one  hundred  and  eighty-six  thousand  miles  a  second.  Still, 
by  light,  some  of  our  journeys  would  be  rather  prolonged. 
Even  by  light  we  should  require  three  and  a  half  years  to  reach 
that  nearest  star. 

But  then,  though  we  can  not  go,  light  goes.  There  is  a 
highway  for  light  even  to  the  stars  —  the  farthest  stars — for 
their  light  has  traveled  over  it  in  coming  to  us.  That  is  not 
a  foreign  territory  from  which  they  glimmer  down  on  us. 
Those  are  our  own  skies  in  which  they  are  set.  One  ether 
bathes  all  the  bodies  within  the  visible  universe,  and  is  every- 
where tremulous  with  one  kind  of  vibration,  regardless  of  the 
luminous  cause — whether  the  fire  on  the  hearth,  the  great  sun, 
or  the  most  distant  star. 

There  is  even  a  closer  union  than  this.  The  very  dust  of 
our  streets  is  made  luminous  in  the  sun.  There  is  the  same 
iron  which  rusts  in  our  garden  hoe ;  the  same  hydrogen  which 
we  drink  from  the  well ;  the  same  lime  which  makes  the  crayon 
with  which  we  work  our  problems  on  the  blackboard ;  the  same 
sodium  which  forms  the  salt  upon  our  tables,  and  salts  the  wa- 
ter of  the  ocean.  Indeed,  we  now  know  that  the  sun  is  made 
of  the  same  materials  as  the  earth.  How  marvelous  an  achieve- 


350  UNITY  OF  PLANETARY  HISTORY. 

ment  of  science  was  that,  to  learn  the  very  substance  of  the 
sun !  But  so  it  is. 

And  now,  more  amazing  still,  those  vastly  more  distant  stars 
are  one  in  substance  with  our  sun ;  one  in  substance  with  the 
mold  which  grows  our  cabbages  in  the  garden.  We  are  surer 
of  this,  by  far,  than  we  are  of  the  distance  of  the  moon  from 
the  earth.  How  do  these  facts  impress  us  with  the  feeling  of 
the  unity  of  the  realm  of  matter !  No  foreign  territory  gloams 
down  upon  us  from  sullen  highlands  over  the  border.  All,  all 
is  the  dominion  of  one  Will,  one  Intelligence,  one  God. 

Our  thoughts  have  been  roaming  among  the  worlds  exist- 
ing in  our  day.  Let  us  send  them  roaming  back  through  time, 
among  other  scenes  and  other  worlds.  There  is  a  pathway 
which  leads  imagination  back  to  a  beginning.  It  is  too  long  a 
road  for  us  to  follow  now.(J)  Let  us  fly  back,  in  thought,  to 
that  beginning  of  the  existence  of  our  world  and  all  the  other 
worlds  which  rotate  about  our  sun.  How  strange  the  scene ! 
Instead  of  separate  worlds,  we  behold  one  vast  sphere  of  fiery 
vapor,  whose  diameter  is  greater  than  that  of  the  orbit  of  Nept- 
une. This  is  the  farthest  limit  to  which  science  guides  us  back- 
ward. Whence  that  fiery  vapor,  and  whence  the  forces  of  mat- 
ter which  abide  in  it,  science  can  not  inform  us;  but  as  our 
reason  declares  that  even  matter  and  force — being  dead,  invol- 
untary existences  themselves — must  be  but  effects  caused  by 
some  living  will,  so  now  we  fall  back  on  the  utterances  of  our 
reason,  and  assert  that  God  is  the  author  of  matter  and  force, 
and  we  feel  that  that  saying  is  true :  "  In  the  beginning  God 
created  the  heavens  and  the  earth." 

Now,  in  such  a  beginning  all  the  bodies  of  the  solar  system 
were  merged  in  one  common  mass.  All  these  bodies  have 
therefore  come  forth  from  a  common  mass — have  had  a  com- 


(')  See  chap.  v. ;  also  "Sketches  of  Creation,"  by  the  present  writer; 
also  MetJiodist  Quarterly  Review  for  April,  1873,  and  January,  1874. 


UNITY  OF  CREATIVE  INTELLIGENCE.  351 

mon  origin  and  a  common  history — one  method,  one  will  guid- 
ing all  those  wonderful  changes  which,  in  the  long  course  of 
ages,  have  resulted  in  separate  worlds,  with  a  common  sun 
shining  down  upon  all  their  surfaces  alike,  and  making  one 
scene  of  all  the  wide  expanse  of  the  solar  system. 

We  have  not  space  to  recount  the  vicissitudes  of  that  long 
history  through  which  planet  after  planet  sprung  into  being; 
and  that  long  history  of  later  times,  during  which  our  world 
was  undergoing  a  special  preparation ;  continents  growing ; 
mountains  rising ;  soils  preparing ;  and  all  with  intelligible  ref- 
erence to  the  wants  of  a  being  then  thousands  of  years  in  the 
future.  What  we  wish  especially  to  impress  is  this :  that  hun- 
dreds of  thousands,  and  probably  millions,  of  years  were  con- 
sumed in  the  history  over  which  our  minds  have  glanced ;  but 
all  the  work  proceeded  according  to  one  method.  One  set  of 
physical  forces,  under  the  mandate  of  the  almighty  Will,  began, 
continued,  and  completed  the  building  of  the  world,  and  all  the 
worlds. 

This  firmly  jointed  fabric  of  the  material  universe,  therefore, 
with  all  its  vastness,  has  foundations  reaching  back  almost 
through  an  eternity,  which  are  as  much  a  solid  and  connected 
whole  as  the  visible  parts  which  rise  above  the  horizon  of  time. 
The  power,  intelligence,  and  goodness  which  we  see  developed 
in  the  economy  of  nature  are  attributes  of  the  same  Being 
through  all  the  immensity  of  space  and  all  the  immensity  of 
time. 

V.  The  Religious  Nature  of  Man. 

It  has  sometimes  been  held  that  man  knows  nothing  of  God 
except  through  the  written  revelation ;  but  who  can  stand  un- 
der the  canopy  of  the  starry  sky  and  gaze  and  ponder  without 
devotion  ?  Who  can  think  of  the  magnitudes,  the  distances, 
the  complexities,  the  harmonies,  which  characterize  the  visible 
creation  on  which  he  gazes,  and  not  fee'l  that  there  is  a  Power 


352  RELIGIOUS  NATURE  OF  SAVAGES. 

infinitely  great  which  upholds  and  moves ;  an  intelligence  infi- 
nitely vast  which  plans  and  provides?  The  aspects  of  nature 
have  in  all  ages  inspired  men  with  awe  and  reverence.  It  is 
not  alone  the  Hebrew  Psalmist  who  exclaims,  "The  heavens 
declare  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  firmament  showeth  his  handi- 
work." The  sun,  moon,  and  stars  have  always  inspired  devo- 
tion ;  and  men  in  their  ignorance  have  mistaken  the  heavenly 
bodies  for  the  real  divinity  apprehended  in  their  inmost  souls, 
and  .have  worshiped  them.  Deeply  impressed  with  the  pres- 
ence of  superior  power,  savage  tribes  have  worshiped  mountains 
and  rivers,  thunders  and  tempests.  Other  tribes,  groveling  in 
deeper  ignorance,  have  prostrated  themselves  before  the  croco- 
dile or  the  serpent,  the  uncouth  idol  or  the  shapeless  stock. 
Alas  that  human  beings  should  go  so  far  astray  from  the  true 
God! 

But  there  is  a  lesson  in  all  this.  Man  must  have  an  object 
to  worship.  He  feels  the  evidences  of  a  power  manifested 
about  him — an  invisible  power  greater  than  himself — a  power 
whose  displeasure  he  fears ;  to  whom  he  turns  for  succor  when 
in  distress;  to  whom  he  feels  himself  accountable  when  he 
sins.  In  the  lowest  stages  of  human  condition,  this  feeling  of 
the  divine  is  only  a  vague  sentiment.  In  the  next  stage,  it 
suggests  a  personal  deity  or  many  deities.  But  underneath  all 
the  polytheisms  of  the  world,  the  human  soul  has  always  rec- 
ognized a  supreme  Divinity,  who  is  regarded  as  Creator  and 
Judge.  The  Greeks  and  Romans  worshiped  many  deities,  but 
always  either  as  mediatorial  between  man  and  Jove  supreme, 
or  as  subordinates,  adequate  to  ordinary  emergencies.  The 
ancient  Brahmans  worshiped  fire,  sun,  and  air,  and  many  other 
deities,  but  only  as  manifestations  of  the  one  supreme  Deity. 
The  Egyptians,  also,  while  polytheistic  in  their  outward  prac- 
tices, held  Kneph  to  be  the  King  of  Gods,  the  creator  of  all 
things.  Monotheism  seems  really  to  be  the  deepest  faith  of  hu- 
manity. 


RELIGIOUS  SENTIMENTS  UNIVERSAL.  353 

I  said  that  all  peoples  had,  somehow,  acknowledged  the  ne- 
cessity of  some  being  to  worship.  Worship,  prayer,  praise, 
religious  rites,  religious  symbolism — these  are  part  of  the  his- 
tory of  every  people  under  the  sun.  The  statement  is  not 
made  lightly.  I  have  examined  all  the  cases  of  savages  alleged- 
destitute  of  a  religious  nature,  and  I  have  been  led  to  these 
conclusions :  In  respect  to  many  tribes,  the  charges  are  clearly 
unfounded ;  in  respect  to  some,  we  have  not  sufficient  informa- 
tion to  base  any  opinion  upon  them ;  in  regard  to  others,  it  is 
only  true  that  their  religious  notions  are  debased  and  shocking, 
while  still  they  are  religious  in  their  meaning,  and  argue  the 
existence  of  a  real  religious  nature.  Only  in  regard  to  three 
tribes  do  I  find  the  testimony  such  as  to  render  it  necessary  to 
admit  that  they  appear  to  be  without  any  religious  sentiments. 
These  are  the  inhabitants  of  the  Andaman  Islands,  the  Gran 
Chacos  of  South  America,  and  the  Arafuras  of  Vorkay,  one  of 
the  Aru  Islands.^) 

I  hold  that  the  united  testimony,  even  of  savage  tribes — even 
of  the  most  degraded  tribes — is  in  support  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  religious  nature  of  man.  But  when  we  consider  the  his- 
tory of  the  rest  of  mankind,  how  overwhelming  becomes  the 
evidence !  Every  nation  that  has  attained  to  any  degree  of 
culture  has  had  its  system  of  religion.  The  religions  of  Egypt 
and  Phoenicia;  Judaism,  Christianity  (viewed  merely  as  a  his- 
torical phenomenon),  Islamism  ;  Brahmanism,  Zoroastrianism, 
Buddhism,  and  the  Greek  and  Norse  religions;  Lao-tseism  and 
Confucianism ;  and,  in  America,  the  religions  of  the  Peruvians 
and  the  Aztecs — these  fourteen  great  systems  of  religion  have 
controlled  the  thoughts,  the  hopes,  the  fears,  and  the  destinies 
of  nine-tenths  of  all  the  people  that  have  lived  upon  the  earth. 


(J)  The  writer  has  presented  and  discussed  the  facts  here  referred  to  in 
two  articles  published  in  the  Methodist  Quarterly  Review  for  January  and 
July,  1875. 


354  GOD'S  NAME  ON  EVERY  HEART. 

And  even  philosophy,  in  its  speculations,  tends  toward  relig- 
ious themes.  It  has  been  the  ambition  of  all  founders  of  phil- 
osophic systems  to  show  that  they  did  not  subvert  prevailing 
religious  ideas.  The  very  highest  problems  of  all  philosophy 
and  all  science  are  about  the  cause  of  things — the  first  cause — 
the  origin  of  matter  and  force,  and  the  orderly  structure  of  the 
universe.  No  one,  it  seems  to  me,  can  contemplate  the  histo- 
ry of  the  human  race  and  not  be  convinced  that  the  religious 
nature  has  ever  been  active,  ever  uppermost.^) 

Such  a  long-continued  manifestation  of  religious  feeling,  re- 
ligious thought,  and  religious  activity  must  be  regarded  as  an 
expression  of  the  nature  of  man — a  demonstration  that  the  re- 
ligious faculties  are  as  deeply  seated  in  our  constitution  as  the 
intellectual.  And  then,  if  our  natures  impel  us  inevitably  to 
lift  up  the  voice  to  God  in  prayer,  there  must  be  a  God  to  hear, 
or  man  is  grievously  mocked.  If  all  mankind  have  felt  im- 
pelled to  entertain  a  belief  in  the  future  life,  there  must  be  a 
hereafter  to  man,  or  his  very  nature  utters  a  lie.  Now,  if  there 
be  not  realities  answering  to  the  religious  faculties  of  man,  there 
exists  here  a  sad  lack  of  co-ordination,  not  witnessed  in  any 
other  faculty  or  instinct,  either  of  man  or  brute. 

God  thus  writes  his  name  on  every  heart.  But  if  man  be 
too  proud  to  confess  the  feeling  of  devotion,  or  if  he  deny  that 
God  has  left  a  testimony  in  the  heart,  he  can  not  exercise  his 
intelligence  without  finding  out  God.  We  have  already  seen 
how,  in  tracing  back  the  history  of  our  world,  we  find  a  begin- 
ning—a sphere  of  fiery  vapor — and  have  been  reminded  that 
science  can  conduct  us  back  no  farther.  Still,  as  reason  asserts 
that  whatever  exists  has  been  caused  to  exist,  we  feel  confident 
that  the  primordial  vapor  had  a  cause ;  and,  as  science  can  as- 
sign no  cause,  we  feel  compelled  to  fall  back  on  that  cause 

(])  A  very  considerable  exemplification  of  these  positions  appears  in  the 
second  and  third  chapters  of  the  present  work. 


DEDUCTION  TO  DEITY.  355 

which  the  soul  spontaneously  and  universally  assigns  as  the  an- 
tecedent of  all  existence.  Thus  the  principle  of  causality  leads 
thought  up  to  God. 

We  have  heretofore  turned  our  attention  to  some  of  the 
manifestations  of  intelligence  in  creation.  We  have  read  in- 
telligence in  numberless  contrivances,  as  in  the  mechanism  of 
the  hand  or  eye.  We  have  also  read  intelligence  in  the  admi- 
rable plans  discovered  in  the  operations  of  nature.  We  have 
seen,  for  instance,  that  the  very  plan  of  the  human  frame  is 
only  a  development  and  perfection  of  the  structure  of  the  low- 
est vertebrated  animal ;  and  that  when  the  fish  was  first  intro- 
duced upon  the  earth,  in  remote  geologic  time,  it  was  a  germ 
which  was  destined  to  expand  into  man ;  it  was,  in  reality,  a 
prophecy  of  man.  Thought  we  have  found  inscribed  every- 
where upon  the  pages  of  nature.  At  least,  we  have  found  ev- 
erywhere such  evidences  that,  were  we  concerned  with  mere 
human  affairs,  we  should  assert  positively  that  they  are  proofs 
of  intelligence.  But  reason  can  not  make  a  discrimination 
here.  There  is  no  datum  for  discrimination.  Mechanical 
adaptations,  order,  utility,  or  other  correlations,  are  everywhere 
and  necessarily  proofs  of  intelligence.  Hence  the  universe  dis- 
plays intelligence,  and  intelligence  as  much  above  human  as  the 
universe  exceeds  a  human  work. 

Again,  man  distinguishes  between  right  and  wrong.  All 
men  do  it.  They  feel  that  certain  deeds  are  right  and  deserve 
approval,  and  that  other  deeds  are  wrong  and  merit  condemna- 
tion. They  feel  that  there  is  a  moral  law  which  can  not  be  in- 
fringed with  impunity.  Now,  if  there  is  a  law,  there  is  a  Law- 
giver. If  punishment  waits  upon  wrong-doing,  there  is  a  mor- 
al Judge.  If  man  exists  under  a  government  of  moral  law, 
there  sits  a  moral  Governor  on  the  throne. 

So,  reason  from  whatever  datum  we  will,  the  conclusion  is 
GOD.  And  this  conclusion  of  reason  is  only  identical  with  the 
intuition  which  animates  every  human  heart.  This  proof  that 


356  REVELATION  PROBABLE. 

the  idea  of  God  arises  spontaneously  in  the  human  soul,  wheth- 
er as  a  direct  intuition,  a  conclusion  of  a  process  of  abstract 
reasoning,  or  an  impression  conveyed  by  the  phenomena  of 
the  universe,  creates  a  presumption  in  favor  of  a  written  revela- 
tion claiming  to  come  from  God.  If  man  knows  beforehand 
that  there  is  a  God,  he  feels  predisposed  to  listen  to  his  mes- 
sages. This  pre-existent  knowledge  of  God  is  assumed  by  all 
the  Scriptural  writers.  They  do  not  attempt  to  prove  the  ex- 
istence of  Deity — they  do  not  even  assert  it.  Christ  himself 
did  not  introduce  a  religion  foreign  to  human  nature.  Such  a 
religion  could  never  have  found  a  foot-hold.  Christianity  finds 
a  deep  response  in  the  soul  of  man.  It  is  built  upon  a  founda- 
tion older  than  itself — a  foundation  which  can  never  be  over- 
thrown without  uprooting  the  instincts  of  humanity. 

Thus  the  voices  of  the  universe,  which  utter  perpetually  the 
name  of  God  and  magnify  his  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness, 
are  found  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  voices  of  the  soul,  which 
whisper  the  name  of  God  perpetually  in  our  ears;  and  both 
these  voices  chime  with  the  Scripture  which  saith, "  The  Lord 
God  omnipotent  reigneth ;  let  the  earth  rejoice." 

VI.   Genesis  and  Geology. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis  we  find  a  brief  account  of  the 
creation  of  the  world.  Until  modern  times,  it  was  the  popu- 
lar opinion(')  that  this  narrative  taught  that  the  earth  and 

(')  It  is  well  known  that  this  has  not  been  the  universal  opinion  of  phi- 
losophers, or  even  of  orthodox  theologians.  St.  Augustine,  to  go  no  farther 
back,  maintained  that  all  created  things  were  created  instantaneously,  but 
only  potentially  so,  and  as  far  as  concerned  the  emission  of  original  causal 
efficiency  ("potentialiter  atque  causaliter");  while  following  this  primordial 
creative  volition,  through  a  period  of  indefinite  length,  "per  temporum 
moras  "  (as  he  styles  the  "  days  "  of  Genesis)  the  forms  of  the  world  rose 
slowly  out  of  potentiality  into  actuality.  Of  this  opinion  St.  Thomas  Aqui- 
nas says,  "Et  Iwcc  opinioplus  mihi placet"  (2  Sent.  Dist.  12,  Quaest.  1,  art.  2); 


THE  "DAYS"    OF  GENESIS.  357 

heavens  were  created  during  an  interval  of  six  literal  days,  and 
that  the  work  dates  back  but  a  few  thousand  years.  These 
views  were  entertained  when  our  Bible  was  translated  into  En- 
glish. Since  that  date,  several  sciences  have  sprung  into  ex- 
istence which  throw  a  va^t  amount  of  light  on  the  history  of 
creation;  and  if  King  James's  translators  had  their  work  to 
perform  to-day,  they  would  see  meanings  in  Genesis  which  the 
world  had  not  dreamed  of  two  hundred  years  ago ;  and  they 
would  make  the  translation  read  a  little  differently,  in  order  to 
make  it  agree  more  exactly  with  the  original  Hebrew.  These 
sciences — especially  geology  and  astronomy — demonstrate  that 
this  creation,  though  not  eternal,  has  stood  millions  of  years, 
and  that  this  world  even  required  millions  of  years  for  its  for- 
mation. We  know  that  the  Infinite  Being  ivas  able  to  create 
this  world  in  six  days,  but  the  evidences  are  that  he  did  not ; 
and  if  he  did  not,  it  would  be  folly  to  persuade  ourselves  oth- 
erwise. It  is  infinitely  better  to  learn  how  God  really  did  pro- 
ceed, than  to  turn  our  backs  upon  scientific  evidence  which  no 
candid  mind  can  resist,  and  wrench  our  Bible  to  make  it  fit  a 

and  St.  Bonaventure  says,  "  Multum  rationabilis  et  valde  subtilis ;  and  in 
reference  to  his  method  calls  it  a  "  via  philosophical  while  the  contrary 
opinion  is  pronounced  "  minus  rationabilis  quam  alia "  (Librura  secund., 
Sent.  Dist.  xii.,  Quacst.  ii.,  art.  1,  conclusio).  Cardinal  Noris,  in  1673,  vindi- 
cating these  views  of  Augustine,  says  he  "subtilem  prorsus  ac  se  dignam 
sententiam  excogitavit,  ncmpe  dies  illos  intdligendos  esse  mysticc"  etc. ;  and  the 
cardinal  then  condemns  the  adverse  opinions  of  Lusitanus  and  Charles 
Moreau  ("  Vindiciae  Augus.,"  c.  iv.,  §  ix. ;  see  Migne,  "  Patrologia  Cursus 
Completus,"  torn,  xlvii.,  p.  719).  Other  similar  opinions,  recorded  before 
the  establishment  of  modern  geological  views,  may  be  found  in  Albertus 
Magnus,  Denis  the  Carthusian  (1470),  Cardinal  Cajetan  (1530),  Melchior 
Canus  (1560),Bannes  (1580),  Vincentius  Contenson  (1670),  Macedo  (1673), 
Tonti  (1714),  Serry  (1720),  Berti  (1740),  and,  more  explicitly,  in  reference 
to  the  days,  St.  Hildegard,  Bertier,  Berchetti,  Ghici,  Robebacher,  and  Bos- 
suet.  For  these  references  I  am  indebted  to  Mivart,  Contemporary  Re- 
view, January,  1872,  where  further  particulars  may  be  obtained. 


358  PRELIMINARIES  TO  THE  HARMONY. 

misconception  of  facts.  The  author  of  Genesis  has  given  us  an 
account  which,  when  rightly  understood,  conforms  admirably  to 
the  indications  of  latest  science.  At  the  same  time,  he  has  not 
attempted  to  write  a  scientific  history  of  creation.  It  possesses 
a  simple,  though  sublime,  style,  and  is  clothed  in  the  thoughts 
and  molded  in  the  structure  of  Oriental  poetry.  While  poet- 
ical, it  is  not  an  aimless  reverie ;  while  unscientific,  it  does  not 
depart  from  the  truth.  While  we  have  to  interpret  it  in  the 
light  of  modern  science,  we  have  no  occasion  to  reject  it  as 
simply  an  Eastern  myth,  of  no  more  significance  than  the  le- 
gends of  the  Ganges  or  of  Yucatan.  We  can  show  that  it  ex- 
emplifies a  most  impressive  harmony  between  the  utterances  of 
trusting  inspiration  and  the  generalizations  of  rigorous  science. 
In  proceeding  to  explain  this  harmony,  we  must  premise  a 
few  things  bearing  on  the  import  of  a  few  words  employed  by 
the  author  or  authors  of  Genesis,  which,  for  convenience,  we 
may  ascribe  to  Moses:  1.  The  word  translated  "created,"  in 
the  first  verse,  refers  to  origination  from  non-existence.  It  is 
of  no  consequence  to  assert  that  such  creation  is  "unthinkable," 
for  not  only  does  the  text  assert  such  creation,  but  human  rea- 
son demands  such  a  resting-place  for  the  chain  of  finite  events. 
2.  There  is  a  little  particle  (eth)  in  the  Hebrew,  not  transla- 
ted in  our  version,  which  (often,  at  least)  means  the  substance 
o/j  and,  standing  before  the  words  translated  "  heaven "  and 
"  earth,"  expresses  "  the  substance  of  the  heaven  and  the  sub- 
stance of  the  earth."  (*)  3.  Instead  of  "  heaven,"  our  text 
should  read  "  heavens,"  and  the  allusion  is  apparently  to  other 
firmaments  of  stars  which  Sir  William  Herschel  discovered  ly- 
ing far  beyond  the  confines  of  our  starry  firmament.  4.  The 
word  translated  "  day  "  signifies  a  period  of  indefinite  length — 

(')  Dr.  Strong  informs  us  (privately)  that  he  does  not  attribute  such 
force  to  this  particle.  But  see  the  Appendix  to  this  section  of  the  pres- 
ent paper. 


GASEOUS  AND  STORMY  PERIODS.  359 


as  in  Gen.  ii.,  11  ;  Job  xiv.,  6  ;  xviii.,  20  ;  Isa.  xxx.,  8  ;  Ezek. 
xxxi.,  25  ;  Prov.  vi.,  34.  5.  The  word  translated  "made"  in  the 
sixteenth  verse,  often  signifies  "appointed,"  as  in  Psa.  civ.,  19. 

Now,  let  us  see  what  science  indicates  in  reference  to  the 
order  of  creation  : 

FIRST  PERIOD.  A  Fiery  Mist.  —  All  the  matter  of  the  sun, 
moon,  and  planets  existed  primevally  at  a  temperature  so  high 
that  it  was  not  only  fused,  but  converted  into  a  luminous  vapor, 
and  blended  in  one  mass.  Its  pre-eminent  characteristic  was 
luminosity.  In  this,  no  chemical  affinities  found  play  ;  but  the 
law  of  cooling  and  consequent  contraction,  and  also  the  laws  of 
gravitation  and  inertia,  held  sway.  Accordingly,  it  began  to 
cool,  and  through  a  long  process,  which,  however  interesting, 
we  have  not  room  to  trace,  it  became  divided  up  into  a  series 
of  planets  and  satellites  —  a  vast  central  mass  remaining.  The 
smaller  masses  cooled  rapidly,  and  attained  a  somewhat  solidi- 
fied and  darkened  state,  while  the  central  mass  was  so  large 
that  it  cooled  more  slowly,  and  continued  (as  it  still  does)  to 
emit  supplies  of  light  and  heat  for  the  benefit  of  planetary 
bodies. 

SECOND  PERIOD.  Descent  of  Rains,  and  Accumulation  of 
Sediments.  —  Confining  our  view  to  a  single  planet  —  our  own 
world  —  a  time  came  in  the  process  of  cooling  when  the  chill 
of  the  upper  atmosphere  condensed  the  vapor  of  water  for  the 
first  time,  and  clouds  began  to  form.  Now  the  light  of  the 
sun,  which  had  fallen  upon  the  earth  from  the  beginning  of  its 
separate  existence,  was  by  degrees  shut  out,  and  total  darkness 
enshrouded  the  world.  As  these  clouds  held  all  the  water  be- 
longing to  our  planet,  they  poured  forth  the  most  abundant 
rains,  which,  by  beating  upon  the  rocky  surface,  and  by  the 
wear  of  torrents,  produced  vast  amounts  of  sediment,  which 
were  spread  over  the  bottom  of  the  accumulated  ocean.  Chem- 
ical reactions  also  took  place  in  these  waters  which  threw  down 
sheets  of  sediments,  which  mingled  with  those  of  mechanical 

16 


360  LAND,  AND  RENEWED  SUN-LIGHT. 

origin.  These  sediments  were  the  material  from  which  the 
oldest  beds  of  rock  were  formed.  By  such  a  precipitation  of 
rains,  the  clouds  were  thinned — twilight  filtered  through  them, 
and  a  separation  was  effected  between  the  waters  which  were 
above  the  earth  and  the  waters  which  were  upon  the  earth. 

THIRD  PERIOD.  Uplift  of  Continents — Appearance  of  Ma- 
rine Plants. —  The  continued  cooling  and  shrinking  of  the 
earth  developed  wrinkles  in  the  crust  (or  solid  exterior  inclosing 
the  still  heated  interior),  and  these  grew  from  age  to  age  until 
they  became  lands  rising  above  the  level  of  the  ocean.  All 
the  continents  and  islands  of  to-day  have  grown  from  those  be- 
ginnings. Continent-building  commenced  while  yet  the  rainy 
period  continued,  and,  as  soon  as  sufficient  light  penetrated  the 
waters  of  the  ocean,  sea-weeds  appeared. 

FOURTH  PERIOD.  Dispersion  of  the  Clouds — Appearance  of 
the  Sun,  Moon,  and  Stars  —  Plant -growth. —  At  length  the 
cooled  world  ceased  to  convert  the  ocean's  waters  into  steam, 
to  be  returned  in  perpetual  rains,  and  so  the  clouds  were  dis- 
persed. Now  the  sun  shone  again  upon  the  earth.  The  scene 
was  changed.  When  the  clouds  first  gathered,  the  earth  was 
partially  self-luminous,  and  cast  no  shadow,  and  consequently 
there  was  no  night.  Now  the  darkened  world  cast  its  shadow 
behind,  and,  on  the  unveiling  of  the  sun,  the  phenomena  of 
day  and  night  were,  for  the  first  time,  possible.  Sunrise  and 
sunset  now  possessed  a  new  significance.  This  is  the  Azoic 
Period  in  geological  science. 

FIFTH  PERIOD.  Marine  Animals,  Aquatic  Reptiles,  and  Birds. 
— The  simplest  possible  forms  of  animal  life  next  appeared,  and 
these  were  followed  by  higher  and  higher  in  regular  succession 
for  many  cycles  of  ages.  For  more  than  half  this  interval,  an- 
imals breathed  only  water;  and  when  at  length  air-breathers 
appeared,  they  were  still  doomed  to  inhabit  the  waters.  They 
were  aquatic  reptiles  —  great  monsters.  Just  at  the  close  of 
this  period,  winged  reptiles  and  then  real  birds,  made  their  ad- 


THE  BIBLICAL  "DAYS."  361 

vent,  and  a  great  change  passed  over  the  life  of  the  globe. 
This  period  is  composed  of  the  Eozoic,  Palaeozoic,  and  Mesozoic 
periods  of  geology. 

SIXTH  PERIOD.  The  Reign  of  Mammals,  followed  by  the 
Advent  of  Man. — When  the  long  reign  of  reptiles  had  ended, 
quadrupeds  and  monkeys  appeared  on  the  earth,  and  held  ex- 
clusive possession,  till  at  last  man  arrived  and  assumed  do- 
minion. 

SEVENTH  PERIOD.  The  Period  now  passing. — Such  is  the 
accepted  geological  story  condensed  into  a  few  sentences. 

Now,  turning  to  an  analysis  of  the  Biblical  account,  we  find 
it  to  stand  thus : 

THE  THEME  (verses  1,  2). — 1.  All  existence  flows  from  God. 
2.  A  glimpse  of  the  cloud-enveloped  world  in  mid-development. 
(See  Second  Period.) 

FIRST  DAY  (verses  3-5). —  Creation  of  light. 

SECOND  DAY  (verses  6-8).  —  Firmament,  or  separation  be- 
tween the  waters. 

THIRD  DAY  (verses  9-13).  —  Formation  of  dry  land  and 
plants. 

FOURTH  DAY  (verses  14-19).  —  Appointment  of  sun,  moon, 
and  stars. 

FIFTH  DAY  (verses  20-23). —  Creation  of  aquatic  animals 
and  birds. 

SIXTH  DAY  (verses  24-31). — Creation  of  land  animals  and, 
lastly,  man. 

SEVENTH  DAY  (Gen.  ii.,  1-3). — God  rested — his  Sabbath. 

Now  compare  the  work  of  these  "  days  "  with  the  events  of 
the  seven  "  periods  "  before  indicated,  and  judge  whether  the 
correspondence  is  not  real,  and,  indeed,  much  greater  than  we 
could  expect  of  a  history  written  in  an  age  before  the  birth  of 
science,  and  (according  to  popular  chronology),  2500  years  aft- 
er the  close  of  the  events  which  it  narrates.  On  the  old  in- 
terpretation, the  Biblical  account  was  irreconcilable  with  even 


362  ON  THE  MEANING   OF  fix. 

popular  information.  How  could  light  exist  on  the  first  day, 
and  plants  vegetate  upon  the  third,  while  the  sun,  the  source  of 
light  and  of  all  organic  activity,  had  no  existence  before  the 
fourth  day  ?  Only  a  short-sighted  faith  will  stake  the  credibil- 
ity of  its  oracles  on  views  of  nature  which  have  been  proved 
untenable  and  incredible. 

[APPENDIX. — To  the  foregoing  article  the  following  adden- 
dum was  made  at  a  subsequent  date. 

The  excessive  brevity  of  this  series  of  articles,  necessitated 
by  the  straitened  limits  of  these  pages,  precludes  the  introduc- 
tion of  any  thing  but  a  meagre  outline  statement  of  conclu- 
sions. Proofs,  arguments,  illustrations,  citations,  reflections, 
must  all  be  omitted.  Many  difficulties,  apparent  to  every  read- 
er, must  be  left  unexplained ;  and  no  space  remains  to  expose 
the  defenses  of  positions  which  the  writer  well  knows  before- 
hand will  be  assailed  by  misdirected  attacks. 

For  instance,  we  asserted  that  the  particle  Sitf,  eth,  used  in 
the  first  verse  of  Gen.  i.,  signifies,  in  some  situations,  "  the  sub- 
stance of  "  the  thing  mentioned.  One  competent  and  respect- 
ed critic  rightly  asserts  that  certain  authorities,  whom  he  cites, 
give  no  sanction  to  such  a  use  of  the  word.  On  the  contrary, 
we  might  have  cited  the  authority  of  Aben-Ezra,  Kimchi,  Ains- 
worth,  Buxtorf,  Nordheimer,  and  others.  In  addition,  the  Syr- 
iac  translation  so  understands  the  particle;  and  St.  Ephraem, 
the  learned  apostle  of  the  old  Syriac  Church,  in  his  commen- 
tary on  this  place,  uses  the  same  Syriac  word  A.  -^  yoth,  and  un- 
derstands it  in  the  same  way.  And,  finally,  the  verb  tna,  6am, 
used  in  connection,  implies,  in  the  Kal  conjugation  (according 
to  Gesenius),  creation  rather  than  formation  ;  and  as  creation,  in 
contrast  with  formation,  is  an  origination  of  substance,  the  con- 
text fully  sanctions  the  meaning  which  we  have  attributed  to 
the  particle  nx,  eth. 

Again,  another  critic  thinks  that  by  giving  dl'i,  yom,  the  sig- 
nification of  a  geological  "period,"  we  invalidate  the  grounds 
for  the  enjoined  observance  of  the  Sabbath.  We  reply:  1. 
Philology  allows  the  meaning ;  and  cite  for  authorities,  Augus- 


ON  TEE  MEANING  'OF  t1\  '  3G3 

tine,  Josephus,  Philo  Judacus,  Tayler  Lewis,  M'Causland,  besides 
an  array  of  scientific  judges,  as  Whiston,  Descartes,  Cuvier, 
De  Luc,  Parkinson,  Jameson,  Silliman,  Miller,  Dana,  etc.  2. 
The  events  described  could  not  have  transpired  in  sbc  literal 
days,  according  to  all  we  know  of  the  order  of  nature;  and 
the  theory  of  the  sudden  creation  of  fossils  and  stratified  rocks 
lias  long  since  been  abandoned  by  intelligent  critics.  3.  The 
Chalmerian  hypothesis  of  a  "chasm"  of  time  between  the 
events  of  the  first  and  second  verses  offers  insuperable  and 
needless  difficulties.  4.  The  Christian  Sabbath  is  not  invali- 
dated by  this  means,  for  the  Sabbath  of  God  is  now  in  prog- 
ress. God  is  now  resting  from  the  works  of  creation  to 
which  Moses  refers.  So  man,  upon  the  seventh  of  his  days,  is 
commanded  to  imitate  the  example  of  his  Creator. 

But,  in  truth,  the  adequate  defense  of  very  intelligible  conclu- 
sions seems  hardly  suited  to  the  pages  of  the  Journal.] 

VII.   The  Mosaic  Deluge. 

The  authors  of  the  Pentateuch  inform  us  that  in  the  ninth 
generation  after  the  introduction  of  Adam's  race  upon  the 
earth,  the  wickedness  of  man  provoked  the  Lord  to  destroy 
"  all  flesh  "  by  a  deluge,  save  Noah  and  his  family.  This  del- 
uge is  represented  as  prevailing  to  such  an  extent  that  "  all  the 
high  hills  that  were  under  the  whole  heaven  were  covered." 

Now,  a  deluge  of  this  kind — taking  the  language  in  its  lit- 
eral signification — was  a  geological  event,  and  geologists  have 
been  called  upon  to  declare  what  their  science  has  to  testify  re- 
specting such  an  occurrence.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  one  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  geology  that  the  materials  of  nearly 
all  the  stratified  rocks  have  been  laid  down  as  sediments  in  the 
bottom  of  the  sea.  There  are  few  localities  upon  the  land, 
therefore,  which  do  not  testify  to  the  former  presence  of  the 
sea ;  and  the  time  was,  when  this  testimony  was  regarded  as 
confirming  the  doctrine  of  a  universal  deluge.  In  the  next 
place,  the  sea  has  at  least  once  returned  over  the  land  since  the 


364  GEOLOGICAL  SUBMERGENCES. 

great  continental  areas  were  completed.  After  the  dissolution 
of  the  great  glaciers  which  once  prevailed  over  the  temperate 
regions  of  America,  Europe,  and  Asia,  there  occurred  a  gener- 
al northern  subsidence,  which  permitted  the  ocean's  waters  to 
bury  all  the  northern  portions  of  the  continents  —  an  event 
which  the  most  eminent  geologists  of  the  last  generation  re- 
garded as  constituting  the  deluge  recorded  by  Moses.  This 
submergence,  however,  though  it  must  have  exterminated  whole 
races  of  animals,  is  now  generally  believed  to  have  occurred  be- 
fore the  appearance  of  man  upon  the  earth ;  and  the  Mosaic 
narrative  could  have  no  reference  to  it. 

Vast  areas  of  the  land-surface,  however,  have  lain  under  water 
during  a  later  period ;  and  the  human  race  has  witnessed  their 
drainage,  if  it  did  not  witness  and  suffer  from  the  deluge  and 
destruction  which  followed  the  disappearance  of  the  continent- 
al glaciers.  The  great  prairie  region  of  Illinois  is  indicated, 
by  a  number  of  evidences,  to  have  been  covered  by  an  immense 
lake  until  long  after  the  representatives  of  our  species  had 
found  their  way  to  America.  A  similar  and  corresponding  re- 
gion in  the  South  of  Russia,  in  Europe,  was,  not  many  centuries 
since,  the  bed  of  a  former  extension  of  the  Black  Sea.  This 
region  is  the  ancient  Lectonia,  which,  in  later  times,  was  the 
home  of  the  warlike  Scythians.  It  was  probably  drained  by 
the  bursting  of  the  barriers  of  the  Thracian  Bosphorus.  It 
has  lately  been  shown  that  the  entire  country  between  the  Cas- 
pian and  Black  seas  was  under  water  until  a  period  geological- 
ly modern ;(')  and  even  the  ancient  geographers  detected  the 
evidences  of  the  recent  submergence  of  the  region  now  covered 
by  the  great  Desert  of  Sahara.  The  ancestors  of  our  race,  we 
may  well  believe,  were  spectators  of  the  retreat  of  the  waters 
from  all  these  regio'ns.  Still,  it  is  scarcely  probable  that  the 

(J)  "  Reunion  de  la  Mer  Caspienne  et  la  Mer  Noir,"  par  le  Docteur  Berg- 
strasser,  conseiller  d'etat  et  directeur  des  salines  du  gouvernement  d'As- 
trakan,  Paris. 


DELUGES  IN  HUMAN  TIMES.  365 

inundation  of  any  of  these  districts  constituted  the  phenome- 
non referred  to  by  the  sacred  historian.  It  is  safe  to  assume 
that  the  water  may  have  rested  over  these  places  before  the  ap- 
pearance of  man  upon  the  earth. 

We  have,  however,  geological,  traditionary,  and  even  histor- 
ical evidences  of  the  occurrence  of  great  inundations  during 
the  human  period.  The  gravel-beds  of  the  Seine  and  Somme, 
inclosing  human  remains,  prove  that  enormous  floods  visited 
Southern  Europe  after  the  advent  of  man.  The  Chinese  rec- 
ords testify  to  no  less  than  eight  or  nine  great  changes  in  the 
bed  and  outlet  of  the  Hwang-ho  River,  by  which  means  many 
thousands  of  square  miles  of  territory  have  been  several  times 
inundated  and  devastated.  The  oldest  deluge  is  fixed  at  twen- 
ty-two hundred  years  before  Christ ;  and  the  latest  great  inun- 
dation was  during  the  Taiping  rebellion,  a  few  years  ago.  The 
bed  of  the  river  has  shifted  from  three  hundred  to  four  hun- 
dred miles,  and  areas  larger  than  all  New  England  have  been 
buried  beneath  the  water.  Never  was  there  a  more  literal 
"  breaking-up  of  the  fountains  of  the  great  deep."  An  inun- 
dation in  India,  in  1819,  overwhelmed  two  thousand  square 
miles  by  an  inroad  of  the  sea ;.  and  a  similar  flood  was  experi- 
enced, in  1872,  upon  the  Western  coast. 

The  Chaldeans  preserved  the  memory  of  a  great  deluge  in 
which  Xisuthrus  and  his  friends  and  relatives  were  saved  by  a 
warning  of  the  Deity,  in  a  vessel  which  also  afforded  protection 
to  multitudes  of  quadrupeds  and  birds,  and  which  finally  rest- 
ed on  a  mountain.  Many  other  incidents  of  the  story — as  the 
sending-out  of  birds  once,  twice,  thrice ;  the  offering  of  sacri- 
fices after  the  flood ;  and  the  subsequent  building  of  cities  and 
temples  upon  the  plains  of  Babylon — indicate  that  the  Chal- 
dean narrative  relates  to  the  same  event  as  the  Mosaic.^)  Oth- 

(J)  Sec,  on  this  subject,  the  late  researches  and  publications  of  Mr. 
George  Smith,  of  the  British  Museum. 


366  TRADITIONS  OF  A  DELUGE. 

er  Eastern  peoples,  as  the  Phoenicians,  Phrygians,  Syrians,  Ar- 
menians, and  Scythians,  had  traditions  of  a  similar  deluge, 
which  have  been  perpetuated  by  various  ancient  writers.  The 
Chinese  preserve  the  story  of  a  deluge  which  dates  back  to 
four  thousand  years  before  Christ,  the  particulars  of  which 
strangely  resemble  those  of  the  Noachian  flood.  In  the  books 
of  the  Hindoos,  also,  are  records  of  a  devastating  flood,  located, 
in  some  of  the  accounts,  to  the  south  of  the  Himalayas,  but, 
in  the  oldest  one,  to  the  north  of  those  mountains,  toward  the 
region  which  we  now  know  was  the  original  home  of  the  Brah- 
manic  people,  as  well  as  the  region  of  the  Mosaic  deluge.  The 
Persians,  also,  have  preserved  the  recollection  of  a  great  deluge, 
sent  to  punish  mankind  for  their  wickedness.  In  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  Greeks  two  deluges  are  mentioned — that  of  Ogy- 
ges  and  that  of  Deucalion.  The  story  of  Deucalion  and  Pyr- 
rha,  as  narrated  by  Ovid,  is  impressively  similar  to  the  story 
of  Noah  and  his  family,  as  told  by  Moses.  In  the  mythologies 
of  the  Scandinavians  and  Celts  re-appear  similar  traditions. 

Finally,  traditions  of  a  deluge  are  found  in  the  islands  of  the 
sea  and  among  the  natives  of  America.  The  Fijians  narrate 
that  their  islands  were  once  flooded  by  a  great  rain,  and  only 
a  few  of  their  people  were  saved,  by  the  aid  of  two  of  their 
deities,  upon  the  island  of  Mbenga.  The  tribes  of  North 
America  and  the  West  Indies  had  traditions  of  a  deluge.  The 
various  nations  which  inhabited  Mexico  at  the  time  of  the 
Conquest  preserved  the  memory  of  a  great  deluge,  in  which 
Coxcox  and  his  wife  were  saved  in  a  floating  vessel,  which 
rested,  after  the  flood,  upon  the  summit  of  a  mountain.  One 
of  the  traditions  approximates  the  Mosaic  history  in  several 
particulars.  Not  only  is  Coxcox  saved,  with  his  wife,  but  also 
his  children  and  several  animals,  and  a  supply  of  grain.  The 
waters  abated  at  the  orders  of  the  Great  Spirit.  The  first  bird 
sent  out  was  a  vulture.  Other  birds  were  sent,  and,  finally,  a 
humming-bird,  which  returned  with  a  leafy  branch  in  its  beak. 


CONCURRENCE  OF  TRADITIONS.  367 

It  is  singular  to  find  such,  coincidences  on  opposite  sides  of  the 
globe. 

The  geological  evidences  and  the  traditions  of  many  nations 
concur,  therefore,  in  testifying  to  the  occurrence  of  one  or 
more  great  deluges  since  the  appearance  of  our  race  upon  the 
earth ;  and  the  traditions  are  singularly  harmonious  in  reference 
to  the  occasion  and  principal  incidents  of  the  deluge.  Thus, 
they  generally  agree  with  each  other  and  with  Moses  in  affirm- 
ing, 1.  That  the  deluge  was  intended  as  a  punishment  for 
man's  wickedness ;  2.  That  it  brought  destruction  to  the  an- 
cestors of  the  nation  perpetuating  the  tradition ;  3.  That  one 
good  man  and  his  immediate  relatives  were  saved  in  a  float- 
ing vessel ;  4.  That  certain  quadrupeds  and  birds  were  also 
preserved ;  5.  That  the  vessel  finally  rested  on  a  mountain ; 
6.  That  birds  were  sent  out  at  intervals  to  bring  back  indica- 
tions of  the  progress  of  the  retirement  of  the  waters.  We  may 
confidently  assert,  therefore,  that  the  Mosaic  narrative  of  the 
deluge,  in  its  essential  features,  is  a  correct  historical  statement. 

That  the  deluge  was  universal  we  have  not  similar  grounds 
for  believing.  1.  There  are  no  geological  evidences  of  a  gen- 
eral inundation  since  the  advent  of  man.  It  must  be  admit- 
ted, however,  that  a  deluge  which  lasted  but  three  hundred  and 
sixty -four  days  could  not  have  left  very  permanent  records. 
2.  If  the  universal  inundation  were  caused  by  a  general  subsid- 
ence of  the  continents  to  the  requisite  extent,  the  evidences  of 
this  must  still  exist ;  but  they  have  not  been  discovered.  3.  If 
it  were  caused  by  the  addition  of  the  requisite  amount  of  water 
to  our  globe,  without  a  subsidence  of  the  continents,  the  earth's 
mass  would  be  so  much  increased  as  to  derange  the  harmonies 
of  the  solar  system.  4.  It  was  impossible  for  Noah  or  any 
number  of  men  to  gather  zoological  couples  from  all  the  vari- 
ous continents — still  less  to  do  it  in  the  time  indicated.  It  is 
a  work  which  has  not  been  accomplished  to  this  day  by  the 
managers  of  all  the  zoological  gardens  of  the  world.  5.  The 

16* 


368  THE  DELUGE  NOT  UNIVERSAL. 

animals  from  different  zones  could  not  have  endured  the  cli- 
matic vicissitudes,  especially  if  the  ark  rested  on  the  summit  of 
a  mountain  reaching  into  the  region  of  perpetual  snow.  6.  The 
capacity  of  the  ark  was  extremely  inadequate  for  the  accom- 
modation of  so  many  animals  and  a  year's  supply  of  food.  7. 
The  waters  of  a  universal  deluge  rising  five  miles  above  the  or- 
dinary level  of  the  sea  could  not  evaporate  in  three  hundred 
and  twenty-five  days ;  and  if  they  could,  the  atmosphere  would 
be  incapable  of  supporting  them ;  and  hence  there  would  be  no 
way  of  disposing  of  such  a  body  of  water  over  the  land,  except 
by  a  change  of  relative  levels,  which  we  have  stated  to  be  geo- 
logically improbable.  8.  The  deluge  may  have  been  "  univers- 
al "  in  respect  to  the  descendants  of  Adam,  and  yet  have  been 
geographically  local.  9.  The  local  character  of  the  deluge  has 
for  centuries  been  maintained  by  many  eminent  divines,  simply 
on  linguistic  and  general  grounds. 

If  it  be  asserted  that  a  universal  deluge,  and  all  the  other 
events  as  formerly  understood,  could  be  accomplished  by  mi- 
raculous agency,  this  must  be  admitted ;  but  it  will  be  noticed 
that  Moses  attributes  the  inundation  to  natural  agencies — great 
rains  and  a  "  breaking-up  of  the  fountains  of  the  great  deep." 

While,  therefore,  the  credibility  of  the  Mosaic  statements  is 
fully  authenticated  by  secular  evidences,  the  historian  must  be 
regarded  as  speaking  only  of  that  quarter  of  the  world  which 
had  become  populated  by  the  descendants  of  Adam ;  and  such 
expressions  as  "  all  flesh  died  "  and  "  all  the  high  hills  that  were 
under  the  whole  heaven  "  must  be  taken  in  an  Oriental  sense 
(Gen.  xli.,  56;  Deut.  ii.,  25;  Luke  ii.,  1 ;  Acts  ii.,  5),  like  so 
many  other  passages  of  the  Hebrew  writings. 

VIII.  Man  in  the  Light  of  Geology. 

What  has  geology  to  testify  concerning  man  ? 
1.  He  belongs  to  the  Last  Fauna. — No  new  types  of  animals, 
so  far  as  we  know,  have  been  introduced  upon  the  earth  since 


REGENT  GEOLOGIC  CHANGES.  369 

his  advent.  All  the  remains  of  man  are  found  in  the  last  geo- 
logical formation.  There  has  been  no  great  geological  revolu- 
tion since  his  appearance.  In  the  rocks  beneath  the  surface 
are  abundant  records  of  older  revolutions,  and  of  older  and  ex- 
tinct types  of  animal  life ;  but  these  types  were  all  greatly  in- 
ferior to  man.  The  testimonies  of  science,  therefore,  confirm 
the  statement  of  Moses,  that  God  made  man  in  the  last  great 
period  of  creative  activity. 

2.  Man's  Advent  is  comparatively  Recent. — There  are  no  au- 
thentic discoveries  of  human  remains  in  Tertiary  deposits,  or 
any  others  older  than  the  last  period  of  glaciation.  The  geo- 
logic events  that  have  transpired  since  man's  advent  are  not 
such,  therefore,  as  demanded  many  thousands  of  years  for  their 
consummation.  Some  of  the  more  prominent  geological  events 
are  the  following:  (1)  The  later  stages  of  the  dissolution  of 
the  continental  glaciers,  and  the  floods  which  resulted  from  the 
melting  ice ;  (2)  The  drainage  of  a  vast  region  of  plains  north 
of  the  Black  Sea,  and  thence  to  the  Caspian  and  Aral  seas ; 
(3)  The  drainage  of  the  prairie  region  of  the  Mississippi  Val- 
ley ;  (4)  The  wanderings  of  the  Hwang-ho  and  Yang-tse  rivers 
of  China  over  intervals  of  hundreds  of  miles,  inundating  many 
thousands  of  square  miles  of  territory;  (5)  The  encroachment  of 
the  Pacific  upon  the  eastern  shores  of  Asia,  leaving  the  Japa- 
nese islands  and  Formosa  to  mark  the  real  limits  of  the  conti- 
nental mass;  (6)  The  extinction  of  the  cave-bear,  cave-hyena, 
two-horned  rhinoceros,  hippopotamus,  hairy  mammoth,  and  oth- 
er quadrupeds;  (7)  The  accumulation  of  peat -bogs  in  Den- 
mark and  Ireland  to  the  depth  of  twenty  or  thirty  feet ;  (8)  The 
transformation  of  the  forest  growths  of  many  parts  of  Europe. 
Other  probable  events  are  the  formation  of  Behring  Strait  be- 
tween Asia  and  America,  the  excavation  of  the  Straits  of  Dover 
and  of  the  gorge  of  the  Niagara  River. 

But  great  as  are  these  events,  it  appears  that  a  few  thousand 
years  suffice  for  their  accomplishment.  1.  The  extinctions  of 


370  DISAPPEARANCE  OF  GLACIERS. 

quadrupeds  are  still  in  progress.  The  Irish  elk  existed  till  the 
fourteenth  century ;  the  urus  lingered  till  the  sixteenth  century ; 
the  dodo,  till  the  seventeenth ;  the  moa  and  epiornis — gigantic 
extinct  birds  of  New  Zealand — have  lived  within  the  scope  of 
tradition ;  as  also  the  mammoth  of  North  America.  The  great 
auk  of  Arctic  America  has  not  been  seen  for  fifty  years.  It 
can  not  be  that  the  other  extinctions  witnessed  by  men  stretch 
back  to  a  very  remote  antiquity.  2.  The  stumps  of  the  an- 
cient glaciers  are  disappearing  at  such  a  rate  that  the  entire 
period  of  glacier-dissolution  can  not  have  been  vast.  The  Mer 
de  Glace  of  Mont  Blanc  has  lowered  one  hundred  feet  in  twen- 
ty years,  and  has  receded  at  its  lower  border  a  quarter  of  a 
mile,  while  the  gravel  moraines  are  burying  it  along  its  lateral 
borders.  The  Glacier  des  Bossons  has  shrunken  even  more. 
An  ice-peak  Jn  the  Tyrolese  Alps  has  been  observed  to  lower 
eighteen  and  a  half  feet  in  a  few  years ;  and  the  Alpine  glaciers 
generally  are  in  process  of  diminution  at  their  lower  extremi- 
ties. The  Siberian  glaciers,  which  inclose  the  well-preserved 
carcasses  of  the  hairy  mammoth,  are  continually  and  rapidly 
dissolving  and  releasing  those  carcasses,  which  are  then  sought 
for  their  ivory.  Stumps  of  the  continental  glacier  of  America 
are  preserved,  half  buried  in  dust  and  mountain  debris,  in  some 
of  the  gulches  of  the  Sierra  Nevada;  and  the  epoch  of  the 
prevalence  of  the  great  glacier  is  not  so  remote  but  some  de- 
tached fragments  of  it  still  persist  in  the  "ice-wells"  of  Ver- 
mont, New  Hampshire,  and  Wisconsin.  Other  evidences  of 
the  shortness  of  the  post-glacial  period  are  at  hand,  but  we 
have  not  the  space  for  their  presentation.  The  total  age  of 
our  race,  therefore,  is  not  necessarily  much  greater  than  is  in- 
dicated by  a  correct,  or  even  the  current,  interpretation  of  the 
Mosaic  history  of  primeval  times. 

3.  Man's  Birthplace  was  in  the  Orient. — We  speak  first  of 
purely  geological  evidences.  The  faunas,  or  animal  assemblages, 
existing  on  the  different  continents  exhibit  a  gradation  in  point 


ORIENTAL  CRADLE  OF  HUMANITY.  3Yl 

of  rank.  The  highest  is  that  in  the  Orient  (Europe,  Asia,  and 
Africa),  characterized  by  carnivores  (flesh-eaters).  Next  is  that 
of  North  America,  characterized  by  herbivores  (plant -eaters). 
The  third  is  that  of  South  America,  whose  leading  types  are 
edentates  (quadrupeds  deficient  in  some  of  the  sorts  of  teeth). 
The  fourth  is  that  of  Australia,  whose  mammals  consist  almost 
exclusively  of  marsupials  (pouched  quadrupeds,  like  the  kanga- 
roo and  opossum).  This  is  a  marked  gradation  of  the  conti- 
nents; but  it  existed  in  the  epoch  preceding  the  advent  of 
man,  as  the  latest  fossil  remains  testify.  Indeed,  something  of 
the  same  gradation  existed  far  back  in  geological  time.  The 
highest  attainments  in  organization  were  always  in  the  Oriental 
quarter  of  the  world.  The  high  rank  of  the  Orient  was  a  per- 
petual prophecy  that  the  ultimate  culmination  of  the  animal 
series  would  be  there.  It  always  pointed  to  the  Orient  as  the 
destined  cradle  of  the  human  race ;  and  there  is  no  room  for  a 
doubt  that  man  first  placed  foot  upon  the  earth  in  that  quarter 
to  which  our  Scriptures  assign  the  Garden  of  Eden. 

But  historical  evidences  and  traditions  point  to  the  same 
conclusion.  All  the  migrations  of  our  race  have  radiated  from 
the  Orient — first,  eastward  into  China,  and  south-eastward 
across  the  Himalayas ;  then,  from  the  same  centre,  westward,  in 
parallel  streams  and  in  successive  swells,  across  the  Urals  and 
the  Bosphorus.  The  eastern  stream,  intercepted  by  the  Pacif- 
ic, continued  its  course  across  the  isthmus  anciently  occupy- 
ing the  place  of  Behring  Strait,  and  populated  America ;  the 
western  surged,  at  length,  across  the  Atlantic,  and  met  the 
eastern  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  globe.  The  streams  of  lan- 
guages and  dialects  have,  of  course,  followed  the  streams  of 
migration.  The  Orient,  moreover,  is  the  home  of  most  of  our 
domesticated  animals  and  plants,  Of  the  seven  hundred  and 
seventy  plants  used  for  food,  fivo  hundred  and  sixty-five  come 
from  the  Old  World,  and  two  hundred  and  four  from  the  New. 
Of  the  two  hundred  and  thirty -seven  starch -producing  plants 


372  PROGRESS  CONVERGING  IN  MAN. 

used  by  man,  one  hundred  and  ninety-eight  originated  in  the 
Old  World,  and  only  forty -five  in  the  New.  It  is  perfectly 
safe,  therefore,  in  view  of  the  secular  evidences,  to  accept  the 
Biblical  statement  of  the  Oriental  home  of  our  first  parents. 

4.  Man's  Advent  was  the  Prophecy  of  the  Ages. — The  great 
work  of  terrestrial  preparation  always  implied  man.  The  ever- 
improving  series  of  organic  forms  pointed  always  to  an  ulti- 
mate consummation.  The  advance  of  a  thousand  ages  was  a 
pledge  of  all  possible  advance.  The  earlier  terms  of  the  series 
expressed  a  law  which  involved  the  highest  term.  Especially, 
when  vertebrate  life  began  its  existence  in  the  fish,  were  the 
prophecies  of  its  ultimate  fullest  unfolding  in  man  most  dis- 
tinctly uttered.  When  each  succeeding  type  of  vertebrates  be- 
came a  farther  step  toward  man,  the  name  of  man  seemed  ut- 
tered in  countless  reptilian,  bird-like,  mammalian,  and  quadru- 
manous  forms.  There  was  no  mistaking  the  ultimate  of  such 
a  series.  Thus  man  is  the  realization  of  an  idea  which  was 
kept  resounding  through  the  geologic  ages.  He  is  correlated 
to  the  whole  history  of  organization,  and  can  not  be  contem- 
plated except  as  a  link  in  the  chain  of  being  which  stretches 
back  through  geologic  eons. 

But  the  whole  course  of  physical  preparations  also  looks  to- 
ward man.  Every  great  revolution  of  the  terrestrial  crust  con- 
stituted a  forward  step  in  the  fashioning  and  furnishing  of  an 
abode  for  intelligent  populations.  The  useful  metals,  elaborated 
and  eliminated  through  ages  of  geological  activity,  are  suited 
exclusively  to  human  ends.  The  vast  deposits  of  mineral  coal 
laid  by  thousands  of  ages  before  the  creation  of  man  sustain 
no  relations  to  any  other  than  human  existence.  Thus  man  is 
a  consummation  foreshadowed  through  countless  ages  of  organ- 
ic and  inorganic  preparations. 

5.  Man  is  the  Last  Term  of  the  Organic  Series. — As  all  ge- 
ological preparations  point  toward  man,  so  they  all  converge  in 
man  and  reach  their  finality  in  him.  Man  signalizes  the  con- 


MAN  A  FINALITY.  373 

summation  of  a  plan — the  fulfillment  of  a  prophecy — the  real- 
ization of  a  long-foreshadowed  ultimate.  We  can  conceive  of 
no  succeeding  organism  or  intelligence  to  which  the  material 
world  and  its  history  should  stand  in  closer  relations  of  corre- 
spondence and  fitness.  So  the  foreshadowings  of  man  in  or- 
ganic history  point  toward  him  as  a  finality.  In  him,  the  phys- 
ical structure  attains  its  highest  conceivable  perfection  and  va- 
riety of  adaptations  to  the  external  world.  To  man  alone  is 
given  the  erect  attitude,  which  is  itself  the  last  possible  term 
of  a  series  of  inclinations  exemplified  in  the  horizontal  fish,  the 
head-uplifting  reptile,  the  inclined  bird,  the  neck-erecting  quad- 
ruped, and  the  half-upright  monkey.  To  man  alone  is  vouch- 
safed the  power  to  defy  all  physical  conditions  in  his  geograph- 
ical range ;  for  while  all  his  predecessors  had  been  confined 
within  progressively  narrowing  limits,  he  first  of  all  became  a 
cosmopolite,  and  possessed  the  whole  world.  There  is  no  term 
in  the  series  beyond  totality.  Then,  as  if  to  emphasize  the 
completion  of  the  work  of  organic  improvement,  and  to  mark 
a  grand  pause  in  creative  progress,  nature  superadded  to  the 
most  perfect  organism,  to  a  heavenward-looking  mien,  and  the 
absolute  freedom  of  the  world,  an  endowment  of  an  intellectu- 
al and  moral  nature  not  vouchsafed  to  any  other  animal.  Thus 
man  is  presented  to  all  intelligences  as  the  final  consummation 
of  the  long  series  of  revolutions  and  advances  whose  records 
are  written  upon  the  pages  of  science. 

IX.   The  Finiteness  of  the  Existing  Order  of  Things. 

We  are  informed  in  the  Sacred  Scriptures  that  the  earth  and 
the  entire  system  of  nature  had  a  beginning,  and  originated  in 
the  creative  activity  of  Elohim.  We  are  also  assured  that  the 
world  is  destined  to  come  to  an  end — that  the  heavens  shall  be 
"  rolled  together  as  a  scroll,"  and  the  "  elements  shall  melt  with 
fervent  heat,"  and  that  ultimately  there  will  be  established  "  a 
new  heaven  and  a  new  earth." 


374  COSMICAL  LIMITATION  IN  THE  PAST. 

Now,  science  is  in  possession  of  data  which  have  a  strong 
bearing  upon  these  doctrines.  We  see  every  thing  in  nature 
undergoing  a  succession  of  changes.  These  changes  are  a  prog- 
ress toward  something  and  a  progress  from  something ;  and 
we  are  prepared  to  show  that  in  tracing  backward  the  series 
of  geological  changes  transpiring  before  our  eyes,  we  reach 
at  last  a  remotest  limit  —  a  beginning,  anterior  to  which  we 
have  no  means  of  knowing  or  ground  for  believing  that  any 
change  was  possible.  Thus,  the  wastage  of  ocean  beaches,  the 
deposition  of  ocean  sediments,  the  measured  escape  of  heat 
from  the  earth,  the  increased  heat  experienced  in  penetrating 
toward  the  earth's  interior,  the  traces  of  ancient  heat  in  many 
of  the  rocks — these  all  are  indications  of  a  long  history  whose 
beginning,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  was  a  fiery  vapor.  We  know 
nothing  of  any  state  of  matter  more  remote  than  this.  Indeed, 
as  we  understand  the  laws  of  matter,  we  are  led  to  affirm  that 
there  was  no  condition  antecedent  to  this.  The  fire-mist,  so 
far  as  science  can  testify,  was  the  first  condition ;  and  as  the 
fire-mist  must  have  begun  to  change  as  soon  as  it  began  to  ex- 
ist, it  can  not  be  an  eternity  since  the  series  of  material  changes 
began.  Science,  therefore,  affirms  that  the  existing  order  of 
the  universe  has  not  continued  from  eternity,  but  is  merely  a 
finite  effect ;  and  the  principles  of  reason  declare  that  such  ef- 
fect must  have  been  caused  by  an  efficient  agent  existing  before 
the  present  universe  existed. 

If  the  series  of  events  transpiring  before  our  eyes  is  tending 
toward  something,  we  are  prepared  to  show  that  it  is  an  end — 
a  finality,  toward  which  it  tends.  There  is  more  than  one  se- 
ries of  changes  in  progress  which  will  bring  the  existing  ter- 
restrial order  to  an  end,  and  render  it  physically  impossible  that 
the  human  race  should  remain  in  existence  upon  the  earth. 

1.  The  land  is  wearing  out.  Every  hill  and  mountain  is  un- 
dergoing a  slow  disintegration  under  the  influence  of  the  ele- 
ments. The  oceans  and  the  rivers  are  also  eating  up  the  land. 


DEOEADATIONAL  AND  REFRIGERANT  LIMITS.       375 

The  materials  resulting  from  these  incessant  erosions  are  de- 
posited in  lakes  and  seas.  Small  lakes  have  been  filled  within 
a  generation  ;  larger  ones,  within  the  memory  of  man.  The 
delta  of  the  Mississippi  is  moving  into  the  Gulf  at  the  rate  of 
three  hundred  and  thirty-eight  feet  a  year.  The  Green  Mount- 
ains are  sensibly  lower  than  a  generation  back,  and  the  Sierra 
Nevada  is  visibly  sinking.  Some  of  the  highest  summits  of 
the  Andes  are  two  hundred  and  twenty  feet  lower  than  when 
first  measured  by  Humboldt,  about  seventy  years  ago.  The 
lowering  of  mountains  may  be  largely  due  to  a  yielding  of 
their  deep  foundations,  but  no  one  can  deny,  on  reflection,  that 
agencies  are  at  work  which  are  destined  ultimately  to  rob  the 
land  of  its  soils — to  sink  the  rivers  into  deep  gorges,  and  drain 
the  continents  to  sterility,  and,  finally,  to  level  their  inequalities 
and  fill  the  ocean  till  again  it  envelopes  nearly  the  whole  earth. 
2.  It  is  an  established  doctrine  of  science  that  the  world  is 
cooling,  as  it  has  been  cooling  through  all  the  geologic  ages. 
We  know  of  no  cause  to  arrest  its  cooling.  The  crust,  there- 
fore, which  now  incloses  an  intensely  heated  nucleus  is  des- 
tined to  grow  thicker,  until  refrigeration  approaches  the  earth's 
centre.  Who  can  affirm  that  insufferable  rigors  will  not  pre- 
vail upon  the  earth  when  frozen  to  the  core?  But,  however 
this  may  be,  another  cause  will  render  the  earth  uninhabitable. 
The  water  resting  on  the  earth's  surface  percolates  downward 
till  it  reaches  a  heat  which  changes  it  to  steam  and  sends  it 
toward  the  surface.  The  internal  fires  hold  all  the  water  be- 
longing to  the  earth  within  a  few  miles  of  the  earth's  surface. 
And  yet  there  is  no  more  water  than  we  need.  Suppose  the 
cooled  crust  were  twice  as  thick ;  the  rocks  would  demand 
twice  the  water  to  saturate  them.  Now,  it  has  been  demon- 
strated that  when  the  earth  shall  have  been  cooled  to  the  cen- 
tre, the  pores  of  the  rocks  will  have  a  capacity  sufficient  to 
hold  ten  times  the  whole  amount  of  water  belonging  to  our 
globe.  They  will  then  drink  up  the  oceans,  and  the  unfilled 


376  LIMITATION  FROM  SOLAR  COOLING. 

pores  will  suck  in  all  the  atmosphere ;  and  the  world,  with  nei- 
ther water  nor  atmosphere,  will  become  utterly  uninhabitable. 
This  is  a  condition  already  attained  by  our  moon.  That  satel- 
lite has  cooled  to  this  condition  while  yet  the  world  is  habita- 
ble, because  its  mass  is  but  one  forty-ninth  part  of  the  terres- 
trial mass.  Yet  the  moon  presents  to-day  a  picture  of  desola- 
tion and  death  which,  in  the  natural  course  of  events,  will  here- 
after be  exhibited  by  the  earth.  Here,  then,  is  a  limit  to  the 
existing  terrestrial  order. 

3.  No  one  doubts  that  the  sun's  mass  is  intensely  heated. 
No  one,  on  a  moment's  reflection,  can  fail  to  understand  that 
the  sun  loses  an  enormous  amount  of  heat  daily,  and  that  it 
must  inevitably  grow  cooler,  unless  some  means  exist  for  re- 
plenishment. Physicists  have  considered  the  problem  of  the 
sun's  heat  and  its  future  persistence  with  the  most  profound 
interest  and  attention ;  and  though  various  suggestions  have 
been  made,  science  is  not  to-day  in  possession  of  any  facts 
which  render  it  improbable  that  the  sun  is  actually  cooling. 
Indeed,  the  loftiest  conclusions  of  the  latest  science  present  our 
source  of  light  and  warmth  as  a  waning,  dying  orb.  Our 
world  was  once  a  glowing  sphere,  and  has  reached  its  present 
condition  so  much  sooner  than  the  sun  because  its  mass  is  a 
million  times  less.  The  sun  is  as  certain  as  the  earth  or  the 
moon  to  attain,  at  length,  a  state  of  total  refrigeration.  It  has 
been  a  "white"  star  and  a  "yellow"  star;  it  is  now  a  "  varia- 
ble "  star,  and  is  destined  to  shine,  in  some  future  age,  with  the 
ruddy  glow  of  a  "  red  "  star — a  dying  ember.  It  will  become 
incrusted.  Then  there  will  be  disruptions  and  outflows  of 
glowing  molten  matter,  and  from  time  to  time  it  will  pour 
forth  a  fitful  gleam  like  the  other  "  temporary  "  stars.  But  its 
ultimate  solidification  is  a  conclusion  which  science  knows  not 
how  to  avoid.  It  is  a  fearful  condition  of  nature  to  contem- 
plate, and  fills  the  imagination  with  pictures  of  desolation ;  but 
the  thought,  the  impending  certainty,  reveals  the  vastness  of 


LIMITATION  FROM  ETHEREAL  RESISTANCE.         377 

the  power  which  works  these  long -coming  results,  and  re- 
echoes the  testimony  of  our  Scriptures  that  the  sun  shall  be 
blotted  out  and  the  world  shall  come  to  an  end. 

4.  There  is  a  grander  disturbing  force  which  is  destined  to 
interrupt  the  existence  of  the  present  terrestrial  and  cosmical 
harmony.  All  space  is  filled  with  an  inconceivably  thin  fluid 
called  ether,  the  vibrations  of  which  give  rise  to  the  phenomena 
of  light  and  heat.  Wherever  light  exists,  there  is  ether.  This 
fluid  is  material.  It  must,  therefore,  oppose  the  movements  of 
all  celestial  bodies.  Indeed,  the  effect  of  this  resistance  has  al- 
ready been  recognized  in  the  motions  of  some  of  those  filmy 
bodies,  the  comets.  Encke's  comet  is  continually  approaching 
the  sun,  and  it  is  a  simple  problem  in  arithmetic  to  ascertain 
when  it  will  be  drawn  into  the  central  luminary.  If  the  ethe- 
real medium  is  capable  of  affecting  measurably,  in  a  few  months, 
the  motion  of  cometary  bodies,  it  must  necessarily  affect,  to 
some  extent,  the  motions  of  all  the  planets.  The  earth,  conse- 
quently, must  be  gradually  approaching  the  sun,  and  must  be 
destined  to  ultimate  precipitation  upon  that  body.  Here  is  an- 
other crisis  impending  over  terrestrial  affairs. 

But  if  the  earth  is  destined  to  fall  upon  the  sun,  the  same 
destiny  awaits  every  planet;  and  the  time  must  arrive  when 
all  the  matter  of  the  solar  system  will  be  aggregated  in  one 
cold,  darkened  mass.  This  is  the  direction  in  which  events  are 
tending.  We  say  this  is  one  of  the  results  of  the  distant  fut- 
ure, if  the  forces  of  nature  continue  to  act  as  they  are  acting. 
Holding  to  the  constancy  of  these  forces,  and  believing  that 
no  new  force  or  mode  of  action  capable  of  averting,  even  if  it 
could  postpone,  such  a  catastrophe,  will  ever  be  discovered,  we 
see  no  way  to  avoid  it,  save  by  miraculous  interference,  of 
which  science  can  take  no  account. 

The  course  of  nature,  therefore,  is  tending  toward  an  end. 
This  final  aggregation  will  be  a  stage  of  total  equilibrium  and 
stagnation  of  all  the  forces  of  matter.  No  heat,  no  light,  no 


378  PARALLELISM  WITH  ST.  PETER. 

motion,  no  life,  no  change  —  but  the  eternal  death  of  the  cos- 
mical  organism.  Eternal  ?  What  prevents  the  Omnific  Hand 
from  being  stretched  forth  to  arouse  the  corpse  of  matter  to  a 
new  resurrection — to  inaugurate  a  new  creation?  This  we 
think  probable ;  and  tlms  may  arise  "  a  new  heaven  and  a 
new  earth." 

We  must  therefore  contemplate  the  life-time  of  the  universe 
as  limited  by  natural  causes  in  both  directions,  and  incapable 
of  sustaining  itself  indefinitely  without  the  interposition  of  a 
Power  external  to  the  universe,  superior  to  it,  and  acting  inde- 
pendently of  the  forces  of  nature. 

Is  any  one  of  these  remote  contingencies  the  mode  of  con- 
summation of  terrestrial  affairs  foreshadowed  by  St.  Peter? 
Perhaps  not,  but  they  involve  the  fiery  catastrophe  of  the 
apostle. 

(l.)  The  end  of  the  world,  in  the  meaning  of  Peter,  is  that 
catastrophe  which  will  end  its  occupancy  by  human  beings. 

(2.)  Vast  stores  of  molten  material  remain  imprisoned  within 
the  crust  of  the  earth.  Geologists  understand  that  the  pro- 
gressive changes  of  the  earth  have,  time  and  again,  involved 
such  disruptions  of  the  crust  as  to  cause  the  outflow  of  vast 
quantities  of  this  molten  matter;  and  that,  though  the  erup- 
tions become  less  frequent  with  the  lapse  of  ages,  it  may  be 
that  occasional  outbursts,  as  the  rigid  crust  thickens,  grow 
necessarily  more  violent.  The  highest  mountains  have  been 
upheaved  in  the  later  ages  of  geological  history.  A  devastating 
outburst  may  yet  occur  which  will  destroy  the  present  aspects 
of  the  world. 

(3.)  The  earth  may  be  precipitated  into  the  sun  before  the 
period  of  its  total  refrigeration  arrives. 

(4.)  Then,  even  if  the  sun  be  totally  refrigerated,  the  impact 
of  the  earth  upon  it  would  develop  heat  sufficient  to  reignite 
the  matter  of  the  world. 

(5.)  The  earth  may  reach,  in  its  well-known  movement  with 


DIVINE  ATTRIBUTES  DEDUCED  FROM  NATURE.      379 

the  sun  through  space,  a  region  so  intensely  heated  as  to  an- 
swer to  a  fulfillment  of  the  prophecy  of  St.  Peter. 

Thus,  there  is  no  occasion  whatever  to  feel  diminished  con- 
fidence in  the  words  of  the  apostle,  or  to  hesitate  to  follow 
natural  causes  to  their  ultimate  issue,  or  to  fear,  in  this  connec- 
tion more  than  elsewhere,  that  science  or  philosophy  will  attain 
a  valid  conclusion  which  was  not  in  full  view  of  the  Author  of 
inspiration  when  each  word  of  our  Sacred  Scriptures  was  penned. 

X.   The  Bible  in  the  Light  of  Nature. 

We  are  not  proposing,  in  a  brief  article,  to  detail  the  coin- 
cidences which  exist  between  the  teachings  of  the  Bible  and 
the  conclusions  of  science  and  reason.  We  propose,  in  view  of 
those  coincidences,  to  maintain  that  the  authenticity  and  au- 
thority of  the  Bible  may  be  rationally  admitted,  and  that  its 
inspiration  is  the  only  explanation  of  these  coincidences. 

In  the  series  of  articles  of  which  this  is  the  conclusion,  it  has 
been  our  object  to  set  forth  the  great  features  of  the  harmony 
between  science  and  revelation.  It  has,  of  course,  been  done 
very  meagrely  and  unsatisfactorily ;  but,  so  far  as  we  have  suc- 
ceeded, it  has  been  shown  that  the  material  universe  presents 
forms,  adaptations,  contrivances,  correlations,  which,  judging  it 
as  we  do  the  products  of  human  agency,  exemplify  various  at- 
tributes and  dispositions  existing  on  the  part  of  its  Author. 
For  instance,  we  involuntarily  regard  the  upbuilding  of  mount- 
ains and  the  movements  of  cosmical  masses  of  matter  as  evi- 
dences of  the  exercise  of  power.  We  involuntarily  declare  that 
the  mechanical  contrivances  witnessed  in  the  eye,  or  the  hand, 
or  the  system  of  the  heavens,  are  proofs  of  the  exercise  of  in- 
telligence. We  can  not  resist  the  conviction  that  in  a  world 
where  almost  every  thing  presents  some  unmistakable  and  oft- 
en elaborate,  and  even  anticipatory,  adaptation  to  promote  hap- 
piness, and  where  so  many  things  have  no  discoverable  end, 
if  it  be  not  to  promote  happiness,  the  attribute  of  benevolence 


380  ONE  DEITY  IN  TWO  REVELATIONS. 

must  have  actuated  the  Planner  of  existing  arrangements.  We 
regard  the  material  world,  therefore,  as  proof  of  the  exercise  of 
power,  intelligence,  and  beneficence ;  and  if  we  are  met  by  the 
objection  that  the  works  of  nature  so  far  transcend  our  com- 
prehension that  we  can  not  be  certain  of  the  motives  and  pow- 
ers through  whose  activity  they  came  into  existence,  we  imme- 
diately and  confidently  reply  that  human  reason  affirms  that 
any  product  which  can  be  pronounced  a  mechanism  must  have 
had  an  intelligent  contriver,  who  exercised  sufficient  power  to 
embody  his  idea,  and  must  have  acted  from  motives  deducible, 
to  some  extent,  from  the  results  of  his  activity.  Any  result 
interpretable  in  terms  of  intellect  and  motive  is  the  result  of 
intellect  and  motive.  This  is  a  law  of  reason  which  we  can 
not  evade  without  self-stultification,  and  a  total  abandonment  of 
grounds  of  inference  which  are  ingrained  in  human  nature  and 
underlie  all  our  actions.  The  data  of  science  supplemented  by 
the  data  of  reason  do,  therefore,  establish  the  existence  of  such 
a  Creator  as  is  portrayed  in  our  Scriptures. 

We  have  gone  farther,  and  shown  that  such  a  unity  of  phys- 
ical conditions  and  such  a  system  of  mutual  dependencies  ex- 
ist throughout  the  limits  of  the  visible  universe,  that  it  would 
be  eminently  unreasonable  to  assume  that  the  universe  had 
been  the  product  of  more  than  one  intelligence ;  and  we  have 
shown  that  a  unity  no  less  intelligible  and  manifest  connects  all 
present  existence  with  the  whole  history  of  the  past ;  so  that 
it  is  impossible  that  indefinite  time,  any  more  than  indefinite 
space,  should  have  witnessed  the  supremacy  of  more  than  one 
intelligent  power.  And  this  revelation-  of  an  infinite  and  eter- 
nal God  in  nature  is  identical  with  the  revelation  given  in  our 
Scriptures.  The  God  of  nature  and  the  God  of  the  Bible 
(viewed  in  his  relations  to  the  natural  world)  are  portrayed  in 
the  same  character;  and  this  commits  science  to  an  indorse- 
ment of  every  thing  said  in  the  Bible  regarding  those  divine  at- 
tributes whose  exercise  is  reflected  in  the  phenomena  of  nature. 


SCIENCE  AND  SCRIPTURE  PARALLEL.  381 

We  have  adverted  to  the  religious  nature  of  man  under  all 
conditions,  and  have  shown  that  religious  ideas,  notions,  or  sen- 
timents are  universal  and  necessary,  and  therefore  ineradicable 
and  innate.  The  constitution  of  human  nature  is,  therefore,  a 
sanction  of  every  thing  which  is  revealed  in  the  material  world 
or  the  Holy  Bible  respecting  the  being  and  attributes  of  Deity 
and  man's  moral  relations  to  him. 

Not  contenting  ourselves  with  proving  that  science  and 
philosophy  demand  such  a  God  as  the  Bible  reveals,  we  have 
shown  that  science  also  authenticates  the  Bible  in  respect  to 
some  important  statements  which  still  might  accord,  or  not, 
with  secular  data.  We  have  shown,  for  instance,  that  the  re- 
markable record  of  creation,  generally  ascribed  to  Moses,  har- 
monizes beautifully  with  the  latest  determinations  of  science, 
and  must  have  been  wholly  unintelligible,  save  in  its  spirit  and 
general  purport,  to  former  generations  of  men ;  and  we  have 
indicated  certain  remarkable  statements  in  this  connection, 
which  prove  that  the  author  of  Genesis  had  information  vastly 
in  advance  of  his  nation  or  age,  and  which  he  could  not  have 
possessed  except  through  miraculous  communication.  We 
have  shown  that  the  Biblical  account  of  the  deluge  violates  no 
physical  probabilities,  while  it  is  sustained  by  geological  anal- 
ogies, and  by  traditions  extant  among  many  nations  and  tribes. 
We  have  shown  that  science  testifies  that  man  belongs,  as  the 
Bible  asserts,  to  the  group  of  last -created  animals;  that  that 
creation  was  comparatively  recent;  that  he  made  his  first  ap- 
pearance in  the  Orient ;  that  he  was,  in  a  certain  sense,  a  long- 
premeditated  consummation ;  and  that  his  advent  and  posses- 
sion of  the  earth  constitute  a  finality  in  the  geological  succes- 
sion of  animals.  We  have  shown,  finally,  that,  contrary  to  the 
tenor  of  ancient  philosophy,  science  declares  that  a  beginning 
of  the  present  order  of  things  is  a  necessity,  and  that  a  conclu- 
sion is  equally  inevitable ;  while  abundant  provision  exists  for 
such  a  fiery  consummation  as  St.  Peter  foreshadows. 


382  THE  BIBLE  AUTHENTICATED. 

What  does  all  this  corroboration  imply  ?  Not  that  the  Bi- 
ble needs  the  sanction  of  science  and  philosophy  in  the  minds 
of  most  men ;  but  that,  if  there  be  men  who  withhold  their 
acceptance  of  the  Bible  until  they  know  whether  science  and 
philosophy  assent,  they  may  feel  assured  that  science  and  phi- 
losophy demand  their  acceptance.  It  implies  that  if  the  per- 
vading ideas  and  so  many  of  the  collateral  statements  of  the 
Bible  are  in  full  accord  with  the  data  and  doctrines  of  science, 
the  whole  body  of  documents  may  be  accepted  as  authentic 
and  authoritative.  It  implies  that  the  authors  of  these  docu- 
ments were  in  possession  of  light,  even  in  secular  affairs,  which 
did  not  belong  to  their  times,  and  could  only  have  come  into 
their  possession  through  immediate  intuition — that  is,  the  sa- 
cred writers  were  inspired  men.  This  proof  establishes  the 
Bible  as  the  utterance  of  God,  the  Author  of  all  truth,  and 
therefore  as  an  infallible  authority  even  in  matters  transcend- 
ing the  limits  of  science  and  philosophy. 

If  it  still  be  felt  that  this  is  admitting  supernatural  presence 
and  intervention  in  an  affair  where  human  agency  may  be 
made  to  account  for  all  the  phenomena,  we  would  further  re- 
ply: 1.  It  is  incredible  that  the  sacred  writers  should  have 
learned,  save  through  inspiration,  facts  and  methods  which  un- 
inspired science  has  had  to  labor  three  thousand  years  to  ac- 
quire. 2.  The  admission  of  supernatural  ism  in  inspiration  is 
no  greater  a  strain  than  to  admit  it  in  creation.  But  the  tend- 
ency of  science  is  to  go  even  farther,  and  recognize  the  daily 
processes  of  the  organic  world  as  but  the  result  of  the  immedi- 
ate activity  of  divine  intelligence  and  power.  We  can  not  es- 
cape the  supernatural,  either  as  an  immediate  presence  or  an 
ultimate  resting-point.  3.  If  such  a  God  exists  as  the  study 
of  nature  proclaims,  there  is  an  antecedent  probability  that  he 
would  make  such  a  written  revelation  as  our  Scriptures  profess 
to  be.  A  God  of  infinite  goodness  could  not  leave  his  creatures 
to  grope  painfully  after  a  knowledge  of  their  origin,  relations, 


THE  SOUL'S  PLEDGE  OF  A  REVELATION.  383 

and  destiny,  but,  having  implanted  in  them  moral  and  religious 
aspirations,  would  make  a  revelation  of  their  appropriate  ob- 
ject. 4.  The  supernatural  teachings  of  the  Scriptures  are  suit- 
ed to  the  constitution  and  wants  of  man.  Though  he  may, 
from  nature,  find  out  the  existence  of  God,  and  may  attain  to 
exalted  conceptions  of  many  of  his  attributes,  there  is  a  deep- 
felt  insufficiency  in  nature.  Looking  up  toward  the  infinite 
Beneficence  to  which  man  feels  that  he  owes  every  enjoyment, 
the  spirit  of  prayer  rises  to  his  lips,  and  he  would  fain  cry,  "  O 
Lord,  rescue  me  from  this  evil !"  But  how  dares  he  enter  into 
the  presence  of  Omnipotence  unbidden  ?  With  what  expecta- 
tion can  he  prefer  a  request  from  the  King  of  kings?  Does 
not  all  nature  declare  that  the  purposes  of  Deity  are  ripening 
through  the  ages,  and  a  poor  mortal  must  vainly  interpose  a 
human-born  motive  to  divine  activity  ?  Will  he  not  be  spurn- 
ed from  the  presence  of  the  Almighty  ?  And  yet  he  feels : 
"  Oh,  if  I  could  but  interpose  my  petition !  Oh,  if  I  could  move 
the  divine  Power  to  avert  this  calamity !"  He  feels  that  he 
must  approach  God,  and  yet  how  dares  he?  And  with  what 
prospect  of  a  hearing  ?  Will  the  Infinite  Beneficence  leave  his 
creatures  in  this  state  of  uncertainty,  or  this  state  of  misery  ? 
No ;  he  will  speak.  And  when  we  read  the  words,  "  Cast  thy 
burden  upon  the  Lord,"  "Come  unto  me,"  "Ask  and  ye  shall 
receive,"  we  recognize  these  as  the  very  words  for  which  the 
soul  was  longing.  These  are  words  framed  for  the  unsatisfied 
heart.  They  fit  the  occasion ;  they  bear  the  stamp  of  authen- 
ticity. They  can  be  non,e  but  the  word  of  God. 

A  revelation  respecting  man's  moral  relations  and  future  state 
must  touch  upon  topics  beyond  the  reach  of  science  and  phi- 
losophy. The  search  for  verities  here  leads  into  the  inscruta- 
ble thoughts  and  purposes  of  the  Omniscient.  Such  a  revela- 
tion as  science  itself  gives  us  ground  for  anticipating  must  be 
a  revelation  involving  important  statements  that  transcend  the 
reach  of  demonstrations,  and  must  be  accepted  solely  on  the 

17 


384  FAITH  IN  THE  UNKNOWABLE. 

established  authority  of  the  Revelator.      Faith  is  the  logical 
corollary  of  science  and  the  highest  flight  of  reason. 

Thus  we  are  led  to  believe  that  the  cultivation  of  science  and 
philosophy  is  not  only  harmless,  but  leads  the  candid  mind  to 
a  reverent  knowledge  of  God  and  an  implicit  faith  in  the  most 
mysterious  utterances  of  his  Sacred  Word. 


INDEX. 


ABARIS,  91. 

Abelard,  75. 

Abidharma,  55. 

Abiogenesis,  opposed  to  logic,  144 ; 
not  unseriptural,  225. 

Abnormal  states  of  faith,  42  ;  causes 
of,  42. 

Abraham,  185. 

Absolute  attributes,  276. 

Abury,  190. 

Academia  Telesiana,  80. 

Academy,  Old,  62 ;  Middle,  93 ;  New, 
66. 

Activity  the  law  of  existence,  128. 

Advent  of  man  recent,  223. 

^Eneas  of  Gaza,  73. 

^Enesidemus,  69,  93. 

JEtiological  argument,  139, 150,  197, 
279  ;  formulated,  284-285  ;  view- 
ed critically,  295. 

Affinity,  chemical,  261-262. 

Agassiz,  Louis,  attacked  by  Haeckel, 
114;  philosopher  and  scientist, 
137 ;  on  relation  of  organism  and 
environment,  141. 

Agathological  argument,  198,  299. 

Ahuramazda,  53. 

Air  as  first  principle,  56. 

Albertus  Magnus,  76,  99,  357. 

Albigenses,  74. 

Alcuin,  73. 

Alembert,d',  82,  2i8,  312. 

Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  284, 293. 

Alexander  of  Hales,  76. 

Alexander,  Stephen,  301. 

Alexander  the  Great,  48,  281. 

Alexandria,  Hebrew  literature  in,  67. 

Alfarabi,  78,  99. 

Algazel,  78. 

Alkendi,  78. 


Alps,  upheaval  of,  333. 

Amalric,  76. 

Amblypoda,  171. 

America,  discovery  of,  79. 

Ammonius  Saccas,  70. 

Amosis,  47. 

Amphibian  stage  of  embryo,  171. 

Amphioxus  stage,  171. 

Anaptomorphiis  (Antiacodon),  172. 

Anaxagoras  of  Clazomenae,  58,  121, 

221,  280,  282,  285. 
Anaximander,  56. 
Anaximenes,  56. 
Anchippus,  169. 
Anchit/ierium,  171. 
Andaman  islanders,  189,  353. 
Andes,  upheaval  of,  333. 
Animals  become  extinct,  370. 
Anniceris,  62. 
Anselm,  266,  293. 
Anselmian  argument,  299. 
Antagonism,  a  law  of  progress,  34, 

41;  self -regulative,  212,  228;   of 

faith  and  philosophy,  72. 
Anthropomorphic  language,  uses  of, 

39 ;  found  in  Hebrew  Scriptures, 

204. 

Anthropomorphic  stage,  38,  282. 
Anthropomorphism    inevitable,    38, 

245,  282. 

Anticipation  of  use  of  organs,  142. 
Anticipatory  organs  not  produced  by 

heredity,  147. 
Antinomians,  72. 
Antiochus  of  Ascalon,  67. 
Antiquity  of  human  race,  222. 
Antisthenes,  61. 

'A-jrtipov  (TO)  as  first  principle,  56. 
Apollodorus,  65. 
Apollonius  of  Tyana,  68. 


386 


INDEX. 


Apollonius  the  Grammarian,  71. 

Apostolicism,  83. 

Apuleius,  68. 

Aquinas,  75,  76,  266,  356. 

Arabs  and  ancient  learning,  78  ;  con- 
tributing science,  79. 

Arago,  277. 

Arafuras  of  Vorkay,  89,  353. 

Aratus,  272. 

Arbitrary  volition  not  implied  by  in- 
telligence, 131. 

Arbrousset,  229. 

Arcesilaus,  63. 

Archegenesis,  Greek  doctrine  of,  59 ; 
must  be  assumed,  149,  225. 

Archetype,  vertebrate,  163,  176;  of 
vegetable,  176. 

Arguments,  theistic,  197-199;  equiv- 
alences of,  279,  299;  in  Greek 
philosophy,  284-286. 

Argyll,  Duke  of,  109,  315. 

Aristasus,  91. 

Aristarchus  of  Samos,  213. 

Aristides,  71. 

Aristippus,  61. 

Aristo,  71. 

Aristobulus,  67. 

Aristotelian  argument,  299. 

Aristotelianism,  63,  64 ;  serving  the 
Church,  76. 

Aristotle,  58,  59,  63,  64,  76,  96, 108, 
137,  233,  276,  279,  283,  285,  286. 

Armenian  traditions  of  deluge,  366t 

Artemia  and  Uranchipus,  253. 

Articulates,  156. 

Aryan  religions,  186. 

Asceticism  of  Antisthencs,  61. 

Ascidian  stage,  171. 

Asoka,  54. 

Asteroidal  zone,  175. 

Atheism  not  defended  by  Draper  or 
Tyndall,  132;  contributing  de- 
fenses to  theism,  176 ;  rejected  by 
Tyndall,  238,  239. 

Athenagoras,  71. 

Athenians,  religion  of,  271. 

Athenian  school  of  Neo  -  Platonism, 
70. 

Athens  and  its  people,  269. 

Atomic  universe,  motions  in,  103. 

Atomism,  held  by  Anaxagoras  of  Cla- 
zomena?,  58  ;  not  necessarily  athe- 


istic, 102,  103,  234 ;  requires  cau- 
sality, 102 ;  implies  creation,  103  ; 
tendency  to,  232. 

Atomists:  Leucippus,  59,  102;  De- 
mocritus,  59,  233,  234 ;  Bruno,  59, 
234;  Tyndall,  59,  102,  232;  Epi- 
curus, 64, 102,  233  ;  Lucretius,  65, 
233,  236 ;  Gassendi,  102,  234. 

Atoms  endowed  with  life,  236 ;  not 
explained  by  chance,  242 ;  ulti- 
mate realities  of  science,  256 ;  ul- 
timate constituents  of  matter,  324. 

Attributes  of  Deity  illustrated  in  nat- 
ure, 333-351. 

Augustine,  Aurelius,  289,  293,  356, 
362. 

Augustinism,  83. 

Aurelius,  Marcus,  287. 

Ausland,  Das,  111. 

Authority  of  primitive  beliefs,  193. 

Averroes,  78. 

Averroism,  78 ;  before  Averroes,  64. 

Averroists,  76. 

A  vesta,  52. 

Avicenna,  78. 

Aztecs,  belief  of,  in  a  redeemer,  22 ; 
religion  of,  185,  353. 

BACON,  FRANCIS,  74,  218,  228,  234, 

279,  320. 

Bacon,  Roger,  78,  79. 
Baer,  Von,  111,  133,  143,  155,  159. 
Bain,  Alexander,  225. 
Baird,  S.  R,  on  hybrid  woodpeckers, 

172. 

Balfour,  158. 
Bannes,  357. 
Bardessanes,  71. 
Barker,  George  R,  129,  225. 
Bar-kochba,  72. 
Barrow,  266, 293. 
Basil  the  Great,  73. 
Basilides,  71. 
Bastian,  224,  322. 
Batrachian  as  a  stage  in  evolution 

of  skeleton,  164. 
Battle-fields  of  faith,  207. 
Boyle,  80,  218. 
Beauty  has  a  teleological  meaning, 

156. 

Beda,  73. 
Behistun,  inscription  at,  53. 


INDEX. 


387 


Belief,  affected  by  mental  states,  92 ; 
rational  and  emotional  avenues 
to,  152 ;  various  degrees  of  valid- 
ity of,  307. 

Bell,  158. 

Beneficence  illustrated  in  nature, 
342-347. 

Berchetti,  357. 

Berengarius,  75. 

Berghaus,  186. 

Bergstrasser,  Dr.,  364. 

Berkeley,  81,  218. 

Berti,  357. 

Bianconi,  109. 

Bible,  made  the  criterion  of  all 
truth,  233 ;  in  the  light  of  nature, 
379-384;  antecedently  probable, 
382 ;  supernatural  teachings  of, 
382-383. 

Biblical  cosmogony.  (See  Cosmogo- 
ny-) 

Biblical  deluge.     (See  Deluge.) 

Biran,  Maine  de,  94. 

Bird  a  stage  in  evolution  of  verte- 
brate skeleton,  164. 

Birds,  connected  with  reptiles,  171 ; 
variations  among,  254. 

Boccaccio,  79. 

Body  in  relation  to  space  and  time, 
318-319. 

Boethius,  73. 

Bonaventure,  St.,  357. 

Bonnet,  82. 

"  Book  of  the  Dead,"  47. 

"  Book  of  Transmigrations,"  47. 

Bosphorus,  Thracian,  364. 

Bossuet,  357. 

Boulak,  Egyptian  antiquities  at,  46. 

Brahman  as,  51. 

Brahmanism,  bifurcation  of,  46 ;  cy- 
cles of,  51 ;  one  of  the  ethnic  re- 
ligions, 186,  353. 

Brain  secreting  thought,  225,  255 ; 
conditioning  thought,  226,  250- 
251. 

Branchipus  and  Artemia,  253. 

Braun,  Adolf,  111. 

"Bridgewater  Treatises,"  314. 

Bronze  Age,  190. 

Brown,  Thomas,  270. 

Bruno,  59,  80,  137,  234. 

Buchner,  89,  111,  225. 


Buckle,  143. 

Buddha,  54,  91. 

Buddhism  a  bifurcation  of  Brahman- 
ism,  46,  52 ;  one  of  the  ethnic  re- 
ligions, 186,  353;  in  China,  50; 
in  Persia,  53 ;  in  various  countries, 
54 ;  missionary  spirit  of,  54 ;  de- 
generacy of,  54. 

Buffon,  82. 

Burton,  89,  208,  292. 

Butler,  Bishop,  151,  179,  234,  266, 
293,  301,  314. 

CAIRO,  Egyptian  antiquities  at,  47. 

Cajetan,  Cardinal,  357. 

Calderwood,  293. 

Calvin,  77. 

Cambyses,  53. 

Campanella,  80. 

Canus,  Melchior,  357. 

Carneades,  63,  94. 

Carpenter,  W.  B.,  145,  225,  293,  315. 

Carpenter  theory,  128. 

Carpocrates,  71. 

Cartesian  vortices  foreshadowed,  59. 

Casalis,  story  told  by,  229. 

Cassianus,  73. 

Catholic,  Roman,  form  of  faith  ap- 
pearing, 215. 

Caucasian  race  perhaps  the  Adamic, 
222,  223. 

Causal  intermediation,  120;  the  field 
of  scientific  inquiry,  134,  241, 245  ; 
modified  by  conditions,  139,  250. 

Causal  intermediation,  or  secondary 
cause  implies  primary  causation, 
137;  absence  of  primary  cause, 
congruity  of  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent, 138;  efficiency,  139. 

Causality,  intuition  of,  26,  197,  242  ; 
doctrine  of,  87 ;  intuition  of,  leads 
to  Deity,  93,  197;  universality  of 
intuition,  93 ;  its  origin,  94 ;  deriv- 
atives of,  298. 

Causal  relation,  implications  of,  95, 
101-119. 

Causation  implies,  spontaneity,  98  ; 
real  cause,  101 ;  relation  of  ante- 
cedence, 104 ;  correlative  subject- 
ivity and  objectivity,  104,  263; 
self  -  consciousness,  105,  263;  ef- 
fect conceived,  106,  263;  con- 


388 


INDEX. 


sciousness  of  principle  of  causa- 
tion, 107,  215;  motive,  107,  264; 
contingency,  115,  250,  264;  influ- 
ence of  contingency  cognized,  116, 
264 ;  desire  to  effectuate,  116,  264 ; 
freedom,  116;  intention,  116;  will, 
117,  260,  264;  personality,  119, 
263 ;  in  finite  causation,  'instru- 
mentalities, 265. 

Causation,  primordial,  recession  of, 
27, 131,  243-245  ;  always  believed 
real,  245. 

Cause,  denial  of  reality  of,  93 ;  but 
one  species  of,  96 ;  arbitrarily  as- 
sumed, 148 ;  not  attainable  by  sci- 
ence, 131,  241. 

Cause,  potential,  95;  material,  97; 
formal,  97;  negative,  97;  exem- 
plary, 97;  modal,  97;  physical, 
120,134,240-241,249. 

Cause  physical  or  secondary  not  real 
cause,  98  ;  discriminated  from  ef- 
ficient, 121,  247 ;  when  idea  of, 
arises,  244;  assumed  as  efficient 
in  scientific  language,  247. 

Cause,  primary,  faith  in,  never  aban- 
doned, 245. 

Causes  of  skepticism,  179-184. 

Causes,  true,  recognized  in  environ- 
ment by  Tyndall,  235. 

Celsus,  68. 

Centrifugal  force  in  organization, 
165. 

Centripetal  force  in  organization, 
165. 

Cesalpinus,  79. 

Chadbourne,P.,158. 

Chaldean  deluge,  365. 

Challis,  Professor,  315. 

Chalmerian  hypothesis,  363. 

Chalmers,  158,  316. 

Chance  not  causal,  101,  242 ;  what  it 
means,  101, 102,  242-243. 

Chaos  as  first  principle,  56. 

Chevron  bones,  183. 

Chinese  psychic  history,  48 ;  religions, 
187 ;  traditions  of  deluge,  366. 

Christ,  signifies  a  culminating  relig- 
ious phase,  69 ;  viewed  as  a  mar- 
tyr, 214. 

Christian  defense,  proper  spirit  of, 
267. 


Christian  psychic  history,  66. 

"  Christianity  and  Greek  Philoso- 
phy," purpose  of,  268 ;  style  of, 
290. 

Christianity,  made  sponsor  for  false 
theories,  1 83 ;  one  of  the  ethnic 
religions,  185,  383 ;  to  ally  itself 
with  all  truth,  267;  concerned  in 
the  discovery  of  all  truth,  268; 
grounded  in  human  nature,  280. 

Cicero,  66,  92, 108, 158,  284,  293. 

Clark,  H.  James,  158, 253. 

Clark,  Samuel,  158. 

Clarke,  James  Freeman,  292. 

Cleanthes,  64, 213,  272. 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  72,  91 ;  on 
the  Sacred  Canon,  47 ;  on  causes, 
98 ;  an  evolutionist,  143 ;  on  in- 
spiration of  Greek  philosophy, 
202;  on  relations  of  faith  and 
knowledge,  266 ;  on  office  of  Greek 
philosophy,  280 ;  on  the  shallow- 
minded,  304 ;  on  the  necessity  of 
knowledge  to  sustain  faith,  311. 

Clerk-Maxwell,  234. 

Cloister  schools,  74. 

Cocker,  B.  R,  109, 118, 134  ;  "  Chris- 
tianity and  Greek  Philosophy,"  by, 
266;  "Theistic  Conception  of  the 
World,"  by,  304. 

Cohesive  attraction,  261-262. 

Coleridge,  94, 138. 

Columbus,  79,  216. 

Comprehensive  types  in  Eocene,  172. 

Comte,  89,  137,  143,  208,  276,  293, 
315. 

Comtean  theory  of  religion,  270. 

Condillac,  81. 

Condition,  in  causality,  115,  250;  in 
secondary  causality,  139, 250;  sub- 
jective and  objective,  140 ;  organ- 
ic, 140 ;  permissive,  146 ;  danger 
of  confounding  with  cause,  250. 

Condition,  objective,  mistaken  for 
efficiency,  145. 

Condition,  subjective,  mistaken  for 
objective,  and  then  for  efficiency, 
140 ;  mistaken  for  efficiency,  142. 

Conditioned  existence,  197. 

Condorcet,  82. 

Conflict  between  religious  and  intel- 
lectual faculties,  18,  31, 34, 77, 208. 


INDEX. 


389 


Conflict,  law  of,  18,  34 ;  how  it  arises, 
26,  211 ;  what  it  really  is,  33,  215, 
218,  233 ;  why  permitted  to  exist, 
33  ;  with  human  passions,  35  ;  in 
individual  mind,  312. 

Conflicts  historically  sketched,  46. 

Conflicts  of  faith,  207. 

Confucianism,  187. 

Confucius,  49, 187. 

Conglomeration  of  planets,  377. 

Congruity,  a  law  of  secondary  cau- 
sation, 138;  enunciated  by  Cole- 
ridge, 138 ;  opposed  to  doctrine  of 
organized  experiences,  148 ;  op- 
posed to  abiogenesis,  148. 

Conscience,  defined  and  discrimi- 
nated, 23,  327;  defined  by  Dr. 
Cocker,  326 ;  not  a  cognitive  fac- 
ulty, 23 ;  a  constituent  of  the  re- 
ligious nature,  25. 

Consciousness  of  self  implied  in  cau- 
sality, 105  ;  of  causal  relation  im- 
plied, 107;  veracity  of,  136. 

Consensus  gentium,  66,  92, 105. 

Conservation  of  force,  181. 

Conservatism  of  religious  faith,  29 ; 
an  indirect  cause  of  skepticism,  179. 

Constants  of  religious  systems,  37, 
187. 

Contenson,  Vincentius,  357. 

Continents  uplifted,  360. 

Continuity  of  motion,  260. 

Contradiction  between  reason  and 
faith,  80. 

Contrivance.    (See  Correlation.) 

Conviction,  grounds  of,  306. 

Cooke,  Josiah,  158. 

Cooling  of  the  earth,  375;  of  the 
sun,  376. 

Cope,  E.  D.,  on  fossil  vertebrates,  171. 

Copernicus,  79, 234. 

Correlation  implies  intelligence,  112, 
150-153. 

Correlations,  mechanical  and  modal, 
153 ;  mechanical,  153 ;  modal, 
154;  conspicuous  in  nature,  154, 
260 ;  modal  may  be  viewed  as  te- 
leological,  155  ;  imply  intelligence, 
260. 

Cosmical  history,  174-177. 

Cosmogony,  Biblical,  222,  320 ;  pro- 
emium  in,  320-322, 961. 


Cosmological  argument,  279 ;  formu- 
lated, 285 ;  equivalences  of,  279- 
299. 

Council  of  Nice,  72, 73 ;  of  Soissons,  75. 

Cousin,  94,  270. 

Cowardice  of  believers,  182. 

Coxcox,  366. 

Cranium  viewed  homologically,  162. 

Creation  of  the  world,  220 ;  Biblical 
idea  of,  358. 

Creations,  occasional  and  perpetual, 
166. 

Creeds,  effete  constituents  of,  30,  31, 
216;  made  to  embrace  non-essen- 
tials, 212,  220;  purified  by  con- 
flict, 37, 228. 

Creodonta,  172. 

Critias,  60,  90. 

Cudworth,  109,  272,  314,  323. 

Curry,  Daniel,  289. 

Cusanus,  79, 91. 

Cushite  religion,  185. 

Cuvier,  Georges,  109,  137,  140,  159, 
363. 

Cycles  in  the  fortunes  of  religion, 
35,213-221. 

Cycles,  psychic.  (See  Intellectual 
Phases;  Religious  Phases.) 

Cyclical  movements  of  faith  and  in- 
tellect, 42,  212. 

Cynic  school,  61. 

Cyprian,  73. 

Cyrenaic  school,  61, 62. 

Cyrus  the  Persian,  53. 

D'ALEMBERT,  82,  218,  312. 

Damascenus,  73. 

Damascius,  last  teacher  at  Athens, 
70. 

Dana,  J.  D.,  277,  363. 

Dante,  79. 

Darius,  53. 

Darwin,  Charles,  110,  140,  144,  172; 
208,  235,  236,  292. 

Darwinism  opposed  by  certain  facts, 
141,  142 ;  violates  principle  of 
congruity,  145 ;  accepted  by  Tyn- 
dall,  235;  to  be  accepted  with 
qualifications,  166,  253-254,  etc. 
(See  Derivation.) 

Darwinists  mistaking  heredity  for 
cause,  146. 


390 


INDEX. 


Dawson,  J.  W.,  140,  2*77. 

Days  of  Genesis,  320-322,  356-357, 
359-362. 

Deduction  the  special  logic  of  phi- 
losophy, 134 ;  but  legitimate  in 
science,  134,  248 ;  examples  of 
use  of,  135 ;  employed  by  Tyn- 
dall,  136. 

Deductions  from  the  theistic  propo- 
sition, 199. 

Deductive  theistic  conclusion,  92, 
117,  274. 

Deductive  theistic  belief,  191,  274. 

Deism,  324. 

Deluge  of  Noah,  223,  363-368 ;  not 
universal,  367. 

Deluges,  post-glacial,  364 ;  in  China, 
365;  in  Chaldea,  365;  Greece, 
366  ;  other  regions,  366-367. 

Democritus,  59,  233. 

Demon  of  Socrates,  319. 

Demonstration  of  being  of  God.  (See 
Deduction,  God,  Religion.) 

De  Morgan,  243. 

Denis  the  Carthusian,  357. 

Derivative  Theory,  philosophical  im- 
plications of,  166 ;  considerations 
favorable  to,  170-172,  253-254; 
theism  of,  174,  224;  depending  on 
the  whole  range  of  evidence,  253- 
254.  (See  Evolution  and  Darwin- 
ism.) 

Descartes,  74,  80,  94,  99,  166,  218, 
234,  266,  275,  273,  363. 

Desert  of  Sahara,  364. 

Designs  in  nature,  use  of  multiplied 
instances  of,  152  ;  writers  illustra- 
ting, 158;  ignored  by  Lucretius, 
233;  illustrations  of,  333-342. 
(See  Final  Cause;  and  Teleology.) 

Desire  implied  in  causality,  116. 

Deucalion,  deluge  of,  366. 

Dharma-Pitaka,  54. 

D'Holbach,  82,  218,  312. 

Diastema,  171. 

Diderot,  82,  218. 

Dinosaurians,  171. 

Diodorus  Cronus,  61. 

Diogenes  of  Sinope,  61. 

Discernment,  of  correlating  forces, 
142  ;  in  organization,  166. 

Dissipation  of  energy,  124. 


Divinity  regarded  as  of  human  ori- 
gin, 60. 

Divorce  of  thought  from  faith,  83. 
Dogmas,  unscientific,  216. 
Dogmatic  theologians,  277. 
Dollinger,  183. 
Domesticated   animals  and   plants, 

371. 

Dordrecht,  Synod  of,  80. 
Draper,  J.  W.,  29,  34,  66,  131,  132, 

244. 

Dualism  inevitable,  105. 
Dubois-Reymond,  257,  258. 
Duns  Scotus,  76. 
Duty,  religious,  rationally   deduced, 

205. 
Dynamic  theory  of  matter,  128-129 ; 

implies  a  modified  pantheism,  130 ; 

consequences,  if  admitted,  1 33. 
Dynamism,  unconscious,  opposed  by 

idea  of  causality,  105. 

ECCLESIASTICISM  in  the  ascendant,  74, 
76. 

Eckart,  78,  91. 

Eclecticism,  66. 

Eclectic  Platonists,  68. 

Ecphantus,  57. 

Effect,  conception  of,  implied  in  cau- 
sality, 106. 

Efficiency  in  secondary  causation, 
139. 

Efficient  cause — how  the  term  is  used, 
96 ;  the  scholastic  sense,  96 ;  not 
known  in  science,  96,  120. 

Egyptian  psychic  history,  46. 

Egyptian  religion,  185,  353. 

Eleatics,  57-58,  283. 

Electricity,  261-262. 

Elements  of  thought — phrase  criti- 
cised, 235. 

Embryonic  development,  171. 

Emotional  conviction,  152. 

Empedocles,  58,  91,  233,  285. 

Empedotimus,  91. 

Encke's  comet,  377. 

End  of  physical  order,  123,  127. 

Endogenous  origin  of  idea  of  causal- 
ity, 94,  95. 

Environment,  and  organic  correla- 
tions, 140;  viewed  as  impressing 
organism,  140 ;  contrary  view, 


INDEX. 


391 


141 ;  not  efficient,  141 ;  sometimes 
an  objective  condition,  146;  no 
explanation  of  persistent  plan, 
168;  regarded  efficient  by  Tyn- 
dall,  235. 

Eocene  animals,  168-172. 

Eohippus,  135,  170. 

Eozoic  age,  361. 

Epictetus,  64,  287. 

Epicureanism,  280. 

Epicurus,  64,  233. 

Epioienides,  91. 

Epicycles  in  psychic  history,  45 ;  in 
Brahmanic  thought,  52 ;  in  the 
Socratic  school,  61 ;  in  the  scho- 
lastic period,  75. 

Equilibrium,  tendency  to,  in  nature, 
122. 

Equine  animals,  166-170,  254. 

Equivalence  of  forces,  261-262. 

Equus,  169. 

Erigena,  75,  76. 

Essenes,  67. 

Eternity  discussed,  315. 

Eternity  of  matter,  63 ;  of  universe, 
276. 

Etli,  a  Hebrew  particle,  358,  362. 

Ether,  disturbing  influence  of,  377. 

Ethical  argument,  198,  284,  299. 

Ethical  influence  of  Greek  philoso- 
phy, 286. 

Ethnic  religions,  353  ;  common  facts 
of,  21, 187  ;  respect  due  to,  205. 

Euclid,  61. 

Eudemus,  63. 

Euhemerus,  62,  82. 

Evangelical  efforts,  304-305. 

Evening  and  morning  in  Genesis,  322. 

Evolution  a  method  of  nature,  142 ; 
a  subjective  condition,  not  a  cause, 
143  ;  implies  a  real  cause,  144  ;  a 
system  of  correlations,  154;  the 
method  of  methods,  154;  a  dem- 
onstration of  mind,  155;  only  a 
method,  155;  ideal  and  material, 
170. 

Evolution  philosophy  in  Greece,  58. 

Evolutionist  school,  232. 

Exemplary  cause,  97. 

Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit  not  a  necessary 
datum,  60. 

Exogenous  origin,  idea  of  cause,  94. 


Experience  not  the  origin  of  idea  of 

causality,  95. 

Experiences  accumulated,  235. 
External  world  deniable,  237,  240; 

rationally  admitted,  240 ;  exists  as 

it  seems,  240. 
Extinctions  of  animals,  370. 

FAITH  and  intellect  in  reciprocal  ac- 
tion, 42. 

Faith  in  God,  origin  of,  89. 

Faith,  religious,  afflictions  of,  27 ; 
conservatism  of,  29, 32, 220 ;  some- 
times defrauded  by  science,  29 ; 
hallows  all  its  objects,  28,  220 ; 
should  not  embrace  scientific  opin- 
ions, 30,  220;  fidelity  of,  27,  220; 
rash  stakes  of,  30 ;  indestructibil- 
ity of,  31 ;  aggressiveness  of,  33. 

False  reasoning  in  science,  139,  140. 

Farrar,  A.  S.,  36,  76,  287. 

Fathers,  force  of  dicta  of,  75 ;  Neo- 
£latonistic,  91. 

Faunas  of  continents  graduated,  371. 

Faustus,  73. 

Favorinus,  69. 

Fetichism,  37,  273. 

Fichte,  I.  H.,  141. 

Fichte,  J.  G.,  195. 

Figuier,  272. 

Fijian  traditions  of  deluge,  366. 

Final  cause,  96 ;  implied  in  causal 
relation,  108 ;  in  Old  Testament, 
108 ;  held  by  Socrates,  Aristotle, 
Stoics,  Cicero,  Lactantius,  Galen, 
108 ;  by  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  Cud- 
worth,  and  many  others,  109 ;  by 
Huxley  and  Hartmann,  110;  by 
Owen  and  others,  111,  158;  illus- 
trations of,  337-342;  mistaken 
for  efficient  cause,  142. 

Final  cause,  opposition  to,  110,  111, 
235,  283  ;  treated  with  levity,  113 ; 
opposition  to,  based  on  an  assump- 
tion, 151 ;  question  of,  philosoph- 
ical, not  scientific,  115. 

Finitencss  of  physical  order,  123, 
127,  319,  373-379. 

Fire  as  first  principle,  66. 

Fire-mist  and  its  evolutions,  74-176, 
359. 

First  cause  only  cause,  99. 


17* 


392 


INDEX. 


Fish  as  expression  of  vertebrate  idea, 
164. 

Fiske,  John,  314. 

Fontenelle,  81. 

Force,  reduced  to  will,  118, 127, 260 ; 
viewed  as  delegated,  122,  125; 
viewed  as  inherent,  122,  256,  322 ; 
tending  to  equilibrium,  123;  in- 
herent, is  unthinkable,  124 ;  view- 
ed as  acting  across  space,  125; 
viewed  as  transmitted  through 
matter,  126;  instantaneously  re- 
newed, 126 ;  viewed  as  identical 
with  divine  will,  127,  260-261; 
implies  substance,  129,  260;  con- 
ceivable relations  of,  to  matter 
tabulated,  130 ;  not  known  to  sci- 
ence, 256 ;  viewed  as  exerted  by 
matter,  256-257;  viewed  as  ex- 
ternal to  matter,  257-259  ;  viewed 
as  initially  applied,  258-259 ;  not 
a  mode  of  motion,  259  ;  viewed  as 
first  principle,  314;  viewed  as  a 
phenomenon  of  the  Unknowable, 
323. 

Forces,  not  all  mutually  convertible, 
261-262;  polar  and  non- polar, 
261 ;  vital,  262 ;  classification  of, 
262 ;  molar,  333. 

Foreknowledge,  divine,  unqualified, 
107. 

Formal  cause,  97, 106. 

Freedom  implied  in  causality,  116, 
328. 

French  philosophy,  81. 

Fu-hi,  48. 

Future  life  and  rewards,  22. 

GALEN,  68,  293. 

Galileo,  80,  109,  137,  151,  158,  181, 
213,  216. 

Gassendi,  79,  137,  234. 

Gastrula  stage,  171. 

Gathas,  52. 

Genealogy,  of  ships,  173  ;  steam-en- 
gines, clocks,  etc.,  173 ;  Gothic 
dome,  conic  sections,  crystalline 
forms,  173. 

Genesis  and  science,  222,  356-363. 

Genetic  relation  of  equine  animals, 
170. 

Gennadius,  73. 


Geology  and  Genesis,  222,  320-322, 
356-363. 

Ghici,  357. 

Glaciers,  370. 

Glanville,  94. 

Gnomic  poets,  287. 

Gnostics,  71,  215. 

God,  a  fact  of  the  ethnic  religions, 
21;  conceptions  of,  37-38;  ac- 
knowledged by  Darius,  53  ;  sought 
in  Greek  philosophy,  56-58,  280- 
288 ;  origin  of  faith  in,  89 ;  view- 
ed as  a  monad,  121 ;  not  attained 
by  natural  science,  131 ;  grounds 
of  faith  in,  150;  revealed  in  or- 
ganic life,  166  ;  knowable  by  nat- 
ural reason,  266  ;  idea  of,  univers- 
al, 274,  282;  idea  of,  complex, 
274 ;  demanded  by  the  universe, 
275 ;  cognoscibility  of,  denied,  276 ; 
attributes  of,  illustrated  in  nature, 
333-351;  unity  of,  347-351; 
name  of,  on  every  heart,  354. 
(See  Religion;  Religious  nature.) 

God  in  the  world,  304. 

Gods  of  Greek  mythology,  131 ;  ob- 
structed science,  232 ;  discarded 
by  science  and  philosophy,  244 ; 
origin  of,  282. 

Goethe,  157, 176. 

Goette,  114. 

Gorgias,  60. 

Gran  Chacos,  189,  353. 

Gravitation,  acting  across  space,  125 ; 
Newton's  view  of,  125  ;  questions 
concerning,  134;  not  an  original 
force,  335. 

Gray,  Asa,  111. 

Greek,  philosophy,  57 ;  psychic  his- 
tory, 55 ;  language,  spread  of,  281 ; 
mythology,  186,  353  ;  traditions  of 
deluges,  366. 

Gregory  of  Nazianzen,  73. 

Gregory  of  Nyssa,  73, 109. 

Grotius,  284. 

Grove,  W.R.,  119,315. 

Gyzicki,  109,  110. 

HABITATS  of  animals,  169-160. 
Haeckel,  E.,  Ill,  113,  135,  137,  171, 

231. 
Haemal  arches,  162. 


INDEX. 


Hamilton,  Sir  William,  94,  137,  196, 
217,239,276,295,301. 

Hand  illustrating  design,  338. 

Hartley,  81. 

Hartmann,  E.  Von,  109, 1 10, 1 1 1, 1 73. 

Harvey,  323. 

Hasty  generalizations,  181. 

Heat,  261-262. 

Heavens  in  Genesis,  358. 

Hebrew  literature  in  Alexandria,  67. 

Hedonism,  61. 

Hegel,  107,  293. 

Hegelian,  theory  of  religion,  270 ; 
paradoxes,  270. 

Hegelianism  before  Hegel,  279. 

Hellenism  blended  with  Christiani- 
ty, 71 ;  one  of  the  ethnic  religions, 
186. 

Helmholtz,  H.  L.  F.,  Ill,  257,  277. 

Helvetius,  82. 

Heraclides  of  Pontus,  62. 

Heraclitus,  56,  121,  279. 

Herbart,  109. 

Herbert,  218. 

Herder,  293. 

Heredity,  a  mode  of  intelligence,  144 ; 
an  instrument,  not  a  cause,  146 ; 
does  not  account  for  homologies, 
157,  165 ;  perpetuates  identity, 
165  ;  transmits,  but  does  not  aug- 
ment, 256. 

Heresies  in  early  Christianity,  72 ; 
crushed  by  decrees,  73 ;  among 
later  Christians,  183. 

Heresism,  83. 

Hermias,  72. 

Herschel,  Sir  John,  118,  315. 

Herschel,  Sir  William,  277,  358. 

Hesiod,  56,  58, 187,  286. 

Hewn-stone  Age,  190. 

Hicetas,  57. 

Hilarius,  73. 

Hildegard,  St.,  357. 

Hindoo  traditions  of  deluge,  366. 

ffipparion,  169,  171. 

Hippias,  60. 

His,  114. 

Hobbes,80,  89, 109,218. 

Holbach,  Von,  82,  218,  312. 

Homer,  55,  58,  87,  286. 

Homeric  Age,  282,  288. 

Homceomeriae,  58. 


Homological  argument,  198  ;  critical- 
ly viewed,  296. 

Homology,  155,  156;  opposed  by 
theologians,  156 ;  harmonious  with 
theology,  156 ;  opposed  by  certain 
anatomists,  157;  writers  on,  158; 
in  vertebrate  structures,  161-165; 
in  cranium,  162;  in  05  coccygis, 
163;  in  limbs,  166-170,  340;  in 
world -life,  174-177;  exemplified 
in  the  world,  260. 

Horse,  serial  types  of,  166-170,  254. 

Hottentots,  ethical  perceptions  of, 
24. 

Huggins,  W.,  277. 

Humboldt,  A.,  375. 

Hume,  82,  94,  218,  275,  276. 

Humphreys  and  Abbot,  181. 

Hunt,  T.  S.,  275. 

Hunter,  323. 

Huxley,  T.  H.,  90,  110,  141,  144,  171, 
235;  258,  270, 322. 

Hwang-ho,  overflows  of,  365-369. 

Hyacinthe,  Father,  183. 

Hybridity,  172. 

Hylozoism,  56, 121,  324. 

Hypatia,  70. 

ICE-WELLS,  370. 

Ideas,  necessary,  297. 

Ideas  of  Plato,  62. 

Ideological  argument,  286 ;  equiva- 
lences of,  299. 

Immanence,  divine,  59  ;  held  by  The- 
ophrastus,  63  ;  by  the  Stoics,  64. 

Immanent  relation  of  God  to  the 
world,  107,  127,  258,  324;  objec- 
tions to,  grounded  in  mental  im- 
potence, 128;  does  not  conflict 
with  doctrine  of  law,  132. 

Immensity  discussed,  315. 

Impotency  of  reason,  300. 

Incarnations,  ethnic  beliefs  in,  22. 9 

Incrusted  condition  of  a  world,  176. 

Index  Librorum  Prohibitorum,  80. 

Indian  psychic  history,  51. 

Indo-European  race,  45. 

Induction,  the  logic  of  science,  134  ; 
uses  d  priori  data,  135  ;  exagger- 
ated estimate  of,  135  ;  progress  of, 
234. 

Inductive  logic,  64. 


394 


INDEX. 


Infinite  series  no  substitute  for 
cause,  99. 

Infinity,  notion  of,  197. 

Inherent  force,  122;  consequences 
of,  123 ;  unthinkable,  124. 

Inheritance  a  mode  of  intelligence, 
144;  law  of,  165.  (See  also  He- 
redity.) 

Innate  origin  of  idea  of  causality,  94. 

Innate  sentiments,  significance  of,  20. 

Inquisition,  80. 

Inspiration,  Jewish  and  Christian,  91. 

Instrument  mistaken  for  cause,  146. 

Instrumentality  employed  in  human 
causation,  265. 

Intellect,  office  of,  33  ;  finds  response 
in  the  world,  346 ;  may  serve  relig- 
ion, 39,  210-211. 

Intellectual  phases,  44 ;  in  Egypt, 
46-48 ;  in  China,  48 ;  in  India,  51 ; 
among  the  Jews,  55  ;  in  Greece,  55, 
278-280 ;  in  Christian  history,  66 ; 
existing,  83. 

Intelligence,  revealed  in  nature,  111, 
112,  150,  332,  355  ;  implied  in  in- 
telligible  correlations,  151,338. 

Intention  implied  in  causality,  116. 

Intentionality,  doctrine  of,  150;  im- 
plied in  causality,  264;  revealed 
in  nature,  117, 150,  337  ;  intuition 
of,  valid,  151,152. 

Interactions  of  the  religious  and  in- 
tellectual faculties,  15,  32,  88, 215- 
220;  laws  of,  42;  beneficent,  36. 

Intuition,  of  causality,  93,  197;  of 
substance,  196;  of  intelligence, 
197,  338 ;  of  ethicality,  198,  355. 

Intuition  of  God,  90,  294 ;  believers 
in,  cited,  91, 196 ;  credulous  believ- 
ers in,  92. 

Intuitional  eye,  309. 

Intuitions,  defined,  191 ;  necessity  of, 

,,192;   authority   of,  21,  193,  304, 

354 ;  analogous  to  instincts,  194. 

Ionic  school,  56,  278. 

Irenaeus,  72. 

Irreligion,  consequences  of,  34. 

Isaiah,  280. 

Islam,  a  bifurcation  of  Christianity, 
46;  the  third  Semitic  religion, 
186;  spread  of,  186. 

Italian  school,  278. 


JACOBI,  91, 196,  270,  295. 

Jamblichus,  70,  91. 

Jameson,  363. 

Jevons,  W.  S.,  96,  135. 

Jewish  religion,  185,  353. 

Jews  in  Egypt,  48, 67. 

John,  St.,  280. 

Jones,  H.  Bence,  322. 

Jupiter  in  its  stormy  stage,  176. 

Justin  Martyr,  289. 

Justinian  closes  Athenian  schools^ 

70,  215. 
Justinus  Flavius,  71. 

KAFFIRS,  229. 

Kant,  94,  109,  110,  115,  192,  218, 
233, 234,  276,  285,  295  ;  on  theist- 
ic  arguments,  260,  296 ;  his  criti- 
cism of  theistic  proofs  examined, 
299-302. 

Kapila,  52. 

Kepler,  79,  158. 

Khedive  of  Egypt,  46, 48. 

Kneph,  352. 

Kronig,  109. 

LACTANTIUS,  72,  108,  157,  178,  202^ 
289. 

Lange,  321. 

Lanoye,  De,  on  Nile  deposits,  181. 

Lao-tse,  49,  187,  353. 

Lamarck,  140. 

Land  first  formed,  360. 

Laplace,  115,  142,  176. 

Lateran  Council,  75,  76. 

Law  the  tyrant  of  men,  60. 

Law,  does  not  imply  capricious  in- 
telligence, 132,  259  ;  not  efficient, 
133,  249;  implies 'intelligent  will, 
133 ;  a  self-imposed  mode  of  ac- 
tivity, 133, 139  ;  not  necessary  ab- 
solutely, 139;  definition  of,  249, 
256  ;  itself  an  effect,  249. 

Laycock,  315,  320,  323. 

Learning,  light  of,  reflected  recipro- 
cally, 48. 

Lectonia,  364,  369. 

Leibnitz,  74,  81,  94,  102,  121,  137, 
142,  218,  266,  279,  293. 

Leibnitzian  argument,  299,  302. 

Leidy  on  fossil  vertebrates,  168,  171. 

Lemuroid  stage,  171. 


INDEX. 


395 


Lessing,  81. 

Leucippus,  59,  221,  234. 

Lewis,  Tayler,  363. 

Liberty,  idea  of,  297-298. 

Life,  origin  of,  224,  235,  236;  in 
monads,  102, 126 ;  in  atoms,  236 ; 
an  insoluble  mystery,  237. 

Light,  distances  passed  over  by,  336  ; 
demonstrating  unity  of  creation, 
349. 

Links,  missing,  recovered,  168-172. 

Liturgical  tendencies.  (See  Ritual- 
ism.) 

Locke,  74,  81, 109, 191. 

Lockyer,  J.  N.,  277. 

Longinus,  70. 

Love  and  hate,  58. 

Lubbock,  Sir  John,  89,  208,  292. 

Lucan,  64. 

Luc,  De,  363. 

Lucretius,  65,  233,  236. 

Lusitanus,  357. 

Luther,  Martin,  74,  76,  77,  217. 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  111,  181. 

MACCABEES,  67. 

Macchiavelli,  80. 

Macedo,  357. 

"  Made,"  in  Gen.  i.,  16,  359. 

Magianism,  38,  91. 

Magnetism,  261-262. 

Magus,  Simon,  71. 

Mahan,Asa,  275,  314,316. 

Maillet,  De,  140. 

Maine  de  Biran,  94. 

Mammals,  variations  among,  254 ; 
reign  of,  361. 

Man,  preparations  for,  344-345;  in 
the  light  of  geology,  368-373 ;  be- 
longs to  the  last  fauna,  368 ;  ad- 
vent of,  recent,  369 ;  birthplace  of, 
370  ;  the  last  term,  372. 

Manetho,  46, 

Mansel,  217,  239,  295. 

Mantras  of  the  Rig  .Veda  Sanhita,  51. 

Marcus  Aurelius,  64. 

Mariette,  Bey,  46. 

Marine  animals,  period  of,  360. 

Mars  in  its  habitable  stage,  176. 

Marsh,  G.  P.,  269. 

Marsh,  0.  0.,  135,  170,  171;  on 
equine  quadrupeds,  168,  170. 


Marsupial  stage,  171. 

Martineau,  James,  270,  316. 

Material  cause,  97. 

Materialism  of  the  Stoics,  64  ;  Epi- 
curus, 65  ;  Tertullian,  72 ;  Hilarius 
and  others,  73;  Gassendi,  79; 
Bruno,  80 ;  Rousseau,  81 ;  Met- 
trie,  de  la,  81;  Condillac,  81; 
D'Holbach,  82 ;  Democritus,  233  ; 
Tyndall,  236-239.  (See  Atomism ; 
Atomists.) 

Materialism,  more  imaginary  than 
real,  226 ;  limited  by  Tyndall,  238 ; 
unconscious,  opposed  by  idea  of 
causality,  105. 

Mathematical  truths,  302. 

Matter  and  force,  table  of  conceiva- 
ble relations  of,  130. 

Matter,  created,  99,  315-319;  dead, 
the  kind  here  considered,  125, 149 ; 
conscious,  necessitates  atheism, 
122 ;  theistically  held  eternal,  102; 
conceived  as  animated,  121,  236, 
257;  not  voluntary,  121,  257; 
viewed  as  adynamic,  122, 126-127, 
324 ;  as  the  seat  of  inherent  force, 
122, 257-258  ;  as  the  vehicle  trans- 
mitting primordial  force,  126  ;  as 
a  phenomenon  of  force,  128;  as 
possessed  of  the  potency  of  life, 
236;  as  first  principle,  314;  as 
constituted  of  atoms,  324 ;  identic- 
al in  different  worlds,  349-350. 

Maudsley,  225. 

Maupertius,  81. 

Maximus,  68. 

Mbenga,  366. 

M'Causland,  Dr.,  222,  223,  363. 

M'Cosh,  James,  109,  158,  243,  289, 
293,  314. 

Mechanical  correlations,  153. 

Mechanism  implies  intelligence,  112. 

Medusa?,  embryonic  stages  of,  253. 

Megaric  school,  61. 

Melanchthon,  77. 

Melissus  of  Samos,  58. 

Melito,  71. 

Mental  latency,  145. 

Mesohippus,  169. 

Mesozoic  age,  361. 

Methodius,  78. 

Mettrie,  De  la,  81. 


396 


INDEX. 


Meunier,  Stanislas,  277. 

Mexican  traditions  of  deluge,  366. 

Michaelis,  114. 

Middle  Academy,  63. 

Migrations  of  man,  371. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  94,  96, 120, 138,  191,  243, 
270,  276,  277,  320. 

Miller  Hugh,  363. 

Miltiades,  71. 

Mimansa,  51. 

Mind  influenced  by  physical  sur- 
roundings, 269. 

Miohippus,  168-169. 

Missing  links  recovered,  167-172; 
effect  of  non-recovery  of,  173. 

Mississippi  delta,  181. 

Mitchel,  O.M.,  158. 

Mivart,  St.  George,  357. 

Modal  correlations,  153. 

Modes  of  motion,  259-262. 

Moffat,  J.  C.,  292. 

Mohammedans,  78. 

Mojaves,  22. 

Molecular  groupings,  238. 

Mollusks,  159;  variations  among, 
254. 

Monads  of  Leibnitz,  102, 121. 

Monism,  105;  favored  by  Tyndall, 
233-238;  said  to  be  spreading, 
239. 

Monotheism,  among  the  Greeks,  58, 
61,  62,  63,  64 ;  of  Apollonius  of 
Tyana,  68 ;  of  Athenagoras,  71 ; 
favorable  to  science,  234,  246  ;  the 
primitive  religion  of  humanity, 
273,  352. 

Monotreme  stage  of  embryo,  171. 

Montaigne,  80. 

Montesquieu,  81, 159. 

Moody,  methods  of,  304. 

Moon,  condition  of,  176. 

Moral  argument,  279. 

Moral  excellence,  ideal  of,  in  Greece, 
287. 

Moral  government,  326. 

Moral  judgments,  24,  25. 

Morality,  standards  of,  24. 

Moreau,  Charles,  357. 

Morphological  conceptions,  176. 

Morris,  G.  S.,  109,  247. 

Morula  stage  of  embryo,  171. 
Moses,  280. 


Motion  an  effect,  not  a  force,  256. 
Motive  implied  in  causality,  107. 
Miiller,  Max,  273,  292. 
Murphy,  3 15,  323. 
Mutius  Scaevola,  90- 
Mystics,  German,  78,  91. 
Mythology,   Greek,   186,  273,   353- 
blended  with  Christianity,  71,  215. 

NATURALISM,  of  Strato,  64 ;  of  Epicu- 
rus, 64. 

Natural  selection  a  mode  of  intelli- 
gence, 144 ;  suggested  by  Emped- 
ocles,  233. 

Navajoes'  expectation  of  a  redeemer, 
289. 

Neander,  71. 

Nebular  cosmogony  foreshadowed, 
59 ;  by  Democritus,  233 ;  by  Lu- 
cretius, 233. 

Nebular  history  of  the  world,  174- 
177,  350. 

Nebular  theory,  attitude  of  Church 
toward,  180;  defenders  of,  277. 

Necessary  being,  300. 

Necessary  ideas,  26,  297;  relative 
and  absolute,  300. 

Necessity  of  some  religion,  184,  352. 

Negative  cause,  97. 

Neo-Platonism,  62,  69,  91. 

Neo-Pythagoreanism,  68,  91. 

Nescience  opposing  teleology,  151. 

Nescience  school,  239. 

Neural  arches,  162. 

Newcomb,  S.,  277. 

Newman,  J.  P.,  289. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  75,  80,  109,  137, 
158,  266. 

Newtonian  argument,  299. 

Nice,  First  Council  of,  72,  73. 

Nichol,  J.  P.,  277. 

Nigridius,  68. 

Nihilism,  of  Gorgias,  60 ;  of  Fichte, 
195. 

Nile  deposits,  181. 

Nitzsch,  91. 

Noachian  deluge,  223. 

Non-essentials  in  the  creed,  220. 

Non-essentials  made  essential,  a 
cause  of  skepticism,  183,  221. 

Noris,  Cardinal,  357. 

Norm  of  faith  and  intellect,  42, 43. 


INDEX. 


397 


Norse  religion,  353. 

Numbers  in  Pythagoreanism,  56. 

Numenius,  68,  73. 

OBJECTIVITY,  implied  in  causation, 
104 ;  phenomena  of,  297. 

Objective  datum  in  creative  causali- 
ty, 104. 

Occam,  William  of,  76. 

Ogyges,  deluge  of,  366. 

Oken,  176. 

Ontological  argument,  279 ;  formu- 
lated, 268;  critically  examined, 
297 ;  equivalences  of,  299. 

Ontological  intuition,  260 ;  neglected 
by  Kant,  260. 

Ophites,  71. 

Opinion,  tyranny  of  unreasoning  faith 
over,  32. 

Opinions  falsely  attributed  to  scien- 
tists, 182. 

Orbits  of  faith  and  intellect,  45. 

Order  a  product  of  mind,  133. 

Organism  the  seat  of  all  transform- 
ing agency,  142,  251 ;  not  modi- 
fied causally  by  environment,  141, 
251. 

Organized  experiences,  148. 

Organs  in  anticipation  of  use,  142. 

Oriental  birthplace  of  man,  370. 

Origen  the  Christian,  70, 72, 178, 289. 

Origen  the  Platonist,  70. 

Origin  of  species,  224 ;  of  life,  224. 

Orohippus,  168-169, 170. 

Orpheus,  283. 

Orphic  Hymns,  56. 

Oscillations.     (See  Cycles.) 

Os  coccygis,  163. 

Owen,  Richard,  111,  157,  158,  170, 
322. 

PACKARD,  A.  S.,  171,253. 

Palaeotherium,  171. 

Palaeozoic  Age,  361. 

Paley,  151, 157,  275,  301,  314. 

Pantheism,  of  Melissus,  58 ;  of  Speu- 
sippus,  62  ;  implied  in  dynamism, 
130;  results  from  monism,  324. 

Parker,  Samuel,  109. 

Parkinson,  363. 

Paris,  Synod  of,  76 ;  University  of, 
76,  80. 


Parmenides  of  Elea,  58, 279. 

Parseeism,  53,  91, 186,  215. 

Passions  prompting  to  tyranny,  36. 

Patangali,  52. 

Patristic  intellectual  phase,  71. 

Paul,  St.,  280. 

Perates,  71. 

Peripatetic  argument,  299. 

Peripatetics,  63. 

Persecutions  for  opinion's  sake,  183, 
213. 

Persian  religion,  52. 

Persistence  of  force,  260. 

Personality  implied  in  causation, 
119;  not  destroyed  by  a  form  of 
pantheism,  130;  not  the  alterna- 
tive of  divine  immanence,  119. 

Peruvian  religion,  185,  353. 

Petrarch,  79. 

Phaedrus,  65. 

Phases,  religious  and  intellectual, 
44 ;  seldom  quite  consecutive,  46  ; 
in  Egypt,  46-48 ;  in  China,  48 ;  in 
India,  51 ;  among  the  Hebrews, 
55  ;  in  Greece,  55. 

Phenomena  the  data  of  science,  134. 

Pherecydes,  56. 

Philolaus,  57. 

Philo  of  Larissa,  66. 

Philo  the  Jew,  68,  91,  363. 

Philoponus,  73. 

Philosophy,  denounced  by  Tertullian, 
72 ;  divorced  from  faith,  74 ;  op- 
posed by  Luther,  76,  217;  logic 
of,  134 ;  inseparable  from  science, 
135,  248;  needs  the  data  of  sci- 
ence, 137  ;  regarded  by  Lactantius 
as  inspired,  202 ;  made  to  serve 
theology,  216;  correcting  science, 
229;  used  by  Tyndall,  236,  241 ; 
province  of,  240;  relation  of,  to 
theology,  240,  241 ;  positive,  248 ; 
religious,  266,  269-271 ;  of  the  un- 
conditioned, 277 ;  founded  on  prim- 
itive beliefs,  803. 

Philosophy,  French,  81. 

Philosophy,  Greek,  56 ;  groping  for 
a  sensible  God,  57 ;  essentially  re- 
ligious, 20 ;  regarded  by  Clement 
as  inspired,  202 ;  seeking  for  ulti- 
mate cause,  213,  280 ;  reached  idea 
of  atoms  and  molecules,  233,  236 ; 


398 


INDEX. 


sketch  of,  278-280;  theological 
results  of,  280-288 ;  shone  upon 
by  the  true  light,  280 ;  propaedeu- 
tic to  Christianity,  281-288 ;  serv- 
ice of,  to  Christianity,  281-288; 
theistic  arguments  of,  formulated, 
284-286;  moral  ideas  developed 
by,  286-287;  ideal  of  moral  excel- 
lence not  attained  by,  287 ;  relig- 
ious sentiments  nurtured  by,  287 ; 
intercessor  suggested  by,  288. 

Phoenician  religion,  353 ;  deluge,  366. 

Phormion,  91. 

Phrygian  traditions  of  deluge,  366. 

Phylogeny,  176. 

Physical  cause.     (See  Cause.) 

Physical  influences  on  mind,  269. 

Physico- theological  argument,  279, 
285. 

Pictet,  Adolf,  293. 

Planets,  unity  exemplified  by,  347- 
348. 

Plans,  conspicuous  in  nature,  154; 
fundamental,  in  animal  structures, 
159. 

Plant-growth,  period  of,  360. 

Planula  stage  of  embryo,  171. 

Plastic  nature,  323. 

Plato,  62,  91,  92,  97,  156,  158,  213, 
233,  276,  279,  280,  283,  285,  286, 
287,  288. 

Platonic  argument,  299. 

Pliohippus,  169. 

Plotinus,  70,  91. 

Plutarch  of  Athens,  70. 

Plutarch  of  Cheronaea,  68, 143, 158. 

Polar  forces,  261-262. 

Polished-stone  Age,  190. 

Polycrates,  91. 

Polytheism,  of  Athenians,  272 ;  ori- 
gin of,  282;  undermined,  283; 
dominated  by  monotheism,  352; 
of  Egyptians,  352. 

Pomponatius,  74,  76, 217. 

Porphyry,  70. 

Positivism  involves  transcendental 
ideas,  275. 

Post-Socratic  schools,  280. 

Pouchet,  F.  A.,  224. 

Powell,  Baden,  322. 

Power  manifested  in  nature,  333. 

Prairie  regions,  364,  369. 


Prayer,  a  fact  of  ethnic  religions,  22  ; 
rationality  of,  325,  383. 

Pre-established  harmony,  121. 

Prehistoric  religion,  20, 190. 

Prescott,  289. 

Pre-Socratic  schools,  278. 

Priesthood  in  ethnic  religions,  22. 

Priestley,  81. 

Primitive  belief  s,  191-196;  influence 
of,  194;  analogous  to  instincts, 
184;  validity  of,  209 ;  involved  in 
every  theistic  argument,  293-303 ; 
authority  of,  303 ;  strength  of,  307. 

Primordial  causality,  99, 100. 

Principle,  first,  of  all  things,  314. 

Printing,  discovery  of,  79. 

Procatarctic  cause,  98. 

Proclus,  70. 

Prodicus,  60. 

Progress  through  antagonism,  34. 

Progressiveness  of  science,  29,  32. 

"  Prometheus  Unbound,"  288. 

Propaedeutic  office  of  Greek  philoso- 
phy, 281-288. 

Protagoras,  60,  213,  286. 

Protohippus,  169. 

Psychic  cycles,  44. 

Psychic  history,  of  Egypt,  46 ;  Chi- 
na, 48 ;  India  and  Persia,  51 ; 
Hebrews,  55;  Greeks,  55;  under 
Christianity,  66. 

Psychic  teleology,  156. 

Ptolemy  Euergetes,  67. 

Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  65,  67. 

Pueblos'  expectation  of  redeemer,  22, 
289. 

Pyrrho  of  Elis,  65,  90,  221,  309. 

Pyrrhonism,  280. 

Pythagoras,  56,  97,  285. 

Pythagorean  school,  56,  91. 

QUADRATUS,  71. 
Quatrefages,  172,  284,  292. 

RACE,  human,  antiquity  of,  222 ;  uni- 
ty of,  223. 

Radiates,  159. 

Rahab,  280. 

Rash  generalizations  a  cause  of  skep- 
ticism, 181. 

Rationalistic  religion,  218. 

Realists  among  the  Schoolmen,  94. 


INDEX. 


399 


Reason  the  sole  criterion  of  truth,  17  9. 

Reconciliation  of  science  and  relig- 
ion, 206. 

Redeemer,  ethnic  beliefs  in,  22,  288- 
289. 

Red  stars,  175. 

Reformation,  how  effected,  43. 

Regressm  in  infinitum,  99. 

Reid,  94. 

Relativity  of  truth,  60. 

Religion,  unchanging,  39 ;  supposi- 
tions as  to  origin  of,  60,  270-271 ; 
some  form  of,  inevitable,  184;  phi- 
losophy of,  269-271 ;  definitions 
of,  271,  327-328;  in  school,  227- 
228;  without  intelligence,  88,  211. 

Religious  beliefs,  universality  of,  19, 
184-187,208,351-356. 

Religious  constants  and  variables, 
37;  constants,  187,  353. 

Religious  conviction,  grounds  of, 
306-312. 

Religious  faiths,  common  facts  of, 
21,187,353. 

Religious  feelings,  great  influence  of, 
26,  308 ;  recognized  by  Tyndall, 
237;  variations  in  intensity  of, 
308 ;  nurtured  by  Greek  philoso- 
phy, 287 ;  by  all  philosophy,  354. 

Religious  nature,  innate,  19;  evi- 
dences, 19 ;  contrasted  with  cog- 
nition, 22,  210;  defined  and  ex- 
plained, 23,  27,  210-211 ;  existing 
in  savages,  188-189, 229,  292,  353 ; 
of  prehistoric  tribes,  190;  univers- 
al, 190;  rights  of ,  vindicated,  227, 
238. 

Religious  phases.     (See  Phases.) 

Religious  predisposition  wanting  in 
some,  310;  influences  felt  by  them, 
310-311. 

Religious  progress  of  mankind,  37. 

Religious  system,  early  crudity  of, 
37 ;  improved  by  conflict,  36,  37. 

Religious  teacher,  responsibility  of, 
310. 

Religious  veneration,  origin  of,  60, 
62,  270. 

Renaissance,  83. 

Reptile  a  stage  in  evolution  of  skele- 
ton, 164. 

Repulsion,  force  of,  261-262. 


Response  of  world  to  intellect,  346. 

Reticence  of  scientists,  248. 

Revelation,  antecedently  probable, 
201,  382 ;  made  to  more  than  one 
race,  201 ;  tinctured  by  human 
medium  of  transmission,  202, 203  ; 
must  embrace  mysteries,  203, 383- 
384 ;  theistic  argument  from,  294 ; 
not  the  origin  of  idea  of  God,  90, 
203,  271,  294. 

Right  and  wrong,  intuition  of,  355..' 
(See  Conscience.) 

Rights  of  religious  nature,  238. 

Rig- Veda,  51. 

Rings  in  world-making,  175. 

Ritter,  293. 

Ritschl,  71. 

Ritualism,  tendency  to,  50,  51, 52. 

Robebacher,  371. 

Robinet,  82. 

Rocks,  strained  by  pressure,  334 ; 
earliest  sedimentary,  359. 

Roman  Church,  services  of,  to  learn- 
ing, 87,  89. 

"  Roots  of  things,"  58. 

Roscellinus,  75. 

Rotation  of  earth  taught  by  Hera- 
elides,  63. 

Rousseau,  J.J.,  81,  218,  312. 

SABBATH,  361,  363. 

Saccas,  Ammonius,  70. 

Sacred  Canon  of  Egypt,  47. 

Sacred  writings  of  the  Egyptians,  47 ; 
Chinese,  48-49. 

Sacrum,  163. 

Saemann,  277. 

Sahara,  desert  of,  364. 

Saisset,  275. 

Sankya,  52. 

Savages  reputed  destitute  of  relig- 
ion, 188. 

Savages,  religious  nature  of,  188-189, 
229-230. 

Semitic  religions,  185-186. 

Sensationalism  opposed,  192. 

Sens,  Synod  of,  76. 

Sentiment  of  the  supernatural,  23. 

Servetus,218. 

Scaevola,  Mutius,  90; 

Scandinavian  religion,  868 :  deluge, 
366. 


400 


INDEX. 


Scapula,  164. 

Scheiner,  174. 

Schellen,  H.,  277. 

Schleiermacher,  91, 196,  270. 

Schmid,  Rudolf,  109, 155. 

Schmidt,  Oscar,  111. 

Schneider,  F.,  129. 

Scholasticism,  74,  83,  216. 

Schoolmen,  Neo  -  platonistic,  91 ;  on 
the  idea  of  causality,  94. 

Science,  origin  of,  26,  232 ;  harmless 
toward  central  faith,  28 ;  hostile 
to  unreasoning  faith,  30;  pro- 
gressiveness  of,  29,  32 ;  new  and 
old  in  conflict,  33,  216;  progress 
of,  conditioned  by  religion,  33 ; 
does  not  lead  to  Deity,  131  ;•  deals 
with  phenomena,  134,  240,  246- 
250 ;  inseparable  from  philosophy, 
135;  progress  of ,  an  indirect  £ause 
of  skepticism,  179;  interacting 
with  religion,  213-220;  recent 
progress  of,  219;  conflict  of,  with 
church  councils,  233;  favored  by 
monotheism,  234 ;  transcended  by 
Tyndall,  236,  241 ;  discriminated 
from  philosophy,  240,  241 ;  of 
Middle  Ages,  deductive,  248 ;  now 
excessively  "positive,"  248;  evi- 
dences of,  irresistible,  311;  implies 
the  creation  of  matter,  319;  har- 
mony of,  with  Genesis,  356-363. 

Scientific  progress  and  religion,  33. 

Scientific  questions  mistakenly  made 
theological,  180,  212. 

Scientists,  reticence  of,  248 ;  de- 
mands of,  248. 

Scotus,  Duns,  75. 

Scripture,  answers  anticipations, 
203  ;  supposed  to  uphold  irration- 
al faiths,  31. 

Scythians,  364 ;  traditions  of  deluge 
among,  366. 

Secondary  causation  unreal,  98. 

Secular  beliefs  embodied  in  creeds, 
30,31,212. 

"  Seeds  of  things,"  58. 

Seidlitz,  111. 

Seine,  gravel-beds  of,  365. 

Semper,  114. 

Seneca,  64,  287. 

Sensationalism  of  Zeno  of  Elea,  58. 


Sensus  numinis,  189,  209,  271. 

Septuagint,  67. 

Sequence  not  implying  causal  rela- 
tion, 95. 

Serry,  357. 

Servitude  of  thought  to  faith,  83. 

Seven  Wise  Men,  286. 

Sextians,  66. 

Sextus  Empiricus,  69. 

Sexual  selection  a  mode  of  intelli- 
gence, 144. 

Shamanism,  38. 

Shark-stage  of  embryo,  171. 

She-king,  49. 

Silliman,  B.,  363. 

Simon  Magus,  71. 

Siredon  lichenoides,  253. 

Skepticism,  causes  of,  179-184;  in 
Greek  philosophy,  60,  63,  65,  69. 

Skeptics,  the  Latin,  69  ;  Hobbes,  80 ; 
Hume,  82. 

Smith,  George,  306,  365. 

Socrates,  61,  91,  151-157, 183,  213- 
214,  233,  266,  279,  280,  283,  284, 
286,  287. 

Socratic  schools,  279. 

Soissons,  Council  of,  75 ;  Synod  of, 
75. 

Somme,  gravel-beds  of,  365. 

Soothsaying,  91. 

Sophists,  60,  65,  279. 

Sorbonne,  77, 217,  227. 

Soul  viewed  as  a  monad,  121. 

Space  and  time  discussed,  316-319. 

Species,  origin  of,  224. 

Spencer,  90,  94,  137,  143,  237,  239, 
258,  293,  314 ;  on  organized  expe- 
riences, 148,  254  ;  on  the  origin  of 
mind,  235,  255  ;  on  connection  of 
intelligence  and  tactual  sense,  254. 

Speusippus,  62. 

Spinoza,  74,  81, 138, 158,  218. 

Splint-bones  in  horses,  170. 

Spontaneous  generation.  (See  Ar- 
ch egenesis  and  Abiogenesis.) 

Sutras,  51. 

Stages  of  embryo,  171 ;  of  cosmical 
life,  174-176. 

Standards  of  morality,  24. 

Stars  in  stages  of  progress,  175,  376  ; 
remoteness  of,  336. 

St.  Hilaire,  Geoffrey,  140. 


INDEX. 


401 


Stoicism,  280. 

Stoics,  63,  64, 108, 284. 

Stonehenge,  190. 

Stormy  period  of  the  world,  359. 

St.  Peter  and  final  fires,  378. 

Strato  of  Lampsacus,  63. 

Strauss,  111. 

Subjectivity  in  causality,  104. 

Subjectivity,  phenomena  of,  297. 

Substance,  law  of,  100 ;  neglected  by 
Kant,  260. 

Substance  of  the  worlds,  identity  of, 
349-350. 

Succession  of  organic  forms.  (See 
Derivation,  Darwinism,  Evolution.) 

Sufficient  reason,  96, 115,  279,  299. 

Sun,  moon,  and  stars  revealed,  360. 

Sun,  remoteness  of,  336 

Sun-worship,  38. 

Supernaturalism  in  national  infancy, 
26,  38. 

Survival  of  the  fittest,  a  mode  of  in- 
telligence, 144 ;  suggested  by  Em- 
pedocles,  233;  possesses  no  effi- 
ciency as  a  law,  249-250. 

Sutra-Pitaka,  54. 

Synesius,  70,  73. 

Synod  of,  Soissons,  75 ;  Sens,  75  ; 
"  Paris,  76  ;  Dordrecht,  80. 

Synthesis  of  thought  and  faith,  84. 

Syrian  schools  of  Neo-Platonism,  70. 

Syrian  traditions  of  deluges,  366. 

Syrophenician  woman,  280. 

TADPOLE  acquiring  lungs,  146-147. 

Taeniodonta,  172. 

Tao-ism  or  Tau-ism,  187,  353. 

Tatian,  71,72. 

Taurellus,  80. 

Tau-teh-king,  49. 

Teleological  argument,  150,  198; 
Kant's  objections  to,  260;  equiv- 
alences of,  279,  299;  formulated, 
285  ;  viewed  critically,  296. 

Teleological  facts  recently  multi- 
plied, 157. 

Teleological  idea,  highest  law  of  uni- 
verse, 320. 

Teleology,  explained,  108;  meaning 
of,  restricted,  156;  psychic,  156; 
unavailable  without  d  priori  data, 
274-275. 


Teleology  among  the  Greeks,  61,  63, 
64 ;  in  Old  Testament,  108 ;  mod- 
ern illustrators  of,  158 ;  said  to  be 
rejected  by  Darwin,  235 ;  familiar 
illustrations  of,  338-342.  (See, 
also,  Final  Cause ;  Design.) 

Telesio,  79. 

Tertullian,  72;  paradoxes  of,  308- 
309. 

Tertullianism,  83. 

Thales,  56, 121. 

Theism,  combines  immanence  and 
transcendence,  325 ;  deductively 
reached,  191-199;  sanctioned  by 
modern  science,  319. 

Theistic  arguments,  in  Greek  philos- 
ophy, 284-286 ;  in  Kant's  philos- 
ophy, 299-302. 

"  Theistic  Conception  of  the  World," 
characteristics  of,  313, 328-329. 

Theistic  conceptions  in  Greek  philos- 
ophy, 282-286. 

Theistic  faith  comforting,  199. 

Theodoras,  62. 

Theologians  in  error,  304-305. 

Theophrastus,  63. 

Theosophy,  Judaistic,  67,  215;  Neo- 
Platonistic,  69 ;  Gnostic,  71,  215. 

Therapeutes,  68. 

Thompson,  Sir  William,  124,  259, 
277,  320. 

Thoth,  47. 

Thought,  conditioned  by  brain,  226 ; 
not  a  product  of  brain,  238,  255 ; 
viewed  as  first  principle,  314; 
modern,  relentless,  267. 

Thrasyllus,  68. 

Three  Gods  of  Numenius,  68 ;  of 
Roscellinus,  75. 

Time  and  space  discussed,  316-319. 

Timon  a  Pyrrhonist,  65. 

TomitJierium  (LimnotJwrium),  172. 

Tonti,  357. 

Totemism,  37. 

Transcendence,  divine,  held  by  Aris- 
totle, 63. 

Transcendental,  ideas,  298;  argu- 
ment, 301. 

Transient  relation  of  God  to  the 
world,  107,  258. 

Trinity,  doctrine  of  Gregory  of  Nys- 
sa  on,  73 ;  of  Lessing,  81. 


402 


INDEX. 


Tripitaka,  53. 

Truth,  an  immediate  revelation  of 
God,  40 ;  sacredness  and  religious 
value  of,  40,  88,  206;  to  be  ac- 
cepted bravely,  206 ;  two  orders 
of,  75,  76,  216. 

Ts'in,  dynasty  of,  49. 

Turanian  religion,  185. 

Tyndall,  90,  257,  258,  259,  277;  on 
the  proper  sphere  of  religious 
faith,  30 ;  on  materialism,  59  ;  on 
atheism,  132 ;  using  deduction, 
136,  236;  on  the  cause  of  evolu- 
tion, 143  ;  materialism  of,  not  ma- 
terialism, 144,  149,  236 ;  on  rela- 
tion of  matter  to  thought,  145; 
synopsis  of  Belfast  address  by, 
231-238;  materialism  of,  ex- 
plained, 237 ;  theory  of,  on  inher- 
ency of  force,  322. 

Types  fundamental,  in  animal  struct- 
ures, 150  ;  persistence  of,  geograph- 
ically, 161 ;  comprehensive,  in  Eo- 
cene, 172. 

Type,  vertebrate,  161-166. 

Tyranny  of  ecclesiastical  power 
prompted  by  passions,  36. 

UNCONDITIONED  existence,  197. 

Unconditioned,  the,  217,  277. 

Unconscious  cerebration,  145,  255. 

Unconscious  mental  states,  145. 

Unity,  of  mankind,  223  ;  of  thought 
and  faith,  83,  229. 

Unity  of  the  world,  347-351 ;  illus- 
trated in  solar  system,  347-348. 

Universe,  influence  of  contemplation 
of,  152,  351-352 ;  demands  a  God, 
275 ;  infinite  mathematically,  275  ; 
eternity  of,  276. 

University  of  Paris,  76,  80. 

Unknowable,  the,  217. 

Unthinkable  beliefs  sometimes  val- 
id, 200. 

VALENTINUS,71. 

Vanini,  79. 

Variable  stars,  175. 

Variations  of  species,  253. 

Varieties  of  animals,  253-254. 

Varro,  69. 

Vastness  of  the  universe,  347-351. 


Vedanta,  51. 

Vendidad,  53. 

Veneration  for  ancestors,  89. 

Venn,  John,  243. 

Veracity  of  consciousness,  183-196. 

Vertebra,  162. 

Vertebrate  archetype,  163. 

Vertebrates,  159. 

Vertebrate  skeleton,  162;  evolved, 
164. 

Vertebrate  type  considered,  161-166 ; 
the  skeleton  in,  162. 

"  Vestiges  of  Creation,"  83. 

Vibrations,  molecular,  261-262. 

Vicarious  expiation  in  ethnic  relig- 
ions, 22. 

Vinaya-pitaka,  54. 

Vinci,  Leonardo  da,  79. 

Virgil  a  Lucretian,  65. 

Vispered,  52. 

Vives,  79. 

Vogt,  Carl,  225,  292. 

Voices  of  the  universe,  356. 

Volney,82,218. 

Voltaire,  81, 109,218. 

Vorstellung,  249. 

Vortices  suggested  by  Democritus, 
233. 

WALLACE,  A.  R.,  173,  315. 

Water  as  first  principle,  56. 

Watson,  Richard,  276. 

Wearing  out  of  land,  374-375. 

Wen-ti,  a  Chinese  monarch,  49,  50. 

Whedon,D.D.,222,328. 

Whewell,  William,  137, 158. 

Whipple,  Lieutenant,  289. 

Whiston,  363. 

White,  A.  D.,  on  warfare  of  science, 
77. 

White  stars,  175. 

Wicked  heart  prompting  to  skepti- 
cism, 28,  33,  35, 179. 

Wiclif ,  74. 

Wigand,  Albert,  109, 155. 

Will,  implied  in  causality,  117;  im- 
plies intelligence  and  sensibility, 
117;  the  ground  of  all  efficiency, 
117;  acting  in  gravitation,  134, 
335 ;  human,  a  picture  of  the  di- 
vine, .262-263 ;  viewed  as  first 


INDEX. 


403 


principle,    314,    324;     manifest 

throughout  the  universe,  347-351. 
William  of  Occam,  76. 
Wolf,  74,  81,  97. 
World,  viewed  as  a  mechanism,  126, 

132, 258 ;  not  self-supporting,  323. 
World-life,  a  process  of  cooling,  74, 

359. 
Worlds,  identity    of  substance  of, 

349-350. 

Worship  in  ethnic  religions,  21. 
Wyman,  Jeffreys,  224. 

XENIADES,60,312. 

Xenocrates,  62. 


Xenophanes,  58,  65,  285. 
Xenophon,  157,  213. 
Xisuthrus,  365. 

YASNA,  52. 

Yellow  stars,  175. 

Yi-king,  148. 

Pom,  meaning  of,  362-363. 

Young,  C.  A.,  277. 

ZELLER,  109, 278. 

Zeno  of  Cittium,  64,  293. 

Zeno  of  Elea,  58,  93,  285. 

Zoroaster,  91. 

Zoroastrianism,  46,  52, 186,  353. 


•JUlSHBAIHfl 

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